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STATE
in the Making

DAVID HOROWITZ

STATE
in the Making

Translated from the Hebrew by
JULIAN MELTZER



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THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK

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P R E F A C E

An observer who looks back at the years 1945–48, the period immediately preceding Israel's emergence into statehood, cannot help feeling how remote and almost forgotten are events that took place, by the measurement of history, so recently. It is, indeed, difficult to realize that only a few years separate us from a time fraught with so much perplexity, anxiety, and expectancy. The history of nations offers few parallels for such rapid change.

The military campaign for Israel's liberation during 1948 and 1949, as well as the subsequent economic efforts, was waged with the world's full cognizance, and many among the Jewish people had a hand in both. But the record of the political struggle from 1945 to 1948 remains still partly undisclosed.

The secrets of diplomatic action—that aspect of history which unfolds in plush-carpeted corridors, behind the doors of inner sanctums, and in elegant drawing-rooms—have been retained in the custody of the few who were active in its prosecution. It is only now, some years after the event, when the epoch has moved into history, that the veil may be lifted and the record more fully revealed.

Although the small group of people then concerned in the collective experience of an evolving drama were sustained by their scattered nation's profound yearning

for redemption and by the innate strength of the cause and of an indomitable if hard-pressed Palestine Jewry, there were times when they felt fearfully alone in contemplating the heavy burden of responsibility. Consequently, while this work represents the subjective observations of its author, and is by no means an objective review of historic occurrences, the parts played by his associates cannot be too strongly emphasized even in these brief introductory remarks.

Among those associates one of the noble souls who has passed away was Zalman Liff, friend, oracle, creative mind, and fighter.

This book was put together from hurried notes made during those urgent days. It is an attempt to weave into a readable narrative the details of passing events, historical background, and purely personal experiences. Impressions, daily happenings, analyses, evaluations, and commentaries are governed by that yardstick. Their equation is in the mood of their time and is not to be envisaged from the longer historical perspective of today. This reservation should be borne in mind by the reader.

I wrote the book originally in rough, unfinished Hebrew draft. It was given its later Hebrew style by my son Dan Horowitz, who took the mass of material and gave it its final form. The work, therefore, is the result of close collaboration with him.

David Horowitz

JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

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
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S T A T E
in the Making



Part One

THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE

HOPE DEFERRED (1)

A group of us sat clustered around a radio in Jerusalem. We were listening intently and with mounting excitement to the intermittent announcements of election figures.

Millions of people had just gone to the polls in a green and foreign island far away overseas. Borough by borough, town after town swelled the tally of votes and magnified the Labour Party's victory in the first general election held in Great Britain for many years. The time was the early summer of 1945.

The score was encouraging. My fellow guests at the hotel, mostly public men and labor leaders, were over-

come with joy. A jubilant atmosphere pervaded the Yishuv, the Jewish population of Palestine. Even those who had little or no sympathy with the Socialist movement celebrated the triumph of the British Labour Party because it had promised to revoke the restrictions imposed under the 1939 White Paper policy, open the gates of the country, and implement the 1922 Mandate wholeheartedly.

Days and weeks passed. The Yishuv awaited the proclamation of the redemption with bated breath. But no proclamation came.

Everyone was seized by the general feeling of tense and eager expectation of blessed relief—to no avail.

Then perturbing rumors began to filter into the country. The British labor leaders were reported to be evading their undertaking. Nevertheless, there was still no inclination to credit rumor.

The Yishuv tried to understand and to find some rational explanation. The Labour Government, it was argued, had only just assumed office, it had numerous pre-occupations, it would undoubtedly fulfill its promise without fail.

But a feeling of suspicion began to grow. People began to grumble and complain, to be puzzled and apprehensive. Then came the great shock. It all set out as a faint and feeble whisper, which quickly assumed substance and spread like wildfire. Within no time at all the incredible truth had come out: the British Government intended to maintain the hated White Paper policy in all the articles of its repression.

The wave of bitterness swept wider. Disappointment, anxiety, despair, and restlessness spread through the Yishuv. A titanic global war had been fought and was over; the intoxication of victory, the feeling of elation that "we're still alive in spite of all that has happened"—these had subsided. The curtain hiding the European Jewish catastrophe had been wrenched off. The millions of people massacred, the death of great communities, and the vast ocean of blood held everyone aghast. The despondency, desperation, and rebelliousness became deep-seated.

The Yishuv stood at the crossroads, angry and muttering, yet restraining itself so long as the tiniest ray of hope and possible salvation flickered on the horizon. It realized the necessity, at a time of bitter struggle, of showing self-control and ignoring a thousand and one acts of humiliation and insult; of fighting a stern campaign for its very right to struggle.

Uneasy doubts and penetrating uncertainties began to eat away at the vitals. A mood of frustration, despair, and revolt permeated the youth, and not the youth alone. Faith in the legal and constitutional methods of political activity was undermined.

The atmosphere in the country was electric and supercharged, as if in anticipation of some unknown dreadful outburst. Terror, mass searches, arrests, hidden forces lurking in the night ready to kill and revolt; murderous weapons abounding on all sides; the murky twilight of an epoch in transition; furtive shadows flitting in the darkened alleyways of Jerusalem and along the highways—all of these bred mystery and menace.

People pointed to the example of Ireland and recalled its history. But comparisons, as is their wont, were equivocal. The conclusions drawn from these comparisons were utterly conflicting. The majority saw in terrorism the symptoms of moral decay. The few regarded violence as an expression of a national will to live and the sole path to redemption. The profound chasm dividing the two camps was unbridged and unbridgeable. No one dared predict the eventual outcome.

And the foul weeds of resentment and belligerence flourished in a soil fertilized by despair and disillusionment.

In October 1945 I was asked to undertake a mission to the United States. Moshe Shertok, then the head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department and now, as Moshe Sharett, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Israel, was in London at the time. He cabled inviting me to spend a few weeks in the British metropolis to help in lobbying and political negotiation.

Before leaving, I had many talks with colleagues at the Jewish Agency on the foremost issues confronting

us. The international scene overshadowed our local problems. Some ascribed the adamant attitude of Whitehall toward continued Jewish immigration into Palestine and its insistence on adhering to the Chamberlain Government's White Paper to the current Russo-British differences and the move to placate the Arabs. The gulf between Jewry and Britain was being widened by the fact that the White Paper was the only surviving article of Neville Chamberlain's policy—Munich, appeasement of Hitler and of Fascism—and it was being persisted in despite the extermination of a third of the Jewish people.

Repudiation of violence continued to be the Yishuv's official line. There was nevertheless a growing tendency to show what at least was demonstrative opposition to the more pronounced aspects of administrative malevolence and denial of obligations—immigration and settlement. Yet it became fairly clear that, technically and psychologically, it would be difficult to limit the gathering opposition to those objectives.

The Yishuv consequently split into "activists" and "moderates." The fissure cut across faction and party lines. The "activists" argued the imperative necessity of awakening the world's conscience and insisted that it was essential to dispense with mere vocal protestations. But the whole moral character of the Zionist movement, which recoiled from methods of political violence, served as an effective curb.

A period of prolonged and unyielding struggle, marked by grim realities, controversy, confusion, and contention, was initiated. It was feared that the influence of the terrorists might be strengthened if Yishuv institutions confined themselves to lodging verbal protests. The prevalent frenzy and the mood of "Let my soul perish with the Philistines" might spread and bring the Yishuv close to a position bristling with rash adventure and danger.

The conflict of opinion grew more acute. The constantly reiterated British statement that "the Jews are right but the Arabs are going to make trouble" was deemed likely to provoke some Jewish groups into making trouble themselves in order to get a hearing for their

case, so that the capacity for causing "trouble" should look as if it were going to be exercised by Arabs and Jews simultaneously.

Just before my departure, one of the commanders of the Haganah (the Jewish self-defense organization) asked me to tell our friends in London of a tentative agreement with the dissidents in the Yishuv which would place them under central discipline and thus prevent complete chaos and terrorist dominance in its more devastating forms. The man asserted that he had succeeded in getting the extremists to accept public authority and that they would henceforth obey his orders. But he admitted that the agreement would be observed only if it led to a physical clash with the Mandatory Power. According to him, it was "an agreement to take action, and not an agreement to prevent it."

During our conversation my informant paced back and forth in his office like a caged animal, tense and keyed up. He was convinced that the pact was the only possible course and tried to imbue me with the same conviction, no doubt wishing me to pass it on to our friends in far-off London.

Those who were pessimistic about the looming development pointed out to me the danger of a conflagration that would consume our whole enterprise and send it up in fire and smoke, leaving only the cinders. On the other hand, there were those who cherished the hope that it would be possible to confine the outbreaks within prescribed bounds, something like a civil-disobedience campaign of limited scope and purpose, a sort of controlled revolution under planned supervision and leadership.

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It was the morning of the 25th of October 1945 when I took the first air trip of my life.

The roar of the motors and the experience of being air-borne dispelled, for the time being, the anxieties plaguing my mind. As the plane climbed higher, green fields, citrus groves, and tiny, toylike, red-roofed houses streamed away below us. Cars crept like small beetles

along the shining roads; the ocean gleamed blue at the horizon. The calm and serenity of it all belied the fact that here was a seething volcano, that a battlefield sprawled over this small land between a titan whose sway encompassed the oceans and vast territories and a pygmy community, remnant of a massacred and persecuted nation, risking its very life at the last barricade of all.

What a puny country, indeed! Only a few moments of flying and the verdant green, the groves, and the houses, evidence of culture and toil, dribbled away into barren, russet plain—the landscape of the Negev scorched by fierce suns; savage wilderness, blistered and sere.

One's initial impression of the flight itself was the strange and weird experience of being held fast in an unnatural, alien element. Over the next couple of years I was destined to travel over one hundred thousand miles in scores of different aircraft across four continents, from one world center to another. Yet the impression of this first journey remained unchanged.

I saw through the window a thin silver strip unexpectedly slashing the empty sepia expanse of desert like a rigidly drawn slender ribbon—the Suez Canal. It was hard to believe this was one of the world's most important highways, and at this moment the world's cynosure.

The plane landed at the large Cairo airport of Al Mazzeh. Heat, dust, Egyptian officials in red tarbooshes, porters in long, off-white cotton gowns, shouting, a great deal of bustle with no apparent results—all the panoply of an Oriental Levantine city. It was not the first time I had been in Cairo. I had already savored the awful stifling heat, the fascinating wealth of Oriental color, the brilliant sunlight, the villas and mansions of pashas and foreigners bathed in foliage and swarming with exotic tropical vegetation, the shocking sight of the densely packed, alley-winding slum quarters, sinks of stark poverty and vice.

It is said there is no other city in the world that so vividly mirrors the extremes of penury and wealth, the peak of splendor and spacious living and the nadir of privation and distress. Charles Issawi, a young Egyptian

sociologist and economist, depicted in his book *Egypt* the backdrop of life in Cairo and Alexandria, a few yards from the fashionable Shepheard's and Continental hotels, in these words:

"First, the terrible overcrowding and promiscuity in which the bulk of the Cairene and Alexandrine populations live make European slums seem almost palatial by comparison. Description cannot convey the full horror to those who have not seen the Egyptian slums cut off from fresh air and light; the inhabitants are, moreover, denied the indispensable substitutes provided by modern civilization. . . .

"Secondly, malnutrition and ill health are prevalent."

It is, in fact, a life of grim and grimy realism, far removed from the Sphinx and the Pyramids, a life which the thousands of American and European tourists to Egypt rarely or only superficially behold.

Cairo, with its incredible destitution, its filth, vice, pauperism, and disease on the one hand, and the fabulous luxuries and wealth on the other, typifies with painful clarity the complexity of the tragic Middle Eastern social problems. The Egyptian fellahin and the urban working-class, underprivileged, illiterate, and impoverished, are so thoroughly submissive and listless as a result of hereditary illness and debility that they lack the slightest will to change their way of life by reform or rebellion. But Cairo was not only an Arab center. It was the residence of embassies and legations of many countries, with ramifications extending throughout the Middle East. International schemes were devised and diplomatic pressures manipulated in Cairo for a sensitive and controversial region of the world. At this hub there were also listening-posts for many countries which focused attention on Palestine.

The day I arrived in Cairo I was invited to dine with a high American official who had once visited my office in Tel Aviv. He wanted to discuss Middle Eastern affairs. I knew him to be a highly placed officer of the American

intelligence service in this corner of the world, and I couched my statements warily.

I explained our attitude, our intense desire for peace and constructive effort and our inflexible resolve not to forgo the fundamentals of our future existence and development: immigration and settlement. I told him of the prevailing mood in the Yishuv following the evasiveness and tergiversation shown toward our interests and of the bitter disappointment rife, and I expressed the conviction that the Mandatory Government was flouting the laws of the land. I hinted at the grave consequences likely to flow from such a policy.

After the conversation I returned to my hotel, where E—, the Jewish Agency representative, showed me a British intelligence report on my trip. This atmosphere of cloak-and-dagger espionage amused me somewhat. My journey was by no means the dark mystery it was made out to be. There was no more in it than met the eye—namely, an economic mission mainly to the United States and a visit to London in order to take part in the information work and aboveboard political activity there. The report gave a detailed account of my life and career and, after some complimentary references to my position as an economic pundit, went on to describe very accurately the objects of my errand. I was surprised also to learn how efficient our own people were in this field. I had not expected to read in Cairo, a day after leaving Palestine, the secret British intelligence report on my mission abroad.

Meanwhile the priority for my flight to London had come through, and I took off by air toward evening. Cairo, as we flew over, offered a unique spectacle. The city was a kaleidoscope of glittering lights, an oasis of blazing splendor in the heart of the desert. It seemed as if the star-studded vault above and the sea of dazzling effulgence beneath were joined into a single bowl of radiance enclosing us completely within its periphery. The nighttime vista of Cairo from above expels all memory of the fetid slums, the filth and shocking reality; and there remain only the fantastic recollections of its *Thousand and One Nights* appearance, the overpowering love-

liness, the indescribable dream-quality which produces a dizzy sense of intoxication.

The luminant island vanished. We soared over the Western Desert. El Adem: a solitary desert outpost, now a Royal Air Force base under military command. German prisoners of war, late of Rommel's Afrika Korps, served our meal in a small hut. It was hard to believe that these industrious, young, blue-eyed men belonged to the Nazi cult of assassins engaged in racial extermination. Their conduct was deferential and obsequious. They were supervised by a youthful-looking British army officer who, it turned out in conversation, was Jewish. An ironic jest of fate.

Night in the desert brought a keen, piercing cold. Our flight ate up the miles; landings and take-offs followed one another rapidly; climates altered sharply. Distances are covered so rapidly in flying that the human metabolism seems hard put to it to adapt itself to the swift mutations. There is no gradual transition as in other modes of transport which more easily habituate the traveler to environmental changes.

Crossing the Mediterranean was an exhausting experience. The plane was a seesaw, there were numerous air pockets, jolts, and jerks; and we spent hours of tiring and depressing travel. The machine landed outside Marseille for refueling. The day before we had been in Cairo, sweltering in the heat; today the skies were overcast, with cold and mist and intermittent rain, and bone-piercing chill—just an ordinary day. The airport was girdled with ruined buildings, relics of wartime bombardments. A small structure that rose intact among the demolitions was the dining-room for crews and civilian high-priority passengers. Over the portal was a proud shingle: "Blitz," the airmen's apposite label for this forlorn caravansery. Pretty French waitresses served refreshments.

A few more hours of flying and a train journey landed me late at night in London—tired, downcast, despondent.

The picture revealed in London itself was by no means inspiring.

Postwar and post-blitz London was gray, dreary, and immeasurably fatigued. The gaps in the long streets, the empty spaces, and the piles of debris were testimony to the ferocity of the aerial bombardments. Many of the wounds had still not been bandaged. London was still sore and aching, showing signs of utter weariness and enervation. Its people were shabbily dressed and dejected. The monotony of the diet and incessant toil had left their marks on people's faces, bodies, and spirit. The brooding aura of melancholy and bleakness was heightened at twilight; and in the evenings, when the dimly lighted streets were almost deserted, everything seemed to close up and withdraw into itself, and the vertebræ of the gigantic frame of this sprawling, teeming metropolis relaxed into inertia. London shrouded in fog, London mutilated by the blitz, London wearied by its exertions, dismal and joyless in its somber aspect, enveloped in the shadows of night. . . .

(2)

OLD SCHOOL TIES

British policies in the Middle East at this juncture were, to all intents and purposes, determined by a school of stanchly die-hard ambassadors and generals who had the closest ties with the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London. It was obviously more convenient to deal with a region that remained fossilized in a timeless mold of political and social petrification, and this school consequently loathed the effervescent spirit, the drive, and the newness of approach which were implicit in the ideological character of Zionism. They regarded the latter as a provoking, disturbing factor.

Moreover, it had always been the strategy of this well-entrenched group to court the Moslem world because of Moslem support for Britain's position in India and because of the supposedly pre-eminent value of the Arab world as a British Imperial junction in a region embracing the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf.

These "men on the spot" were London's mentors in the Middle Eastern labyrinth. Lord Killearn (formerly Sir Miles Lampson), Sir Walter Smart, and Brigadier Ian Clayton were the real molders of the Imperial *politique* in the region and shaped its form.

The policy they framed had even more far-reaching repercussions in the assessment of world-wide diplomatic, military, and political forces at this time. The face of the world was changing. A combination of military, political, and economic pressure groups—the familiar compulsions of power politics—continued to inhibit the world in no smaller intensity than during the interval between the two World Wars. The zone of conflict had been switched, the adversaries were different, but the rules of the game remained the same. The code still held good.

Palestine was being dragged into an international political imbroglio, where lay the arena of the clash between the world's mighty powers, to a far greater extent than in the past. The counsel of military experts, who surveyed the world through the looking-glass, darkly, of a third world war, exercised a decisive influence over our country's destiny.

These political and military oracles summed up the situation in the simplest terms: the Middle East, stretching from Egypt to Iran, Greece, and Turkey, was a single great arc, encompassing the British Commonwealth's most vital arteries—airways, seaways via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, railways, oil wells, and pipelines. It was a vital Imperial crossroads; and also a frontier zone and area of disputed hegemony between two of the three powers straddling the world and its strategic routes—Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The schism between the Anglo-Saxon bloc and Soviet Russia was the axis on which the international power politics of our age revolved. The principal points of stress and strain between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R. were Germany and the Middle East, just as the Pacific was the frontier demarcation between the United States and the Soviets.

This school of British diplomatic and military thinking found its expression in Cairo in the branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, better known as Chatham House, the name of its headquarters building. The Institute carried on its activities through the publication of surveys and reports wielding considerable influence over the formulation of British policies. Chatham House had at this time, or a short while after, put out three memoranda on the Imperial interest in the Middle East which remained confidential until they reached the press and public at first by partial publication and subsequently by publication in full.

I had the opportunity in London of reading these reports, before they were made generally known. The trend of thinking in them went something like this:

The British Empire had a vital interest in the Middle East. The safeguarding of the military and political facets of this interest was possible only by one of three methods:

1. The occupation and maintenance of the Middle East by direct British administration. This course was not feasible, in the view of the authors of the memorandum, because democratic public opinion in Britain would not acquiesce in holding a large army of occupation in the Middle East and denying self-government to so vast an area;

2. An alliance with the racial minority groups scattered over a multinational area of manifold social characteristics, such as the Kurds in Iraq, the Christians in the Lebanon, the Jews in Palestine, and so forth—minorities that were likely to be loyal devotees of the British interest. The authors of the memorandum rejected this policy because, they held, the most significant and strongest nodal factor in the Middle East was the Arab peoples;

3. A policy based on the ideal of a treaty with the Arab peoples: "that the core of the Middle Eastern area is Arabic-speaking and that there is a great and growing desire for unity on the part of its peoples."

The conclusions and clearly defined political program were evident: to unify the Arab Middle East in a regional

security pact and to associate the "independent" Arab peoples in a military and political alliance with Great Britain. This, it was assumed, would be the surest guarantee for preservation of the British interest in the Middle East.

The importance of Palestine was enhanced within the frame of this dogma. A firmer hold over the country was presumably dictated by the necessity to evacuate Egypt as an Imperial strategic base, the need to defend the Suez Canal as well as oilfields and pipelines, and the growing significance of Haifa as one of the British naval bases in the Mediterranean.

In London I was invited to a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive to report on the position in Palestine. The review I gave was far from encouraging. Internecine differences, confusion, lack of resources, and the absence of a clearly defined course were characteristic of our situation. I believed my survey to be a true reflection of conditions, yet it aroused considerable astonishment. I then learned that Major Wellesley Aron, formerly of the Jewish Brigade Group, had reported to the Executive several days earlier on the position in Palestine but that he had given a rosy and optimistic picture, which ran like this: "The Yishuv is united and knows what it wants. It has devised new methods of physical warfare which will compel the British authorities to adopt a new policy. These methods will be most effective yet far removed from terrorism at one and the same time. The Yishuv's spirit is sound and it possesses adequate military ability."

I was asked to explain the deviation between the two reports and pointed out that the root of the difference lay in the respective coigns from which we surveyed the scene. Major Aron, I said, was like the man invited to a banquet who found a handsomely appointed chamber with a splendid repast laid out on an elegant refectory table. But I had peeped into the kitchen where the picture was utterly different: confusion, muddled thinking, clashing viewpoints, and lack of the principal items for the promised menu.

The position went from bad to worse in those months.

The first reports came through of attacks in all parts of the country, against the railroad system and at the Lydda rail-junction, in Haifa Harbor, and elsewhere. It was a very wide front and the British deduced, from the reports and spot information, that Haganah had participated in the large-scale operation and co-operated with the dissident groups.

Dr. Weizmann and Moshe Shertok were summoned to an interview with Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary. They found him in wrathful and indignant mood. He upbraided them harshly and revealed that information in his possession showed this to have been a joint operation between Haganah and terrorist groups. In his view, the action taken was a declaration of war against Britain and he would employ the utmost measures to counter it.

Shertok remarked that these were the inevitable results of a most unfortunate situation. Bevin vigorously repudiated that assessment. The interview ended, of course, fruitlessly.

At that time I found some people in England, including outstanding personalities, maintaining that the chief fulcrum in the Labour Government's policy was fear of the Arabs, and that if we wished to avoid being victimized by this psychosis of fear, it was up to us to show we constituted a no lesser danger.

David Ben-Gurion arrived in London. The others had awaited his coming eagerly and impatiently, and several meetings of the Jewish Agency Executive were held. He had been on a tour of liberated Europe and was filled with a militant spirit. He spoke of the activities of the resistance movement and unauthorized immigration, which were defying the Mandatory Power. He reiterated that the decision would be shaped in Eretz Israel itself as the outcome of a stern and difficult struggle, without which no solution was possible.

It was striking to perceive the difference between his fiery and ardent manner and the frigid, hesitant, sober, and even somewhat despairing attitude of our associates in London.

Ernest Bevin's pronouncement on his Palestine policy had been eagerly awaited. It came at the close of a streaming, rainy day.

As I entered Dr. Weizmann's room at No. 77 Great Russell Street, Moshe Shertok—who was there with David Ben-Gurion—silently held out a copy of the statement. It seemed hardly necessary for me to read the document to guess at its unfavorable contents. One look at their gloomy faces sufficed.

As for its political significance, the statement provided that immigration would continue at the White Paper rate of 1,500 persons monthly and deferred a solution of the problem by announcing the appointment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

Echoes reached us from Eretz Israel of the bitterness, rancor, and disappointment aroused there. The Yishuv waited tensely for a signal from the leading institutions on the next step to be taken.

An Executive meeting was held the next morning. Ben-Gurion analyzed the Bevin statement and its impact on the political situation. He summed up the prospects in a blunt alternative: "Who is to be the majority and who the minority in Palestine? We face the danger of remaining a perpetual minority in the land, and there can be only one possible reply—resistance."

The meeting rose without reaching any conclusions—the question of reaction was left pending.

Fresh disturbances broke out. I was deeply worried and went to a post-office to cable my home in Tel Aviv. The clerk was startled when he saw the address.

"Haven't you read the papers this morning?" he asked. "They say that Tel Aviv is ablaze and a revolution has begun there. We cannot send this."

I insisted, however, until he accepted the cablegram.

"But it's at your own responsibility," he added, eyeing me as if I had taken leave of my senses.

Revolution, blood, fire, chaos—that was the way the average British citizen envisaged the situation in Palestine at the time.

Around that time I had a long and far-ranging talk with Viscount Samuel. The eminent statesman, then in his middle seventies, had a shrewd and brilliant mind, and a personality that exuded vitality and mental vigor. His clear, wise eyes looked out over a somewhat high-bridged nose. There were only the two of us in his study, each in an armchair.

"There are two causes for the Zionist debacle and the present position in Palestine—the White Paper on the one hand, and Zionist extremism on the other," he said.

"The latter attitude was expressed in the so-called 'Biltmore' program. Terrorism must be repudiated as utterly abhorrent. It would be a calamity, and the Jewish cause would be gravely jeopardized if terrorist methods were to prevail."

I did not try to justify, but to explain. I described the background of the commotion—the widespread bitterness because the survivors of Hitler's holocaust had not been permitted to enter Palestine and were virtually still imprisoned behind the barbed wire of concentration camps. I depicted the anguish of those people in Palestine who were being denied reunion with their own close kin among the remnants of massacred communities; the feeling that the Mandatory Government was sinning and transgressing the law, which provoked a state of anarchy; and the profound sense of resentment and frustration which these conditions engendered.

Lord Samuel heard me out intently. He asked my permission to take notes; he wished to refer to them in a forthcoming debate in the House of Lords.

He wound up our conversation by expressing the hope and confidence that the appointment of the new inquiry committee would turn the scales. Recalling the Royal Commission's report of 1937, the statesman said: "It is impossible for anyone not to wish the Jewish national home every success."

One evening I was at the home of a friend in North London. The company around the table included my

host and his wife; a young Malay leader, member of the nationalist movement in his country; and a beautiful young Indian psychology student, with a wonderfully expressive and delicate face and black, piercing eyes. She wore the traditional Indian sari, spoke flawless, polished English, and belonged to a wealthy, aristocratic family. Naturally, her views were strongly Indian nationalist.

The Malay, somewhat of a doctrinaire, contended there was no real Jewish-Arab divergence: it was merely a transient side-issue. He foresaw the time when both peoples would join together in combating British imperialism.

It was difficult to budge him from his obstinate and naïve viewpoint. I tried to explain my conception of the countervailing differences between long-term historical tendencies and current political conditions, and the decisive importance of the time factor.

It was my first encounter with this type of young Asiatic intellectual. I met with little understanding of our undertaking and sympathy for it among these people and other Asiatic pedagogues. Most of them were obsessed by preconceived ideas and hackneyed formulas on the difference between East and West, and they saw the Zionist movement as a Western tide of invasion of the East, relying for support on imperialism and comprising aggressive designs. It was by no means easy to dispel these misconceptions from their minds.

I was to come across the same attitudes later among fellow passengers on an Atlantic voyage to America and at the United Nations sessions at Lake Success. I heard of it from colleagues who took part in the Pan-Asiatic Congress at New Delhi and who talked with Indian national leaders. Our isolation in this sector on the continent of Asia, with its antique civilizations and many renascent peoples, cannot but arouse anxiety. It is the site of our ancient homeland and of our future national structure. Shall we be able to build a bridge uniting us with those populations, and carve a highway to reach their heart?

The young girl, daughter of a Scottish father and a cultured Indian mother, was better equipped by her finer

traits to comprehend the problem. She resembled a cameo miniature in her Indian national garb and with a cigarette drooping from the corner of her mouth. The bluish smoke coiled about her classical head as she listened and tried hard to understand and absorb the political significance of what I was saying. Perhaps it was her own hybrid personality, active beneath her subconscious self, that caused her to veer in the direction of universalism.

When we parted later that evening, I felt I had for the first time experienced the impact of a new climate of human thought and what had, until then, been unknown territory for me.

(4) FRIENDS AND FOES

Jarranged over the telephone to meet Sir Douglas Harris, one of the veteran senior officials who had served in the Palestine Administration. He had been responsible for steering the Royal Commission's work in 1936-7, and had been one of the few men of stature and intellectual caliber among British officialdom in the country.

Although nominally the officer responsible for the Department of Reconstruction in the last period of his Government service, Sir Douglas actually discharged functions of far wider importance. High commissioners and Government chief secretaries came and went in regular succession, and even British policy—or its expedient equivalent—changed tone more often than not; but Harris remained at his post, his influence unimpaired, regarded by some as the uncrowned ruler of Mandated Palestine.

My own friendly relations with him dated from association on a wartime wage-fixing commission. Unlike the majority of my colleagues, I was disinclined to accept the evaluation of him as a sworn enemy of our movement; and while I hardly believed him to be friendly, I found him a man of independent thought, willing to learn and even to admit his mistakes.

Sir Douglas received me with courtesy and cordiality. In our subsequent conversation he observed with fetching candor that, in his view, the Royal Commission headed by the late Earl Peel had come closer than any other commission to an acceptable and reasonable solution on Palestine. He asserted, however, that he did not believe in the feasibility of a full solution of the Jewish or refugee problems within Palestine's boundaries.

I knew Sir Douglas to be the principal expert on Palestine at the Colonial Office, but there was a tendency at the time to throw a veil of secrecy over his work. When I asked him if any particular significance attached to the map of Palestine hanging on the wall of his office and the file of press clippings on his desk, he replied: "Yes, I take some interest in the questions of Palestine and Cyprus."

Generally speaking, the political atmosphere in London was forbidding and colored by suspicion of our cause. It was evident to all that if the civil disturbances in Palestine became widespread, they would be blamed for the further delay in demobilizing British troops. This would heap more fuel on the bonfire of anti-Semitism now flickering on every side.

INTERLUDE AT SEA (5)

Hone dank and drizzly Tuesday afternoon, the 11th of December 1945, I went aboard the small British cargo steamer *Tor Head* at her Merseyside berth in Liverpool. She was gray and she was dingy and she was very, very old. I learned then and there that I had been misled in London. I had been told she was a 9,000-tonner, but she actually displaced only 4,000 tons. Her passenger list comprised ten persons, and our voyage took much longer than the scheduled eight days.

The cabins were of the simplest. There was also a small passenger lounge and an austere dining-room, in which the ship's officers ate with us. There was no doc-

tor on board, and the use of the wireless for private messages was forbidden.

To cap it all, the weather wore its most unpleasant aspect. Rain fell persistently day after day, the sea was leaden and surly, and the atmosphere on the small vessel matched the mood of sky and ocean. The ten passengers had never met before, though enforced companionship and isolation, of course, were later to break down the barriers.

My fellow travellers consisted of an elderly, silver-haired Englishman, about seventy years old, tall and spare of build, wearing a bowler hat of the sort worn in England, who seemed to be a businessman or banker and who was obviously conscious of his dignity and standing; two English G.I. fiancées going out to the States to marry their American suitors, who had been stationed in England during the war; an elegantly attired young man with a perpetual smile on his lips, who was accompanied by his beautiful young wife and was apparently of some worldly substance; a middle-aged man with his wife and small son; an Indian manufacturer; an Indian girl, with delicate, sensitive face and lively, sparkling eyes; and myself—ten men and women sailing the ocean in a tiny cockleshell.

I shared a cabin with the old Englishman, who confided to me he was a London banker going to visit his son and daughter in America. None of us particularly desired to spend any time in the minute cabins and we whiled away most of our time in the tiny passenger lounge.

One morning I was turning over the pages of a book in a corner of the lounge. The Indian girl, wearing her distinctive sari, slumped in an armchair a couple of paces away, and the elderly English gentleman sat beside her. They were talking of India, England, Cambridge, where the young lady had obtained her degree, and the banker's family. But behind the apparently innocuous social chatter there seemed to be a hidden, indefinable purposefulness hard to pin down.

The girl was directing her companion's conversation, drawing him out by personal questions almost outside

the bounds of ordinary polite intercourse. She was especially trying to find out if he had any connection with Austria.

He was at first surprised and inclined to be resentful. He also spoke of his son, a captain in a British tank squadron, who had had a miraculous escape during battle, had been in a German prisoner-of-war camp, and had returned home after the war. After talking about his son, and learning that the pretty Indian girl came from Ahmedabad, he asked her diffidently, of a sudden: "Do you happen to know Mr. G. of Ahmedabad?"

She was astonished, then answered excitedly: "Why, he's my brother!"

The elderly Briton and the Indian girl eyed each other for a moment in silent amazement at this million-to-one encounter. Path-crossings of this kind, how strange they are! People meet casually, accidentally, by the operation of sheer chance, in circumstances far removed from their normal habitual ones, as if drawn toward each other by invisible gossamer threads. They exclaim in surprise and remark what a small world it is, after all!

It appears that the banker's son had been at Cambridge together with the son of a wealthy Ahmedabad manufacturer and ardent supporter of the Indian nationalist movement. The young men had become friendly, and the Indian often spent week-ends and term vacations with his English friend, and even stayed at the home of the latter's parents. On returning to India, he told his sister about the friendship and his friend's family and asked her to look them up. She had not found the time to do so.

Now, on shipboard, listening to her fellow passenger speaking of his family, it seemed to her it must be the same one of which her brother had spoken. There was one link missing—the fact that the elder man had originally come to England twenty years earlier from Vienna and was of Austrian origin.

It was now quite clear to me. The typical Englishman, the courteous banker, with his starched front of nineteenth-century mannerisms, was in reality one of my own covenant, a Jew who had emigrated to England

from Vienna two decades earlier. The incident served to illustrate further the highly developed talent for assimilation and environmental reintegration which Jews possessed.

The twenty-two-year-old Indian girl was the outstanding figure in that small company. She held a Cambridge University degree, was alert, intelligent, and of wide culture. She was an able conversationalist on a variety of topics and took an active part in the talk among the passengers.

Once, sitting alone in my corner, I caught the muted echo of the conversation going on at the other side of the lounge between the Indian girl and the pretty wife of the young Briton. They were discussing Palestine and Zionism, a common enough subject at the time.

The Asiatic was the more assertive and used all the arguments with which I was familiar from my meetings with her fellow Orientals: Zionism was the spearhead of Western imperialism; it was alien to the experience and national make-up of Asia; Palestine was an Arab country, and so forth. Her statements were the usual product of oversimplification and dogmatism. The other woman tried to defend Zionism, but her knowledge was meager and her reasoning somewhat feeble.

Then I heard the remark: "There's a man here from Palestine. He probably knows more about it than we do."

The Indian girl agreed to hear another opinion on a matter bristling with so many complexities. Invited to join their conversation, I was thus given an opportunity of engaging the Indian in verbal contest. I had always stressed the importance of talks with Asiatic intellectuals. Our position was delicate enough: we were in conflict with the British power and practically ostracized and isolated in the East; it would be fatal to wage simultaneous warfare against Western and Eastern forces. We were going to live in Asia anyhow and its peoples would be our neighbors.

I asked the Indian girl how she explained the clash between England and Palestine Jewry if Zionism, as she claimed, was no more than a beachhead of British Imperialism, and what in her view was the purpose of the

Arab League, which was indisputably a British creation. I explained India's official attitude as the product of a transient piece of expediency in order not to provoke its Moslem minority.

I tried to detach the question itself from subsidiary issues and to clarify the acute difference between our position and the Arab position, our aspiration to enter fully and integrally into Eastern life, the operation of social factors in our respective spheres, and our rights, needs, and achievements.

She listened raptly, differing with me here and there and putting various questions with pertinacious zeal, but her obduracy weakened until finally she fell back on the insecure support of purely formalistic considerations.

A circle had formed around us. The other eight passengers showed great interest in the discussion. The London-Viennese banker seemed especially gratified with my arguments, and his eyes lighted up. The young manufacturer and his wife told me later that they were Jewish and described their delight at my exposition.

The Jewish voyagers enjoyed my presentation of the situation even though they themselves were removed from Jewish matters. A kind of solidarity and feeling of unity sprouted within them and they began to acknowledge their Jewishness, no longer afraid of betraying it.

When I went aboard the vessel at Liverpool, I was aware only of the presence of seven Britons, two Indians, and one Jew—myself—among the passengers. On landing at St. John, in New Brunswick, after a fifteen-day voyage, there were four Jews, two Indians, two Poles, and only two English girls, on their way to wed Americans.

The days passed as the vessel lumbered slowly on her way. We counted the hours and the number of knots in vain. The gales became fiercer and there were days when the ship made no headway; one day, indeed, it was even blown off its course. The officers told me they had not experienced such a storm for years in the Atlantic, and the passengers, with the exception of the Indian girl, the elderly banker, and myself, were seriously ill.

The small lounge contained ten bored travelers, cut off from the world and longing for journey's end. Their mood varied constantly, running the gamut from hilarity to melancholy and back again. The longer a journey, the more its participants feel the burden of loneliness and despondency, weighed down by a load of sadness, gripped by the sense of isolation and devoid of all hope. They try vainly to kill time, which ceases to be a measurement of existence and seems to stand still.

It was Christmas Day 1945 when I first stepped on the North American continent in the small New Brunswick port of St. John. A sparkling carpet of snow lay on the ground, and a bitingly frost-laden wind penetrated to the bones. The fine natural harbor, ringed with hills and forests, evoked long-forgotten scenes of my distant childhood. The protracted voyage had all but numbed my strength, but the tide of new impressions threw me into a reverie of nostalgic memories.

St. John was swimming in thousands of lights decorating the small Christmas firs adorning window-sills and balconies, and the huge firs in the streets were ablaze with illumination. The half-sleepy fishing town seemed to be sunk in its dreams, summoning up recollections of Poland and the panorama of my youth.

Finally, New York—Manhattan. I stood beneath the towering skyscrapers; on glittering Broadway, casting the eye-smarting luster of its millions of lights on the city; a feverish activity swirled about me, an incredible pace of life. The crowding impressions, tripping on the heels of one another, made it all seem like an Oriental fantasy, a strange figment of the imagination in a strange world, with a drab mass of humanity flitting shadowlike through the streets of a metropolis unique for the multiplicity of its nationalities, types, and tongues.

A few days later I toured the length and breadth of the city. Fifth Avenue with its luxuries and treasures, Broadway with its restless, never dimmed lights, swept by a coruscating torrent of silver and gold flooding unendingly through the nights. The complexions of Negro Harlem and slant-eyed Chinatown, the back streets of poverty and crime. The short stretch of Wall Street,

modern temple of the world's newest Mammon, with its beginning in a graveyard and its finish at the riverside. I gazed at them from ground level and from the dizzy top of the Empire State Building, and still failed to plumb the spirit and meaning of the vast city. The solitary fact that stood out as comprehensible in the motley and medley of New York was the pulse of life itself, so urgently different from that in any other ant-hill on the threshold of the new era, immersed by a deluge of gnawing perplexities at this juncture of world destiny.

The intoxication of deliverance from the hazards of a vast war, a blessed sense of release from nameless perils, had brought to America an epoch without parallel in its history.

On the first evening of my arrival, however, all problems were blotted from my sight by the blaze of neon lights and the massed bulk of the skyscrapers.

My fifteen-day isolation from the world, deprived of information from mail or newspapers, had stripped me of all extraneous concerns. That first evening I strolled over to the Waldorf-Astoria, where Eliezer Kaplan, Treasurer of the Jewish Agency and later Israel Minister of Finance, was staying.

As always, our reunion was cordial, the product of a warm friendship and close association we had enjoyed many years. We had a long talk. I was surprised to learn that shortly before I landed, Moshe Shertok had cabled urging my immediate return home to prepare our case for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which had in the meantime been named. I could not help reflecting whether my two weeks' turbulent voyage across the ocean had not in fact been unnecessary. It was a profound disappointment, but I decided to take Eliezer's advice to remain in New York at least ten days before leaving for Eretz Israel. The plans originally made for me to take over the co-ordination of Jewish Agency economic activities in the United States had now to be shelved, and I turned my mind to more cogent political matters.

I participated in a conference with Dr. Weizmann on the political situation. The Partition proposal had been

revived as a possible way out of the political impasse, and it was again a foremost topic of discussion.

Already, while in London, I had laid a plan before the Zionist president urging a return to the Partition plan, backed by appropriate political action to demonstrate that it was the only feasible solution. I argued that the drawbacks supposedly detrimental to economic potentialities and immigrant absorption were, in reality, fewer than was imagined. If the mode of territorial division was favorable to our side, the area wrested from the Jewish state would, in fact, involve no palpable disadvantage to settlement, I argued, whereas the use of the remaining territory would benefit from freedom of action. On the other hand, the achievement of a Jewish majority in an undivided Palestine would be a prolonged and difficult process, and was virtually incapable of attainment under the conditions imposed by the British Mandate.

Dr. Weizmann favored Partition. But acceptance of the principle as the prelude to a concrete plan was not discussed at this meeting. All that we decided was to give the proposal further consideration and study in the event of its being put up to us.

(6) ON THE SHORES OF COLUMBIA

Che first reports about the Anglo-American Committee began to filter through, heralding another stage in our political struggle.

The circumstances in which the new inquiry was scheduled to begin were, for Palestine Jewry, grievous and tragic. Although a year had elapsed since the Nazi defeat, hundreds of thousands of Jewish D.P.'s and homeless people were still behind barbed wire in Germany. Barbed wire, indeed, had become an emblem of the postwar world, symbol of its sinister passions and

of the continuing incarceration of Jewish survivors. Hatred and hostility rose in every land in noxious clouds.

The persecution and massacre of great Jewish communities were tangible pointers to the world's frightening moral decline. The world's conscience was sunk in a profound torpor. Once stirred by the Dreyfus case and the Mendel Beilis blood-ritual trial, that conscience was no longer responsive to reports even of wholesale bloodshed and atrocities, fiendish torments and mass slaughter. The same atmosphere of indifference permeated the universal attitude and policy toward the Palestine issue.

The penultimate chapter in Palestine's troubled history had witnessed a political "freeze." The 1939 White Paper was projected to terminate the Jewish National Home idea by arresting all further development and expansion.

Jewish policies had never before faced a more fateful dilemma. For the first time perhaps in the history of the Jewish people since the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, the virile elements of an independent policy coalesced within the Yishuv. That body of people, the Jewish population of Eretz Israel, had many attributes of incipient statehood. They ranged from a sturdy social-democratic organization at one end of the scale to economic strength and a certain degree of paramilitary power at the other. These were now to be weighed in a titanic struggle in a vital theater of the swiftly forming world war front as the year 1939 drew on.

The trend of this independent policy had been clearly decided by the compulsion of the most terrifying conditions that had ever faced the Jewish people: the grim necessity to oppose the most vengeful enemy who had ever risen to threaten them with extermination and extinction. The interest of the Jewish people at this juncture of history was identical with mankind's own vital interest. Even the act of betrayal explicit in the White Paper, directed as it was at crushing the Jewish will and stamping out the nucleus of Jewish statehood—the first tender shoots of political renascence—could not prevent the Jews from placing their complete energy and re-

sources at the service of those who were fighting Nazidom.

Those whom the White Paper had been contrived to placate were by no means complaisant: Iraq revolted and Egypt embarked on a career of treachery, obstructing the Allied war effort as far as they could and, at the highest estimate, doing no more than to observe a hostile neutrality. The sons and daughters of the Jewish national home, oppressed and under restraint, mustered by the thousands for the war effort in alliance with those who had slammed the country's gates in the face of their distressed brethren and who had enacted legislation proscribing land purchases on their behalf.

The tragic cross-purposes of the Jewish policy became pronounced in the war years, when faint echoes came of the hideous genocide in Nazi Europe and ship-loads of survivors battered vainly at the country's locked gates. The painful episodes of the refugee vessels *Patria* and *Struma* ate acidlike into the Yishuv's soul. Yet the Jews of Palestine neither faltered from their pro-Allied stand nor abated their loyalty to the obligations assumed, fulfilling their duty unswervingly despite their bitter feelings. Tens of thousands of volunteers enlisted in the British armed forces and many fell in action, some as commandos behind the enemy lines and others in daring operations on land, at sea, and in the air. Hope still flickered here and there that British policy toward Zionism would show a change for the better.

Some ground seems to have existed for such sanguine expectations. Political contacts with the British coalition Government, while extracting no firm political assurances, none the less fostered the assumption that sufficient political good will was being generated to bring about an eventual reconsideration of the Palestine question as part of the postwar agenda. That was the view taken by Britain's wartime Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.

As for the British Labour Party, not only did it vigorously oppose the 1939 White Paper, while its conferences and spokesmen proclaimed day and night their unalterable attachment to the Balfour Declaration and

a consonant Mandate policy, but it went farther and announced at its 1945 Blackpool Conference a Zionist program that was more ambitious than the official Zionist blueprint.

Therein lay the reason for the greatest disappointment and disillusionment suffered in the history of Zionism and the Palestine policies. For no sooner had the Labour Government assumed office than it went back on the word and spirit of the promises, old and new.

But the groups that perceived the character of the Palestine problem in its whole compass remained steadfast even in England. A faction arose within the Labour Party which adhered loyally to the party's political tradition in regard to Palestine policy and which sought a constructive solution of the problem involving the Jewish people. Nevertheless, the friends of Zionism did not sally out openly in opposition to the Government over its anti-Zionist policy, for domestic considerations.

While the discussion was proceeding within the British Government in 1945, President Truman sent his historic memorandum requesting the admission of one hundred thousand Jewish refugees into Palestine. There were thus counterposed a majority of the British Cabinet supporting the continuation in some modified form of the White Paper policy and the intervention by the President of the largest power in the world, backed by an important minority of British ministers.

Ernest Bevin sought a way out of the deadlock by suggesting the appointment of an Anglo-American inquiry body. He hoped thereby to achieve two principal aims:

1. to defer the necessity of a solution for several months;
2. to obtain American endorsement of a compromise solution, and thus to win American support for British policy in the Middle East.

It is now evident that the British Foreign Minister gave undue credence to false reports from occupied Europe that Jewish D.P.'s were disinclined to go to Palestine and that Zionist claims in this respect were exaggerated. He

probably also relied on testimony, provided by British ambassadors in the Middle East and by anti-Zionist British officialdom in Palestine, of the influence of the interests of the Arab peoples and states.

The suggestion was received in Britain with relief. Bevin showed sufficient acumen to clothe the proposal in his statement in a speciously objective humanitarian garb. British opinion deemed the suggestion to be a convenient escape from the maze of contradictions. The committee's terms of reference differentiated between the Jews of Europe and the Palestine case, and from the outset vested the inquiry with a purely humanitarian and philanthropic character. The Jewish and Palestine questions were made distinctly separate, and the implication was that Palestine was incapable of offering a solution to the European Jewish problem.

The selection of the twelve British and American members of the committee was governed by a single criterion: their complete ignorance of the Palestine problem. None had ever previously visited the country, and they were all new to its complex issues.

These, then, were the men who for the first time in their lives were confronted by the baffling Palestine enigma: a British and an American judge; a professor at Princeton University; a British Conservative M.P.; a high official in the U.S. State Department who had performed a similar mission in India; a Labour peer who was interested in co-operation; a veteran Boston newspaperman; a senior official in the British Ministry of Labour who was a close friend of Ernest Bevin; a former High Commissioner for Refugees, American writer and historian; a rising young politician, journalist, and Labour M.P.; a brilliant San Francisco lawyer and politician; and the economic adviser of one of the largest banking institutions in London.

The committee began its work in Washington. The environment here was more amenable to Zionist interests than elsewhere: a sympathetic public opinion, a congenial attitude toward the Jewish population of Palestine, a friendly government, and restricted Arab in-

fluence. The twelve commissioners met in the ornate council hall of the State Department, to begin consideration of one of the most piteous world problems and to determine the future of an ancient people more exposed to suffering than any other on earth.

Alongside the powerful negative factors encountered by Zionism, there were several positive elements working in its favor. The essential reality of the Jewish enterprise in Palestine was highly important for two reasons:

1. The deep impression created by the most outstanding constructive effort in the world pursued in the between-wars period of confusion and deterioration; the social experiment going on there; the cultural and economic achievements; the success of new types of agricultural settlement, and the political renascence;
2. The growing consciousness, from the angle of political realism, that a political, economic, and cultural force was emerging in the Middle East which could not be lightly dismissed or pushed aside and must be accepted as a *fait accompli*; its vibrant will to live and grow.

More than that: United States support was a factor of considerable weight in the scales. America's co-operation was a primary requisite in Great Britain's foreign policies, and American influence on behalf of Zionism therefore constituted a highly significant political fact. America's attitude was formed by a number of political elements. Humanitarian considerations indubitably played their part, but not less potent was the considerable influence wielded by American Jewry; its political weight and its cultural and economic value exceeded by far its numerical importance.

Apart from the foregoing, the pressure on the American military administration in occupied Europe which D.P. problems exercised underlined the exigency of a comprehensive solution. The report of the President's envoy, Earl Harrison, who had investigated the D.P.

problem and focused it in the proper light, reflected the humanitarian approach and administrative wisdom of the American occupation authorities in Germany.



A few days before the committee arrived, I traveled down to Washington, D.C., for the first time. I went by car so as to see the countryside at a more leisurely pace. We passed through the Quaker City of Philadelphia, surrounded by foliage and woodland, and gray, depressing, industrial Baltimore.

We traversed beautiful green valleys and went through small towns so uniform in appearance and character that you felt for all the world as if, by some strange quirk of travel, you had miraculously come back roundabout to the same town the outskirts of which had been left behind a short while earlier.

Then Washington, D.C., national capital, city of diplomats and officialdom, of international intrigue and matchless beauty.

It was here I first met the American group of the Committee's secretarial staff. The main topic of our talk on Palestine's economy was the monoculture of the citrus industry, the adverse trade balance, the structure of export trade, the extent of stability in the diamond-cutting and polishing industry, the balance of payments, and Article 18 of the Mandate (maintaining the "Open Door" trade policy). I was helped at several stages of the examination by quotations from the Royal Commission's report in which a memorandum I had submitted for the Jewish Agency at the time was incorporated. Once more I learned the truth of the principle of casting one's bread upon the waters in political work of this kind.

The atmosphere in America was conducive to the enlistment of public sympathy for our cause. One of the more formidable obstacles we encountered in the effort to enlighten public opinion on the elements of our case, however, was the general ignorance of what we were after. The problem of "dual loyalties" came up time and again, and one of the Anglo-American Committee

members remarked with some acerbity: "American Jews must decide whether they are Jews or Americans!"

Remarks such as these by committeemen caused us no little concern. It was reported that a British member of the committee said on one occasion: "It is probable that the Jews are right, but it would mean sending another six British army divisions to Palestine to enforce their claim, and that's out of the question."

Ominous rumors reached us day after day. It was in this charged atmosphere that, seized by no little apprehension, we entered a new phase of our political struggle —the inquiry by the Anglo-American Committee.

THE COMMITTEE (7) BEGINS WORK

The twelve members of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee sat behind a crescent-shaped table in the magnificent assembly chamber at the State Department, near the Capitol. The Palestinians among the visitors at the back listened tensely as the first hearing of evidence was opened.

The Jewish witnesses wove a tapestry as universal in scope and compass as Jewish destiny itself, the strands of the weft stretching from the American continent to Europe, the lands of the Middle East, and Palestine. Their testimony served as an introduction to a broad review of the question.

Earl Harrison, President Truman's special investigator of the European D.P. situation, gave a dry, factual, but comprehensive account of the distress among the homeless refugees in central Europe. He went beyond the rigid limits of his brief, however, and reported on the Jewish Agency's detailed proposals to settle one hundred thousand displaced persons in Palestine, elaborated upon in my memorandum submitted by the Jewish Agency. "This convincing document," Harrison added, "shows

that Palestine offers a solution of the vexatious problem of Jewish D.P.'s in Europe."

A firm Jewish position was taken by Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz, European director-general of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. He stressed that while it was true that thousands of Jews were streaming from eastern to western Europe, at the risk of their lives, with the pursuers hot on their heels, and that the J.D.C. was helping them, nevertheless "I should feel ashamed if we did not assist them with transport, shelter and food."

Dr. Schwartz testified to the desire of these Jewish survivors to migrate to Palestine, and dwelt movingly on the plight of those immured in D.P. camps. He explained that these people knew they no longer had any future in the Diaspora and quoted Hungarian Jews as saying something like this:

"We built the Hungarian state with our toil and capital, devoting our energies and efforts to the development of its prosperity. Yet when the blow fell, we were dispossessed, robbed, persecuted and massacred. We are no longer interested in building for others; we want to build for ourselves. We want to sow and plant, and to reap the fruits of our labours. We want to be responsible for our own destiny!"

The same statements were being uttered in practically every other country in Europe.

Mrs. Judith Epstein, president of Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, gave a deeply moving account of the rescue work undertaken among the Jewish children of the Diaspora and their transplantation to Palestine. Several members had tears in their eyes during her narrative.

A penetrating disquisition on the Jewish people's life and historical mission came from a Christian friend of Israel, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr. It was interesting to observe how the committeemen's reaction to his statement ran true to the pattern—their ingrained resistance to a problem which bristled with complex issues and refused to conform to accepted valuations.

Next to testify was a party of leading American engineers, with an international reputation, who analyzed development possibilities, sketched the broad outline of a major program, and dwelt with the force of their authority on the vast potentialities of reconstruction blue-prints.

I had already met Robert Nathan and Oscar Gass, two foremost Washington economists, prior to their appearance before the committee, and had discussed with them the questions likely to be raised. Bob Nathan's exposition of Palestine economy led to some keen interrogation on Jewish labor, the clause in the Jewish National Fund charter prohibiting employment of Arab labor on its land, the agrarian problems and Jewish relations with the Arabs. The British chairman, Sir John E. Singleton, was the most persistent. Richard Crossman caused great surprise by asking: "Would the revolution you are carrying out in the social-economic sphere be possible under a foreign regime?"

The Jewish evidence was directed by an advisory committee of which I was a member. It soon transpired that economic and social issues were in the forefront of consideration. I was assigned to prepare witnesses.

The Committee continued its hearings. The late Rabbi Stephen S. Wise's appeal to the conscience of the world was an impressive *tour de force*. Dr. Emanuel Neumann gave a graphic résumé of the political issue from a Jewish standpoint. Rabbi Irving Miller dwelt on two methods of solving the Jewish problem: the assurance of minority rights in the Diaspora, and settlement in Palestine; and elucidated the advantages of the latter course in the light of experience during the period between wars. Judge Joseph Proskauer, of New York, chairman of the American Jewish Committee, while departing from the general line, was nevertheless helpful in presenting the fundamental claim for immigration into Palestine, which was identical with the Zionist case.

Lessing W. Rosenwald, president of the American Council for Judaism, was so academic and one-sided in his approach as to make no impression on the commit-

tee, particularly when it elicited the admission that his group had no large public following.

One evening Eliahu Epstein, who later became Israel's first Ambassador in Washington, gave a reception attended by the committee's secretarial staff, headed by the two principal secretaries, Harold Beeley of Britain and Evan Wilson of the United States. It was the first time I had met Beeley, who was destined to play a decisive, even sinister role in our fortunes as a moving spirit in Britain's anti-Zionist policy.

From the outset I found the man, with his cold, incisive intellect, to be an interesting study. He was of the type of person who, in spite of an icy temperament, develops an intensity of passion which holds him in a tight grip. He was not an anti-Semite. His grim, unyielding antagonism to Zionism arose from his assessment and appreciation of British Imperial interests in the East, and perhaps also from a modicum of romantic, and irrational, sympathy for the Arabs. He remained an uncompromising and unrelenting foe.

Yet, for some reason, we struck up a personal friendship that survived the vicissitudes of political differences and behind-the-scenes polemic. Our conversations served to crystallize the polarity of our respective viewpoints.

The first evening, however, I had only a brief preliminary chat with Beeley, whose reserved and guarded manner befitting the secretary of an inquiry committee. I also exchanged a few words with Evan Wilson, the American secretary, on the committee's procedures and proposed itinerary.

An amusing incident occurred in the course of Eliahu's reception. I had met Administration officials and members of the Washington diplomatic corps, among them a young American officer in uniform who held some political post. I was cautious at the beginning of our talk, in line with my usual practice when meeting people of this kind, and I was consequently taken aback when he suddenly began speaking to me in fluent Hebrew, discussing affairs in the Yishuv with expert knowledge.

We had a most interesting talk, and I admired the efficiency of the American political service in enlisting peo-

ple acquainted with a strange, out-of-the-way language such as Hebrew.

A few moments later I remembered that I had not introduced myself and said: "My name's Horowitz."

He smiled and shook hands and, much to our mutual amusement, retorted: "So's mine."



The committee's hearings continued to drag on slowly. The succession of witnesses reiterated points already made by predecessors, and it was seldom that a new idea emerged.

The Arab evidence was on a poor level, despite the outbursts of extremist talk and threats. The best of the Arab witnesses who appeared in Washington, Professor Philip Hitti, of Princeton, became unnecessarily confused in a maze of argument and historical analyses which rather detracted from the impression he made.

The Arab case was substantially helped by Dr. Frank W. Notestein, director of the Population Research Institute at Princeton University. He claimed that Zionism could not be implemented from a demographic standpoint and showed, by citing statistics and data, that the Jewish people were not able to become a majority in Palestine before the country reached the saturation point of its absorptive capacity. Even if they did attain a majority, they would be unable to maintain it for long.

Albert Einstein's evidence took an extreme line: he accused Great Britain of a "divide and rule" policy and of Machiavellian imperialist designs.

Only the merest echoes reached us of what was going on among the committeemen and we knew very little about the attitudes of the individuals. This emerged at an important consultation held one evening in the Jewish Agency offices. A brilliant address was given at this private gathering by a remarkable person: Mrs. Lorna Wingate, the widow of that splendid British officer Major-General Orde Charles Wingate, D.S.O.,—"Ha' Yedid" ("the Friend"), as he was known to the Yishuv. She spoke in her late husband's inspired Zionist vein.

Lorna proved to be a scintillating speaker, endowed with fervor, a lively mind, and shrewd understanding. The beautiful young Scotswoman had deep-set flashing eyes and lustrous dark hair, features seemingly chiseled from marble, and a dignified bearing. Her statements had the compelling qualities of penetrating logic, fiery Zionist ardor, and an enchanting persuasiveness. We were all deeply stirred by her gloomy forecast and pessimistic appraisal of the political situation, as well as of the frame of mind within the committee, though later developments disproved some of her basic assumptions and most of her dire forebodings failed to mature.

She believed that the committeemen were getting direct or indirect instructions from their governments and one ought not expect them to conduct an objective inquiry. "The position in London and Jerusalem will be much worse than in Washington, and the Jewish witnesses before the committee won't be given much heed because of the deep gulf of spirit, culture, and mode of thought between their world and that of the committee members."

I could not concur in Lorna's opinion, expressed though it was with painful clarity and a profound anxiety for the welfare of our assignment. We agreed only on one point: we both felt that the Washington political climate was far healthier than that in London, where the frigid atmosphere would present great difficulties. I advanced this view at the meeting, but differed with the latter part of her statement, arguing that our case would be the more powerful in Jerusalem in spite of the obvious danger that the full weight of the Arab brief would be exerted.

As for the political solution, I believed that a transition period of fifteen to twenty years would tend to obliterate the Zionist vision. Palestine might reach a saturation peak of population before the Jews became a majority. Those who favored a Jewish state fell into two categories: supporters of Partition, and shortsighted simpletons, to put it no stronger. Anyone who, knowingly or unknowingly, opposed a Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine merely condemned the Jewish peo-

ple to a minority position in a binational country, which in existing conditions was tantamount to an Arab state.

Meanwhile we received a fine briefing on do's and don't's from a well-placed Jewish observer who knew the mood among the Americans and closely followed the proceedings.

"Don't keep on repeating the same arguments over and over again, and don't overstress the emotional appeal," he advised. "You aren't presenting your achievements sufficiently, and your replies on a number of questions are much too ambiguous, especially concerning the Arab position under the country's constitution.

"Say whatever you want to say simply, lucidly, and forcefully, as well as graphically by showing diagrams." (When I testified later, I made successful use of this advice.)

"Tell them how you're providing for immigrants. Don't depict everything in black and white. You're only human and you must admit it's human to err.

"Don't dismiss the committee lightly or underestimate it. Treat it with respect.

"Try to show there's a physical possibility of creating and maintaining a Jewish majority in the country. Don't harp on the idea of transferring the Arabs, as it's bound to infuriate some of the committee members.

"Be careful of overstating the legal side of the problem. You're far better off to stick to an explanation of what the Jewish state is going to be like and the kind of laws it will have.

"Tell them the history of your efforts to reach an understanding with the Arabs, and how they failed. Develop Lowdermilk's idea and explain the advantages to the Arabs if they agree to share in carrying it out.

"Emphasize not only the civil equality of Arabs under the law in a Jewish state, but also the economic equality they'll be assured.

"Explain the land and labor questions, and be precise in defining such terms as 'nation,' 'race,' 'state,' and the like. These are generally much too vaguely used and only confuse the members.

"When you get to Palestine, show the committee your

settlements, especially the new ones, which are likely to remind the Americans of the Western frontier days of the early American pioneering epoch.

"You must produce some young witnesses, and present some of your future plans in writing. Don't give the impression you're leading a hand-to-mouth existence.

"Talk about the relationship of your future state to the other countries of the Middle East. You ought to portray the feudal structure of Arab economy, but don't present the Arabs as demons and fiends or argue that only the effendi class is against you."

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The committee's sojourn in Washington was nearing its end. The first contacts with its personnel had been made in the lobbies and corridors of the handsome State Department building.

One morning Meyer Weisgal, who was secretary-general of the American section of the Jewish Agency at the time, happened to have a short friendly chat with Richard Crossman.

"One of the first people I want to look up in Jerusalem is David Horowitz," Crossman said. "I was advised to do so by a friend in London."

"Why the hell do you have to go all the way to Palestine?" Meyer exploded in his inimitable manner. "The guy is right here in Washington."

"You mean it? Well, then, get him at once," Crossman rejoined.

Weisgal searched high and low for me in the building; but I was out shopping for a few gifts for my staff back in Jerusalem, especially lipsticks for the girls. The saleswoman widened her eyes as she served the odd foreigner who spoke with a strange accent and bought lipsticks by the dozen. I overheard her conjecturing to another saleswoman whether I spoke like a Turk. She thought I was a Turkish pasha buying a load of gifts for his harem.

Meanwhile, Meyer Weisgal had given up his efforts to find me and arranged with Crossman to bring me around

the following evening. As Crossman was believed to be a confirmed adversary of our cause, as well as the only parliamentary and political representative of the Labour Party on the committee and a loyal emissary of his Government, everyone attached great importance to the forthcoming conversation. I, too, looked forward to the talk with a great deal of pleasure, and with a due sense of the responsibility resting on me.

But neither Crossman nor myself could have foreseen at that moment how fateful our discussion would become at this stage of the inquiry and, indeed, for our cause generally.

AN EVENING WITH (8) CROSSMAN

There were some people in Richard Crossman's hotel room when I called on him the following evening, but they left half an hour later and the two of us remained together. Crossman threw himself on the bed, hands clasped behind his neck, transfixed me with a gimlet stare, and launched a machine-gun clatter of questions.

He was a man of strong and energetic appearance. He had broad, athletic shoulders and a fine head, with hair worn somewhat long, and his face bore the impress of an alert, inquiring mind.

When listening, he was intent and receptive; when talking, he was swift and accurate, piercing to the heart of the matter, and extracting the maximum of information. His conversation was pointed and witty.

Here are some of his questions which I jotted down later for the record:

"Are you prepared for full equality with the Arabs on the labor market, an equal wage for equal work and production? . . .

*"What about the principle of Jewish employment?
"Are you ready to admit Arabs into your trade unions? . . .*

"I attach particular importance to the problems of the labor movement," he went on. "The latent strength of your movement is sometimes revealed by such matters, and I don't believe in paper guarantees. I'm interested in knowing the spirit that moves you, animates your existence, and causes it to thrive. That's the crux of the problem. . . .

"Do you think that the picture given by the Mizrahi representative, who spoke of 'thy cattle and thy stranger that is within thy gates,' is particularly encouraging? Is that to be the position of the Arabs in your midst? . . .

"I know you're suspicious of the British members of the committee, but I believe you'll have more trouble with the Americans. I'm a Marxist and I don't regard formalistic democracy as the last word in wisdom, but the Americans are strongly attached to its principles. We British have had a great deal of experience in backward colonial countries and in adjusting ourselves to unorthodox conditions. But the Americans haven't grasped the essence of this quality. . . .

"The concept of the Jewish state and its parliamentary democratic structure don't worry me in the least. Your approach as Jews, and your emphasis on a parliamentary majority of one per cent, make me suspicious. It's an absurd idea. Free immigration is the core of the problem, and its most thorny feature."

I tried, in my reply, to limn a broad canvas of our longings and aspirations, our intentions and achievements in the past, our projections for the future. I dwelt on the all-embracing character of our movement, especially its social aspects, and sought to infuse him with its spirit.

In discussing the subject of wages and Jewish labor, I reiterated our economic and social arguments in this field, but frankly admitted that the position with regard to these issues was the inevitable and, in so far as I was concerned, unsavory outcome of the peculiar conditions. I explained that the balancing of Jewish and Arab wage-

scales was not a social aim alone but a real imperative if we desired to maintain our standard of living and economic equilibrium in this backward area of the world.

"I have also studied the dialectical method of analysis and thought," I said. "I accept your premise as regards the definition of formalistic democracy."

I went on to describe, from the dialectical standpoint, the influence wielded by Jewish settlement in the Middle East and the prospects of the Zionist enterprise in the light of prevailing regional conditions. I alluded to the social revolution brought about by Zionism in the Jewish world, the metamorphosis of the social and professional class structure, and the impulses stirring the movement. He showed rapt interest.

My disquisition lasted so long that I felt in courtesy bound to take my leave and return to my hotel, but Crossman insisted on my remaining. The hours passed and we went on talking. I made an effort now and then to get up and go; he deterred me each time.

I felt a deep inner satisfaction, first of all, at being given such an excellent opportunity to elucidate and clarify our cause, and, secondly, because of the intellectual enjoyment I was deriving from a far-ranging talk of this kind. It had molded a useful spiritual communion between two segments of thought and feeling which varied so widely yet, withal, came so close to each other.

Crossman sketched two concepts of the relationship between Britain, the Jewish people, and the Middle East. One was imperialistic. It was mainly concerned with creating a British bastion in that part of the world which had become a dangerous frontier zone and point of contact between East and West, whose relations had already begun to be strained. As far as this concept went, the alternative choice between Jews or Arabs as allies was not governed by any dictate of fundamental principle but was purely expedient, depending upon the assessment of the balance of forces. Crossman discarded this concept. He foresaw disaster and ruin, primarily for Britain, in any new conflict between East and West. Nor did he believe in the military value of the forces avail-

able in the Middle East, or felt like relying on the whim and caprice of some Arab effendi.

In his opinion, Britain's policy had still not been determined and Ernest Bevin might yet show a spark of independence if he went deeper into the problem. But for the moment he leaned on his advisers.

I lectured Crossman on my views of the feeble handling of foreign-policy issues by labor parties throughout the world. These groups directed their entire efforts on home affairs, rose to power through the sanction of domestic social convulsions, and had no foreign policy of their own.

Crossman accepted my thesis in part, but claimed that the Labour Government had in a number of respects adjusted its policy for the better.

I once more touched on the errors and weaknesses of a policy of appeasement toward the Arabs and on their reaction against Bevin's declaration.

Crossman was keenly interested in the social evolution of the Middle East, and I tried to outline our place in the tangled web of social and economic changes in the regional structure.

"What about those big irrigation schemes? Are you going to associate the Arabs in the financing, management, employment of labor, and benefits of those projects?" he asked.

I answered affirmatively, telling him of our proposal to reduce the agricultural subsistence units by installing irrigation networks and increasing the productivity of land units, thereby creating a larger aggregate viable area for immigrant absorption.

Crossman suggested that we go down to the bar for a drink, and Meyer Weisgal joined us downstairs for a short spell. We continued our discussion, which covered many subjects.

Weisgal voiced an opinion on one of the topics brought up, and remarked that his own approach might be regarded as emotional and sentimental, adding: "You intellectuals probably turn your noses up at that kind of attitude."

46 Crossman burst out laughing and said: "It's a great

mistake to believe that what you call intellectuals always react to stern logic. You'll find no more sentimental and emotional people than intellectuals."

Turning to me, he went on: "We intellectuals know just how wrong friend Weisgal's judgment can be."

I suddenly felt that Dick Crossman had a warm heart as well as a clear mind, and I was really glad to have made the discovery.

Crossman, like the other committeemen, insisted they were completely independent. He heard me out attentively, especially when I spoke of the character of the movement and the prospects of social change in the Middle East, the human side of the refugee salvation project, the moral force inherent in the Zionist idea and its labor movement, the economic achievements in Palestine, and the *kibbutzim* and accomplishments of the labor community.

He asked about my own past, and I told him of my years as a road-laborer and settler in a *kibbutz* in the early period of Emek Jezreel settlement, when I also took a hand in swamp reclamation.

He confessed that American Jewry, and the testimony given to the committee, had not made a favorable impression on him. He had not sensed behind their statements any realization of flesh-and-blood actualities, the toil and sweat of the project, the pangs and vitality of the movement and the enterprise which he had perceived through our talk.

As he spoke, I felt he had begun to veer toward my own trend of thinking and that the icy front of his inner resistance and prejudice against Zionism was breaking. He admitted much later in his book, *Palestine Mission: A Personal Record*, that this antagonism was partly due to subconscious anti-Semitism and partly to his dissatisfaction with the committee's deliberations and the Jewish evidence so far given.

I understood why Crossman was showing an increasing candor in his statements. He emphasized that his participation on the committee must not be judged by the style and expression of what he said, but by its political substance. The committee's appointment was a compro-

mise designed to shape a common Anglo-American policy, and it served as a test of the feasibility of Anglo-American co-operation. He accused the Americans of causing difficulties, and recalled President Truman's refusal to accept Attlee's invitation for active help and support in carrying out the request concerning the admission of one hundred thousand Jewish immigrants into Palestine. Actually, the U.S. Administration had withdrawn the last of its troops from the Middle East.

As to the Jewish position, Crossman was of the opinion, like many others, that it would be wrong to indulge in legalistic pedantry and sophistical argument, or to display impatience and irritation.

"You must inspire us with the moral power of your effort, as you've done with me this evening; that's the most important thing," he added. "And remember the need to co-opt the Arabs into the *Histadruth* and your undertakings and achievements."

Our talk turned to the topic of economic absorptivity. I explained to him that no such abstract, fixed and immutable concept existed in reality. Absorptive capacity was the functional result of a number of factors, the most significant of which was the quality and skills of the human material, the capital available, and the compelling need—or, rather, the overriding imperative—of creating new sources of livelihood.

"There's a static and a dynamic absorptive capacity," I said, "and we're creating the dynamic brand."

Crossman accepted my opinion in the matter and even differed from Dr. Notestein's postulates, saying there was no way of knowing the extent to which the Arab birth-rate would change under the impact of new conditions.

"The social revolution in Palestine may come to resemble the nineteenth-century industrial revolution in England," he said, and then reiterated: "It's important to remember that evidence is not the principal thing; it's the spirit of the people, the living experience and the first-hand impressions the committee gets of the work and the men behind it, that will really count in the long run."

We were still in lively converse around midnight when suddenly a voice behind me exclaimed: "Dolek, what are you doing here?"

I turned my head and recognized the wife of a well-known Tel Aviv manufacturer, who by some freak of chance had come into the hotel bar. I was afraid she might say something politically indiscreet and hurriedly introduced Richard Crossman as a member of the inquiry committee.

"I hope you're not British," the Tel Aviv lady remarked ingenuously without much ado.

Crossman burst out laughing. "But I am, madam, I am! What's wrong with being British?"

"Never mind. We've learned to survive your sort, too," she answered, somewhat self-importantly. "Look, I had a lot to do with hospitality services for British troops during the war, and now, as a reward, we're being forbidden to enter the country. But it doesn't matter, we shall get Jews into Palestine in spite of you, and I'm doing my bit in that movement, too."

I tried to mitigate the impression her pungent remarks must be making on Crossman by telling him that her husband was engaged in translating some of Shakespeare's plays into Hebrew. But she refused to be sidetracked and asked him: "I suppose you've heard about the thing called 'illegal immigration'?"

"Something of the sort has come to my ears," he rejoined with dry humor.

The lady went on to speak freely in the same vein.

When she left us a few minutes later, Crossman was amused at the odd combination—the woman who had been a wartime hostess to British troops and was now helping to promote unauthorized immigration into Palestine, with a businessman husband who translated Shakespeare into Hebrew.

"That can only happen in a peculiar and wonderful country," he said, smiling.

In further conversation, he repeated that he wanted to get to the bottom of the problem but none the less believed that the Jews must be fair to the Arabs. He insisted that policy must reckon with realities.

"Realities?" I queried. "For what purpose? I loathe the realism that becomes a tactical means to serve its own ends. It breeds the decay of politics, which ceases to be an instrument serving an ideal and becomes an ideal in itself. The main thing is to conduct a realistic policy to promote a great human, social, or national ideal, but there can never be a realistic policy founded on political tactics alone. That's just plain, sterile opportunism lacking any noble aim!"

Crossman hastened to agree with me and accepted this estimate of political realism.

We parted at half past one in the morning with a warm handshake and I returned to my hotel, meditating on our talk.

A few days later Meyer Weisgal told me of Dick Crossman's reference to our conversation: "It was really a highlight of my stay in Washington. I'd hoped beforehand it would be helpful, but it exceeded my expectations." In his book *Palestine Mission* he concludes his account of that evening's discussion: "I went back to my hotel, happy and excited."

I too went to my hotel at that early hour experiencing the same feelings.



As the committee's hearings went on, we were given capsule information on the personality and outlook of its individual members by people in close touch. This was part of the picture that emerged:

Mr. Justice (Sir John E.) Singleton, British chairman: A legal expert, dry and caustic, devoid of any sentiment that might have a bearing on this case.

Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, American chairman: A man with a heart of gold, simple, solid, and of great common sense. The chief difficulty—his formalistic conception of liberal democracy.

Major R. E. Manningham-Buller, U.K.: An honest, shrewd Conservative commoner, overinclined to accept authoritative opinions and somewhat influenced by Singleton, his former law partner.

Bartley Crum, U.S.A.: A skilled politician and lawyer with large ambitions, friendly to any unorthodox cause, somewhat of a rebel, and likely to be an ally of our cause.

Richard Crossman, U.K.: Divergent opinions. Many regarded him as an actual opponent, but all agreed on his brilliance and high intellectual calibre.

James G. McDonald, U.S.A.: A man with a reputation for possessing wide knowledge of affairs, and sympathetic to Zionism. It was to be supposed that his considerable experience as High Commissioner for Refugees would convince him of the necessity of finding a solution in Palestine of the D.P. problem, thereby also vindicating Zionism.

William Phillips, U.S.A.: The conventional diplomat.

W. F. Crick, U.K.: Regarded as an expert with little faculty of imagination.

Sir Frederick Leggett, U.K.: A man of considerable professional experience of compromise solutions during his service as an arbitrator in labor disputes.

Lord Morrison, U.K.: A Labour veteran for many years in Parliament, who was only recently elevated to the peerage. His capacity for understanding and grasping the meaning of problems was exceeded by his large-heartedness.

Professor Frank Aydelotte, U.S.A.: An educationist aloof from political affairs who had been drawn into the inquiry but had not yet found his feet in it.

Frank W. Buxton, U.S.A.: A veteran Boston editor, a newspaperman to the core, realistic and shrewd, broad-minded, and inclined to favor our cause.

Would these twelve Americans and Britons find a common tongue? Would their inquiry bring salvation or new frustration?

These questions, like so many others, could only be answered in the fullness of time.



I began to get busy procuring a priority flight in an American Air Force plane to Cairo, and encountered

considerable difficulties. The experience reminded me of an incident told by Bob Nathan, which summed up the more comic and absurd facets of our epoch and the administrative and political stupidity to which a state bureaucracy sometimes degenerates.

It was an established practice, said Nathan, that any American citizen could get a visa for Palestine on the sole condition that he would undertake not to remain there, and would make a small cash deposit at the British Consulate. When Nathan and Oscar Gass were about to undertake their economic investigation in Palestine, they attached a letter of recommendation signed by some highly placed Americans to the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, to their visa applications.

The letter aroused unusual attention. Lord Halifax forwarded it to the British Foreign Office, which in turn transmitted it to the Colonial Office, which asked the High Commissioner in Palestine for his advice. The High Commissioner laid the matter before his Advisory Council and it was decided that the time was inappropriate for a visit of this kind. His reply trickled back through the same channels to Lord Halifax.

Nathan and Gass thereupon enlisted the aid of the highest-level American personages, and after a good deal of diplomatic negotiation, intervention, and political pull they succeeded in getting visas. But these visas were available freely enough in the first place to anyone who applied in the ordinary way to the British Consulate without attaching letters of recommendation.

My stay in the United States was coming to a close. I packed my clothing, said good-bye to friends, and one evening took a taxi out to La Guardia Airport in New York, from which I was to take off at midnight in an American military aircraft on my second Atlantic crossing.

Into the air again. This time the ocean crossing was poles apart—or, rather, aloft—from that previous voyage in a small tramp steamer plowing the waves for fifteen days. It was a short, swift flight. The others in the plane were nearly all American officers and men, and there were only three civilians including myself. We stopped over a short while at Bermuda and in the Azores, and landed at Casablanca.

As guests of the United Army, we were put up at the palatial Anfa Hotel, a few miles outside the city, where Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had had their historic meeting. It was now used by the U.S. army authorities. The guest lounge still displayed some of the maps, marked with the Allied strategic and political lines, over which the Big Two had pored at their conference.

The hotel showed signs of neglect. It was occupied by American officers in transit to and from the United States and a few civilian V.I.P.'s who had received special permission to use Transport Command aircraft and were given free run of the facilities, including the bars and messes.

The building was at the heart of a small, highly exclusive suburb of villas and fine summer homes owned by leading residents. A vista of green fields and orchards, with the white Atlantic combers rolling up to the beaches in the distance, could be seen from the hilltop on which the hotel was perched.

It was an isolated spot, lending the impression of being hidden away in a forgotten corner of the world. I had never before seemed so far removed from the madding age and its cares, problems, anxieties, and strife as in this hotel somewhere near Casablanca.

The officers and sprinkling of civilians, including a high State Department official and several engineers

bound for West Africa to erect some large plants, spent the wait in conversation, athletics, card games, seeing movies, and taking trips into the city.

On the whole, the monotony weighed heavily on me, but I tried to make good use of the enforced leisure and the tranquil atmosphere to prepare the evidence I was to give to the Anglo-American Committee.

It was particularly vexing to feel I was marooned here at a time when the committee was due to arrive in Jerusalem, and to be kept from initiating the preparatory work.

The military system of transport priorities made it impossible to know when a plane would leave or who would be posted on the passenger list. Several hours before the plane's scheduled take-off, a list was put up on the hotel bulletin-board with a "stand-by" order to be ready to start at any moment. The appearance of these lists caused a certain amount of nervous anticipation among those awaiting their turn. I used to consult the notice-board several times a day.

From the hotel rooftop I looked out over the city of Casablanca, twinkling white against the blue ocean backdrop, and mused over the historic associations and vast body of literature concerning the place. It shimmered out of the books as a city of exotic flavor, Oriental romance and fantasy, or secret delights and enchantments, like a woman's half-veiled face; yet sprawled alongside it were the squalid precincts of the drab port town with its aura of lurking menace.

Casablanca, city of Eastern magic and beauty, villas of pashas, opulent homes and great estates, and the portside quarter of winding, tortuous alleyways exuding the mephitic odors of an underworld life. I often walked through the streets, eager to observe the strange life so different from my own familiar environment and experience, and was oppressed by the feeling of exile and isolation.

The days passed in writing, fretful waiting, and nostalgia. The first bewitching spell of the serenity, beauty, and charm of this far-away place soon evaporated. It

was only when I left for Cairo, eight days after my arrival in Morocco, that the fit of depression lifted.




Our friends in Cairo believed, as I did, that our affairs were in process of becoming more fluid. The chief danger lay in stagnation and a resigned acceptance of the issue as insoluble. We had now succeeded in breaking the ice. Everyone now knew that a problem existed and that it was imperative to find some form of solution.

The rigid maintenance of the White Paper, with its static conditions, was an intolerable prospect, though we had learned that the advisers of the British Foreign Office in Cairo and European capitals had reported that "any impartial committee considering the Palestine problem judiciously and objectively would inevitably conclude that no policy save that in the 'White Paper' was susceptible of practical implementation." The Foreign Office had founded its hopes on the outcome of this advice in sponsoring the appointment of the Anglo-American Committee. It believed that once the Americans had been exposed to Palestinian realities, they would agree that the White Paper propounded the only feasible solution, and that it would not be difficult to carry it out with American aid.

I telephoned my home the first evening and learned that a cablegram I had sent on arrival at Casablanca, eight days earlier, had only just arrived in Tel Aviv via Beirut, Lebanon. Meanwhile my family and friends thought I had vanished into the unknown.

We left Cairo at dawn in an Egyptian Airways plane, more like a toy than an aircraft. I was aquiver with anticipation: another two hours, another hour, another few moments and we would touch down at Lydda. I had crossed four continents, stayed in great noisy cities, traversed oceans and vast woodland areas, traveled along great highways, sojourned in worlds inhabited by problems and people, multitudes and multitudes of people. . . .

The mind and the senses seek a common thread in the endless fabric of impressions, experiences, panoramas, city lights, and masses of people encountered during travel. It is the same man who moves through the fogs of London, below the lofty Manhattan skyscrapers, along the broad avenues of Washington; who lolls on board a small vessel tossing on ocean's stormy bosom, sits in a small cubicle between the wings of an aircraft, or meanders through the streets of mysterious Casablanca. He finds everywhere the same yearning for a new world, the same feeling of insecurity, the same fear of what the morrow may bring, the same moments of exaltation and despair, of joy and despondency; and, overshadowing all else, the same impenetrable enigma of whither and toward what is mankind groping.



Part Two

THE STRUGGLE

THE LOCAL SCENE (10)

Lydda Airport was under close guard. Everyone was closely inspected by sullen Arab customs officials and members of the British Criminal Investigation Department. My family and friends, who had failed to get permits to welcome me inside the airport, waited outside at the gate. They said Moshe Shertok was in Tel Aviv awaiting my report on the proceedings at Washington. Without going home or to my office, I went directly to Shertok's place. The committee's imminent arrival was the theme of our urgency.

The creation of the inquiry was undoubtedly symptomatic of a new turn in evolving events. Our problem

had ceased to be one of Anglo-Israel relations and had once again been projected into a much wider orbit, albeit limited to that of the two Anglo-Saxon powers. The limitation, however, by no means contracted the importance of the opportunity.

I reported to Shertok on progress in Washington and apologized for being unable to explain more fully from that distance the full significance of the meetings with the committee. I outlined the difficult struggle ahead, but dwelt on the prospect of breaking through the political barriers that had so far obstructed our efforts. I attached great faith to Crossman, whose brilliant intellect and bold political approach had impressed me. I ventured the belief that he had touched the core of the problem, and said I regarded his attitude in the nature of a breach in the stubborn British position and as offering a gleam of hope for the future.

Moshe told me of the inner party struggle concerning the presentation of Jewish testimony. Many of our colleagues were tired of all these inquiries, and there was considerable doubt as to the value of appearing before yet another, especially one which, as many feared, if not actually directed, was at least influenced by the British Foreign Office line. But Shertok's dogged insistence had overcome the objections within his party, and the vote taken after he had addressed a conference resulted in only two dissentients.

Shertok regretted that he had not known, prior to that Labour Party meeting, several details I was now able to give him, as they would have fortified his position. At all events, he had succeeded in obtaining sanction for our appearance before the committee.

Those who had supported it took the view that a people as weak as the Jews could not afford to disregard popular world feeling. Refusal to testify would have alienated many in America, which was then the sole powerful factor on the international scene upholding the Jewish cause.

Moreover, we were being given a forum in which to proclaim our aspirations and to instill conviction by the

justice of our cause and the employment of political acumen. Were we justified in forfeiting this unique opportunity? Ought we to rest content with physical force alone, and to pursue a consistent, undeviating line of wholesale negation? Had our faith in our own ability to persuade others of the legitimacy of our aims been so shaken as to bring retreat before even the struggle began?

The answers were too obvious to need elaboration. I was always amazed at the attitude of those who tried to avoid tackling an issue in the very sector in which our position was the soundest. Moreover, I did not believe in the rigid character of directives to inquiry commissions if their members could be persuaded by a strong case.

My experiences with various economic inquiries under the Mandated regime had strengthened the feeling I held in this connection. While such inquiries were not comparable with the Anglo-American Committee, which was a major political development, nevertheless it ought not to be forgotten that the committee comprised representatives of two great powers, and the members were obviously less subservient to instructions from higher levels than government officials with a colonial tradition of service.

Even if it were accurate to say, on the one hand, that the general outlook of the committeemen was influenced by their government's policy, there was on the other hand a broad gap between general outlook and formulated recommendations.

Our task loomed as a difficult one. It devolved upon us to overcome intellectual inertia as well as a natural tendency to be identified with a governmental attitude. As the committee did not consist of professional diplomats obedient to the foreign-policy agencies of their respective governments, the objective could be attained. Moreover, every committee of this kind was invariably at pains to demonstrate its independence of thought, at least to some extent, and that inclination might yield advantage.

Shertok, too, was confident that our appearance was

essential. He laid great stress on the factual and economic aspects of the evidence in presenting the country's true absorptive capacity, the immigration issue, and the breadth of Jewish achievements.

He asked me to initiate the preparations for our case. He returned to Jerusalem, but telephoned me again that evening and invited me to co-ordinate the assembly of the political and economic material, both written and oral. I was reluctant at first, but then agreed. Shertok had been appointed by the Jewish Agency Executive to assume responsibility for its representations to the committee, and I was assigned to supervise the preparatory work.

Busy days—and nights—set in. With Shertok, we were at it from dawn until well after midnight, and on occasion round the clock to sunup again. The compilation of the material benefited in no small measure from Shertok's inexhaustible capacity for sustained effort and assiduous application, and he took part in every section of the preparations. He went over each memorandum, co-operated in briefing each witness, and showed a faculty of political sapience and perspicacity which was an unfailing inspiration.

Eliezer Kaplan returned to Jerusalem a few days after my arrival. Although indisposed in health, he bent his whole energies to collating the economic data. He spent day and night in the company of hydrological, agricultural, and soil experts, going into every fact and figure. He urged the necessity of presenting an objective canvas, neither concealing the weaknesses nor exaggerating the capabilities of the Zionist enterprise, and of endeavouring to imbue conviction by accurate statement and demonstrable proof—far more effective principles than ephemeral overemphasis.

David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, who was engaged in projecting the broad political line, also took an interest in the details. He devoted his main effort to framing the political indictment against the Mandatory Government and unfolding the historical mission of the Zionist effort and the Jewish

The date of the committee's arrival drew closer. The Mandated Government planned elaborate security precautions.



The committee eventually arrived in Jerusalem early in the spring of 1946.

The delicate anemones and cyclamens bloomed on the slopes along the highway to Jerusalem over which the convoy of cars swept at high speed. The countryside was presenting its utmost attractions to welcome the visitors—the myriads of flowers, ruby-red, blue, violet, yellow, and white, a wealth of color and tints, smiling green fields.

The Yishuv at the time was wavering between hope and despair, mentally tormented, pondering the outcome of the latest in the long succession of inquiries into the "Palestine question." What sort of political climate would it be—the fresh, young smile of verdant spring or the dark, ominous clouds of winter, boding disaster and fatality?

Two attitudes were at once evident within the committee. Richard Crossman and the American members believed they could get at the heart of the problem only by meeting the ordinary citizens, Jew and Arab. They felt that a key to the puzzle could be found by direct and intimate contact, by a human perception of the country's life, experience of its physical and spiritual being, its scenic beauty and atmosphere. They wanted to tour the country, visit its towns and villages, see its meadows and mountains, its scenery and soil; but principally to talk with its people—the men in the street, on the farms, and in the workshops on the lower levels, the political leaders on the upper.

Several of the other members, however, believed it essential for them to maintain their complete objectivity by remaining secluded and shunning any extrinsic influences that might smirch the purity of the inquiry. One of them practiced his own precept with unabating zeal, rigorously eluding contacts with Palestinians outside

the committee room. He saw the country only once—from an aircraft placed at his disposal by the Mandated Government.

As there was no rule of procedure to govern individual behavior and method of inquiry, each member followed his own bent. Several took the middle course of not going out of their way to evade local residents but of ignoring opportunities to meet them. That was characteristic of both chairmen, and especially of Sir John Singleton.

The committee limited its stay in Palestine to three weeks, and a number of members cut into this short sojourn by taking side-trips to Arab countries—Syria, the Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Naturally we regarded this procedure as most unsatisfactory, for we wished the committee to see as much as possible and to derive the maximum impressions of conditions on the spot.

Tacit avoidance of local contacts by most of the committee, however, did not extend to British officialdom, which had ample opportunity thereby of influencing them. The higher official levels had many friendships in Arab society, and Crossman in *Palestine Mission* reports a British functionary as remarking that there were actually only two societies in Palestine, Anglo-Arab and Jewish, instead of three as was commonly supposed.

The committee had spent some time in London, on the Continent, and in Cairo before coming to Jerusalem. The atmosphere was far less impassioned in London, where the influence of the British Government and Arab spokesmen was stronger, and Jewish testimony, to say the least, was pallid. Then came the tour of D.P. camps in Europe and of the ruined ghettos, which made a profoundly moving impression. The "Jewish problem" in Europe following the Second World War was seen in its more somber aspect.

But the emphasis of the inquiry obviously centered on Palestine. The committee was able to observe the full scope of Jewish effort, the tremendous work that had been done, the new values created. The country itself offered the best possible testimony.

Yet the evidence tendered in the meeting-hall itself carried great weight. The ground for a deeper and more fundamental grasp of the problem was prepared by the broad historical perspective that emerged from Dr. Weizmann's statement and David Ben-Gurion's trenchant approach, Moshe Shertok's judicious political survey, the able economic analysis by Eliezer Kaplan, and the testimony of the Jewish Agency's specialists.

Arab evidence also carried far greater weight than in Washington and London. Albert Hourani's coldly analytical and logical approach, Ahmed Shukairi's violent statements, vibrant with menace, and Jamal el Husseini's aggressive, forceful manner served their purpose. They revealed the real Arab position and its conflict with the Jewish settlement enterprise.

Subcommittees also visited the Arab League countries, listening to aged King ibn-Saud's impassioned oration in his palace at Riyadh, the League spokesmen's diatribes at Mena House, outside Cairo, the threats and menaces voiced in Damascus and Beirut, adding up to a formidable Arab front against the Zionist project. They were also able to witness, it is true, the police statism of Syria and the Lebanon, and the merciless coercion of unfortunate, trembling Jewish witnesses to testify on behalf of the Arab case against their own consciences. This exhibition amply illustrated the probable fate of the Jews in Palestine if they were condemned to perpetual minority status.

THE HEARINGS IN JERUSALEM

(11)

n the 8th of March 1946 the Anglo-American Committee assembled for the first time in public in the Jerusalem Y.M.C.A. meeting-hall. The members sat behind a semicircular mahogany table, facing a diverse Jewish, British, and Arab audience, who followed each

successive chapter of the unfolding drama with rapt interest.

The Jewish case was founded on three premises:

1. the Jewish people's need of Palestine;
2. the Jewish people's right to enter and settle in Palestine, with the corollary prerogative of developing forms of sovereign autonomy;
3. the achievements that validated that right.

The British attempt to separate the Jewish from the Palestine issue, and the argument that the holocaust staged by Hitler was a solitary historical phenomenon that would never be repeated, made elaboration of the overall Jewish case an imperative.

The identification of the endemic historical character of the Jewish problem with the refugee issue, which Hitler's terror had accentuated, was evident in the statements by British ministers. As far as they were concerned, the Jewish problem had begun with the advent of the Nazis and had terminated with the Nazi defeat. It was essential, therefore, to remind the committee of the long duration of the Jewish question, the eternal presence of a homeless, displaced people without political, economic, or cultural *terra firma*.

History bears witness again and again to the persistence of the Jewish tragedy. The persecutions by Torquemada and Chmielnicki preceded Hitler's. The palpable need of a people without refuge and homeland had only been sharpened by events, and the Europe that became a vast gas-chamber for millions of Jews was only one of the major stations along an interminable path of agony.

And here is a small land, one-hundredth part of the vast territories over which the Arab peoples hold sway, which can provide a solution. The Arabs have no dearth of land. The unoccupied stretches of Iraq, Syria, and Transjordan can absorb tens of millions of settlers. Palestine itself can take all the Jewish immigrants without prejudicing the economic, civil, or cultural status of Arab inhabitants.

need for Palestine? And what actually is the Arab position in regard to this minute slice of land?

As to right, it is virtually the only instance on historical record where a right has been solemnly endorsed by treaty by fifty-two nations and is part of a country's constitution. It is the foundation for all Jewish efforts in Palestine. Jewish economic and cultural achievements and the massive settlement enterprise are demonstrated in the very appearance of the country, making the presentation of data and facts, diagrams and testimony almost superfluous.

But the main function of these proofs was to underline the *sui generis* character of the problem and the unique position of Palestine, as well as to rid the committee of its subservience to the sovereignty complex—that superficial conception that a people living in a specific geographical area enjoys complete sovereignty irrespective of any other consideration of circumstance, time, and place.

The whole trend of modern politics was to eliminate the sovereignty complex from international relations as a cause of war. Its elimination from the complications of the Palestine issue was particularly important. World interest and world conscience were at this point in conflict with the conception of unlimited sovereignty and had to be resolved. The Jewish argument had succeeded in breaching to some extent, if not actually demolishing, the barriers of prejudice.

The committeemen faced the tragic picture dejectedly. The Palestine Administration was bustling actively behind the scenes. It mustered every effort to prove the limited economic absorptivity of the country, the positive aspects of the White Paper policy, and the incompatibility of military interests with further Zionist undertakings.

The official whispering campaign bore fruit, especially among the British members. International problems began to bear down heavily on the committee's deliberations, and the rift between the West and East, the United States and Russia, assumed a foremost position in its mind.

The tendency was detrimental to our interest. On the one hand, it increased the appeasement of the Arabs; on the other, it brought the oil gambit into prominence. It was aimed at reconciling the Americans to the British line and at persuading them to refrain from embarrassing a potential ally in a possible American-Russian conflict. It was our ill fortune to be affected by every storm of international relations and threat of new world conflict. These fluctuations helped the Arabs and bolstered the arguments posing political and strategic expedience in contrast to judgment of intrinsic merits.

The Arabs, for their part, exploited the position skillfully, and their statements were speckled with threats of disturbances and military insurrection.

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The best of the Arab witnesses was Albert Hourani, whom I mentioned earlier. He was of Syrian Christian extraction and had been educated in England. He studied at Oxford under Richard Crossman, then a don in classic philosophy. A living example of an assimilant who had returned of his own volition to his people, Hourani was by the irony of fate the prototype of a "Zionist" among the Arabs. Far removed from the basic performance of his family's original nationality, he had attained recognition of it by the intellectual route and the feeling of being a stranger in his English environment. He learned Arabic and became one of his people's spokesmen.

During the war years he served in the British Army as one of the two principal aides of Brigadier Ian Clayton, chief of the British military-intelligence service in the Middle East. Clayton's other aide in those days was a young Reader in Semitic languages at Oxford named Aubrey Eban.

The brigadier-general assigned them to duties by what was a highly original and effective method. He appointed Eban, the Jew, to investigate political feeling and developments in the Arab world, and Hourani, the Arab, to collate information and reports on what was happening in the Jewish sector. Both young officers struck up a

close friendship in the course of their professional association against the common enemy of the period, the Nazis. They shared the same office and the same general outlook, in spite of the political gulf dividing them.

Hourani studied the writings of Herzl, Ahad Ha'Am, Borochow, and others; Eban immersed himself in the complicated pattern of Arab politics, personalities, and partisan trends. On leaving the army for civilian life, each went his own way. Shortly after the war ended, Hourani joined the staff of the Arab Offices set up in various world centers by a Palestinian Moslem leader, Musa el Alami, for the purpose of disseminating information on the Arab national movement. Eban had served for a while as deputy director of the Middle East College for Arab Studies maintained by the British Army in Jerusalem. But, a Zionist from his youth, he joined the Political Department of the Jewish Agency on the termination of his wartime career.

Hourani appeared before the committee as representative of the Arab Office in Jerusalem. His testimony was ably and brilliantly presented. He analyzed the problem with merciless logic and consistency and tried by precept and example to show that any solution was liable to provoke a conflict. There was no hope of unraveling the tangled skein, which must be cut through by a slashing decision.

He stressed the inflexible Arab opposition to any Partition scheme. In his opinion, the difference between Partition and a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine was nothing more than a question of degree, and therefore insignificant. Jewish immigration, he held, was in any event designed to bring about the creation of the Jewish state, and the Arabs were consequently bound to fight it. He foresaw the danger of opposition to specific solutions by both sides simultaneously and tried to show that the only possible solution was one favoring the Arabs.

But that was the weak link in his statement. He tried to convince the committee that such a solution was feasible and would need a far smaller employment of armed force, since the Jews would become reconciled to it once

they found there was no alternative. But the committee was by now so well aware of the extent of Jewish resistance that it discredited the assessment, which was repeated in other Arab testimony.

Hourani's testimony must have seemed unduly moderate to the Arab side, in style if not in context. But Ahmed Shukairi, who followed, made up for the defect. His fiery and bellicose address, studded with overt and covert threat, did indeed erase the impression Albert Hourani made, but it is highly doubtful whether it produced any advantage for the Arabs. Hourani's measured statement created a sevenfold stronger impression on the minds of the twelve men around the inquiry table than the fanatical blood-and-thunder oratory of Shukairi. His Holy War of bombast bordered on the farcical, while his blind bigotry hardly encouraged the committee to consider entrusting the fate of a Jewish minority into Arab keeping.

Actually, the strength of the Arab case lay in its appeal to realism. When Jamal el Husseini spoke of the Arab world stretching from the Taurus to the Atlas mountains, the vision was conjured up for the committee of a tremendous ocean of manpower united under one purpose and one political idea, and though the picture was wholly fictitious, as later events showed, it made a great effect at the time.

Arab loyalty to the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Husseini, also detracted from their case. It was the year 1946. The memory of Hitler's atrocities was still vivid and loathsome. Everyone who heard it could not but show distaste for the Arab declaration that "the Mufti is our only leader and has no substitute."

The negative impression caused by Arab adherence to the Mufti was heightened when Richard Crossman asked witnesses whether the Arabs had fought at the side of the democracies. On eliciting an affirmative response, he asked again: "Do you believe that Nazism was a democratic movement?"

When a negative answer came, Crum interjected a similar question and was regaled with a pledge of unequivocal and unshaken loyalty to the Mufti.

Crossman then produced the notorious photograph showing Haj Amin reviewing Moslem volunteer units in Bosnia who had enlisted in Hitler's forces at the Mufti's initiative.

The Arab witnesses were flabbergasted. They tried vainly to wriggle out of the mess they had made of things. Several committeemen, especially the Britons, and Government officials were furious with Crossman for his "tactlessness" in revealing the Arab conspirings with the Nazis.

By now the committee was coming round to the conclusion that it was up a dead end. Crossman analyzed the position masterfully in a short memorandum in which he weighed the advantages and disadvantages of a Jewish solution, which the Zionists would accept; an Arab solution, which meant a return to the White Paper and the granting of independence after the suppression of the Zionists by British troops; and a compromise solution, "providing considerable immigration on condition that the Zionists give up their claims to a Jewish state." He concluded that the first two were unfeasible and that "a compromise solution, despite all the difficulties, must be found," adding:

"There is, however, a real danger that our anxiety to find a compromise may make us look at its advantages and fail to see the difficulties. It is indeed important to notice that a compromise which fails would actually be worse than either of the all-out solutions analyzed above.

"For these reasons, it is vital that the rest of our time should be spent in trying to discover the real basis of conciliation, and in analyzing the make-up of the two contending parties. In doing this, however, we must be aware that, if we discover that the real basis of conciliation does not exist, and war is inevitable, we shall be doing our countries no service in proposing an unreal compromise, and shall be forced to return to the consideration of the choice of evils between Policy I and Policy II" (the Jewish and the Arab solutions).

This interesting paper, given by Crossman in Chapter VI of his *Palestine Mission*, showed that the committee faced a ticklish Hobson's choice, pregnant with danger: war against the Jews, war against the Arabs, or war with both at once.

Economic considerations were foremost. The Arab economic case was weak and ill-prepared. This was evident from a reported telephone conversation between Mrs. Katy Antonius and Mme Alami immediately after I had testified on economic matters to the committee. Mrs. Antonius was the widow of George Antonius, an eminent leader of Arab nationalist thought, herself an outstanding figure of Anglo-Arab social life in Jerusalem around whom the young Arab intelligentsia clustered. Mme Alami was the wife of the Moslem leader who headed the Arab Offices.

"Aren't we able to find an expert of our own too, a *real* expert with diagrams and figures and facts?" Mrs. Antonius is said to have inquired plaintively.

Our own economic case had been thoroughly assembled. Eliezer Kaplan's calm and dispassionate presentation, his integrity, his wide knowledge, and his objective approach were impressive. He dwelt candidly on our difficulties without shirking a discussion of the structural weaknesses in our economy. Implicit in his practical testimony were the vital strength of a broad settlement enterprise, the vision of things to come, and clear-cut planning sustained by past achievements. The committee was given a factual panorama of the land as a flowering garden, watered by a wide irrigation network. It was a telling combination of past attainments and future prospects.

A large blackboard had been set up on an easel in the Y.M.C.A. meeting-hall when I came to give my testimony, which I proposed to illustrate with diagrams. I had an eerie feeling as I faced the twelve committeemen around the table and sensed the gravity and responsibility of the task in driving home an understanding of our case. It was a challenge to which I hoped to be equal.

I opened my statement by saying that I intended to establish four facts. These were:

1. that the absorption of the increase of population in Palestine, which was quite considerable, had been successful;
2. that the economic structure so established was sound;
3. that this process of absorption conferred considerable benefits on the existing population and improved the economic condition of the Arabs;
4. that there were possibilities and potentialities for continuing that process of development and absorption.

"As to the first point," I went on, "we have the empirical test of direct observation of life and developments in Palestine, but, in addition, we have some scientific and statistical criteria as to whether or not the absorption was successful.

"The first statistical criterion is whether, at the end of the period, production per head was at least the same as at the beginning of the period. The second criterion is whether consumption kept pace with and corresponded to the increased population. The third refers to whether national wealth kept pace with the increase of population. That third point is of great importance because we might have an increased consumption by eating up part of the accumulated national capital."

Proceeding, I said that a comparison between 1922 and the years 1937-8 showed a steady, continuous increase of production per head of population.

The same was true of consumption. As the population increased, so did the consumption per head; that meant that the standard of life was simultaneously raised.

As to the third question—whether the capital assets of the country were not eaten up in order to maintain the higher standard of life—it was obvious by examining the country's general assets—namely, irrigated areas, citrus plantations, fruit plantations, industries, buildings, railroads, and highways—that the development of consumption was not the result of any diminution of national wealth, but, on the contrary, that there had been

a spectacular increase of capital assets per head of population.

Consequently, the statistics shown in the diagrams indicated that the development of production, consumption, and capital assets not only kept pace with the increase in population, but exceeded it very considerably.

I then went on to test the soundness of the economic structure by instancing the correlation between the trade deficit, Jewish capital imports, and Jewish investments.

"I believe it is erroneous to say that the deficit in the trade balance is covered by capital imports," I stated. "I would put it the other way round—that capital imports create a deficit in the trade balance.

"The expansion of our economy necessitates an extensive import of capital goods, agricultural machinery, industrial machinery, building materials, irrigation piping, and the like. That is the source and the cause of the trade deficit. Capital imports, therefore, are a source of development for this country as in every other country where settlement has been undertaken."

Looking at the history of Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand, I said, we found that each had an adverse balance at the beginning because capital had to be imported. They were repaying that capital in the course of their development, and the burden of capital repayment and interest charges was a heavy one.

"We shall not have such a problem, at any rate not to such an extent, because most of our capital was brought over with the immigrants or donated.

"Even the United States of America was in a similar position and had an adverse trade balance for a long period because of its need to import production capital."

I showed by one of the diagrams the complete correlation between the trade deficit, Jewish investments and Jewish capital imports. The figures demonstrated that the deficit was about equal to the investment for the eight years 1932 to 1939 inclusive, which meant that the influx of capital was not used to support the existing population, but to expand the country's economy and create new potentialities, new facilities for additional absorption of increased population. The result was clearly

an increased rate of production and of consumption and increased capital assets.

Another method of determining a sound economy which I presented to the committee was by showing the occupational structure and distribution of the Jewish population of Palestine. One of the diagrams displayed the vast difference between that structure in Palestine and among Jewish communities elsewhere in the world. The ratio of Palestine Jews engaged in primary and secondary pursuits, such as agriculture and manufacturing industries, to those employed in the country's tertiary services, such as transport, commerce, and similar activities, was much higher than in the Diaspora. The proportion compared with the figures for such well-developed countries as the United States, Holland, and Australia.

In a further diagram I presented the paradoxical fact that the figures for unemployment were in inverse ratio to immigration figures. The statistics showed that the number of unemployed is lowest at the time of the highest immigration, and vice versa—unemployment is highest at the time of low immigration.

"That paradox can be very easily explained in economic terms. There was once an economic theory, the so-called 'lump of labor' theory, that employment in each country was fixed and constant, and that every newcomer would be competing for this very limited employment. Thus, immigration in a time of unemployment must be detrimental to the employment position.

"But the theory has now been completely discounted by modern economists. They have determined that a newcomer to a country is primarily a consumer. The pace of development depends mainly on marketing facilities, and every new consumer expands the market for industrial and agricultural production.

"Thus, immigration in a period of crisis does not necessarily aggravate unemployment at all; indeed, it may relieve or alleviate the situation, because the additional consumption brings an expansion of production, so that unemployment decreases concurrently with immigration.

"Of course, these factors are related to the question of

productivity, which is determined by two main components: the skill of the worker, on the one hand, and the quality of capital equipment on the other. We are improving and renewing our equipment, and the growth of the population enables us to reduce production costs through the increased scope of production."

I traced the effect of the process on the Arab population of Palestine. Comparing the life-expectancy of the Moslem population with the growth of the Jewish community, I showed by diagram that the upward curve of Moslem life-expectancy was even more rapid than the relative increase of the Jewish ratio within Palestine's total population. That had been most decidedly so from the outset of Jewish settlement. A similar picture was obtained in comparing the Arab life-expectancy in Palestine with that in other Middle East countries. "Moslems in Palestine have a very much higher expectation of life at birth than the inhabitants of Egypt or Iraq," I pointed out.

Other indications pertaining to Jewish population increase led to the same conclusion. Arab infantile mortality decreased correspondingly with Jewish population increase, and the decline in Moslem infantile mortality was most marked in areas where the increase of Jewish population was greatest.

By way of marginal comment I gave some account of our achievements and economic attainments by citing my own personal experience of road construction and swamp drainage in my younger days.

I could not help feeling somewhat entertained by the obvious surprise my listeners had at receiving a highly technical lecture from a man who twenty years earlier had been a *kibbutz* settler and road-laborer in the Plain of Esdraelon. The circumstance undoubtedly enlivened the testimony by spotlighting the human angle of cold facts and dry figures.

With the conclusion of the public hearings, the committee split into several groups, one going to visit the neighboring Arab countries and the others touring Palestine itself.

Those who went to Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Lebanon saw the way the Jewish communities were harried and browbeaten. It was an excellent object lesson against leaving Palestine Jewry at the mercy of a sovereign Arab regime. The members who toured Palestine itself collected a wealth and variety of impressions.

Shortly after the committee's arrival, Judge Hutcheson had asked me to accompany him and Sir John Singleton on a trip to the Dead Sea. We left under police guard early one afternoon. I was in the same car with Judge Hutcheson. A British detective sat next the driver and I knew that every word of our conversation would be relayed to the authorities the same day.

Our route was the Jericho Road, which winds out of Jerusalem in the lee of the old city walls. As we topped the rise above the Garden of Gethsemane, the walled city stretched below us in all its serene dignity—the gray stone buildings, church towers, and mosque domes, the cupolas of many edifices, steeped in the mystic beauty of their antiquity.

The highway wound between olive-treed hillsides and occasional straggling plantations until it began to drop four thousand feet below our starting-point into the awesomely desolate chasm that is the Wilderness of Benjamin. We reached the "Sea Level" sign and continued to descend between the stark, barren hills, which presented a sight probably unique in the world.

Judge Hutcheson, who had been brought up on Holy Writ, began quoting passages from the Old and New Testaments relating to the wild countryside. Indeed, the rugged grandeur of the scenery gave one an insight into the soul of the prophets and seers of ancient times, and

into the spirit of the prophetic utterances that had originated in these enduring hills. It was easy to understand that the prophets of old felt this grim panorama to be far removed from the living world and to exist on the rim between death and eternity.

At the outset Judge Hutcheson warned that he did not intend to discuss the object of his visit to the land. But a short while later, he broke his own promise and asked about the Jewish flight from Europe. He let drop a few critical remarks about lawbreaking.

"I have a great respect for law and order, which I regard as a lofty human ideal," he said. "Your people show no regard for the law by their activities, though, to tell the truth, they're committing their unlawful acts with wonderful efficiency."

"There are times when the law isn't compatible with principles of elementary justice," I rejoined. "That's when citizens begin to defy the law. It's the history of all human progress. It happened during the French Revolution. Whenever the law becomes unbearable under the changing conditions of any historical epoch, the people throw off its bonds and rise in rebellion. If it weren't for these acts of defiance, I doubt whether mankind could have progressed at all."

"After all," I added with a smile, "the Boston Tea party, which was the beginning of your own independent American political civilization, wasn't exactly a law-abiding affair."

The elderly Texan jurist burst out laughing and said something that taught as well as astonished me a great deal at that moment. "Yes, that's true," he admitted. "But they had enough power and purpose to finish the job and attain their object. That's the crux of the difference."

His rejoinder vividly illustrated the hard fact that revolution is perhaps the only crime for which its perpetrators are not punished unless they fail. This stranger from distant Texas had correctly assessed the value of our resistance by the only possible gauge—was it capable of consummation?

ern shore of the Dead Sea and Beth Ha'arava ("House in the Wilderness") settlement. The visitors were deeply impressed by the sight of what had been achieved, by the self-sacrifice and drive of the pioneers, and by their intellectual caliber.

The pleasant green oasis in the heart of a savage desert, girdled by the gaunt, bister mountains, was an earnest of indomitable effort and faith. We saw the mounds of earth dug up so that the settlers could soak the soil to remove the high saline content. Flowers, lawns, bushes, fruit, tomatoes, and other truck produce flourished in the wilderness, torn from the sand by bare hands. Happy, bronzed children romped among the houses.

The settlers showed the visitors their handiwork proudly. Even Sir John was moved to relax his customary icy reserve and to express some measure of admiration of the enterprise, a striking example of man's conquest over obdurate nature and the taming of a salt-encrusted wasteland.

A few days later I met Dick Crossman and happened to mention Judge Hutcheson's odd remark during our drive down to the Dead Sea. Our meeting took place at a private home, the owners of which were abroad at the time, some hours after I had testified.

Dick, who had apparently given up hope of an agreed solution, reverted to the question of the balance of power between the three contestants for control of the country's political future.

When I recalled the annoying platitude: "The Jews may be right but the Arabs are going to make trouble," he smiled and said: "Those days are over. Many people now believe that the Arabs haven't a bad case but the Jews are going to make trouble."

I was surprised at the new attitude, but remembered a remark by T— of *The Times* in London and reflected on its uncanny resemblance to the viewpoint that Crossman now attributed to leading British personalities.

When we met again some time later, Crossman told me of his interview with Jamal el Husseini, who had insisted on the utter impossibility of any other way out of the tragic dilemma than a Jewish-Arab war. He railed

bitterly against the British, whose interference, he claimed, obstructed such a straight decision. Jamal firmly believed that the outcome would be an Arab victory and cited precedent as proving that many historic problems had been finally resolved by direct conflict.

I heard the same theory expressed in due course by another Arab leader, Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League. It was these short-sighted men who themselves led their people along the path to inevitable defeat.

The next trip I took was in company with Judge Hutcheson, James G. MacDonald, and Frank W. Buxton, to whom I had been assigned to show all I thought would be interesting. Our convoy left Jerusalem with heavy police escort and armored cars. There were C.I.D. agents in each car.

On our way down to the coast, we drove into Kibbutz Maaleh Ha'hamisha ("Hill of the Five"), where MacDonald—later to become the first United States Ambassador to Israel—spent most of the time in company with children rescued from Europe. The others chatted with members of the settlement, including European refugees, and were able to see a real-life parallel between the similar types of people they met in the D.P. camps of Germany and Austria and these rehabilitated persons in Eretz Israel.

The Americans were most impressed, however, by the lovely garden at Maaleh Ha'hamisha, which seemed to have been literally wrested from the wild and pitiless rock-strewn Judean hills. The sole vibrant life in the expanse of gray crags and boulders was that wonderful verdure, the avenues of trees, the green lawns encircled by pines and the neat fruit orchards.

I told the visitors how the area had to be cleared and prepared, the stones and weeds removed and the terraces built, all by hand. Twenty-five years earlier, I said, I had taken part in similar work in the Galilee hills. The land on which Maaleh Ha'hamisha's garden now flourished was no different from the rest of the mountain region before the pioneers settled here, but they were prevented by the White Paper's restrictions on land-purchase from

extending the development work to adjacent sites. The iniquity of the restrictions was only too evident.

We had a similar experience at Holon, near Tel Aviv, where I showed Frank Buxton the beautiful gardens at Kiryat Avodah and the sand-dunes near by. In telling him the history of the place, I said it had all been dune-land a short while before. It sounded such a tall story that despite Buxton's sympathy with our cause, he could not help an irritated outburst:

"Do you really want us to believe these dunes can be turned into gardens, and that there was no difference between the two areas before you developed this part?"

Instead of replying, I called over some children who had gathered around us and suggested that Buxton ask several who spoke English to describe what the place looked like before it was developed. He did so. I need hardly add what they said.

The last trip I took was with Dick Crossman alone. In our long conversation during the drive I explained the significance of Partition, and in his *Palestine Mission* Crossman remarked that I had "added one important argument for this plan"—namely, the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine outside the hill regions and the purely Arab settled areas. Crossman wrote:

"If the Agency had its way, the British Government would now declare its adherence in principle to a Jewish State and there would then be a long period of mandatory rule until a Jewish majority was achieved. During this period, Jewish-Arab friction would obviously reach new heights, since the Arabs would have to watch month by month the immigration figures creeping towards a Jewish majority. All they would have to do would be to cause trouble from time to time in order to stop immigration. Under these conditions, there would never be a Jewish State.

"In the second place, the transition period would also be a period of extreme economic difficulty, during which deflation would have to occur. It is difficult to conceive that the Palestine Administration

would permit the Jews to carry through this deflation-cum-immigration policy successfully. A financial crisis would almost certainly occur and be blamed on immigration, and once again the Jewish State would never be realized."

The fact was, Crossman went on, that transition to a Jewish state could not be achieved under a colonial administration that inevitably found the "backward Arabs" easier to manage than the Jews. It was obvious that an administration "schooled in the autocratic habits of Tanganyika and Nigeria, and dependent on London for every major decision of policy, cannot possibly run a modern, self-assertive, self-consciously democratic community like the Jews of Palestine." Crossman added that any policy which prolonged the present administration either indefinitely or for ten years was "asking for trouble."

We lunched at my home in Tel Aviv after calling at the offices of Hamashbir Hamerkazi, a *Histadruth* affiliate, and the Manufacturers Association. Golda Meirerson, then one of the secretaries-general of the *Histadruth*, was the other guest. A keen discussion arose on the social achievements of the labor movement in Palestine and on the fate of European Jewry as Crossman's keen eye had observed it during his visit to the camps.

Crossman was invited to a meeting of the *Histadruth* executive council. It was a thrilling event. The entire council membership attended, and Joseph Sprinzak, now Speaker of the Israel Knesseth, welcomed the guest of honor.

In replying, Crossman outlined the British Labour Government's difficulties and the necessity for "going slow" in the changes evolving in the United Kingdom, particularly in the Labour Government's foreign-policy attitude. It was a judicious, diplomatic, and extremely cautious exposition and almost skirted the Palestine issue.

The *Histadruth* leaders delivered addresses in tones ranging from candor to outright acrimony, presenting our position and claims clearly and unequivocally. The

statements must have impressed Crossman deeply. I sat alongside him and almost felt the warring impulses within him as he listened—his political acumen and reserve conflicting with sympathy and identity of view with these people. He replied briefly and moderately, yet with deep feeling, thanking his hosts for their frankness and concluding on a significant note: "I won't say much, but you will have to judge me by my actions rather than by what I say."

There was a good deal of excitement outside as we left the building. Hundreds of workers had gathered and cheered Crossman, who was visibly moved.

Golda and I escorted him to David Ben-Gurion's home near the seashore in Tel Aviv. Rumors had reached us that he was allegedly in favor of a token Jewish state in part of the country as a means of fulfilling our demands at least partially, while the White Paper restrictions would be maintained elsewhere in Palestine.

B.-G. did not mention the rumor, but in addressing Crossman he said: "You have the power to suppress us, of course, but you must remember one thing. The Jews are no fools and you'll never be able to delude them. They won't be misled. They'll fight."

Crossman understood the full significance of the statement. He was apparently weighing it up in his mind as we motored back in the darkness from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The barbed-wire barriers, the numerous patrols, the deserted highways, and the strict road curfew testified more eloquently to the situation than words could convey.

The somewhat astonishing evidence given to a closed session of the committee by General J. C. D'Arcy, the British commanding officer in Palestine, was reported by Bartley Crum in his *Behind the Silken Curtain*. Crum summed up as follows what he said was "without question the most authoritative military information we could obtain":

1. Speaking purely from the military point of view, the British general could enforce a pro-Jewish solution without much difficulty.

2. In enforcing such a solution, the Haganah could be most helpful.

3. In the event of a pro-Arab solution, he would have to contend with a "highly efficient" military organization (the Haganah). He estimated the budget of this organization to reach four million dollars a year. He would require three army divisions and from four to six months to break the back of the opposition. Even then some measure of underground resistance would persist.

4. In enforcing a pro-Arab solution, Arab support, he was afraid, would be of no value.

On being asked what would happen if British troops were withdrawn from Palestine, General D'Arcy replied flatly that Haganah would take over the whole country on the morrow and could hold it against the entire Arab world.

A British committeeman asked whether he was implying that it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to disarm Haganah, to which he said: "You cannot disarm a whole people. I rather think the world will not stand for another mass murder of Jews."



Was there no other solution save the ordeal by blood and fire?

That was the unspoken question uppermost in every mind when the committee finally completed its assignment and left Palestine.

On its departure for Switzerland, a consultation was held on the course of action now to be taken. Those present included David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok, Moshe Sneh, Dov Joseph, Leo Kohn, Arthur Lourie, myself, and two or three others.

The question before us was the momentous one: Where are we bound? Any likelihood of influencing the committee's deliberations was naturally limited; actually, it was now up to us to determine at least what our line and objective were to be in the impending struggle.

It was difficult to reconcile the two basic conceptions that emerged. One school regarded the committee as a mere episode of little real significance in the light of the historic vision inherent in the Zionist ideal and the Jewish state, and consequently thought it best to win support for the Jewish state idea in its entirety from even the smallest minority within the committee, irrespective of what the remainder, albeit the large majority, might decide.

The second group, aiming at another objective, was certain that only a minority of three or four committee-men would advocate a Jewish state and acceptance of the full Zionist demands. This minority would have little effect on the substance or tone of the majority report. The majority, under the influence of the British members, would without doubt favor political action so closely approximating the White Paper policy as to be indistinguishable from it. At best there would be a few unimportant modifications.

Those who believed in this approach felt that a unified report would be advantageous to us even if it did not recognize our full demands. "Moreover," they argued, "our standing in the committee is much better than in relation to popular British feeling and we shall be able to get a more amenable solution from its members than from the British Government. What can we possibly expect to get from a hostile government backed by public opinion if the majority report is against us? Won't the declaration by the pro-Zionist minority then remain a useless and insignificant demonstration, and therefore easily ignored?"

Pursuing this argument, its proponents urged a realistic and flexible course of action. They differed from the maximalist viewpoint that public opinion in the United Kingdom was susceptible of change; and, indeed, anyone closely acquainted with the state of affairs in England was unable to deceive himself on the score.

It was a conflict between the almost mystic religious belief in fulfillment of the historic dream and a sober, pragmatic political realism.

The discussion was overcast by a certain tension and

depression. The general political situation and balance of forces overshadowed all else.

As we sat in a corner of Dr. Weizmann's room, around a small table, none of us but felt the full weight of the grave responsibility resting on us. A small, weak community was ranged against the almost unlimited strength of a mighty empire. The baffling problem faced us of how to break through this ironclad barrier to achieve our aspirations, armed as we were with no more than our faith, our vision, and the valid political case of the supreme Jewish tragedy just behind us.

It was a most difficult decision to frame and it was not taken at that conference.

Several of us—Shertok, Nahum Goldmann, Lourie, and I—were assigned to go to Switzerland and remain close to the scene of the committee's deliberations, and to do whatever lay within our power to sway them in our favor.

Thus ended the Jerusalem act of the drama. The scene shifted to the lakes and snow-capped mountains of tranquil Switzerland.

(13) MORE JOURNEYINGS

Cairo again. The familiar cosmopolitan atmosphere, the motley of languages and customs, the colored lights and the queer people. . . . A conference at that international caravansery Shepheard's Hotel, with an American oil company's representative, who suggests a plan designed to fortify our political struggle. Engaged as we are in a conflict of unequal forces, any disregard of a scheme or device capable of helping us is a luxury we cannot afford. An important oil corporation may possibly assist in the attainment of our purpose and it is necessary to listen, test out, and speculate on any suggestion offered.

The hotel lounge was like the interior of a mosque, with dim lights and soft-glowing color. Elegantly clad

couples danced to lilting tunes. Snatches of conversation in English, French, Arabic, and Turkish could be overheard, a potpourri of tongues. This was the center of Middle East intrigue. The talk babbled on. Here and there a burst of laughter rose over the din, and at the next table there was a cautious whisper.

British, American, and French diplomats, high officers, adventurers and courtesans, foreign millionaires and Egyptian pashas, politicians and businessmen sat around, while, near by, the dancing was in full swing. A British intelligence officer murmured something into the ear of his beautiful Greek companion. Everyone seemed caught up in some dangerous game, tense yet exciting, and all ears appeared to be alert for the least sound or whisper muttered in this strangest of ballrooms. You imagined of a sudden that the chamber was crowded with spies, lovely Mata Haris, secret political agents; a frothy mixture of adventure, political machinations, and venality constantly simmering.

The American oil executive with whom I was sitting hailed from Lwow, my boyhood home in Galicia. He had made his way in Shanghai and was now in the American oil business. It was a hard-driving, hard-boiled world, a real tough business, as the Americans say. He suggested that we should utilize the purchasing power of the Jewish market in Palestine to secure economic and, possibly also, political advantages, and to capitalize the clash between British and American oil interests to our benefit. His idea was to set up an independent oil trading corporation.

I tried to sound him out further. I believed him when he claimed to be inspired by "Jewish feeling"; it sounded sincere enough. But I knew, too, that the interest of his corporation was involved, and it had not been able to get a toehold on the Palestinian market. No doubt it would not be averse to using us as a pawn in this game between rival interests and corporations. On the other hand, there might be an identity of interest between us and it would do no harm to consider his idea when I returned home.

These were my reflections during a conversation

which, if it achieved nothing else, perhaps lit up one of the hundreds and thousands of the more obscure ramifications of our problem in the political and economic sphere.

As I had to sit around for a few days for the plane, I decided to spend some time in sightseeing and walked round to the famous Egyptian National Museum. I saw the fabulous treasures of Tutankhamen and the relics of that legendary wealth which had been preserved intact for over three thousand years in the depths of the royal tombs, chapters of living history and a remarkable testimony to that ancient culture.

The gulf between Egypt of old and Egypt of today is so startling that you feel for a moment there has been cultural recession. Was Spengler right in his *Decline of the West* when he wrote that we are caught up in a vicious circle of hopeless, purposeless, aimless rise and fall?

But these are dangerous thoughts for one occupied with an important political errand. Gold, ivory, precious gems, a superior culture, highly developed technology and art; and, posed against them, primitive mentalities and superstitious cults. The king is escorted to his sepulchre by slaves, weapons, and tools so that they may serve him in the beyond; a highly skilled technique at the service of a primordial, backward, and childish belief. Yet is the same contradiction really not the heritage of our own modern culture as well?

Leaving the museum, I felt as though I were returning to another world. The æons of difference between Tutankhamen, and the vestiges of his epoch, and the harsh business world of today were never more acutely accentuated. This time the executives of another oil corporation conferred with us. Truly, the importance of petroleum in the rubric of our political affairs was increasing hourly.



London. I hurried to the hotel. A few hours later I was called to the telephone. Shertok was speaking from Geneva.

"You must come here tomorrow," he said. "It's urgent. The committee is pressing on with its work. We've heard about the discussions on Haganah. Hutcheson has changed his mind and won't be budged."

I went to a travel agency. By a friend who was flying to Eretz Israel the next day, I sent word to Eliezer Kaplan and made ready to leave for Paris.

Arriving in Paris, I met our emissaries from home. They were then touring the continent of Europe, especially Germany, trying to save what they could of the remnants of Jewish life and property. They showed a considerable degree of ability, energy, efficiency and initiative, and often genuine heroism as well, in the adventures and vicissitudes that befell them in the byways of Europe. The thrilling stories they told sounded like fantastic adventure tales. I was enthralled the whole of that day at Claridge's in Paris.

The next day I reached Geneva. Shertok gave me more details of the latest developments within the committee. Indirect information revealed that a sharp discussion had arisen over the questions of Haganah and terrorism. Singleton had tried to stretch the term "terrorists" to include Haganah. Hutcheson protested and said: "My forefathers fought your forefathers, Sir John, but they were not terrorists. I don't accept that term."

Moreover, it appeared that a new fundamental change had come about in Hutcheson's views and he had suddenly become incensed at the formalistic British conception of the resistance movement. He remembered the revolutionary tradition of his American forebears and was sharply critical of the rigid legal stand on Haganah and terrorist issues taken by the British members. Crossman, Crum, McDonald, and most of the other Americans supported him, and the committee entered a dead end when the Britons, apart from Crossman, tried to turn the report into a brief defending the White Paper and the need to continue it. The position was grave and at a deadlock.

As we had little elbow-room at Geneva, we decided to transfer our headquarters to Montreux, where Nahum Goldmann had taken some rooms at a lakeside hotel.

Spring was celebrating its triumph in Switzerland. The cherry trees were in bloom like snowflakes against a green mantle; the mountains reared their stately heads, peaks and summits glistening white against the sky. A deep, fresh, wonderful green, a multicolored wealth of flowers, a spring of hope, beauty, faith, and blossom.

The car, with Shertok, Lourie, my wife, and I as passengers and Goldmann at the wheel, sped along one of the finest highways in Europe, the route from Geneva to Montreux. At our feet lay the twinkling blue lake, and, around us, towering forests and quietly slumbering Swiss villages—a peaceful, restful world, free from cares and problems. The only incongruous note amid the soothing hush and charm of the Swiss rural scene, long-precious heritage of the Swiss people, was our small party with its tragic and disturbing worries compounded of many vexing elements—the recognition of our existence as a nation, the struggle, refugees groping for a final haven, barbed wire in the streets of our small far-away land, decrepit ships tossing on stormy seas, terrorism and counter-terrorism, the threatened collapse of prized political and social values and bastions, suffering, bloodshed, battle, and hazard. And we here, alone with our tempest of feelings, amid the loveliest, most tranquil scenery imaginable.

We could not but realize the full significance of the contrast. We realized it now, in the car between Geneva and Montreux, and realized it later while sitting around the table set in the fragrant hotel garden, alongside the turquoise waters of the lake; and I realized it again a year later when I spent another few weeks at Geneva in proximity to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

On our way to Montreux we passed through Lausanne, where the car that Goldmann had hired in Geneva broke down. It was a situation by no means pleasant. We had no desire to court excessive publicity in Switzerland, and certainly not at Lausanne, where the committee was pondering the final text of its report behind closed doors.

With great difficulty we managed to roll the vehicle

to a garage and had to wait about three hours until the repairs were done. The mechanic told us that the motor would have "burst" in our faces had we continued the journey, causing a serious accident.

I tried to imagine what would have happened had we all been involved in a bad smash. One thing seemed certain: no one would have believed it an ordinary mishap. The view that would have found most credence at home would undoubtedly have been that the "enemy" had succeeded in removing us, and speculation would have centered on the identity of the unknown assailant. Similar mysterious incidents occur frequently in political life; and as I have long since learned from my own experience, many important events are wholly the result of blind chance which, after occurrence, are attributed by the wiseacres to dire plots.

Reaching the hotel at Montreux, we were greeted by the hotel manager and his secretary, who told us that Washington, London, and Paris had been on the phone for us. They stared at us with wide-open eyes in which astonishment and suspicion struggled for the ascendancy. Overseas telephone calls in a hotel inhabited almost exclusively by portly old gentlemen of dignified and sedate bearing and elderly ladies living in retirement were a rare phenomenon, and here came a group of guests who, long before they turned up, were being called from England, France, and the United States. There was something wrong here, the hotel people appeared to think. They must have thought the same quite often the next few days as calls from other countries multiplied, until the management, bowing to the inevitable, had a telephone installed in Moshe Shertok's room.

The hotel management scaled the height of bewilderment when telephone calls began coming through from Italy, where the episode of the refugee ships *Spezia* and *Fada* began, and we had to remain in constant communication with our people at the Italian ports and advise them what to do. Consequently, a third sphere of action was added to the two others at Lausanne and Washington, and we were placed under the constant pressure of

the leader of the refugee movement, a young Palestinian, who insisted on immediate action; and this grave new problem was added to our other preoccupations.



"Kibbutz Montreux" was the nickname we gave to the small group comprising Moshe Shertok, Nahum Goldmann, Arthur Lourie, Gideon Rufer, my wife, and me, as well as two newspaper correspondents, Ruth Gruber and Gerold Frank. The latter were in the worst conceivable plight that newspaper writers could find for themselves—a plenitude of news that they were in honor bound precluded from reporting.

There was considerable tension. The reports on the committee's work were that the impasse continued. Our own uneasiness grew as the committee gave the impression of being unable to compose its differences.

I remember that one evening we decided to go to the movies to relax. We sat and watched the film, but our thoughts were far away.

Suddenly Shertok turned to me and exclaimed: "Don't you feel how strange this all is? Here we are, sitting in a corner of Montreux in Switzerland, and over there our people are struggling for their existence. We're stuck here waiting, in all this peace and quiet, and we go on living and watching and observing as though nothing had happened, nothing at all. It's all so very strange."

The telephone in the room next to the one my wife and I occupied rang at all hours up to two o'clock in the morning. Moshe Shertok conferred with his associates in Europe and the States, explained our position, listened to what they had to say, directed political activity. The refugee envoys and others came to see us at the hotel, and our small group increased and decreased by turns. It became a pivot of activity, the brain and nerve-center of all our work in Europe, and the other guests at the quiet hotel watched the mad foreigners in their midst with growing alarm.

Indeed, when we were finally about to leave, the secretary remarked: "It was the hardest time we ever had

here at the hotel, but the most interesting. All those conversations at night with Washington, London, Cleveland, Paris, and Milan—it was so exciting and thrilling!"

Meanwhile, a bizarre episode was disclosed as part of this chapter of the committee's activity. The Mandatory Administration had sent a C.I.D. officer to the spot, ostensibly to be responsible for the committee's security, though of course it was in no possible danger, but actually to watch and report on the comings and goings and to ensure complete isolation.

The officer once had a chat with one of our adversaries on the committee and told him with all the authority of his expert knowledge: "The Haganah people aren't really murderers, terrorists, or criminals. They only want immigration, and once you give it them, they'll be good boys. It's far better to be friendly with them and even allies."

When asked how the Arabs would react if immigration were increased, the C.I.D. man said: "It'll be child's play to settle anything like that if Haganah is allowed to help. Generally speaking, the Arabs aren't expected to start anything really serious."

This testimony by a British police officer under the Palestine Mandate took the member of the committee aback. It was the last thing he had expected to hear.

The scales tilted up and down between the two viewpoints on the committee: the British, excluding Crossman, and the American. On the surface it seemed as though two separate reports, and perhaps even a third, were inevitable: it looked at that moment as if the small group that unreservedly supported a Jewish state might break away from the rest.

But a British Minister who happened to be visiting Geneva, without going into the merits of the problem at all, said to the British committeemen that, in his humble opinion, "Anglo-American unity is essential above all."

His remark produced an immediate change. The British retreated from their position along the whole front and finally submitted to a compromise solution. Although this formula included a number of clear recommenda-

tions for speedy action, the principal portion, especially that relating to a long-range remedy, was obscure, ambiguous, and liable to varying interpretations, and it represented a curious medley of viewpoints, which could be construed as you wished.

(14)

PROS AND CONS of THE REPORT

The report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was not a brilliant document. It lacked breadth of vision and any bold approach to a solution, and betrayed nothing of the high intellectual level of the Palestine Royal Commission's report of 1937.

The report had two main defects:

First, under its terms of reference, the committee was compelled to start out from wholly fallacious assumptions. These terms limited the committee to an investigation of the position of Jews in European countries where the greater mass had fallen victim to Nazi and Fascist persecution. In other words, the assumption was that the Jewish question had been merely the product of conditions created in the preceding decade.

This limitation was one of both location and timing. From the aspect of location, the problems of Middle East Jewry and the spiritual condition of the Dispersion in democratic countries were completely overlooked; from that of timing, the roots of the "Jewish question"—eternal homelessness and lack of fundamental sovereignty—were ignored.

Secondly, the committee members were unable to reconcile their inner differences and consequently adopted a vague formula on a number of cardinal points. Clearly, several of the recommendations were deliberately left to the interpretation of the governments concerned, and indeed the committeemen themselves construed the proposals each by his own light. The result was that too

many recommendations were made subject to governmental construction.

The report abounded with contradictions. It failed to penetrate to the core of the problem. Yet, despite these flaws, it had great objective value. For the first time it authoritatively defined the position and aspirations of the remnants of European Jewry. It lifted that issue from the arena of polemics and clearly demonstrated the unmoral and unconstitutional character of the White Paper, which was incapable of being implemented.

The committee in effect brushed aside the White Paper's provisions regarding immigration and land-purchases; voided the political section of the White Paper by proposing a trusteeship for an indefinite period and rejecting the theory of majority rule; and opposed the article declaring that the Jews must remain a minority in the country.

The report also approved the continuation of the Mandate until the trusteeship was created. It obliquely recognized the Jewish Agency's rights in regard to immigration, development, and germane matters.

Negative political features were the denial of a Jewish state in perpetuity and the absence of an express provision that the articles in the Mandate pertaining to the Jewish national home would be included in the trusteeship charter.

In general, the short-range policy set forth in the report was acceptable. The request for the admission of one hundred thousand Jewish immigrants and the recommendation urging fulfillment of the Mandate provisions concerning the Jewish national home were the two fundamentals of this policy.

The long-range policy was vague on the whole. Its discharge depended entirely on the British Government and its attitude toward including the national-home provisions in a trusteeship regime, and on the Palestine Administration's discretion as regards immigration needs and its interpretation of the clause relating to protection of small landowners and tenants.

Profound differences of opinion over judgment of the document arose among the Jewish Agency leaders.

David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok, Berl Locker, Nahum Goldmann, Arthur Lourie, and I met for a brief consultation in Paris.

B.-G. flatly rejected the report, which he regarded as a disguised new edition of the White Paper, though more cleverly compiled. It was evident that it had been framed ambiguously and equivocally with the deliberate intent of evading a decision on the issues in dispute within the committee, in which the two schools of thought were poles apart. The report simply left the decision to the party entrusted with its interpretation. It shifted the political struggle to another arena by vesting wide powers in the administration that was to construe and implement its recommendations. The proposals for immediate action, primarily those concerning the grant of one hundred thousand immigration permits, were its only saving grace.

Contrasted with B.-G.'s negative attitude, several of our other colleagues found the report to offer a fine springboard for renewed political activity. They believed that outright rejection by the Jews was extremely risky and would permit Great Britain to maintain the status quo while arousing adverse public opinion in the United States. After all, they pointed out, the report had been passed unanimously by the committeemen, and defiance of it would be taken as directed against public opinion in America as well as in Britain, and would destroy immediate prospects, including the proposal of one hundred thousand certificates.

The discussion was not completed in Paris. The differences were not resolved and we were unable to reach a clear-cut decision. I hardly know what attitude we would have taken had Prime Minister Attlee's unexpected statement not released us, in a manner none had anticipated, from the necessity of decision.

rejection of the recommendations by making their acceptance contingent on conditions that could not be met, and the question of our own attitude to the report speedily became of secondary moment.

British reaction to the report differed from the American. While President Truman accepted the short-range policy proposed, and was more cautious when it came to the long-range proposals, the British Prime Minister posed two conditions for implementing it: first, the broad assistance of the United States, and, secondly, the disarming of the population in Palestine.

As the members of the Anglo-American Committee themselves disclosed in the meantime, the suggestion of disarming arose during their deliberations but was outvoted by eight to four. The British Premier's statement was in sharp contradiction to Bevin's promise, vouched by several committeemen, that he would give effect to the report if it were unanimous.

From the moment Attlee's statement was made, a new chapter of delays, circumlocution, and recantations set in. There was no attempt to carry out the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations, and one committee after another was appointed to whittle down the proposals of the preceding one.



Richard Crossman arrived in London after a short holiday in Switzerland. I met him soon after his return and found him to be unusually dejected and pessimistic over the future of the Anglo-American Committee's report. In Crossman's disappointed mind there was a growing inclination (which had long been germinating there) to accept Partition as a solution.

He clashed with the Government's official line, and in the *New Statesman and Nation*, of which he was assistant editor, he openly attacked Bevin's Palestine policy. That marked the beginning of Dick Crossman's aggressive opposition on the Palestine issue, during the course of which he was identified more than once with

our own position. But one basic fear continued to obsess him: the possibility of a collision between Britain and the Jewish people, against which he uttered the most dire warnings.

Crossman's frame of mind and outlook found articulate expression in his address to a private meeting of about forty M.P.s who were sympathetic to the Zionist movement, which took place in a committee room at the House of Commons. Other speakers included Moshe Shertok, Berl Locker, and D.P. representatives from Bergen-Belsen.

Crossman began by saying he was going to speak on matters to which the Jews themselves were unable to allude. "The situation is dangerous," he said. "Inaction is tantamount to action. Palestine has become a single, united resistance movement. It's a strong, determined movement and there are no quislings in it. It's a body of men banded together to defend their rights, which, as far as they are concerned, are a matter of life and death.

"The 'White Paper' which promises the country its independence contains no guarantee of minority rights, and the upshot is nothing but the danger of physical extermination of the Jewish population at a none too distant date. It's a resistance movement against our country, but in the cause of justice.

"A British general told me in Cairo that there's only one formidable force in the Middle East—the Jewish people. Haganah has wonderful fighting qualities, a steeled determination and the best intelligence service in the world. It's a great force which we mustn't despise. We must consequently avert any British-Jewish war with all which it implies."

To me, the developments appeared to be moving like two clocks, on one of which the hands were rotating toward a pacific solution of the Palestine question, and on the other were swinging round to the hour of outbreaks, clashes, and bloodshed. No one knew which of the two clocks would first toll the hour of twelve. But it seemed at the time as if the clock showing a peaceful solution had stopped running altogether, and the hands on the

other dial were pushing rapidly onward to the point of inevitable conflict.

One single ray of light filtered through the darkening clouds—the tidings from the United States, especially of President Truman's resolute adherence to his promises.

The British Government remained as obdurate as before. Among members of Parliament there was considerable confusion. Crossman asked a very shrewd question at a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party's Foreign Affairs Committee: "Why do less justice with more British divisions when you can do more justice with less divisions?"

Meanwhile the British Government was perfecting its plan to smash Jewish resistance. Rumors emanated from Government quarters concerning the plans to disband and liquidate the Jewish Agency and to suppress the Haganah as part of the general disarmament of the Yishuv.

The changes that were taking place in the broad arena of international and Imperial politics made it more difficult to fathom the Government's policy on Palestine. The White Paper on India, with its undertaking to evacuate British forces at once, was published at this time; and many were unable to understand why it was essential to maintain bases and lines of communication on the route to India if British rule were being withdrawn from the subcontinent itself.

Two replies were generally given to the question. The first was that the evacuation of India was only ostensible and that there was no real intention of leaving it unguarded. The second contended that Palestine was a vital factor in Great Britain's defense of its African empire, which was destined to occupy a foremost place in the economy, policy, and strategy of the British Commonwealth.

There was keen resentment among the Conservatives at the Labour Government's promise to evacuate Egypt, to which they ascribed the utmost importance owing to the inestimable value of the Suez Canal, both as a foremost defense link on the route to India—which the Conservatives were by no means disposed to surrender—and

as a pillar of the African line, which they regarded as the last bastion in whatever emergency befell the Commonwealth.

(16) WEIGHING THE PROSPECTS

A current appraisal of the political situation and outlook in terms of the equiponderance of factors operating for and against the Zionist interest showed the following:

For: support by the United States (even if somewhat restricted); President Truman's sympathy; the pressure of the D.P. problem; internal differences in the British Labour Party; and fear of the "trouble" that the Jews might cause.

Against: the conflict between the West and Russia, and its offshoot, appeasement of the Arabs; plans for a regional security alliance hinging on the Arab states; fear of the Arabs; and the influence wielded by British political and military officialdom in the Middle East.

Reports reaching us from the Arab camp spoke of acute internal dissension and controversy. Albert Hourani deplored the fact that the Arab cause had enlisted the support mainly of the most reactionary quarters, while Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League, maintained that the Arabs had to be reconciled to the prospect of one hundred thousand Jews ultimately entering Palestine, but that the admissions would be spread out over three years.

Disquieting news was meanwhile trickling through concerning the British Government's designs to crush the Yishuv, the Zionist movement, and the Jewish Agency by a large-scale military suppression intended to spearhead the "strong-arm policy" by which the Government proposed once for all to end the Yishuv's power of resistance.

The reports speeded my return home. I left within a few days to warn our colleagues of the portents and to await the actual events on the spot, instead of in London.

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Cairo welcomed us, as is its wont, with stifling heat, clouds of dust, and familiar stenches. Nevertheless, it offered a blessed relief after an arduous journey during which the aircraft pitched almost without pause from one sickening air-pocket into another, much to the physical discomfort of the passengers.

Five of us sat in armchairs in a corner of the fashionable lounge at the Hotel Continental, in Opera Square, sipping black coffee and engaging in lively discourse. Actually it was a duologue, between two persons and, one might almost say, two worlds. The group comprised Tak ed-Din, Lebanese diplomat; Yolande, a pretty young Cairo Jewess; E—, Jewish Agency representative in Cairo, whom she assisted; my wife, and myself.

Tak ed-Din, who lived in Cairo, was one of the leading figures in the Arab League. He was its delegate at the Pan-Asiatic Congress at New Delhi and at a number of other conferences and gatherings. A cousin of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riadh Bey es-Solh, Tak ed-Din was a very capable journalist, with a sound French cultural background. He was intelligent and broad-minded and had a pleasing personality.

We had met and struck up friendship during my previous visits to Cairo, and the fact that the commotion and turmoil over the Palestine issue were then reaching their peak vested our calm discussion with special if somewhat bizarre meaning, which heightened my interest in what he had to say.

"The Palestine problem seems to defy any solution or prospect of solution," Tak ed-Din remarked. "It needs the introduction of some Archimedean principle to move it from the present freezing-point. We're all in the same dead end.

"Palestine's geographical position makes it a cross-

roads of transport routes, telephonic, postal, and telegraphic communications, and a junction which actually divides the Arab countries. Take the recent strike by Palestine Government employees, for example. It halted postal, telephone, and travel communications throughout the Middle East.

"Moreover, the Arabs are still weak, and the danger of Jewish aggression, expansion, and lust of conquest which is likely to develop will inevitably provoke a bloody clash for hegemony over the East."

Listening to him, I knew that this fear of alleged Jewish expansion and domination was by no means factitious. I had heard similar apprehensions expressed in talks with others, and my colleagues—who met and talked to more Arab people than I did—reported it as the most recurrent theme in their conversations.

Tak ed-Din went on to talk of the heterogeneous character of the peoples and multifarious languages of the Middle East and their immanent dangers and difficulties, basing his observations principally on his experiences in the Lebanon.

In replying, I tried to convince him of our earnest desire to become an integral part of Oriental life and to achieve the emancipation of the Orient through the force of Arab-Jewish co-operation. Depicting our renewed links with the awakening East, I went on to say how absurd it was to suppose that the Jews were capable of embarking on a campaign of aggression against the whole Arab world simply on account of an alleged "lust of conquest" and expansion. "We regard ourselves as kinsmen of the Eastern peoples and partners in their destiny and fortunes," I asserted.

Tak ed-Din and I were on easy terms together. He had few prejudices and spoke his mind candidly. But historical conflicts and contradictions cannot be altogether eliminated even in affable discussion, and neither of us deluded himself into the belief that the seed of a far-reaching political accord had been sown in these friendly exchanges.

It was especially difficult to conceive of any bridge
oo between the Arabs and ourselves at this time, when the

British were offering the Arab countries a regional pact of which the purpose was to elevate Anglo-Arab military and security co-operation to the level of a mutual assistance treaty.

The East-West clash was having a growing effect on the Middle East. Suspicion and fear were casting their sinister pall over political realities throughout the world. The atomic bomb had frightened all peoples, and, after all, we Jews were but a small grain of sand whirled around by the tempest.

A new game was now starting. Fresh plots were being hatched and pursued in the Middle East and we were destined to be the first victim.

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Returning home, we were filled with a sense of disappointment, pessimism, dread, and an irksome foreboding of the storm about to erupt. We faced a truly menacing situation in the sure knowledge that there was no retreat, but none the less we breathed more easily when, at last, we felt the soil of Israel beneath our feet.

I had brought back with me from London the fairly well-substantiated reports of the impending attack planned by the authorities against the Jewish Agency, Haganah, and the whole Yishuv. The indications were of a concentrated "purge" of the settlements, mass arrests, disarming of Haganah, the detention of Jewish Agency Executive members, and widespread military operations which would have the effect of shaking the Yishuv's existence to its very foundations and placing the entire structure, built up with such effort during the past thirty years, in danger of collapse.

Golda Meyerson told me that Haganah had in the meantime succeeded in getting hold of the actual British military plan, which called for wholesale arrests and smashing the Yishuv's resistance with one massive and lasting blow. The same information was conveyed by Haganah leaders.

I learned afterwards that a political program based on similar operations had been devised as a corollary to the

military campaign. The program was to avoid a frontal assault on the terrorist groups for the time being, since their continued existence caused dissension in the Jewish fold, and to bolster up the moderate elements. Moreover, the terrorist groups were not powerful. On the other hand, it was imperative to strike a decisive blow at Haganah and the Jewish Agency, which were the most formidable core of resistance in the Yishuv.

The plan was based on the belief that a blow of this kind against the authorized representative body of the Yishuv would bring about internal differences, schism, and, finally, the realization that there would be no advantage in the Yishuv's carrying on the struggle. The moderate elements would then take over and, bolstered by some so-called concessions, would collaborate with the Mandatory Power.

A violent discussion began within the Yishuv and among the different factions, primarily in the labor community, over the method and means of struggle. The split cut across party lines.

At one extreme were the "dissidents," whose tactics ranged from personal violence to guerrilla actions; at the other was the pacifist wing, which opposed any kind of physical violence and urged political campaigning coupled with unauthorized immigration. The majority of the Yishuv, despondent and hesitant, stood between these two extremes, grappling with the issues posed by the "activists" and "anti-activists," the extremists and moderates, those who supported aggression and those ready to enter the fray solely in defense of active immigration and land settlement.

Meanwhile the collisions with authority daily assumed more stringent forms. Acts of violence grew in scope, and the country grimly awaited the inevitable upshot without knowing its precise nature.

On the 18th of June 1946 Haganah blew up eight bridges on the Palestine frontier and paralyzed communications with neighboring territories. The operation was the crowning act of the organized struggle against the White Paper Administration in Palestine.

Ten days later the British authorities launched their own action against the Yishuv, Haganah, and the Jewish Agency.

CURFEW, ARRESTS, (17) and BOMBSHELLS

It was a Sabbath morning, the 29th of June 1946. I was awakened at dawn by the sound of firing and explosions in the streets of Tel Aviv.

Then the familiar booming of the mobile loud-speakers echoed through the city, proclaiming that a strict curfew had been imposed. Although curfews in those days were a common enough occurrence, it was obvious this time that something big was afoot. A strange feeling descended on us.

Turning on the radio, we heard the broadcast announcement in the three official languages—Hebrew, English, and Arabic—on behalf of the High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, that widespread military operations had been launched against the Yishuv, the Jewish Agency, and Haganah, which were accused of organizing and conducting acts of violence against the Government.

Armored cars cruised along the deserted thoroughfares. The hobnailed boots of British infantry patrols fell hollowly on the sidewalks, while now and then the sharp crack of rifle-shots was heard as the troops fired into the air to keep people well indoors and off their balconies.

I lifted the telephone and dialed the hotel where Moshe Shertok was staying. His wife, Zippora, came on at the other end. She told me that Moshe had been arrested at daybreak by a large squad of police.

Golda Meyerson, with whom I got in contact next, informed me of the arrests of David Remez, Itzhak Gruen-

baum, Dov Joseph, and Rabbi Y. L. Fishman. I kept in regular touch with Golda throughout the day.

Several friends who lived near my house drifted in one by one. We clustered round the telephone receiving reports from all parts of the country. I was afraid that Golda might be arrested, and she rather expected it.

At noon she broke off in the middle of a telephone colloquy and said she heard the steps of policemen climbing the staircase to her apartment. Half an hour later the phone rang again and I was surprised to hear Golda's voice. She said it had been a search in the neighboring apartment.

From the Emek came the report of men killed in one of the settlements. News also reached us of those arrested in Jerusalem. It was stated that all had been removed to Latrun detention camp.

In the afternoon Joseph Sprinzak and I telephoned to the home of the president of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, at Rehovoth. Meyer Weisgal answered and said that the "Chief" was preparing to call on the High Commissioner to demand the immediate suspension of the operation and the release of the detained people. We suggested that Dr. Weizmann should apprise the High Commissioner of the Yishuv's complete identification with the detainees and fighters, and he agreed.

The telephone went on ringing intermittently. People called me up from various places, asking for news, exchanging information, advice, and ideas. We were shocked, tense, and helpless, immured indoors, with only the telephone to connect us with the outside world, circumscribed in our movements and unable to take any effective steps.

It was a sleepless night for all of us, a night of vigil. The curfew ended the next morning and I tried to reach Jerusalem, but in vain. My car was not allowed to leave Tel Aviv, and it was stated that the road to Jerusalem was still closed.

The Tel Aviv Municipal Council met to discuss the position. Dr. Weizmann attended the meeting. I learned there details of the Zionist president's fruitless talk with

the High Commissioner. General Cunningham had hinted at the necessity of setting up a new Yishuv leadership and even went so far as to indicate the names of those who would be acceptable, in the best British colonial tradition.

Bewilderment reigned at the meeting. Someone tried to utter words of comfort: "We shall survive this, too, and overcome them yet." But it sounded like empty rhetoric rather than a convincing political statement. The discussion revolved around the question of whether or not to set up a new official leadership, but nothing was resolved. A few days later it was decided to reject any such idea lest it be interpreted as surrender.

The next day I finally succeeded in reaching Jerusalem, and took a hand in organizing a provisional executive to take over the Yishuv's administration during the interim.

The only two Executive members who had not been detained, Dr. Emil Schmorak and Eliahu Dobkin, together with Zeev Sherf, Shlomo Eisenberg, and myself, became the acting provisional Executive and got down to tackling the grave matters involved.

A Press and Information Office was set up under Dr. Walter Eytan. We also instituted communication by a secret code with our detained associates at the Latrun camp, and succeeded in retailing full daily reports of what was happening in the country. The replies, along the same grapevine, contained instructions, ideas, impressions, and a wealth of information of what was happening in the camp. Contact was maintained unflaggingly until the day of their release.

All relations with the Mandate Government had been suspended. We received the utmost support from every section of the Yishuv. Temporary office accommodation was obtained—the British Army had occupied the Jewish Agency buildings—and we worked at high tempo.

Overseas communication was also established. David Ben-Gurion and Eliezer Kaplan were then abroad. Moshe Sneh had gone underground together with other Haganah leaders.

Arrests, searches, and extensive military operations

were the order of the day throughout the country. Settlements were surrounded by cordons, and painstaking searches were made into every nook and cranny. Hundreds and thousands of young men were taken to concentration camps at Rafa, in Egypt, Athlit, and Latrun. Quantities of arms and ammunition were discovered and impounded, especially at Yagur, where, after a prolonged search, troops unearthed a large arsenal of mortars, machine guns, and other weapons.

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Several days after my arrival in Jerusalem, an urgent Yishuv Council meeting was summoned and took place at the Beth Ha'Halutzot (Pioneer Girls' Hostel) in Rehavia. Those participating included representatives of the Vaad Leumi (National Council), Jewish municipalities, and the Labor Federation and members of the Agency Executive who had not been detained.

Sharp differences arose in the discussion over the issue of joint action and the method of struggle to be pursued against the Government. Although everyone was agreed on the necessity of combating the Government and showing Yishuv solidarity with its representatives, nevertheless fundamental doubts concerning a policy of complete non-co-operation and anti-government economic measures were evident in the speeches of a number of participants, especially Israel Rokach, the Mayor of Tel Aviv, and his associates in Ha'Ihud Ha'Ezrahi (Citizens' Union).

Rokach insisted that the maintenance of orderly economic activity was an essential condition for the struggle and a principal element for our success.

During the discussion a report was handed in concerning the arrival of a new refugee ship. This encouraged the meeting somewhat, but immediately afterwards word came of the large arms find at Yagur and had a depressing effect on us. Everyone knew that our only hope depended on what arms we possessed, and that the Yishuv's defensive power would be destroyed if it were disarmed. We were afraid that discovery of the method

of concealing the arms would lead to similar finds at other places. Many of the participants at the meeting were visibly shocked to the core at the report concerning Yagur.

The deliberations at the conference were stamped by consciousness of the grave juncture and the absence of any clear line to follow. It was an imbroglio of confusion and frustration, a resolute desire to defend ourselves, the need to give a firm demonstration of devotion to and identity with those who were penned behind the barbed wire of Latrun and Rafa, and the lack of any plan for future practical action.

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I traveled constantly between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in those days, but spent most of my time in the latter city. I was conscious of the heavy responsibility that reposed on my colleagues and myself.

One Saturday the telephone rang at my home in Tel Aviv, and a London newspaperman named Jon Kimche, with whom I had become friendly, asked me to come urgently to Jerusalem to see him. It was not customary at the time to ask too many questions. I ordered a car and left at once. I went straight to Jon, who told me of a conversation with the Chief Secretary, Sir John Shaw, in which the latter hinted at the likelihood of the detainees' being released if Dr. Weizmann would put the request to the High Commissioner. It was a hopeful sign, which I felt ought not be disregarded.

I telephoned Dr. Weizmann at Rehovoth to say I was coming with some important news. He took the matter skeptically, but said he was ready to do whatever was necessary, on the clear understanding that he would not be placed in an invidious, undignified position and that it would not be a fool's errand. I then returned to Tel Aviv, where I consulted some of our associates, and arrived back in Jerusalem exhausted after the double journey.

An urgent interview was arranged for me that evening with a British colonel who headed the intelligence

service. He undertook to ascertain the High Commissioner's views on a visit from Dr. Weizmann. On returning from Government House, he told me that an aide had telephoned Rehovoth and invited Dr. Weizmann.

Late that night I again spoke to Dr. Weizmann and learned that no definite assurance had been given by the aide on behalf of the British authorities, as indeed none had been given to me in talking with the colonel, that the errand would not be fruitless. On returning to my hotel that time, I was deeply worried whether the whole affair might not be a trap or the result of a misunderstanding.

It transpired that Dr. Weizmann's call on the High Commissioner the next morning led to no result, and to this day it is uncertain whether this was not a ruse to lead the Zionist president astray or a misunderstanding between the High Commissioner and his Chief Secretary or between the latter and Jon Kimche. At all events, the hope that our colleagues might be freed became feebler after the incident, and the outlook grew more dismal.

It was learned that the official in charge of Jewish affairs in the Government was a young assistant secretary named Roderick C. Musgrave. He was a capable young man, who had been Assistant District Commissioner for the area comprising Tel Aviv. I knew him fairly well and we had been friendly from the time we had both served on a three-man committee set up by the Government during the war to investigate wage-scales at the Tel Aviv Municipality.

I had come to like the handsome young Englishman, who was intelligent and charming, had an affable way with people, and possessed a keen sense of humor. My colleagues had long sought someone who knew him, and on learning of my own acquaintance with him, they urged me to ascertain from him the Government's intentions and to find some way out of the deadlock.

At five o'clock one afternoon I telephoned Musgrave and reached him without difficulty. I remembered how busy the lines used to be whenever one tried to call a

Government office and reflected that the rupture of relations with the Jewish population had obviously relieved that pressure. Musgrave was obviously glad to get my call and, on learning that I was staying at Pension Greta Asher in Rehavia, agreed to come there whenever I said. We arranged to meet at seven o'clock that evening. I was surprised at his acquiescence, which showed him to be not only courteous but plucky in venturing to come alone into a Jewish residential quarter. It certainly seemed as if Musgrave were glad of the opportunity to break down the barrier with the Yishuv which the British themselves had erected.

He arrived punctually and we sat over some drinks in my room in frank and unreserved discussion. Musgrave dwelt primarily on the point that terrorism was the chief obstacle to any agreement or understanding between the Government and the Yishuv. I replied that although we discountenanced the terrorists, it was impossible to adopt his formal and legal attitude in view of the historic wrong done to us and the administration's attack on our very existence.

"There are moments in the history of nearly all peoples," I said, "when the bulwarks of law and order collapse under the grim pressure of reality and the demand for justice, when these conflict with the demands of law and order. A whole population cannot be coerced into obeying a universally detested law that all are prepared to oppose.

"Political astuteness lies in adjusting the law to the dictates of life and justice. 'Rebel' is a harsh word, but Cromwell and George Washington were rebels, and you yourselves conducted and are conducting negotiations with De Valera and Nehru, who undoubtedly fall into that category from a strictly legal and technical standpoint. The Boston Tea Party, which touched off the spark that led to American independence, wasn't a legal affair, and the European resistance movements weren't legal if judged formally by international law, which forbids civilian participation in belligerent actions.

"Is there no validity at all in the mood of a people of whom one third, about six million persons, were mas-

sacred? Is there any explanation of the fact that the might of an empire, its navy, army, and air force, were for years engaged in preventing the survivors of the Jewish tragedy in Europe from reaching their sole haven of refuge in Eretz Israel? And at the same time that Jewish troops fought alongside British troops against the common enemy, seven hundred Jewish refugees fleeing from the Nazi inferno were drowned in the Mediterranean because the route to that haven was blocked by the White Paper.

"Can you find in human history a more moving tragedy, or a more profound and human vindication for the conflict between justice and the forces of law? Is there a stronger power capable of propelling people into acts of desperation and lunacy, into bitter reaction and revolt?

"You have pitiless slaughter on the one hand, and on the other the expulsion of survivors from the one and only haven left to them by their late comrades in arms during the world struggle, all in the name of an inhumane policy.

"Moreover, unlike the other instances of conflict between law and justice, the administration forces in this instance don't enjoy the uninhibited support of law and statute; the policy they pursue is contrary to the country's Constitution, and it has been denounced by the highest authority in this sphere, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Ministers in the British Government today brand the policy as illegal and immoral in their capacity as members of the Labour Party. Many have openly expressed that view on numerous occasions.

"Even the Anglo-American Committee, half of whose members were nominated by the British Government, rejected the policy and inferred that it was irreconcilable with the country's Constitution and the principles of the Mandate.

"It is a self-willed, cruel policy imposed by force alone on a tormented people, at the gravest juncture of their history, without any moral or legal basis, and it is always that objectionable picture which the Yishuv sees.

110 "In adjudicating a conflict between justice and law,

history generally takes the side of justice. How much more so if the collision takes place with law and justice simultaneously, when a government flouts the law and its policy impinges on the principles of justice!

"Is it not the primary duty of every citizen in any democratic state to take up arms against such an infringement of law, elementary ethics, and justice?"

I knew that every word I uttered would be noted and conveyed to the powers-that-be after our talk, and I couched my statement accordingly.

Musgrave listened intently. He did not try to justify the Government's policy. The question he reiterated was: what is the outcome going to be?

"No matter what the conception of abstract justice, and whoever is right, the important thing isn't an argument over the merits of the case," he said. "What is important at this stage is to find some way out of the mess we're all in. I have myself submitted a memorandum to Government urging it to refrain from any further measures, and I am in favor of releasing the detainees. My opinion hasn't of course been accepted, but its time will probably come. Some sort of understanding must be found, and your fanaticism and impatience aren't making the situation any easier."

I replied that the prospect of becoming a minority under Arab rule was tantamount to a decree of extinction for us. "We still vividly remember what occurred on the Continent, and we know the Orient from much earlier than yesterday," I added. "We are aware of the fate of minorities in the East, and we can still recall the massacre of the Armenians in Turkey. We know from bitter experience the value of guarantees and we now prefer to fight with weapons rather than be carted off tomorrow to slaughter, unarmed, defenseless, and without help or salvation."

Musgrave submitted it was desirable to reach a compromise on the question of arms. The Government was prepared to reconcile itself to the fact that the Jews possessed arms if some gesture were made to save its prestige. We must ourselves hand over a small quantity of arms as a token, and if we surrendered such offensive weap-

ons as mortars, the Government would not object to our retaining the rifles and ammunition in our possession for defensive purposes, nor insist on their being given up.

I responded that his approach was purely artificial, unrealistic, and short-sighted. "What is the political situation at this moment?" I asked. "The relations between the Jewish community and the British authorities are deteriorating, and it is possible that the latter may sooner or later decide to evacuate the country or transfer its army bases to the Negev. In that event it won't be a question of rifles for defense against brigands or marauders, but actual warfare, in which defensive and offensive tactics are measures directed to only one end—victory.

"It's a well-known tactical maxim that offense is the best form of defense, and even a strategical offensive may serve as an effective tactic of self-defense. If, then, any war is going to be essentially defensive, we shall need offensive weapons, because the character of a military struggle isn't determined by the political significance of the attack, and the most efficacious defensive war from a political standpoint is attack in the military sphere.

"The broad modern conception of strategy doesn't recognize any distinction between systems of defensive and offensive battle, and this fact bears no relationship to the question of who is the attacker in the political sense or who the defender.

"In any situation likely to develop as an outcome of such a large-scale war with the Arab world, there will be no hope of holding ground with defensive weapons alone, and if we forgo our offensive weapons, we'll only risk being wiped out without a trace. Consequently, in our present position, when our relations with Britain have reached such a sorry pass and we're going to be completely isolated in a region like the Middle East, with its record for butchering peoples and minorities, armaments constitute a most decisive factor in safeguarding our physical existence.

"We have no certainty or guarantee that we shall face only rioters and brigands, and in any way we shan't have

any alternative other than to fight without flinching with all the resources at our command.

"The conception of defense has long been defined by our political and geopolitical position, and from that perspective it must be extended under existing circumstances."

I painted a fairly bold and macabre canvas in the light of conditions at the time, and indeed I had no idea then how tangibly close it came to the subsequent grave eventuality. No doubt it seemed an almost soaring flight of imagination at a period when British authority was holding on firmly with its very fingernails to every part of the country and no thought of evacuation had arisen in any quarter or political agency. At all events, I felt that it would be wrong to remain blind to such a possible contingency and that we must be prepared for whatever might happen.

Musgrave brought up the broad political problem, that of the country's constitutional future. I evaded an explicit reply in this connection, but hinted that, in the light of developments, I saw no likelihood of a solution save by geographical division, and the best way out was Partition, although the three parties chiefly concerned refused at the moment to accept it.

He told me there was no objection to Eliezer Kaplan's return, nor any intention of arresting him. He warned me several times against non-co-operation in the economic and administrative sectors, which, in his opinion, would tend only to aggravate an already complex situation. He alluded again to his memorandum, which contained proposals for an amelioration of the political line of action, and dwelt on the possible degree of influence which the memorandum might have on the current state of affairs. He claimed that his authority was limited and his position in the Government insecure, but he had been able to prevent at least the taking of several measures which might have had an irritating effect.

The next morning I sent a digest of the conversation to Moshe Shertok at Latrun.

In reply Shertok wrote: "The talk between Abu Dan" (my nickname at the time) "and Musgrave was splendid

for its dynamism." He encouraged me to continue the meetings, and I decided to arrange one for the following week.

I believed in Musgrave's fair and friendly attitude and trusted him to do his best to secure an amelioration. But I still awaited the outcome of the vigorous debate still proceeding in our fold over the issue of administrative and economic non-co-operation with the Government, and therefore put off a second meeting with him for a day or two.

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On the 22nd of July 1946 a meeting was convened of Vaad Leumi and Jewish Agency representatives and heads of local councils. It launched into a lively and most heated discussion of the scope of non-co-operation.

During the meeting I was called out for a few moments to a consultation in the Jewish National Fund offices, in another wing of the building. While sitting there, we heard a loud explosion, which, like all explosions at the time, alarmed and worried us.

Walking across the courtyard to the Vaad Leumi meeting, I was startled by a tremendous detonation, which rocked the neighborhood. A huge cloud of black smoke spiraled upward into the sky in the near distance.

I hurried into the meeting-hall, where everyone was in confusion. Within a short while the deep suspicion in our minds was confirmed: a part of the King David Hotel, where the civil and military administrations had their headquarters, had been blown up.

Someone rose and said that in view of what had happened, there was no longer any point in continuing the meeting, and everyone dispersed. In the streets there were evident signs that a curfew was about to be announced. People hurried home in panic, cars raced by at high speed, the first patrols of British troops and police appeared, their faces stern and drawn with anger.

The atmosphere was supercharged. Alarm and anxiety mounted as one report succeeded another. A Jewish Agency official, who happened to be in another part of

the building at the time, stated that scores had been killed and injured, an entire wing had been demolished, and people were still buried under the piles of debris.

We stood aghast and shocked on the roof of the Jewish Agency building, but soon had to leave, gnawed by grim forebodings.

A radio broadcast confirmed the horrible news. We all felt thoroughly disgusted and incensed with the "dissidents" who had wrought this fiendish murder of scores of Jews, Arabs, and Britons, and a deep abhorrence filled us.

I was particularly concerned for two of my friends, Julius Jacobs, a good loyal Jew, companion, and wonderful man, and Roderick Musgrave, whom I liked so much and held in esteem. Before nightfall the news came that both had been killed, and it was for me the most grievous moment of a grief-laden day.

A nagging helplessness, sorrow, bewilderment, and oppressive anxiety were the discordant notes in the threnody of life during those days succeeding the 22nd of July.

THE CRISIS AT ITS PEAK (18)

The political developments proceeded in tempo with the unfolding events, which were marked by terrorism on the one hand and a policy of severe repression on the other.

Shortly after publication of the Anglo-American Committee's report, a commission of British and American technical experts had been appointed to consider the technical arrangements for the admission of one hundred thousand immigrants. It had now completed its work and gave birth to the premature weakling known as the Morrison-Grady plan.

The plan was completely oblivious of the position of the D.P.'s. It restricted the area of Jewish settlement to fifteen to seventeen per cent of the country, separated

two districts of somewhat doubtful autonomy, and vested all authority and powers in a British High Commissioner. From the economic standpoint the new proposal dismissed the inquiry committee's suggestions—to support the immigration of victims of fascism from Europe—and recommended, instead, large financial grants to the Arab states.

The new blueprint for immigration was particularly astonishing. The admission of one hundred thousand Jewish refugees was made conditional on the acceptance of the new constitution, which called for the postponement of immigration, even if the negotiations succeeded, for an indefinite period. Moreover, authority over immigration would remain in the hands of the central government—that is, the High Commissioner, who would determine the country's absorptive capacity. More surprisingly, the puppet government of the Jewish area would not be entitled to fix an immigration quota for itself, yet responsibility for any blunders in this respect would devolve on—the area itself!

It was evident that any scheme of federation would defeat itself if the decision on immigration quotas rested with the central government. The Jewish-Arab difference was not over municipal government or health services, agriculture or neighborly relations, but arose solely over the immigration issue. But the Morrison-Grady plan divided the Jews and Arabs in those spheres where differences were slight, while retaining the crux of difference, the immigration question, as a joint matter over which the incompatibility could never be resolved, and the British authority would hand down its rulings as it had done hitherto. That arrangement obviously abrogated any right the plan had to exist.

The question, therefore, arose: why undertake division at all, as in any event division was only necessitated by the dynamic elements of development, primarily immigration?

Opinions of the plan varied during a debate in the British Parliament. Winston Churchill, in a brilliant address, condemned the Government for its past blunders.

vealed the origin of the plan—in the Colonial Office. Several friends of Zionism—Richard Crossman and others—dwelt on its inequitable aspects. But the debate was inconclusive.

The Jewish Agency Executive, which met in Paris to discuss the political situation and the new proposals, rejected the federal plan. The Agency defined its critical attitude under four heads:

1. the proposals whittled down the rights of the Jewish people under the Mandate by 85 per cent of the area of Palestine, and annulled its right to determine the immigration policy in even the 15 per cent of the territory allotted to the Jewish area;
2. the size of the proposed Jewish autonomous zone was even smaller than the Jewish state proposed by the Royal Commission in 1937;
3. the plan lacked any concrete element apart from denying the Jews access to 85 per cent of the country;
4. British rule would be extended for an indefinite period.



Following a meeting of the Zionist General Council, several informal talks were held with Ernest Bevin in Paris. While they produced no tangible accord, these talks constituted a preliminary step in renewing contacts and an initial attempt to find some way out of the labyrinth. Nahum Goldmann, who flew to Washington, succeeded in getting the United States Government to support, or at least to give serious consideration to, the Partition plan, which was then beginning to come up again in spite of internal Zionist opposition.

Meanwhile, Eliahu Sasson, of the Jewish Agency's Arab Affairs Department, got in contact with several Egyptian statesmen, including Cabinet members, and was able to persuade them to consider the possibility of a solution by Partition. The Egyptians made a solution conditional on British assent and on direct British overtures to Egypt in this connection.

Apprised of this, Bevin hinted that we must not interfere in the Egyptian aspect and must negotiate with His Majesty's Government alone.

In Palestine the disturbances continued. A three-day curfew in Tel Aviv, searches, clashes, and the protracted detention of the Agency Executive and other leaders clearly evidenced that the British policy of repression was unabated.

One day in Jerusalem, when I was curfew-bound in my hotel—like other Agency personnel—because I had refrained from asking the authorities for a permit to circulate during curfew hours, Jon Kimche called on me. He had a newspaperman's pass and was free to go and come as he pleased.

"I have something to tell you," he said.

I was accustomed to getting only bad news at that time, and asked, in alarm: "What's happened?"

"It's either me or General Barker!" he snapped.

I did not quite understand what he meant. General Sir Evelyn Barker was the general officer commanding the British troops in Palestine.

Jon extracted a creased piece of paper from his pocket and thrust it at me. "Read it," he commanded.

It was General Barker's order of the day, in which he urged the British forces to "hit the Jews where it hurts them most—their pockets." I read the document with suppressed fury.

"Have you cabled it to England?" I asked.

"Yes," Kimche answered.

"Have you given it to the American correspondents as well? It's possible that the censorship may try to hold it up at all costs."

"I've done that too."

The next day I read out the document at a meeting of the Agency Executive and said it had been cabled abroad. It was widely published.

The crisis in the relations between Britain and the Yishuv reached its height in August, when the British authorities began the expulsion of refugees from Palestine to Cyprus. At first it had been the practice to intern the unauthorized newcomers in special camps in

Palestine until their turn for release came under the monthly immigration quotas. But this arrangement was apparently unsatisfactory to the authorities, and reports began trickling through to us of the erection of detention camps on the island of Cyprus. We refused to believe them until our eyes were opened to bitter reality.

Large forces of the navy, army, and air force were mustered for this purpose. The Government published a statement trying to justify its action. Britain, it was said, was a friend of the Jewish people, and the illegal immigration movement was a conspiracy hatched by conscienceless persons. The movement was described as a transgression of the law, and a transgression of the law alone.

The acting Executive met to consider its action on receiving word of the preparations for expulsion. It was clear that any ordinary protest would be only a pale and shallow reflection of the Yishuv's profound anger. On the other hand, any physical resistance would simply precipitate a blood-bath. We could hardly request Haganah to undertake such action without arms. In spite of the fact that the Haganah men were ready to undertake an operation, which would assume the form of actual fighting owing to breach of the curfew, there was none among us who cared to accept the responsibility for bloodshed, the advantages of which would be doubtful, to say the least.

Fury and helplessness struggled within us. I was assigned by the Executive to make a statement at a foreign press conference in the Eden Hotel, off Ben-Yehuda Street in Jerusalem. In addressing the correspondents, I dwelt on the fact that the Government's action lacked moral or legal justification and any sanction of human justice. The correspondents bombarded me with a volley of questions aimed at ascertaining the nature of the concrete reaction proposed and the form it would take. I replied that the Yishuv was united in its uncompromising opposition to the expulsion of the refugees, while as for the reaction I used the blunt English term "resist" in alluding to the Yishuv's future attitude to such action.

The same afternoon the B.B.C. broadcast a dramatized

account of the latest developments in Palestine which appeared to be designed to create the impression that a general revolt had broken out.

"A tense situation is developing in Palestine, with the focal point in Haifa Harbor," the announcer proclaimed. "This is apparently the result of the detention of illegal immigrants on five ships. About eighteen hundred of these immigrants, women, children, and sick men, have been brought ashore in the past two days. Another fifteen hundred men remain on board the ships in harbor.

"Jewish quarters have threatened action against the continued detention of these illegal immigrants. A member of the acting Jewish Agency Executive, Mr. David Horowitz, said today in Jerusalem that the entire Jewish population would resist any attempt to prevent them coming ashore. A similar threat was made by the 'Voice of Israel,' the illegal broadcasting station of the Jewish underground forces, which claimed that the British had massed military reinforcements in the Haifa area."

Curfew was imposed on Haifa and was broken by demonstrators, who were dispersed forcibly by troops. Large army forces cordoned the harbor zone. The first expulsion of Jewish refugees to Cyprus was carried out behind barbed wire and under army guard. Additional expulsions later provoked a series of clashes between the army and police and the Yishuv's forces, Haganah, and the refugees themselves, and there were several attempts, mostly successful, by Haganah "frog-men" to blow up the ships engaged in refugee expatriation.

Meanwhile the Government was made aware that all its efforts to break the Yishuv's spirit of resistance were doomed to unmitigated failure. The hoped-for split and the emergence of the "moderate" elements into the leadership had not eventuated. The Morrison-Grady plan had encountered obstinate Jewish opposition, and President Truman had refused his blessing to it. The attempt to solve the Palestine problem by a regime of military repression against the Yishuv had bogged down, and in British Government circles the idea had emerged of holding a new round-table conference with Jewish and Arab participation. But there was no inclination on the

Jewish side to enter into any transactions so long as the Yishuv leaders were not released and negotiations be conducted with the elected representatives. The British authorities maintained contact in the matter with Dr. Weizmann in London.

One day Golda Meyerson telephoned to ask me to accompany her to Jerusalem. On the way up—Golda, Joseph Sprinzak, and I—she said that the High Commissioner had asked to see immediately one of the four Agency representatives—Eliezer Kaplan, Rabbi Fishman (who had been released from Latrun camp some while before), Golda, or myself. Kaplan, who had recently returned from abroad, was touring the country. Rabbi Fishman was not in Jerusalem. There were only the two of us. After a short consultation with our colleagues in Jerusalem, it was decided that Golda should see General Cunningham at his request.

On her return to the Agency offices, where we awaited her, Mrs. Meyerson reported that the High Commissioner had received a dispatch from the Colonial Office inviting the four persons named to proceed to London for immediate conferences. Golda had deferred any reply and told the High Commissioner, who seemed much disappointed, that a decision of this kind required a meeting of the Executive, which was the sole authorized body to make it.

A stormy discussion ensued, after which it was finally agreed to accept the invitation on condition that there would be no general discussion of the question, but only initiation of negotiations for releasing the detainees, terminating the emergency, and suspending the covert state of war between the Yishuv and the British Government.

The mission was assigned to Eliezer Kaplan and Rabbi Fishman, who discharged it with great success. The negotiations in London were brief, and agreement was secured in a few weeks on the release of the detainees and repeal of the repressive measures.

One winter evening not long afterwards the leaders were freed. It was evident to all of us that this was but a prelude to wider negotiations with the Arabs and Jews which the British Government was planning.

(19) TERROR AND COUNTER-TERROR

The 23rd World Zionist Congress was held in Basel in December 1946, and drastic changes were made in the Executive. Dr. Weizmann relinquished the presidency of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, and as no successor was elected, the chairman of the Executive, David Ben-Gurion, headed the Jewish Agency, and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver was elected chairman of the American Section of the Executive.

The period of the Congress imposed an onerous task on the small group of people who had remained in Palestine to administer affairs. The burden of responsibility imposed by my duties on the provisional Executive in Jerusalem was a heavy one. Acts of terrorism and British reprisals were mounting. We on the Executive struggled hard to safeguard the position and to forestall any disastrous deterioration in it, at least until our associates returned from the Congress.

An attempt was made, through the medium of Israel Rokach, the Mayor of Tel Aviv, to get in touch with the "dissidents" and to persuade them to halt their misguided activities. The dissidents were not above exploiting their advantageous position in these approaches and threatened a blood-bath if the death sentences imposed by a British military tribunal on three of their members were executed.

We viewed the situation with extreme gravity, and felt it necessary to sue for a postponement of the sentences at least until our colleagues came back from the Congress. But we knew that any overtures we might make to the Government not only would be of no benefit, but might even aggravate the situation still further.

Someone thereupon suggested that I should approach one of the leading foreign consular envoys in Jerusalem, whom I knew well, and enlist his help with the authorities. I was to ask him to persuade the Chief Secretary to

put off the executions. It was not a pleasant errand, but I agreed and telephoned for an appointment.

On meeting him at his office, I apologized for whatever inconvenience I might be causing and, without saying why I had come, launched into a description of our position. He immediately divined the reason, and when I had concluded, he asked bluntly: "Well, then, do you want me to inform the Government of your quandary and get them to defer the death sentences?"

"I would not dare ask you to do so," I replied. "I have no right to. But if you were to intervene, it would be a great humanitarian act which would prevent considerable and unnecessary bloodshed, and you would be rendering a great service to this country."

He listened carefully and then penned a letter with his own hand. On completing it, he held it out to me and I read it with no little agitation.

It was addressed personally to Sir Henry Gurney, the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government. After recounting the grave position, the writer said his own Government had not given him any instructions in the matter and he was, therefore, not making any diplomatic demarche, but a private approach. He expressed the view that the Jewish Agency was unable to make representations to the Palestine Government on the matter, as such representations might be regarded improper. But as time was running short before the death sentences were to be carried out, he took it upon his own grave responsibility to address the Government on the subject.

I was profuse in my gratitude and appreciation. He asked me if we were in touch with the "dissidents." I explained that we had no direct communication, but were in contact indirectly through intermediaries.

He assured me that he was making the approach to the Chief Secretary in an entirely private capacity, and then suddenly asked: "What are you mixed up in this for? I thought you were an economist! But I have heard you're engaged in a lot of political work." He smiled broadly.

I explained that an emergency had arisen with the departure of many of my colleagues to the Zionist Con-

gress and that I had been compelled to deal with matters outside my own regular line of activity.

He smiled again and remarked: "You'll find out the real taste of things when you start dealing with this stuff behind the scenes."

I left with a feeling of relief that something might have been done to prevent grave bloodshed. The Chief Secretary did, in fact, accede to the consul-general's request, but accompanied his reply with some sharp criticism on the intervention.

The shocking disaster to an immigrant ship that sank at sea, and the great difficulties attending the rescue of its passengers, were another disturbing event at the time. The vessel was being awaited when its radio sent out distress signals. It went down and the miserable people on board scrambled ashore on a barren, lonely island in Greek waters, without food or clothing and exposed to the severe winter cold. We at once approached the Government and it responded by allowing the R.A.F. to extend its aid. But the incident provoked still greater feeling in the country and profound anxiety as to what might develop.

Relations with the Government were strained and delicate. Even though it gave its humanitarian assistance, the whole affair was indirectly the result of the vast refugee tragedy and the shutting of the country's gates. Consequently it came as a considerable relief to be able to organize and carry out the rescue of these particular immigrants. We were able to get the "dissidents" consent to a truce in their operations, and impatiently awaited the return of the Executive members from Switzerland.

The Congress ended. The members returned. A new period was initiated—of negotiations with the British Government in London.



Golda Meyerson, who was acting as head of the Agency's Political Department in Jerusalem, called me up one morning and asked me to come to her home,

where she told me of a telephone conversation with Moshe Shertok, then in London, who asked that I should come there at once as a member of the Agency delegation.

I left a couple of days later. Cairo, the first and last stage of my travels, was no longer a novelty. After the brusque and discourteous customs examination at the airfield, to which all holders of Palestinian passports were subjected, I went to the Continental Hotel. The city seemed to me to be more shabby and wretched than at any other time. The destitution of practically everyone on the streets filled an outside onlooker with indescribable melancholy. Outside the handsome offices of Air France, I saw two grimy, pale-faced children hugging the wall as if it were their last refuge. Several men in tatters were asleep on the sidewalk. Opposite the luxurious Shepheard's Hotel were the stench-laden slums, nests of crime and vice.

Egyptian statesmanship seemed to be cut off from the mass of the populace and devoid of all basis in reality. The scene of age-old social distress hardly persuaded one that the most cogent problems in Egyptian life were the Sudan, the evacuation of British troops, and the fate of Palestine. I looked at the faces of the Egyptian people, reflecting the standard of living, of health and hygiene, the want, and the agrarian question. The people were definitely living below the poverty level, and social conscience still slumbered.

I learned of the tension over Palestine between the Arab League and the Arab Higher Committee. The ex-Mufti, Haj Amin el Husseini, was engaged in preparing for a revolt in Palestine, and the Higher Committee took an uncompromising attitude; and the League feared dire complications. The League delegation at the London conference was a weak one. Azzam Pasha had refused to take part, since he did not wish to be saddled with compromises bringing him into conflict with the Higher Committee, while on the other hand he knew full well there could be no solution without compromise.

David Ben-Gurion passed through Cairo on his way to

London. An Egyptian customs official turned his baggage upside down and did his best to annoy B.-G. We had no recourse against these Egyptian pleasantries and could only grind our teeth at the insulting behavior. All that B.-G. said was: "They'll be sorry one day for what they're doing"; but no one could, of course, guess at the time how quickly that prophecy would be fulfilled.

Dr. Sneh was the next to come through Cairo. He was very skeptical about the outcome of the negotiations and showed a mixture of scorn and cynicism in discussing the prospects of a compromise.

Finally I left. It was a wonderful flight to Paris. We paused at Tunis, crossed above the snow-capped Alps and over the green valleys, and reveled at the sight of the gracious landscape of France.

Paris, sad and poor, with long queues everywhere, exuded an aura of hardship and economic stress.

On the way over to London I ruminated on the significance of the negotiations. We all felt this would probably be the last attempt at a solution in concert with Great Britain, and failure would be equivalent to closing the brief chapter of a thirty-year experiment in Jewish-British relations.

The winter morning was gray and drizzly, as though striving to augur the melancholy finale in prospect for this fateful errand.

(20) IN THE CALDRON AGAIN

The airport and Stratford Court, in Oxford Street, where the Palestinians usually stayed, were familiar. I had the feeling of "This is where I came in," as if the wheel of events had come round full circle.

The political scene was depressing, and the coal crisis, then at its height, added to the general gloom and hardships. Houses were cold and unheated and, owing to the need to conserve electric power, remained unlighted

during the dark, foggy days. Elevators were not working, and I had to walk up and down five floors at my apartment house. Food was scarce and badly cooked, and the people were tired, edgy, and careworn.

I recalled my former visits to London and the old political frustrations, and it seemed to me that the two figurative clocks were still tick-tocking, the hands of one moving toward a peaceful solution and of the other to strife and bloodshed.

I was swept up again into the caldron of political activity. We had learned that the British Government and its military advisers now held the view that Palestine was indispensable to Britain as a base and there was consequently no intention of quitting.

Moshe Shertok, who had been to Washington, spoke of the frigid way he had been received at the State Department. Loy Henderson, head of the Middle East section in the Department, intimated that though the United States was interested in the Palestine question, its active intervention could not be expected. Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador there, alluded to the possibility of turning over the whole issue to the United Nations, with or without a British recommendation for a solution.

We learned that Arthur Creech-Jones, the Colonial Secretary, had defended the Partition proposal at a Cabinet meeting, but Ernest Bevin was obdurately opposed to it. Dr. Hugh Dalton and Aneurin Bevan were regarded as supporters of Partition, but Clement Attlee and Herbert Morrison were among the waverers, with their inclination if anything toward Bevin's side. The portents were that they would eventually come over to the group opposing Partition, which was headed by Bevin and A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.

It was predicted that even Creech-Jones would soon withdraw his suit on behalf of Partition, and there was a jest current at the time that the difference in political weight between burly Bevin and the slight-framed Creech-Jones was the same as the disparity of their physical weight.

There were differences, too, in the views current at discussions. Nahum Goldmann was at the one extreme, and Moshe Sneh at the other. Goldmann favored a clear and unequivocal Partition proposal on our part, without any diplomatic beating about the bush or tactical maneuvering, whereas Dr. Sneh opposed any hint of acquiescence in Partition by us, and consent to it, if proposed by the British, only in deference to the judgment of the Zionist Congress, which he personally opposed. He argued that talk about Partition at this time would be harmful, since the British were disinclined to entertain any solution at all, and such a solution was out of the question anyhow.

Sneh believed that our whole position was based on self-delusion, and that any Partition offer made to us would of necessity be so bad as to preclude initial consideration. The only way to win anything was by remaining firm and uncompromising. Furthermore, if we suggested Partition, it would serve only as a bargaining point, whereas if the British raised the proposal, it would be regarded as a halfway stage between our demand for a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and the Arab demands.

At the other end, Goldmann insisted that Partition was the last and only hope of salvation in view of the threatened collision, which was liable to wreck our entire undertaking. Zero hour was so close, and the time remaining to avert a catastrophe so short, that any tactical jockeying would be pointless and hazardous.

Ben-Gurion and Shertok, whose influence was decisive, were ready for a struggle. But they first wished to explore every possibility of solution by peaceful means, stressing the heavy weight of responsibility involved in the fate of the Yishuv and Zionism. They were conscious of the far-reaching consequences of any fresh sanguinary conflict with the British.

They, too, like most other members of the Executive and the delegation, were doubtful of the benefit in our raising the Partition proposal, which would be regarded as a maximum and serve only as a basis for whittling down and substantial curtailments. But they reserved to

themselves the right to conduct an exploratory and elastic policy without prejudging the negotiations.

At a meeting held in B.-G.'s hotel room, Dr. Emanuel Neumann supported Sneh, while Berl Locker and Selig Brodetsky were on the side of B.-G. and Shertok.

The decision taken was in three parts:

1. our proposal was the complete official program of the Zionist movement—a Jewish state in an undivided Palestine;

2. there could be no retreat from the Paris decisions empowering the Executive to consider an offer of a Jewish state in a part of Palestine, if this should be made by the British;

3. any perpetuation of the White Paper policy to be categorically rejected.

On the adoption of this formula, it was suggested that I should address the gathering on the possible boundaries in the event of Partition. Moshe Sneh objected, but a majority vote was in favor.

I unrolled political, physical, and demographical maps and described the Partition plan as I saw it. I analyzed the economic and demographic facts, and formulated the principles of my scheme. I clarified the significance of the slogan I had mentioned half an hour earlier: "Peel plus the Negev"—referring to the partition plan recommended by the Peel Commission of 1936–37—and emphasized that it was not a precise interpretation of our demands, for in addition to including the Negev some modifications were necessary in the Lydda and Ramleh areas.

The boundaries I sketched on the map at that time, except for the Jerusalem Corridor, were almost the same as the frontiers of the State of Israel which were demarcated in the armistice agreements of 1948.

Sneh scoffed at the whole idea of mapping boundaries for the future state; he had no belief whatever in the likelihood of a compromise and dismissed the Partition idea. He admitted it would merit serious consideration if a partition could be implemented along the lines in-

dicated, but felt that any notion of such a partition was a will-o'-the-wisp.

A couple of days after the meeting, we were invited to the first session at the Colonial Office. It was a cold, drab day, and the snow and frost covering the principal thoroughfares of London hampered the traffic. Our party—Ben-Gurion, Shertok, Locker, Goldmann, Brodetsky, Ivor Linton (now Israeli Minister in Japan), Aubrey Eban, and myself—waited in the anteroom outside Creech-Jones's office. After a while we were ushered in. His office was spacious, more like a salon, with a large, thick carpet on the floor, and a desk clear of papers at one end, while in the center stood a long table.

The place was dark, owing to the electricity cuts. Tall candles flickered on the table, giving the conference a weird appearance. The dancing shadows on the wall heightened the eerie impression.

We stood for a few moments and chatted with the British representatives who had trickled in, waiting for Ernest Bevin to appear. Suddenly there was a whisper and a furtive movement among them and they were electrified into attention. I looked toward the open doorway and saw the thickset figure of the British Foreign Secretary coming through. We all felt that this man was the central figure among our hosts. He had a magnetic, almost hypnotic effect over the officials clustered around.

Ernest Bevin's bulky person, about which he himself often spoke jocularly through his pursed lips, and his broad shoulders and piercing eyes were expressive of power, authority, influence, and a rare stormy temperament. He reminded me a little of the late Pinhas Rutenberg, progenitor of Palestine's electricity system, both in outer appearance and in strength of personality, the effect of which was repulsive rather than attractive, oppressive rather than cordial, and as having the same lack of diffidence and faculty of contemplation, which were replaced by intuition and impulsiveness. Although it was evident that he was not in good health and his hands trembled slightly, one could sense the man's aggressive temperament and the egocentricity exuding at every pore of his being. It was fairly obvious that none of the

entourage of officials at his beck and call would dare to cross him or show any independence of thought in the presence of that dynamism and firmness which marked manner and gesture.

The chairman, Mr. Secretary Creech-Jones, was the antithesis of Bevin: short, soft and gentle, hesitant in speech, without any sharp angularities of personality, moderate and quiet, without much influence or power.

Bevin and Creech-Jones were accompanied by Harold Beeley, no stranger to us, the Foreign Secretary's personal adviser on Palestine affairs, who sat at his side and whispered advice and comments into his ear incessantly; Sir Norman Brook, a precise, phlegmatic, reserved, and courteous Englishman, of intelligent appearance; our old acquaintance Sir Douglas Harris; J. M. Martin, slim and sagacious Colonial Office adviser; and a number of other high officials.

THE GULF WIDENS (21)

The gulf dividing the British from the Jewish standpoints was evident from the day the talks began; or, to use another metaphor, they entered a *cul de sac* almost on the first day.

Ben-Gurion in his speech declared that the two issues to be threshed out were Jewish existence in its concrete actuality on the one hand, and the resumption of Jewish-British friendship on the other. The roots of the entire problem lay in both of these.

Ernest Bevin emphasized three controversial points: immigration, land, and the Arab fear of Jewish domination. If some way could be found of composing them, then it was possible, in the course of time, for new non-racial criteria of differentiation to be established among the inhabitants of Palestine. That was the reason, he said, for the proposal concerning Jewish immigration and settlement in restricted areas. It would dissipate the Jewish fear of becoming a minority subject to Arab rule, while

the Arabs could live in safety, and without fear of Jewish expansion, on their side of the frontier. Bevin was convinced of the impossibility of setting up two durable, independent states in Palestine.

Answering the latter point, our delegates cited the existence of Transjordan, the viability of which was far below that of each of the two proposed states.

The Jewish position, as defined principally by Ben-Gurion, consisted of three negative postulates and three positive alternative proposals. The postulates were:

1. opposition to any ban on or restriction of settlement or entry of Jews into Palestine or any part of it. In the event of infringement of these rights in any part of Palestine, they must be compensated by the creation of valid Jewish self-government in the other parts;
2. opposition to any artificial limitation of immigration based on considerations other than the economic absorptive capacity of the country;
3. opposition to any attempt designed to turn the Jews into a minority in an Arab state.

The alternative proposals:

1. the conversion of the whole of Palestine into a Jewish state;
2. in the event of this not being within the realm of possibility for any reason whatsoever, the fulfillment of the letter of the Mandate according to the practice prior to 1937, before artificial limitations were imposed on immigration, and especially before the White Paper policy was instituted; and also the absolute revocation of current British policy;
3. if the Government proposed the creation of a durable Jewish state in a suitable area of Palestine, the Jewish representatives were prepared to consider the proposal.

While we presented our plan at once, the British delegates put off their own proposals from one session to the next. We impatiently awaited the document containing

their offer, which finally reached us in the form of a memorandum by the British delegation.

One foggy morning we were told that the memorandum had at last been delivered at the Jewish Agency offices at 77 Great Russell Street. Shertok and I hurried there at once, opened the large envelope with the embossed Colonial Office crest, and read its contents with almost bated breath.

The plan provided for the permanent closing of most of Palestine to the Jews, and the enforcement of stringent restrictions on immigration and development in the remaining section.

After having sped through the document, we gazed at each other for a while in disappointment. We had tried to find in it at least one glimmering of hope, even the skeleton of a bridge across the chasm, the least shred of prospect or basis for further negotiation. But—"no dice," as the Americans say.

"We can't accept this," I murmured.

Shertok nodded his head in assent, a wry smile on his lips.

The entire delegation soon assembled and we began to analyze the plan. It constituted a substantial retreat even from the Morrison-Grady plan. While the latter permitted the admission of one hundred thousand Jews within one year, the new scheme spread that number over three years. Immigration into the Jewish zone was made conditional not only on its economic absorptivity, but on "the welfare of the country as a whole," meaning that the Arab zones, bolted and barred against Jewish immigration, would exercise an influence on immigration into that area where it was to be permitted to some extent.

The memorandum proposed, first, that the Arabs be endowed with powers of decision over Jewish immigration through the binational legislative council. The latter advisory organ, comprising representatives of the two peoples, would not be based on actual numerical ratios, but on an artificial equilibrium of representatives of various interests which would fail to reflect the actual proportionate volumes. It was evident that this structure, reared on such flimsy foundations, would be swept

away by the first political tempest, whereupon the Jewish community would become a tolerated minority in a state with a majority of Arab inhabitants.

We learned that the memorandum had been drawn up by our old "friend" Mr. Beeley, and indeed it clearly mirrored his projection of a Jewish future in Palestine which was more or less identical with that entertained by Ernest Bevin, whom he influenced.

The plan was a body-blow even to us, inured to disappointments. Until it appeared, we had hoped for at least some form of compromise, such a vital necessity at the time, and our hopes had been fortified by several tentative explorations the British delegates had undertaken during the previous sessions.

At one meeting Creech-Jones had surprised us by outlining in general terms, even though cautiously, a proposal to divide the country into zones, with free immigration in the Jewish one and with the prospect of complete separation after some years. But Bevin categorically rejected the proposal, which we were prepared to consider, emphasizing that it did not mean really free immigration into the Jewish zone, but immigration at "a predetermined rate," and that separation and secession after a number of years were out of the question.

The discussions at these sessions were exhaustive, at times also heated and stormy, though on the whole a polite diplomatic atmosphere was maintained.

The tenor of the British delegation was determined by Bevin. He reiterated time and again his opposition to any Partition solution, on the ground that the creation of a Jewish state was not provided in the Mandate, and it would be an injustice to the Arabs. The Balfour Declaration had been a mistake, in his opinion, as it had not been clearly framed and had promised the country to the two peoples simultaneously. Had he been the one to decide in those days, he would have promised the country definitely to one of the two peoples now contesting it.

When a British delegate remarked at one session that England was now compelled "to mind the baby," meaning the assumption of responsibility for its administration, the Foreign Secretary rumbled that it was not a

baby but two brothers born of different fathers, who had come into the world fully armed and ready to scrap.

He pushed aside the three Jewish proposals. He was against a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine because the Jews were a minority, and even the Mandate had never promised one to them. The same considerations applied to Partition, with its additional need for many "corridors," which he didn't like, and the fact that a large Arab minority would have to be left under Jewish government. He was opposed to continuing the Mandate on the lines followed prior to the White Paper, because they were repugnant to the Arabs and could not be restored against their desires; they regarded the White Paper as their charter, and in the event of its being abrogated, it must be replaced by a solution giving them some kind of satisfaction and allaying their fears.

Creech-Jones supported Bevin in opposing the reinstatement of the Mandate and argued that the Mandatory regime operated in a vacuum divorced from Arab or Jewish realities, was hated by both parties, had not been rooted in the verities of Palestinian life, was unpopular, and bore a colonial bureaucratic character. It was, therefore, essential to supplant it by some degree of self-government.

Bevin was asked at one meeting whether Arab consent was necessary to carry out the plan.

He replied that the definite consent of either the Arabs or the Jews was not required, as he understood that no plan would win such unequivocal agreement. He had no interest in obtaining declarations of consent nor was he alarmed by wordy protests so long as there was acquiescence, and no actual physical or forcible opposition or refusal to co-operate was apprehended. That, in fact, was the second thread in the negotiations.

Parallel to the talks with the Jews, others were held with representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states, and the progress made at our conferences more or less reflected that on the other side. Reports and echoes of what went on in the other conferences reached us from authoritative quarters, and we followed them with great interest.

The Arabs took an uncompromising stand. They regarded the White Paper as wholly unsatisfactory. Jamal el Husseini openly told Bevin that the British ought to quit Palestine. He quoted Ben-Gurion's statement to the Anglo-American Committee that "we can look after ourselves" and read into it proof that the Jews, too, acquiesced in this solution by a face-to-face conflict which the Arabs so heartily desired.

This Arab craving for a solution by force of arms and a straight clash with the Jews, from which they hoped to emerge victorious and to destroy the Yishuv once for all, characterized every statement and submission they made. Jamal once said in private conversation: "Great historic conflicts are always settled by force of arms and weapons. Let us have the struggle and get it over with." He and his colleagues now repeated the refrain to Ernest Bevin, and even I was privileged to hear it several months later from the secretary-general of the Arab League, Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha.

Indeed, Arab self-confidence was still unshaken in those days. In view of their aggressive attitude, Bevin warned the Arabs against overdoing the extremism. He told them he was their best friend in the Cabinet, and if he retired for reasons of health, which was not unlikely, it would imperil their position.

When one delegate of an Arab state asserted that if the Arabs took power they would easily overcome the Jews by means of economic suppression, Bevin took him up sharply and exclaimed: "Is that in your opinion the way to deal with national minorities, and is that the proof of your sovereign maturity and national independence?"

It was evident that a considerable impression had been made on him by the fact that there was no prospect of appeasing the Arabs, which was a prime requisite in his Palestine policy. When he found there was no hope of finding an agreed compromise with the Arabs, he lost all interest in a compromise with the Jews, for such an arrangement lacking Arab consent would compel him to force a solution on the Arabs, which he was not at all prepared to undertake.

(When I told the Chief Secretary in Palestine, Sir Henry Gurney, of the negotiations, at our meeting in Jerusalem several weeks later, I expressed my belief that Bevin was interested in a tripartite agreement, but that the desire had come up against the stone wall of Arab obstinacy, and the British had consequently shown complete indifference in the second phase of the negotiations with us. Gurney listened quietly, smiled meaningfully, and uttered only one word: "Possibly," which I took to be confirmation of my surmise.)

A decisive role was taken in the London negotiations by Harold Beeley. Apart from being the author of the memorandum submitted by the British, he had an appreciable influence over the whole course of the negotiations. I was made vividly aware of this as I sat at the table exactly opposite Bevin and Beeley. We knew that Beeley tried to persuade the Arabs to accept a compromise, which would be one in name only and would in fact satisfy most of their demands. He protested his friendship for the Arabs and his identity of interest in their aspirations, and advised them to accept his proposal as the best way to achieve their aims. But he argued in vain. They remained adamant and unbudging, refusing to yield an inch from their position; and the end of it all was that in due time they paid the heaviest price for their stubborn conduct.

The talks with the Jewish delegation continued in spite of the fact that the British had lost all interest in them when it was evident that the Arabs were irreconcilable. We kept on coming to that candlelit chamber in Whitehall, and Bevin kept on expressing his dogmatic views. He stressed the high political traditions of the British Empire and the British political sapience that had enabled the Empire to rule so many and such diversified peoples and countries solely because of its unmatched and unequaled faculty for being able to establish compromise formulas between opposing and contradicting purposes and trends.

"The only time this failed," Bevin said, "was in the American War of Independence, nearly two hundred years ago. But it had a beneficial result. It initiated the

growth of the great and mighty commonwealth of the United States, which has already twice rushed to Britain's aid in two World Wars."

But Bevin showed no inclination to favor the revival of the splendor of the Jewish historical past in the Holy Land, which David Ben-Gurion tried to depict to him. When B.-G. once began with portraying the vision of the ancient prophets of Israel, the British Foreign Secretary reminded him how the children of Israel had treated those prophets.

I had the impression that Bevin was toying with the idea of creating an artificial system of balance, based on a number of checks, safeguards, and restrictions, which would attenuate the dynamic character of the Zionist enterprise.

We stated and re-stated again and again that we had no faith in artificial checks and balances under a constitution based on parity status in a country where the Arabs would be a majority, nor did we see in it an adequate safeguard of our rights.

At this point a discussion ensued on the purport of the term "democracy." Creech-Jones argued that democracy did not necessarily mean the counting of noses alone. There was no reason to suppose that democracy in the East should assume the same forms as it had in the West. "It is necessary to develop new forms of democracy like those in India, to accord with the new conditions," he said.

Against this we voiced strong objection to any so-called democratization that was not based on suffrage, but on a principle of parity involving dubious tactics of expediency, as a result of which the balance of forces would be neither stable nor durable.

Economic problems, absorptive capacity, and the influence of Jewish settlement on the Arab economic position were also reviewed in the talks. It was apparent that the British representatives, with the exception perhaps of Sir Douglas Harris, had no experience of economic facts, and I had the opportunity of speaking on the effect of Jewish immigration and settlement in improving the Arab economy and raising the Arab standard of

living. I cited the comparative prosperity among the Arabs in relation to their past and the comparison with neighboring territories, and dwelt on the decline of mortality, and of infantile mortality in particular, as well as the longer average life-expectancy among Palestinian Arabs.

The Negev occupied a foremost place in our deliberations. We underlined that the Arabs had not developed it for centuries and that the Jews were the only people capable of doing so. Development would require not only superhuman effort and dedication, but also pioneering venture-capital for investment in basic installations and soil improvement.

During one session Creech-Jones claimed that, from the demographic standpoint, there was no hope of the Jews ever reaching majority status in Palestine at any time. Ben-Gurion differed and spoke of the immigration of a million Jews. To that, Bevin tartly retorted that the plan lacked any substance and could never come into consideration.

Another serious obstacle in these talks was the absence of any clear idea of the boundaries involved. The term "a viable state in a suitable area of Palestine" was vague, and the British delegates kept on pressing us to reveal our territorial demands. We withstood the pressure and did not tell them for two reasons: first, because we had no authority to propose Partition; second, because of the risks entailed in defining our claims, mainly the risk of limiting the area without the corresponding establishment of a Jewish state, so that it would become a bargaining point leading to negative results.

On the other hand, we urged the British negotiators to show their own maps, especially after it transpired that they were not drawn up with Partition in mind, but were divided into cantons dotted here and there about the country, and not lying contiguous to each other.

A deadlock developed over this point, and there seemed no way out until Bevin suddenly gesticulated and proclaimed, to the obvious astonishment of his aides, that he was ready to show us the maps if we agreed to express our opinion on the matter. It was a spontaneous

announcement, caused by a momentary impulse, and we sensed the palpable shock it caused among the British delegates.

We agreed to his suggestion and accepted his condition that it should be an informal noncommittal meeting, which would be kept confidential and not reported to the press. It was also arranged that only three members of our delegation, Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and I, should take part.

The Britons gathered at one end of the chamber to confer among themselves, we at the other end. It appeared to me that they were trying to persuade the Foreign Secretary to retract his decision to show us the maps, or at least not to produce all of them.

The meeting was fixed for the morrow in the Colonial Office.

(22)

the ENIGMA of the BRITISH ATTITUDE

David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok, and I arrived at the Colonial Office, on the west side of Whitehall, on the following afternoon. It was a typical London day, overcast and rainy.

We were shown into a small office where Sir Norman Brook, Sir Douglas Harris, and Harold Beeley awaited us. They unfolded a map, which was part of the Morrison-Grady plan. The thought at once darted into my mind, and was later confirmed, that Ernest Bevin had yielded to the importunings of his advisers and we were being shown only one of the maps, and the less important one at that.

The cantonal map, which had been the basis of Beeley's proposals, was kept from us. We were familiar with the one produced, and B.-G. explained its territorial significance as far as we were concerned. He said that the delineations were perhaps justified from the perspective

of a general concept of the Palestine and Zionist issues which existed in British circles, but from the Zionist standpoint it signified a constriction that would result in the Yishuv remaining static and closed to any further large immigration. For that reason it was unacceptable.

A long discussion ensued. B.-G. explained the Zionist conception of the country's economic and settlement requirements. We were urged to reveal our position. As we had undertaken to comment on the plan, B.-G. indicated with a broad stroke of the finger the Zionist idea of a possible Partition map of Palestine. The boundaries he indicated closely resembled those which were eventually established as an outcome of the war of liberation and the armistice agreements of 1948-9. It was a bold step on his part and showed remarkable prescience of what, at that time, was a boundary plan which had not even started gestating.

The proposal flowed from a far-ranging political appraisal. The balance of forces was then far from advantageous to our position, and the sole though profound well-spring of that inspired vision of Israel's frontiers was an unflinching and invincible faith in the people's future and the Yishuv's capabilities.

The British noted Ben-Gurion's sweeping gesture with close attention, but made no comment, though the expressions on their faces betokened the sardonic view they took of the extravagant Jewish claims.

At the next day's session, after B.-G. had spoken briefly on the map shown us, Sir Norman Brook suddenly produced and unrolled a large map of Palestine. The lines that B.-G. had broadly sketched the previous afternoon were meticulously drawn on it.

Sir Norman inquired if that, in our view, approximated what we had been referring to as "a suitable area of Palestine."

We replied that it was so, except for a few minor details.

It was a cunning move to evolve a hypothesis from what had only been a swift movement of the hand. It demonstrated the ostensibly absurd and fantastic nature

of our demands, and showed how unreal and impracticable they looked, once put down on paper.

Bevin declared that Partition could only be imposed by force, and he was not ready to assign any force to implementing an idea that would compel a large Arab minority to live under Jewish rule.

The sole reply to our arguments and postulations was: "Don't you agree with our proposals? Then let us lay them before the United Nations so that they can judge between us." Bevin added that Britain would submit to the adjudication of the United Nations without presenting any recommendations of its own.

We found it difficult to comprehend their attitude. It was apparent that the British did not want to evacuate Palestine, and this assumption, later to be verified by a long concatenation of proofs, seemed to us incontrovertible at the time. We could only conjecture that the true purpose was to scare us into submission. It seemed reasonable to assume we would recoil from the eventuality of being left alone to face an Arab attack, without means of defense or British protection. Moreover, it might be supposed that we had every reason to fear the judgment of the United Nations in relation to which, in those days, our prospects were still very beclouded.

This reasoning was based entirely on the assumption that we had no alternative but to yield on weighing up the grave and weighty factors involved.

But if we refused to give in?

The question remained foremost in our minds, and I was privileged to get the answer, after the breakdown of the negotiations, from the mouth of no less a person than our old familiar, Harold Beeley.

It occurred at the conclusion of the talks. I invited Beeley to lunch and a chat. We sat in the Carlton Grill and reviewed the course we had run together around the conference-table at the Colonial Office.

Beeley tried to prove that we had not put forward any practical scheme and had adopted a negative and obstructive attitude. I reminded him of our suggestion to reinstate the Mandate in letter and spirit, of the Partition scheme and others.

I retailed the anecdote concerning two Jewish leaders, one of "Poalei Zion" and the other of the Socialist "Bund," who met on a train somewhere in Poland. When the second man told the other that his party had no program, the Zionist retorted: "I hope you'll be hit by as many punches as we have programs."

We went on talking half-jestingly, half-seriously. Then a new turn in the conversation provided me with an answer to the riddle over which I had cogitated unavailingly since the failure of the negotiations—the riddle of the British attitude.

"Why did you agree so readily to the idea of handing over the Palestine problem to the United Nations?" Beeley asked. "Look at the Charter of the United Nations and the list of its member nations. To get an affirmative decision, you'll need a two-thirds majority of the votes of these members. You can only win a majority if the Eastern bloc and the United States join together and support the same resolution in the same terms. That has never happened, it cannot happen, and it will never happen!"

That was it, then! Bevin's policy was now to count strongly on the clash in the world's political arena between the colossi of East and West, in which it was believed that our tiny cause would be lost in the grim struggle. In that event the White Paper would be upheld and the Mandatory would return to discharge its functions, this time with all the force and authority of the United Nations behind it.

The plan, on the surface, had been ingeniously contrived. It was based to all intents and purposes on a sound realism and drew its assumptions cleverly. Only a miracle could defeat it.

I grasped the full import of the devious artifice in transferring the problem to the United Nations, and visualized the danger of decisive defeat facing us in any logical assessment of the forces involved or sober, unillusory political judgment.

I remarked to Beeley that Britain ran the risk of repeating in Palestine its fatal blundering over Irish policy and would suffer the consequences for a long time.

He retorted that the analogy was incorrect, as the clash in Ireland was between the British Government and a nation fighting for its freedom, whereas in Palestine the quarrel was between two peoples. His reply completely overlooked the conflict between southern and northern Ireland, which had some resemblance to the issues in Palestine for one thing.

The train of developments and events over the next couple of years validated my premise at that time that the British could have obtained far more from granting concessions than they did as the end result of their intractable attitude. But Beeley, in the early months of 1947, was totally unprepared to admit the possibility.

We shook hands and he said, "Au revoir." I rejoined that I was leaving London shortly. He explained that he was not referring to another meeting in London, but at the United Nations at Lake Success. I said that I was not certain I should be there and, in any event, we would have nothing new to say to each other about the Palestine issue as we had "talked it out."

Before parting, I cracked that the next time we met, we could refer to various aspects of our Palestine argument by numbers, like the two traveling salesmen who knew each other's jokes so well that they no longer bothered to repeat them but merely said "Remember No. 67?" or "That reminds me of No. 34."

But I was not in a merry mood going away. The new policy he had revealed seemed to me very logical, very realistic, and very dangerous. The negotiations had broken down, our adversaries had gained freedom of action, and the old deadlock was resumed.

I recalled our meeting in 1939 with Lord Halifax, at the time of the Round-Table Conference which culminated in the promulgation of the White Paper. There was an enormous difference between Halifax and Bevin. They were men of two entirely different worlds, in form and style and method of negotiation, and yet the political context had barely changed a hair's-breadth.

The Palestine issue did not cut across party lines, but within them. Had there been a general vote on the Partition proposal, with party members free to vote accord-

ing to conscience, it would undoubtedly have resulted in a Parliamentary division supporting it. The enormous expenditure on maintaining troops in Palestine to impose an unpopular policy was distasteful to popular feeling. A large group within the Labour Party on the one side, and Winston Churchill and Oliver Stanley on the Conservative side, favored Partition. The press urged its adoption. Colonel Stanley had even drawn up a Partition plan during the war period, and the late Lord Moyne, toward the end of his life, had approved of it and wanted to carry it out. The British Government had not evinced any opposition to it, and the U.S. Administration viewed it sympathetically, as transpired from conversations that Nahum Goldmann had with Dean Acheson and others.

More often than not we asked ourselves how the Labour Government in Britain had sanctioned a policy based on considerations that flouted the party's pro-Zionist tradition and express pledges.

Of course, it was not the attitude of the whole Labour Party. The debates in Parliament on the Labour Government's policy in Palestine showed that the spirit of freedom and progress animated the new Britain. The brilliant speeches of supporters of Zionism were in the highest British traditions and an expression of the Socialist movement's conscience.

The Government, however, did not waver. The Foreign Office line was approved at a Cabinet meeting, and the problem of Palestine was transmitted for adjudication to the United Nations, from which the British Government hoped to secure approval for its White Paper policy.

The move was accompanied by the withdrawal of the families of British officials in Palestine, known as "Operation Polly" (and nicknamed "Folly"). The evacuation was founded on the assumption that, with the failure of the London talks, the position would deteriorate in the Holy Land and there would be an increasing spate of terrorism, counter-terrorism, tension, and bloodshed.

I had a talk one day with a man who had come to London from Eretz Israel on a Jewish Agency mission. It

had to do with a particular press plan the Agency had in mind. But it is interesting to observe the background of the mission, as disclosed to me a year later, in the light of the tangled web of conspiracy, terrorism, espionage, and underground intrigue.

The man, who traveled at the Agency's expense, brought letters of introduction to the Colonial Office from high British officials in Palestine. His demeanor was objectionable owing to his servile and obsequious attitude to the authorities, whom he flattered and courted. In reality he was a secret emissary of the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Sternists), who had for years succeeded in misleading both the Jewish Agency and the British Government.

(23) A STRANGE ENCOUNTER

Leaving London, I went to Paris with the intention of booking a sea passage for home. But I had the opportunity of flying direct to Lydda in a Norwegian aircraft and took it. The plane belonged to a Norwegian company that ran a shuttle service to evacuate British families and was going half-full.

At seven thirty the next morning I went to the office of the Norwegian air-line representatives, situated in a narrow, dark side-street. Several people were waiting in the doorway, and cars were parked near by.

As soon as I arrived, a man came up and asked if I knew why the office had not opened. They had been told to come at seven o'clock and had waited half an hour. I said I was advised to turn up at half past seven. The young man thanked me and returned to his companion, to whom I overheard him talking in Arabic.

It aroused my curiosity and I sauntered toward the group standing near the cars. They belonged to Arab Legations in Paris, one carrying the Egyptian flag, another the Syrian, and a third the Lebanese, and they had "C.D." (Corps Diplomatique) number-plates.

The men were fairly youthful-looking and seemed like military officers in civilian clothing. Among them a tall, broad-shouldered man, with fair hair of a reddish tinge, stood out. Although they spoke Arabic among themselves, the tall man now and then turned and bent to talk through the window of a car inside which a young woman was sitting. They conversed in German. I guessed that this must be one of the Arab leaders who had spent the war years in Germany under Hitler's patronage, had married a German woman, and was now returning to the Middle East. I tried to conjecture who it was, but had no inkling.

The office finally opened and we completed the formalities and left for the airfield. Eight of us—five Jews, the burly man and his wife, and a young Arab, apparently his secretary or aide—waited half an hour at the airfield before the take-off.

The weather was fine and the first couple of hours' flying was equable. Then the young Norwegian stewardess came to me and said she had bad news.

"We're not flying to Lydda, as we first intended, but to Cairo. We've had a wireless message to go there. You'll have to sleep over in Cairo and go on to Lydda in another plane."

I was greatly annoyed. First of all, I did not like Cairo overmuch, and I had even less liking for it at that period. Secondly, I knew there was to be a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem the next day, and as I was the first to return of those taking part, I wanted to report on the London talks. The change of destination meant I should have to go straight up to Jerusalem without first going home to Tel Aviv, or else abandon the idea of attending the meeting, neither of which suited me.

I turned to the hostess and told her I had paid for a direct flight to Lydda, and the ticket said so. I saw no valid reason for altering the destination, which merely inconvenienced the passengers. Had I wanted to visit Cairo, I could have taken an Air-France plane that took off half an hour before we did. Then, too, it was likely that several of us had particular reason to avoid Cairo

and therefore chose the Norwegian plane. The company ought to know that its Paris-Lydda route depended on Jewish custom, without which the plane would have flown to Lydda almost empty.

The hostess was taken aback at my vigorous protest and said she was not responsible for the arrangements. I asked her to pass my remarks on to the captain. He appeared fifteen minutes later and asked me to tell him what was wrong. I repeated my complaint and added that the diversion, without any good reason, was a breach of agreement, and the reputation of the company was involved. He listened to me carefully and said he would radio for further instructions.

The other passengers who had listened reacted differently. The tall, burly man prodded his aide, who immediately urged the captain apparently to continue to Cairo. The Jewish travelers tried to persuade me not to be refractory; it would be useless and pointless to argue with the air crew.

I saw that the Arab was uneasy, flushing and palping by turns. He whispered continually with his aide, who went on arguing with the pilot. It was apparent that the aircraft's destination was of particular importance to the Arab, who kept looking at me angrily and in alarm.

The atmosphere in the cabin became supercharged, as if a silent duel were going on between the Arab and me. It was a weird location for a clash of wills, suspended between sea and sky. We stared at the doorway to the cockpit, where the captain was probably exchanging wireless messages. From the tense and expectant mien of the passengers you would hardly have thought it was all because of a trifling diversion and the minor problem of spending a night in Cairo. A much more profound issue seemed to be boiling up to a dramatic climax.

It was getting late. The aircraft engines droned on through the void. We were wondering what was going to happen, when the hostess came in and said to me: "I have good news—we're going to Lydda."

When I thanked her, she said: "Don't thank me—thank the captain." A few moments later she returned

and said: "The captain wants you to know he's doing this against orders."

My glance fell on the Arab sitting with his German wife. She seemed to be much worried and wrought up. I could not understand the reason for their anxiety, since it only meant prolonging their journey by three hours. I went on ruminating over the peculiar circumstance.

We reached Lydda at eleven o'clock that evening. As I was leaving the plane, a man unknown to me came over and asked in Hebrew: "Did a tall, reddish-haired man speaking Arabic and with a German wife get into your plane in Paris?"

I answered yes, and he asked if I knew who the man was. I said I didn't.

My informant then spoke with deliberation: "It was Fawzi Bey Kaukji."

Another of the Jewish passengers, who had joined us, said: "Yes, I saw the name in his passport." This passenger was a Palestinian who had lived many years in France and he was not familiar with the name of the Arab guerrilla leader who had led the revolt in Palestine in 1936-38.

The man who had accosted me at Lydda, and who was (I later learned) a Haganah intelligence-service agent, looked at me and said reflectively: "We knew everything, we understood what was happening, but why did the aircraft come to Lydda when the pilot had strict orders to fly to Cairo?"

The simple, prosaic explanation that I wanted to spend the night at my own home in Tel Aviv before going to the meeting in Jerusalem the next day had not occurred to anyone.

It was all now clear to me. Kaukji and the Arab diplomats had arranged for the company to radio the plane to go to Cairo. He knew that the Palestine Government had offered a large reward for his capture and he was anxious to avoid arrest at Lydda. When he found how hard I was trying to persuade the pilot to keep on to Lydda, he was certain I had found out his identity and wanted to hand him over.

That was the whole upshot of the dramatic incident.

The aircraft remained only an hour at Lydda and flew on to Cairo the same night. The whole affair blew up into an international scandal and was the subject of criticism, representations, and questions in the newspapers, which wanted the Government to explain the strange fact that Kaukji had been allowed to land on Palestine soil and leave again without let or hindrance.

The hero of the occasion, the international adventurer who had led the Arab revolt of 1936-38 and was destined to become the commander of the ill-fated Arab Liberation Army of 1948, told newspapermen in Cairo: "The hour that I spent at Lydda was the worst one in my life."

The British press went on for days conjecturing why the plane, ordered to Cairo, had gone instead to Lydda and not only precipitated a major scandal, but blemished the name of the Palestine Government, which had allowed Kaukji to escape. The newspapers tried to ferret out some highly mysterious and significant motive, and some of them advanced the most far-fetched theories.

No one, of course, could stumble on the plain, unvarnished truth of the matter; and even if it had been told at the time, few would have believed it—that in persuading the pilot to fly to Lydda, I had no idea that Fawzi Kaukji was aboard. The British authorities would no doubt have puzzled for days over why the Jews first contrived that Kaukji be brought to Lydda and then took no steps to get him arrested.

Tel Aviv, as I drove through to my home after midnight, was sunk in slumber. A strange tranquillity enveloped the white-fronted houses, illumined by the street lamps. It seemed to me that the tension, fears, and anxieties of our life in cold, rainy London had no real validity on the soil of the homeland.

But below the soil, far removed from the visible world, were budding the tiny fruitful seeds of what was to be a stormy, blood-soaked epoch of history.

Part Three

AT THE BAR OF THE WORLD

A RAY OF HOPE

(24)

Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, routine economic work, negotiations with the authorities, conferences, meetings, memoranda—I was back in the familiar rut at the desk in my office, busy with the thousand and one current problems that went on mounting and developing against the backdrop of confusion and bloodshed. To all of these a new responsibility had been added: to maintain contact with the Mandatory Government on a number of political and economic questions, especially with Palestine's last Chief Secretary, renowned for his hostility to our cause, Sir Henry Gurney.

With Sir Henry, as indeed with other of our political

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opponents, I was able to cultivate a relationship that, at the period, was unique of its kind. Our conversations were free, candid, unadorned by diplomatic double-talk, and none the less fairly amiable, so that more than once the results were helpful.

Our first talk following my return revolved around the London conference. I expressed my frank opinion that the British delegation had no interest in reaching agreement with us. What they really were after was an agreement with the Arabs which they could impose on us, and once that possibility was seen to be unattainable, they could not care less whether the talks with the Jews broke down. Gurney admitted that the British wanted a tripartite agreement, and not a bilateral one with the Jews alone.

I then raised the request of amending the immigration policy, to which we could never become reconciled. He countered that the principal problem was terrorism. "It's sticking a knife in your own backs, and you at the Agency refuse to co-operate with us though many private individuals do," he declared.

I explained the reason for our refusal in spite of our abhorrence of terrorism and argued that any co-operation would be interpreted as connivance in maintaining a regime to which we were inflexibly opposed and in which we saw no legal or moral justification. Moreover, our democratic community would not permit us to co-operate, and we had no wish to remain isolated within the community.

Wars of liberation entailed sacrifices and peril. We sought a fair compromise and agreement, I stated. "You are holding fast to the *status quo* of suspended immigration and other restrictions. You want us to fight terrorism under a false banner, whereas by providing a proper basis to combat it, such as free immigration, you could remove the need for any combat whatever. We have every legal, moral, and humanitarian justification on our side," I went on. "Considerations such as that increased immigration necessitates the use of military force to implement it merely justify the employment of more violent measures against you."

When I referred to the bitterness rife in the Yishuv, the Chief Secretary accused the Jewish Agency of fomenting it, and added: "True, the Agency does not condone terrorism, but it's powerless to cope with it. Terror means murder, and there's no room for argument about murder."

I remarked that our position was far from being as simple as that. The Agency was caught between the hammer of terrorism and the anvil of the White Paper.

Gurney's rejoinder was that the British had no other interest than to discharge their obligations.

"You have a difficult alternative to face," I said. "You can either start a new page or continue the *status quo*. It's a choice between justice and law on the one hand, and considerations of an illusory advantage on the other.

"The enforcement of the *status quo* requires the maintenance of large British forces, and a White Paper has just been published in London on the British armed services which shows the enormous cost of keeping an army here. Even from the viewpoint of the self-interest of administrative convenience, therefore, the policy lacks any kind of valid ground or purpose. It wasn't we who started this business of expedience and inexpedience. We have a different criterion. We came here on the strength of your promise and you're breaking the Mandate, breaking the law of the country, and breaking the word of the present ministers in the home Government who said in the past that this regime was illegal and unmoral."

He commented briefly and pointlessly: "You ought to be in the Agency's Political Department, not only the Economic one," and added: "Try to do something with the Arabs."

"We're always ready to sit down and talk things over with the Arabs, but we shall never agree to remain a minority among them," I answered. "We have plenty of reasons for it, and plenty of examples to show how the Arabs treat minorities. We don't intend to commit suicide so easily. We prefer to try our hand at fighting a last-ditch battle, which may probably turn out not to be a last-ditch battle at all."

Sir Henry did not reply. I left with the feeling that it had been a casual if interesting talk, but of little practical value, at least at this stage of affairs.

I met him several times after that initial talk. Most of our conversations dealt with laying a water pipeline to the Negev, which would have to be installed in Government land on highway verges and for which we needed Government permission.

My associates differed over the matter, some believing we could get the permit and others that it was unobtainable anyway and we might as well try to construct the line without a permit. But this would have provoked British as well as Arab resistance, though it was doubtful whether the British would employ violent military measures. Those among us who opposed the use of force warned direly against action just before our case was coming before U.N.O., where we faced a bitter political campaign in any event. For myself, I fought hard for winning the Government's consent, which I believed it was possible to obtain. I was authorized to seek it by negotiation, but I knew that was only a delaying action, and my failure would probably mean having to let the others use forcible methods.

The negotiations were still further complicated by the new water ordinance that the Mandatory Government was about to enact, which would greatly curtail our irrigation activities. We were afraid the Government might try to impose the water ordinance on us in exchange for permission to lay the Negev pipeline.

I mentioned the projected ordinance in one of my talks with Sir Henry. We felt it had no objective justification, especially as a new chapter in the consideration of the Palestine problem was about to open.

Sir Henry maintained that our attitude was selfish and ignored the interest of the country as a whole. Moreover, it was founded on the fallacious assumption that every new piece of legislation was directed against us and was only a means of cramping our activities.

It was not difficult for me to demonstrate the fact that Palestine legislation had always been used to limit our activities, to interfere with the efforts to develop and

settle the country. As for the general welfare of the country, I alluded to the favorable effect of our settlement work on Arab economy. I repeated that we faced renewed consideration and possibly a final solution of the whole problem, and it was possibly best to defer any radical change in the country for some months.

Sir Henry thereupon uttered a very significant remark: "Final solution! Do you really believe that?"

The negotiations over the pipeline ran into rough water. Gurney was highly displeased with newspaper reports concerning the Government's objection to the project and asked if they were part of our campaign. I rejoined that the press were not under our orders in these matters, and drew his attention to the fact that the reports had appeared without undue prominence on the back pages. "If we had had anything to do with it," I said, smiling, "you may be sure that they would have had banner headlines in the local press, and been splashed over the front page in many papers abroad."

Gurney burst out laughing and agreed, accepting the hint I had let fall of what would happen if the negotiations fell through.

The Government's position this time was a weak one. The Jewish Agency had put up a plan that would provide water for Arab villages and Bedouin encampments afflicted by the shortage as well as for Jewish lands. Any delay or obstruction would be universally regarded as being politically motivated on the eve of consideration of the entire issue by the supreme world forum.

My own position was especially difficult. I had to break through the obtuseness of the Mandatory Administration as well as to restrain my own colleagues from injudicious haste, which would lead to an out-and-out fight without practical result.

It was only after strenuous effort that I obtained permission to have the first section of the line built. When we tried to get a permit for the next section, we came up against official resistance again. I met Gurney and some compromise was reached, and the work was resumed. Then we clashed with the Arabs, who had been instigated against us, and with the police.

One night the manager of the water company laying the pipeline and another friend came to my house and told me that fighting had taken place. We telephoned Ben-Gurion and went round to his house next morning. My colleagues urged the use of force, but I insisted on being given another day to take up the matter in Jerusalem, and B.-G. sided with me.

In Jerusalem, at the Chief Secretary's office, I was promised that appropriate instructions would be issued to the District Commissioner. The British police immediately changed their tone and even went so far as to give our men every assistance.



Around this time I began first to give serious thought to the possibility that the British would quit Palestine. I knew they had had no intention of doing so in placing the whole case before U.N.O., but I believed that chains of events had a logic of their own and that developments, once in train, need not necessarily have the same climax as planned.

Arising out of these cogitations on the purely hypothetical plane, I had a talk one day with Levi Shkolnik (now Eshkol, Israel Minister of Finance), who was then active in Haganah affairs.

"It is probable that within a fairly short period the British may leave the country," I said. "We shall then perhaps be faced not only with an attack by the Palestinian Arabs, but also by an Arab invasion from the neighboring countries. We shall be lacking in heavy equipment—artillery, tanks, and perhaps also aircraft—and we must try to get them as quickly as possible."

It was a fantastic idea in those days, and Shkolnik was somewhat skeptical in his reply. Even I was not fully convinced that there was any substance in the theory.

The vicious circle of terrorism and counter-terrorism was in full wheel. The crowning event was the imposition of martial law on Tel Aviv and its environs. I suddenly found myself cut off from Jerusalem, laden with

problems and anxieties as the Jewish Agency's representative in the martial-law zone. I had the additional worry of keeping the regular processes of commerce and industry in orderly running in the emergency situation.

But time and tides never stand still. The hands on the clock of history moved on to zero hour. The General Assembly of the United Nations met at Lake Success, and the Palestine issue appeared on the agenda.

We remained glued to the radio, which relayed the addresses of Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and Abba Hillel Silver, who reiterated the familiar arguments. But there was a rarer excitement in the air; we all felt that here, for the first time in thirty years of Zionist diplomacy, the problem had left that triangular orbit in which it had rotated—the triangle of Jews, Arabs, and Britons—and was now being judged by the world at large, which had been asked to find a solution.

The full significance of the new turn could only be gauged when a remarkable, wholly unexpected, and startling development occurred. Remarkable and startling, yes; but encouraging, too. It completely upset the whole kettleful of calculations which had been simmering for so long.

My wife and I were at tea with a friend toward evening. The radio was turned on and there was an atmosphere of mingled expectancy and studied indifference.

Suddenly an electric spark galvanized everyone present. The announcer came on the air with the first dramatic bulletin of Andrei Gromyko's speech to the Assembly demanding a solution of the Palestine problem in keeping with the Jewish calamity in Europe. It was like a thunderbolt out of a clear blue sky after so many years during which our cause had been ostracized by the Russians.

The recollection of my last conversation with Harold Beeley in London flashed through my mind, and it seemed to me that the whole apparently solid edifice of logical premise he had so carefully built up before my eyes on the firm ground of Russian-American differences had begun to totter and the foundations to crack.

A new prospect that none had dared even to envisage now opened up. The outlines of a new image began to assume flesh and sinews.

We knew, of course, that it was only the first augury. The way ahead was still long and fraught with innumerable hazards. Yet for the first time in a long period of frustration a new sphere of action had been opened, and a new portal of hopefulness.

And so, for the first time, there was no longer any acrimonious discussion over whether the Jewish representatives should or should not appear before the Assembly. When its session ended with the decision to appoint a new commission of inquiry into the problem of Palestine, everyone knew but one thing: that the United Nations Organization, the supreme international body, was our last resort; and that our political and historical destiny would be molded by its epochal judgment.

(25)

UNSCOP

With Moshe Shertok's return from Lake Success, the Jewish Agency Executive decided to appoint Aubrey Eban and myself as its liaison officers with the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, known as UNSCOP. We were detailed to organize, guide, and direct the Agency's appearance before the new inquiry under Shertok's supervision as head of the Political Department.

Shertok addressed the Executive on the composition and standing of the Committee. "It has been set up on a territorial basis in accordance with the various national blocs," he said. "The Swedish chairman and the Netherlands member represent the western European area; the Canadian and Australian, the British Commonwealth; there are three Latin Americans, representing Guatemala, Uruguay, and Peru; two of the eastern European bloc, the Czech and Yugoslav members; and two Asiatics, from India and Iran.

"The decision to exclude the big powers directly was taken in Committee after a long debate in the General Assembly. But their influence will no doubt be evident behind the scenes. The western European and Dominions representatives will undoubtedly be influenced by Britain's attitude, while the Czech and the Yugoslav will act in accordance with Moscow's attitude, to the important change in which Gromyko's speech testified. The Latin-American members will probably be swayed by United States policy, while the Asiatic representatives will far more than any of the others be under the decided influence of the Arab League."

It was indubitably a more or less correct appreciation of the factors concerned. But, in the view of us all, it was a starting-point rather than a final judgment, a field of action rather than a summation of arbitrary decision; and the three of us—Shertok, Eban, and I—began our preparations with that recognition in mind.

After several conferences with Executive members, at which we received clear instructions to work for the creation of a Jewish state in a suitable area of Palestine, the practical work was launched, and our first step was to get in contact with the three-man secretariat, which had meanwhile arrived in Jerusalem.

We met Dr. Victor Hoo, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Chinese, who had had a long diplomatic career and had a wonderful command of Chinese, French, English, Russian, and German. He received us formally and with reserve—an attitude he was to retain throughout the inquiry. He seemed to keep somewhat aloof from the Palestine issue the whole time.

His associate, Dr. Alfonso García Robles, dealt principally with UNSCOP's organizational matters, and discharged his functions most ably.

In contrast, Dr. Ralph Bunche, an American Negro, at once penetrated into the ramifications of the complex issue with practiced skill and amazed everyone with his depth of understanding, his wide knowledge, and his dedication. He created a profound impression by his remarkable intelligence, the celerity with which he grasped a problem, his brilliance, and, above all, his energy. I

sensed in him immediately the driving force that would keep UNSCOP's wheels turning and be its enlivening spirit.

We welcomed the Committee's decision to accelerate its visit to Palestine to hear witnesses, which had not inconsiderably been influenced by the Arab boycott of it, one of their more blatant and stupid tactical errors. UNSCOP hoped *inter alia* to meet various Arab groups unofficially during its visit, and thereby gauge the feeling.

To preserve strict neutrality, the drawing up of the itineraries was assigned to a special subcommittee comprising the eleven deputy members together with the Mandatory Government and Jewish Agency's liaison officers.

The British liaison officer was Donald C. MacGillivray, one of the Chief Secretary's principal assistants, a young Scot thoroughly unlike many of his colleagues, especially those encountered in the colonial service. He was tall, black-haired, with dark eyes; quick-witted and ready to grasp an idea; nimble and energetic, and very industrious; and, withal, he had an affable personality and was free of the prejudices current among colonial administrators.

Unlike his comrades in the service, MacGillivray constantly sought opportunities of meeting local inhabitants, Arabs and Jews, and in his former post as Deputy District Commissioner at Acre, in northern Palestine, and later in Samaria, he often visited Arab villages and Jewish settlements. He knew the country at first hand and not merely from memoranda and reports. He toured its highways and byways, the plains and mountain regions and desolate areas, on his hunting trips. He knew the customs and usages among Bedouin and Arab peasantry on the one hand, and the frame of mind and credos of the Jewish *kibbutz* settler on the other.

Little of the essential character and spirit of the country was alien to him. He regarded the Jewish-Arab conflict as a tragic, irrational, and inevitable stroke of fate over which the peoples concerned perforce had no control. His gift of insight and his considerable experience

had long convinced him that Partition was the best and only solution capable of effective application, and he was not afraid of making his views known.

MacGillivray and I struck up friendly relations, which were marked by understanding and sympathy, and I was glad he had been appointed to the job. It was amusing to see the surprise and astonishment of the Committee's deputy members who had expected some sharp exchanges between myself as Agency representative and Donald MacGillivray as the representative of the Mandatory Government, over details of the tour, which, in everyone's opinion, would form the committeemen's first important impressions. The deputies found us not only chatting amicably before the meeting, but falling in with each other's suggestions at the meeting itself.

Dr. Bunche, who was the chairman of the subcommittee, and the others were taken aback at the display of harmony, which undoubtedly arose as a result of MacGillivray's fairness and personal integrity. That harmony helped us to tackle and settle our problems swiftly.

It was decided to begin with a visit to the "mixed" Municipality of Haifa and other institutions, as well as industrial plants in the Haifa district. I suggested an inspection of the Arab cigarette factory owned by Messrs. Karaman, Dik, and Salti, and the suggestion was taken by the subcommittee as fair and objective in relation to the Arabs, who were boycotting the inquiry. MacGillivray supported me. But several of the deputy members wanted to visit an equal number of Arab and Jewish factories.

I turned to MacGillivray, seated alongside me, and whispered that a fair standard would be the relative strengths of Jewish and Arab industry; otherwise a false picture would emerge. He agreed, and, with his help, the proposal to visit equal numbers of Arab and Jewish factories was dropped. Other sharp edges were smoothed with Dr. Bunche's diplomatic aid, and plans for the itinerary were completed.

At nine o'clock one sunny morning we drove out of Jerusalem heading north in company with the UNSCOP members. On the trip the opportunity was provided of closely studying and weighing them.

The chairman was Justice Emil Sandstrom, an elderly Swede, reticent and reserved, usually stern and of few words, of judicious and intelligent appearance, and very courteous.

Dr. Nicolaas Blom, of the Netherlands, was a former acting lieutenant governor-general of the Dutch East Indies, whose natural abilities were enhanced by considerable administrative experience. He was a realist by temperament and so completely objective in his approach as to avoid any unofficial contacts with the parties involved. Nevertheless, he betrayed a slight tendency to show greater understanding of the British difficulties and of their administrative and political problems in the colonial sphere.

The Canadian, Supreme Court Justice Ivan Rand, was utterly different from both of them. He was elderly, tall, and of spare build and had bright, clear eyes. He was not disposed to regard administrative problems as the essence of the matter. This obstinate, fiery, and explosive liberal, of broad outlook and deep intellectual and moral caliber, sought truth, morality, justice, and humanity in the tangled skein of the problem. He showed little patience with ephemeral political considerations; he was animated by a warm humanitarianism, unassailible moral principles, and a deep perception. In accepting the task, he had made it clear to those who commissioned him that he would obey no directives save those of his own conscience, and he behaved in that spirit throughout.

John D. L. Hood, of Australia, where he was senior counselor in the Department of External Affairs, was a hearty person of the hail-fellow-well-met type, who found time to fraternize with the outside world while doing his job. At first he showed some slight prejudice toward us, but this soon disappeared and a lively friendship took its place.

Czechoslovakia was represented by Dr. Karel Lisicky, a good friend of Jan Masaryk, a Social-Democrat by

leanings and a diplomat by profession, moderate yet conscientious, punctilious yet fair. Blue-eyed Vladimir Simic, President of the Yugoslav Senate, had a fine head, with the thick hair shot with gray. He was a quiet man, of high rectitude, somewhat of a doctrinaire, and out of touch with realities in Palestine.

Finally, the three Latin Americans. Dr. Jorge García-Granados, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States and its chief representative at the United Nations, was of short stature and stormy temperament, bright-eyed and given to quick, original thought. He was an experienced and progressive diplomat, who had grown up in the revolutionary traditions of a subcontinent where insurrections were commonplace, and had from his youth been accustomed to tempestuous political upheavals. Once he became friendly to our cause and struggle, he turned into a courageous, vigorous fighter, though at times he built up whole systems of thought which had little foundation in reality, and it required great efforts to show him he was wrong. His worldliness and lively humor won him many friends in Palestine, with whose life and destiny he formed a close spiritual affinity.

His friend Professor Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, of Uruguay, where he had been Minister of Education at one time, was a left-wing liberal with a brilliant political past. Like Granados, he had been to prison for his beliefs and he was a revolutionary in the Latin-American tradition. But the Uruguay representative differed in all other traits from his Guatemalan comrade. His piercing eyes, which peered half-satirically, half-childishly through his glasses and indeed uncannily mirrored a strange mixture of transparent, almost childish innocence and brilliant mentality, his fervent humanitarianism and fine pungent irony, made him a unique person. The tragic Jewish destiny and the sufferings of Jewish children in Europe especially became the cornerstone of his thinking. His advanced education, probity, careful habit of thought and keen humane impulses won the appreciation and admiration of his fellow members and explained his great influence over them.

By contrast, the placid, meditative, and taciturn per-

sonality of Dr. Arthur Garcia Salazar, of Peru, his unassuming but watchful demeanor as it was observed at the sittings in Jerusalem, made him appear a static spectator of the unfolding drama. He looked, listened, and remained silent throughout the Committee's travels and taking of testimony until we reached Geneva. There a tremendous surprise awaited us. The silent old man turned out to have a most penetrating and ruthless intellect hidden behind that mild and harmless mask of his. His faculty of incisive analysis devoid of all sentimental considerations stamped him as an eminent descendant of the great medieval Catholic political tradition, which never hesitated to sacrifice all else on the altar of the Church's interests. A grim unemotionalism, unalloyed by feelings of either sympathy or hostility, characterized this steely old Peruvian, who surveyed the realities of life through the spyglass of a remorseless logic alone, as he did a problem which, perhaps alone among its counterparts, antedated in antiquity that ecclesiastical political tradition which he had inherited and represented.

Asia was represented on the committee by Nasrollah Entezam, a former Foreign Minister of Iran who was destined to become President of the U.N. General Assembly at a most fateful hour in world history, and Sir Abdur Rahman, a High Court judge, of Lahore, India. Both represented two human types as far apart as the poles. Entezam was a complete and rounded synthesis of French culture and the ancient Persian civilization, a man of the world, polished, elegant, courteous, and singularly imperturbable. He was fluent in English, French, German, and Persian, a striking example of a diplomat of the old school. He combined those qualities which personified the traditional diplomat—shrewdness and courtesy, intelligence and refinement, tastefulness and sobriety of manner. His deportment, like his character, was uneffusive, gentle, and marked by keen humor. He lacked any feeling of fanaticism or undue enthusiasm for any of the parties to the Palestine dispute, the tragic nature of which stood in profound contrast to his impassive mien, which itself had a tinge of decadence but

was fascinating because of its singularity in these stormy times.

Sir Abdur Rahman was an outright antithesis to him. The Indian was corpulent and heavy, with coarse pronounced features. He was openly and virulently pro-Arab. His manner was forthright and tactless, and he had a narrowly juridical approach to problems. As a Moslem, he became an unabashed spokesman for the Arabs without bothering to conceal the bias.

Among the deputy members, the outstanding ones were Dr. Paul Mohn of Sweden and Dr. Jose Brilej of Yugoslavia.

Dr. Mohn continued to be associated with the Palestine problem long after the inquiry had ended, and he served in various U.N. capacities on the spot until the Israel war of liberation and the proclamation of the State of Israel. His personality was at first impenetrable. He was tall, very slender, with a somewhat Mephistophelean cast of countenance. A man of high education, he had had a long diplomatic career and was widely traveled, the author of a number of books, a former secretary of the Non-Intervention Commission during the Spanish civil war, a Swedish emissary engaged on humanitarian missions to Hitler-occupied Poland, and at one time an explorer in the fastnesses of Afghanistan. These were some of the phases in the remarkable life of a strange personality, of brittle and satirical humor, who was among the most controversially discussed members of the Committee. He was always alone and restless, and one would meet him suddenly late at night in some dark corner or in a public park, leaning against a tree in deep thought. His sharp intellect, the relentless and meticulous precision of his mentality, his grim logic and command of many languages made up a saturnine personality that provoked the surprised interest and perhaps also fear of his fellows.

The other foremost deputy, Jose Brilej, a former Yugoslav partisan leader, was somewhat of a dogmatist and belonged to the type of person who believe that faith can move mountains. A resolute determination, rocklike principles, and immovable ideology were his main char-

acteristics. His doctrinal abstractiveness held a certain danger to our interest.



The hearings were initiated by two general statements, one by the Palestine Administration and the other by the Jewish Agency. The rest of the evidence was to be heard after the members' tour.

The Government's statement was submitted at a closed session by Sir Henry Gurney (who was killed in a guerrilla ambush in Malaya in the fall of 1951) and Donald MacGillivray (who became chief political adviser to Gurney's successor in Malaya, General Templer, early in 1952).

Moshe Shertok and I presented the Jewish Agency's introductory statement. Shertok reviewed the main issues, developments, and difficulties over Palestine; I answered a number of specific questions. Private reports later indicated we made a far better impression than Sir Henry, who was somewhat hectoring and insistent on rights of sovereignty.

Another argument running like a refrain through the British testimony and in the Memorandum ("Blue Paper") given to UNSCOP went something like this: "There are two peoples in Palestine differing in rate of progress, customs, culture, and standard of living. Their trends of development are fundamentally opposed and consequently they collide with uncompromising extremism. All the Mandatory Government's efforts to mediate between them have been in vain."

(26) A TOUR OF THE HOLY LAND

Before the tour of the country started, the sub-committee in charge of the arrangements held a stormy session, which after a long discussion of the questions involved—it lasted until a late hour at night—decided

among other things that the Agency's liaison officers could not travel in UNSCOP's cars but only in their own transport.

At dawn that day we arrived in our car outside the starting-point to join the long column of shining U.N. limousines. As we waited, Mr. Justice Rand's deputy, a Canadian, invited me to join them. I said I would do so willingly, but had no wish to disregard the subcommittee's decision. Rand himself strolled over and was highly indignant at learning of the ban. He spoke immediately to the Chairman, Justice Sandstrom, and to the secretaries, had the decision reversed, and made me get into his car.

We went north through the Arab town of Ramallah to Haifa. A frank and intimate conversation started from the first moments of the journey. Justice Rand inquired into my early life, of which I gave him details, and my present work. He told me about himself and his activities on the bench, and revealed his progressive ideas and philosophy of far-reaching social reform, which were founded on the belief that a transformation of the social structure and of world polity was imperative. He emphasized his spiritual and intellectual dedication to liberalism and to the concepts of democracy and freedom. I perceived in his exposition an attempt, possibly a little in the spirit of the nineteenth century, to bridge the difference between the two fundamentals of social reform and the widest personal liberty by a deep humanism.

From the general our talk veered to the particular, and I gave the distinguished Canadian jurist a broad review of the various facets of our case—our aspirations, the tragic submergence of our people in the last few years, the perplexities of the current situation, our inability to become reconciled to a minority status after all that had happened in Europe, and the unavoidable cleavage from British policy.

He listened intently and asked several questions, and I felt that he was trying to determine his own standpoint. He showed his understanding of the relationship between the events of the Second World War and our political

orientation, especially our position regarding immigration. He wanted to know the origins of the terrorist movement, and I explained the growth of this phenomenon in the fertile soil of desperation, frustration, and inequities.

When I outlined the various possible solutions, Rand displayed particular interest in Partition. I told him candidly that while the Jewish Agency and the Zionist movement had not finally decided on their attitude, I thought that in existing conditions the proposal offered the sole possibility of extricating the country from its political dilemma.

He asked about various features of constitutional and territorial plans for a Jewish state, if it were set up. I said that peace and tranquil construction without involvement in international adventures were consonant with the spirit and idealism of our movement and people, who were tired of being the fuel for other nations' fires. Moreover, we wanted to become an integral part of the constructive effort in the part of the world in which we lived, in close and friendly concert with our Arab neighbors.

The Canadian expressed admiration for this attitude. I sensed that the idea of Partition was coalescing in his mind as the only means to an objective solution. We went on talking of the historical aspects of the Jewish problem, with which his mind was actively occupied. It was evident that the reservations concerning our movement which he had brought to the country were rapidly disappearing and being replaced by a deep understanding that was inspired by his humanity and human conscience, joined to a vigorous political philosophy of farsighted perception.

We lunched at the Zion Hotel in Haifa after attending a reception at the Municipality, which the Arabs boycotted. During the meal Dr. Robles and Dr. Bunche called me aside and, in apologetic tones, said they had spoken by telephone to the owners of the Karaman, Dik and Salti tobacco factory, who were adamantly opposed to any Jewish visitors.

tidings, I was quite unperturbed and gladly waived the "pleasure" of taking part in the inspection. Several of the UNSCOP members whom I told about it on returning to the table were most annoyed, knowing as they did that the visit was at my suggestion. Rand was especially upset at my being excluded.

But the Arabs suffered their worst setback when the UNSCOP visitors saw the shameful conditions of exploitation of child labor in the thoroughly unhygienic conditions at the plant. None of them believed the patent falsehood in the guides' assertion that these children were over fourteen. The rehearsed mechanical replies by the boys and girls to the questions put by the members only heightened the bad impression and enhanced the picture of racial animosity, due to the exclusion of the Jewish visitors, and of social backwardness.

When they left, Rand told me again of his disgust at our exclusion on grounds of racial and national discrimination, which he loathed.

Toward evening, after visiting a number of Jewish factories, we took our leave of the others and went up Mount Carmel in the Canadian member's car to get a view of the town and harbor spread out below us. The rusting hulks of the Jewish "refugee fleet" rocked at their moorings at a corner of the harbor, and in pointing the vessels out to Justice Rand, I described the epic drama of the fight for free immigration, its grandeur and suffering, its anguish and heroism. I revealed the meaning and significance of refugee immigration.

Rand stood quietly musing, his blue eyes gazing out over the vista of harbor and rickety vessels illuminated by the glow of the setting sun.

We returned that evening to Jerusalem and caught up with the cavalcade of UNSCOP cars. From afar, on the highway near the Latrun monastery, we saw the twinkling lights of the detention camp. I told Rand of the internment of Moshe Shertok and other leaders, and again sensed his swift reaction. It was the crowning impression of an eventful day, during which he had been given visual evidence of the Arab attitude to the Jews, the plight of Jewish refugees battering their way toward

their haven, and the broad panorama of the Jewish struggle.

He had listened to my explanations and recital for eleven hours, with short intervals, and had been able to grasp the full scope and significance of our position. These impressions, scenes, ideas, and personal experiences had combined into a vivid picture, and I knew that the sympathy which had been engendered within him was bound to become more pronounced as UNSCOP's work proceeded.

All he said as we parted was: "I fully appreciate that you're fighting with your backs to the wall." The way he said it was encouraging and offered some future hope from a quarter in which we had expected very little sympathy in our struggle.

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The committeemen continued to visit Jewish and Arab areas alternately, the latter without our participation. When they reached Tel Aviv they were taken aback at the enthusiastic reception by the crowds of people who lined the streets, and who so graphically demonstrated their hopes and longings for a real solution.

The addresses and visits to the Municipality, the port, factories, and social institutions developed into a splendid manifestation of Jewish creative power. Nor did the committeemen remain oblivious of the vestiges of the Jewish tragedy: workingmen and women with the blue concentration-camp numerals tattooed on their arms, and refugee orphans in children's homes.

Vladimir Simic spoke in Serbian to a young girl at the Women's International Zionist Organization home, Entezam discovered Persian-speaking Jewish youngsters, the Latin Americans were able to converse with inhabitants in Spanish, and the Netherlands delegate found some who conversed in Dutch.

The trip through the Negev was undertaken in suffocating heat, and the green oasis of Revivim, set in the heart of the wilderness, with its refreshing water reservoir, provided another telling demonstration of Jewish

diligence and capacity to turn the country "which eateth the inhabitants thereof" into a flourishing garden.

I think that more than anything else the appearance of the new Jew whom they met on the roads, and the young boys and girls in the desert *kibbutzim* and settlements winning the desolation back to fertility, etched themselves into the committeemen's memories. They had spent a full day traversing the expanse of the Emek in clouds of dust, heat, and relentless sun. Justice Sandstrom and Dr. Mohn, with whom Donald MacGillivray and I were traveling, seemed to be particularly fatigued, and Mohn remarked with a touch of irony: "What a blessing it is we haven't been asked to investigate Saudi Arabia!" We smiled at the analogy between the Negev and Hejaz and sank back into our thoughts until, before us, loomed the green-clad bluffs, plantations, lawns, fields, and water-tower of Ruhama.

It was one of the most wonderfully impressive moments of the entire tour. I had pointed out to the occupants of the car the various sections of the Negev pipeline, and a group of irrigation engineers, including Simha Blass, author of the Negev irrigation scheme, awaited us at Nir-Am. We sat down in a room with maps of the country on its walls, and the experts described the great hydrological plans that were designed to refresh the vast, arid Negev.

At Safad some of the committeemen and ourselves were accommodated at the fine, well-appointed hotel on Mount Canaan, and one of the members told me smilingly how Trygve Lie had warned them, before they left, that they were coming to a primitive land in which they would be compelled to forgo many comforts. They had brought along food, utensils, and other equipment for camping out, but were pleasantly surprised by the modern arrangements, which were not far below American standards.

The warm reception by the Yishuv, in contrast with the cold malevolence shown by the Arabs, did not pass unnoticed by UNSCOP. The obvious conclusion was that the Jews were ready to be judged by the objective international tribunal whereas the Arabs did not feel

their case was sufficiently stable for them to put in an appearance.

Another positive factor was the creative dynamism of the Jewish enterprise, coupled with the expressions of the intense Jewish desire for redemption and a decision that would open the country's gates and thereby terminate the sufferings of their brethren, victims of Nazism in Europe. The members came upon this atmosphere of expectancy wherever they went in the Yishuv, and it summed up more than any explicit statements the ardent hope of every Jew in the country for a peaceful remedy that would arrest the headlong rush of political events toward the edge of the precipice in this twelfth hour of their history.

They saw the symptoms of the dangerous situation everywhere. In Jerusalem they saw "Bevingrad"—the central area of the city held as a British redoubt behind barbed wire, with armed military patrols. At Ramleh they saw the wrecked railroad depot. They traveled at night along deserted highways, emptied by the curfew regulations after sunset. The peace of the country was jeopardized by perils that lurked in every house and street and alleyway.

(27) PUBLIC HEARINGS and the UNDERGROUND

David Ben-Gurion was the first of the Jewish witnesses. He gave a detailed review of Jewish history and dwelt on the indissoluble tie between the people of Israel and its land. In portraying the somber aspects of the Jewish tragedy of these times, he launched into a severe and trenchant indictment of the Mandatory Government, condemned the Chamberlain policy of appeasement, which was still enforced over Palestine, and ended with a warning of the calamity into which the withhold-

ing of sovereign status from Israel would plunge the people and its very historic existence.

In my testimony, which followed, I took advantage of diagrams again to illustrate the complex theoretical verities of Palestinian economy, along the lines of my exposition to the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee.

Eliezer Kaplan presented a broad plan for construction and development. He cited Jewish achievements in turning deserts and areas dismissed as "uncultivable" into fertile meadows as a result of intensive agricultural and irrigation methods. He depicted the whole vast panorama of Jewish agricultural and industrial development, and the beckoning possibilities of future immigrant absorption. The vision implicit behind the dry figures of his economic testimony and the soaring concept of his planning, which was none the less sound and practical, had a powerful impact on his auditors.

The second thread in the Jewish testimony was the unique character of the historic issue now being judged by the civilized world. Our spokesmen hammered away at the theme that the complexities could not be resolved except by discarding the accepted formulas and taking a far-sighted view of world interests. It was then likely that a *modus vivendi* would be found to bridge Jewish-Arab differences, and that the stage of Jewish autonomous regeneration would be rapidly succeeded by the stage of interracial co-operation based upon sovereign equality.

The same recognition of Partition as a proper and acceptable solution was still further stressed by Dr. Weizmann, whose eminent and dignified personality imbued the suggestion with considerable political validity. The Zionist leader drew a picture of the Jewish people as a homeless, wandering nation, without roots or soil of its own, a kind of head without a body, circulating among other nations, in whom it aroused the most base instincts of fear and hatred of the peculiar stranger. He reviewed Jewish efforts to rid themselves of this curse of the centuries and the failure of their attempts at resettlement in various places outside Eretz Israel.

Dr. Weizmann went on to describe the evolution of the Jewish construction and settlement enterprise in Palestine and emphasized its uniqueness, as demonstrated by the fact that the Jews invested their blood, toil, tears, and sweat in the desperate effort to free themselves of the bane of exile. He did not confine himself to the historiographical survey. He expressed his political viewpoint by openly defending the Partition plan, to which his predecessors testifying before UNSCOP had referred merely in passing. He underlined that as he no longer held an official position in the Zionist movement, he was at liberty to disclose his views unhesitatingly, and he claimed that Partition was the only exit from the tragic maze of suffering and bloodshed which held the country in its toils. To reinforce his statement Dr. Weizmann read a letter he had received a few days earlier from Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, of Pretoria, who similarly advocated Partition as the most acceptable solution in the circumstances.

The deeper UNSCOP went into the problem, the more complex and complicated it became. The members slowly reconciled themselves to the absence of any prospect of a solution agreed to by both parties or one that would do absolute justice, and sought the solution that would be the most just.

The opinion of the committeemen was not determined in the meeting-hall alone. It was evident that both they and ourselves sought and found ways of effecting unofficial and non-binding contacts to examine the issues outside the formal sessions. Our meetings with Dr. Granados and Professor Fabregat, the Latin Americans, were most cordial and free of formality from the outset. Granados had a strange attachment to the cantonization proposal. We met at receptions and later at my hotel for long talks, at which I elucidated the geographical, demographic, economic, and political facts that invalidated the proposal. I showed him that the demographic division of the population in the various sectors of the country under cantonization would limit the Jews to two or three congested islands in which they would be the majority; but these would remain islands

resembling ghettos, from which it would be impossible to have access to the undeveloped areas in which a clear Arab majority now lived. Granados understood and accepted the argument.

Another obstacle arose. This time it was the handiwork of the inscrutable if versatile Swedish deputy, Dr. Paul Mohn. He had studied the map of Palestine with great thoroughness and had become so intimately acquainted with the territorial aspect that he could immediately place his finger on any village or out-of-the-way spot mentioned.

We met for lunch at my boarding establishment in Rehavia and Dr. Mohn lectured me at length on his theory that there could not be an independent Jewish state except in the narrowest and most limited area of Palestine, and therefore we could hardly expect independence "in an appropriate part of the country" that would enable us, even partially, to solve the immigration and refugee problems. A Jewish state in Palestine could only be a token state, said Dr. Mohn.

He recounted the ethnographic, demographic, and political premises for his belief, and sat with me a long time over a map to get explanations of our proposed frontiers, without laying his own cards on the table.

But he dealt me the greatest surprise when he concluded, in connection with his postulate of a token state, that it was necessary to find room in one of the undeveloped overseas territories. That would kill two birds with one stone—to have Jewish independence in Palestine on the one hand, and to relieve the pressure of the refugee problem on the other. It was a weird idea, which I tried hard to dissipate. I explained to Dr. Mohn that none of the spiritual motivations that had inspired Jewish energy and genius in building up Palestine would be operative in a colonial area of the sort he had in mind, and the proposal merely signified excluding the Jews from a major section of the country—a prospect to which the Jewish people would never submit.

I have no idea what effect my statement had on Dr. Mohn, but from that time onward I heard no more about the plan for a Jewish state overseas.

My frequent meetings with Ralph Bunche strengthened my initial feeling that he was one of the outstanding and central figures in UNSCOP. It was evident that he was free of all prejudice and that his approach was wholly objective and unbiased. He lost few opportunities for informal consultation and clarification. He tried to penetrate to the heart of the issue, disregarding the tangle of reservations, fears, diplomatic statements, and internal political considerations which befogged the official conferences and sessions and obscured the true facts and aspirations at the crux of the conflict.

The constant worry over the possibility of talking to the committeemen informally did not affect the Arabs, who abstained officially but who, through Sir Abdur Rahman, of India, conveyed their views and attitudes fully to the members. We consequently tried to do the same and used the occasion of a reception at Moshe Shertok's home which almost all the members attended, as well as Ben-Gurion, Eliezer Kaplan, Shertok, Golda Meirerson, Aubrey Eban, Leo Kohn, and myself.

B.-G. reviewed the broad aspect of the problem frankly and informally. The Partition issue soon came up. Justice Rand tried to ascertain what our reaction would be to a proposal for Partition accompanied by economic union between the two states. The territorial and constitutional aspects of giving effect to the proposal were discussed. The committeemen were cautious and reserved in their statements and refrained from committing themselves, but Karel Lisicky, with whom I chatted in a corner, gave me the opportunity of concluding from something he said that even though he regarded our territorial claims as most exaggerated, nevertheless he favored the principle of Partition.

Our conversation led to one of the most surprising conclusions that we obtained from our meetings with the committeemen, which was that no Slav bloc existed in UNSCOP. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were divided over the principles and details of the problem. The Yugoslavs were mainly influenced by the attitude of the local Communists, whereas Lisicky's position stemmed from his more flexible mentality, which tended toward

compromise. Neither had received clear or express prior directives.

The Committee in two successive groups visited Dr. Weizmann's home at Rehovoth, where they dined and had long conversations. Weizmann sparkled especially at the first conversation. With masterful dexterity he interwove the story of his own early years with the broad narrative of the Jewish people's past and destiny, so that the latter appeared to focus on his own experiences. The wonderful synthesis of Jewish wit and delicate irony of this fine and gifted personality, who combined Jewish simplicity with the highest values of the European spirit in the best sense of the term; his tales about his father, the timber-merchant of Pinsk, and of the school in which he studied in his youth; and, thrown in casually, his references to meetings with the great ones of the earth, completely captivated those present, who included Justice Sandstrom and Justice Rand.

His narrative embraced the world, yet showed no signs of being forced or artificial. It was apparent that this was an easy friendly discourse, without any trace of attempt to ram home his own ideas and opinions on his listeners.

Dr. Bunche, who was greatly moved, referred to his feelings as a Negro and the emotional identity that Dr. Weizmann's description of Jewish destiny aroused in him. The others were so enthralled and spellbound that they could only ask a few questions or proffer an odd comment or so.

As we motored down to Rehovoth, Sandstrom and Rand interrogated me at length on settlement and security matters. Driving back to Jerusalem, they sat silent and meditative, and only murmured: "Well, that's really a great man."

The second group remained a shorter time, but long enough to be profoundly impressed by Dr. Weizmann's personality as a man and a statesman. For the first time we heard the normally taciturn Dutch representative, Dr. Blom, speaking in defense of the British Administration. With all the authority of a colonial governor, he maintained that any colonial administration must in

the course of time become an honest interceder with the central government on behalf of the inhabitants whom it ruled, but it never won the appreciation of the natives, who regarded it as representative of the alien power. "Although Dutch rule in the Far East is fair and benevolent, the Indonesians want to expel us," he commented.

Dr. Bunche, that courageous and brilliant man, was foremost in maintaining the informal contacts. He quickly realized the decisive importance of the relative military strengths, and eagerly welcomed meetings with Haganah and the dissidents. The conference with the Haganah leaders made a deep impact on its participants, Dr. Sandstrom and the secretaries. They faced the commanders of a well-organized, disciplined, and responsible paramilitary force, which waited underground for the signal to muster at the call of the national institutions.

The meeting with the Irgunists yielded nothing new. The dissidents repeated their familiar arguments with parrot-like fluency, without trying to make their statements sound convincing. The conspiratorial atmosphere and dark secrecy in which the encounter was staged had a greater effect than the declarations with which the committeemen were regaled.

One of the most dramatic events in the annals of our struggle and fight for immigration occurred during UNSCOP's sojourn. For a short while it cast its shadow over the deliberations, and shed new light on the tragedy accompanying the historic political debacle.

Exodus from Europe 1947, largest of the refugee vessels, was returned to Europe by the British authorities after a bitter fight at Haifa.

Sandstrom, Simic, and Granados were eyewitnesses of the expulsion operation at Haifa and were moved to the core by the sight. The Committee as a whole felt that it shouldered a heavy load of responsibility and was destined to play a historic role in reaching a decision.

And as the wretched immigrants of *Exodus from Europe* writhed in their agony at a small French port, refusing to leave the ships which later took them to Hamburg, the members of UNSCOP floated off to Geneva

on a sea of files, testimony, and theories in search of an anchorage. We could hardly tell at the time if it were that blessed anchorage to which those four thousand refugees aspired vainly as they fought their despairing battles on the decks of the prison ships in which they were being exiled from Israel.

BACK IN GENEVA

(28)

Before UNSCOP left the country, Dr. Sandstrom invited the liaison officers to join it at Geneva. The transport officer of UNSCOP told us he was able to route us through Cairo, from which we could fly to Geneva the same afternoon.

On reaching Cairo we applied to the company with which the transport officer had arranged the passage, but were told it would take at least a week. I made the necessary arrangements through our connections in Egypt, and a couple of days later proceeded to Geneva via Paris.

The short time we spent in Cairo was sufficient to glean from our representatives a good many details of UNSCOP's meetings with the representatives of the Arab states in the Lebanon, and of the appearance of the Maronite opposition leaders before the committee. The Maronites denied every claim by the Lebanese Government, and to one question whether there would be a Jewish-Arab war, they replied with typical Levantine exaggeration that the Jews would win any fight within two weeks.

The envoys of the Arab states merely harped on the familiar uncompromising Arab League attitudes which vied with each other in extremism. The self-evident conclusion, of course, was the opposite to what the orators desired. The committeemen were again given proof of the folly it would be to entrust the fate of a large Jewish minority in the hands of the extremist and fanatical Arab authorities represented in the League.

Some of the UNSCOP members attached particular

significance to the absence of Transjordan representatives from the meeting, on the unconvincing ground that the Hashemite kingdom was not a member of U.N.O. Although the aged monarch at Amman repeated the arguments of his associates in the League, the committee was more inclined to place emphasis on the abstention of his delegates from the Beirut meeting.

Our representatives in Cairo also spoke of the Egyptian Government's attitude to the Palestine issue. They felt there was no need to fear Egyptian military intervention in Palestine. Jamal el Husseini, who called on the Prime Minister, Mahmoud Nokrashy Pasha (later to be assassinated), was received coldly and told in most discourteous language that Palestine was still not the main problem in the Arab world. The disappointed Jamal read into the Egyptian rebuff a confirmation of the ex-Mufti's contention that only the removal of the current Arab rulers and their replacement by a union of Arab states under a single leader could bring about a triumphant Moslem holy war. The ex-Mufti believed that the plan would only be achieved by a popular movement directed against the ruling Arab governments. Haj Amin and his coadjutors were under no doubt as to who the supreme leader of a frenetic nationalist-religious movement of this kind ought to be.

The Arab dynasts were well aware of his views, and suspicion and hostility dogged Haj Amin even among his brethren and confederates in the anti-Zionist political struggle waged by the Arab countries.

Egypt was at the time locked in the "eternal" conflict between King Farouk and the Wafd, the pivot of domestic politics of yore. The deteriorating Anglo-Egyptian relations overshadowed all other problems in foreign policy. The Suez Canal and "unity of the Nile Valley" were the two principal topics in the Cairo salons and streets, pushing the Palestine question into the background.

Additional evidence of the confusion reigning in the Egyptian capital was an article by a high Egyptian army officer in one of the local monthlies which aroused public opinion. The article asserted that not only was the

Egyptian Army incapable of fighting a campaign outside the country, but it was inadequate to maintain law, security, and order within the kingdom itself.

I again met my friend the journalist-diplomat Tak ed-Din, of the Lebanon. He told me he had been invited to be an Arab liaison officer with the U.N. Committee in Palestine and was now sorry he had declined, for he wished to go to Geneva to dispel the influence of my "dangerous charm." I was amused by this mixture of Oriental courtesy and subtle flattery more than I had been by his endless refrain on the Arab fear of Jewish expansion in the Middle East.

While still in Cairo the news came of the recrudescence of terrorism and counter-terrorism throughout Palestine. The stops were apparently pulled out just as soon as UNSCOP left. Killings by the dissidents, unrestrained reprisals and countermeasures plunged the country into an orgy of destruction and bloodshed.

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We reached Geneva on a torrid July day, more sweltering by far than those spent in Tel Aviv. Moshe Sher tok, who had preceded us, seemed unusually depressed by the heavy weight of his responsibilities. The full significance of the fateful decision that was to be handed down by this U.N. Committee was made plain to us only now after many weeks of work. The repeal of the British Mandate and the creation of a Jewish state were only possible by an unequivocal directive from the United Nations, and its Special Committee on Palestine was the key to that achievement.

Reports received from our colleagues in Paris, Washington, and Lake Success endorsed the surmise. They were being told on every hand, especially by American and French statesmen, that while a report favorable to our interest would help in securing a solution meeting with our satisfaction, the alternative eventuality of a negative report would rob us of all hope. "In that event," we were informed, "there won't be a single country ready to give serious support to Jewish demands after

the considered report by the representatives of eleven disinterested powers."

In view of this fact, the small group gathered in Geneva and maintaining official and informal contacts with UNSCOP carried an overwhelming burden of cares.

The question of the visit by UNSCOP to D.P. camps in Europe, which had been a bone of contention within it, became a matter of principle. It involved recognition or non-recognition of the tie between the Jewish problem and the Palestine problem. In the final vote the three members who later signed the minority report—India, Persia, and Yugoslavia—were against the visit. They were joined by the Peruvian representative, who, while supporting Partition, saw in it no solution of the Jewish problem but only a means of settling the internal differences in Palestine itself. The Czechoslovak member, hesitant as always, abstained from voting. The other six members were in favor of the visit. The party that undertook the tour comprised the deputy members, led by John Hood, of Australia, as chairman.

Shortly after our arrival, Aubrey Eban and I went to the magnificent palace that had once served as the home of that political corpse known as the League of Nations. UNSCOP had taken offices there.

We found the Committee's secretariat at the end of a long walk through deserted corridors and echoing, high-vaulted chambers. We chatted with the secretaries, apart from Dr. Bunche, and asked to see Justice Sandstrom in his official capacity as chairman. We were told that our request would be conveyed to him, but were somewhat disappointed at the prolonged and complicated procedure of securing an interview with the Committee chairman, who had invited us to come to Geneva.

We called on Dr. Bunche, who received us with great cordiality and inquired with interest about our attitude on the matters which the Committee was deliberating. When we mentioned casually our desire to see Dr. Sandstrom, Dr. Bunche got up from his seat, excused himself, and went out of the room. Two or three minutes later he returned and, without any protocol or formality, invited us into the chairman's office.

The conversation with Dr. Sandstrom dealt with the *Exodus 1947* affair and the renewed outbreaks of violence in Palestine. He expressed his regret at being unable to intervene in the case of refugees detained forcibly under conditions of hunger, thirst, and congestion on the prison ships anchored at a small French port, without knowing what their future was to be.

I told him of our impressions of Cairo, of the No-krashy-Jamal interview, the article by the Egyptian army officer, and the minor interest in the Palestine problem. He appeared to concur with our view. If anything, he was inclined to believe that the rest of the Arab countries took an identical attitude. He thought Transjordan was the most placatory of them.

Justice Sandstrom had spent many years in Egypt as a member of the Mixed International Courts under the old "Capitulations" system. We had often been worried whether he might not have been affected, like so many other Europeans, by the hollow enchantments of the Orient. It came as a most pleasant surprise to find him in concurrence with our estimate of Arab demands, regarding them as no more than a form of Oriental haggling.

Yugoslavia's stand caused us no little anxiety, and we decided to meet its delegation. Moshe Shertok and I met Vladimir Simic and Jose Brilej and ascertained that the various delegations knew far less of what went on in each other's inner councils than we did as a result of our contacts. Most of the representatives were wary and on their guard at the committee meetings and refrained from revealing even a hint of their ultimate intentions.

Simic and Brilej reiterated their support of a binational state and Jewish-Arab unity. Yet they expressed their sympathy with us and their confidence that the Jews would anyhow get the upper hand and win control in the binational state because of their economic, social, cultural, and intellectual superiority.

Countering their viewpoint, I raised an argument that I felt would be more convincing than any other made to them. "Your main interest, as far as I can make out from what you've said, is to get the British out of Pales-

tine," I said with blunt directness. "But actually you're going in the exactly opposite direction. A binational state is an unenforceable solution. It needs mutual agreement and co-operation between the parties concerned. But any such co-operation is foredoomed to crack up on the reefs of the immigration problem. The Arabs won't acquiesce in immigration, and the Jews won't suspend it, so it will need a third dominant party. Who can that be unless it's Britain, which now holds the reins of power?"

Notwithstanding the cordial nature of our conversation, we failed to perceive whether we had convinced the Yugoslavs. The uncertainty perturbed us because of the harmful effect their decision would have on the entire Slav bloc. Lisicky's growing hesitation, and his remark, during the discussion on several of the issues, that he was unwilling to vote against his colleagues in the Slav bloc, increased our uneasiness.

It was therefore decided that one of us should go to Belgrade to meet and talk over the matter with the Foreign Minister himself. The Yugoslavs readily agreed and helped in arranging the entry permit and other formalities, and Moshe Shertok undertook the errand.

Meanwhile the delegation led by John Hood which had gone to inspect the D.P. camps returned with a wealth of notes and impressions, and under the impact of a deep emotional experience. Every one of the delegates had been persuaded of the readiness of the inmates to undergo any sacrifice in order to reach Eretz Israel. They conducted their investigation with great secrecy to forestall propaganda and pressure on our part. They did not announce beforehand their visits to the camps selected and they chose the people with whom they wanted to speak. The result, which exceeded all expectations, was to administer a striking defeat to any attempt at thwarting the D.P.'s strong and unquenchable aspiration to rebuild their lives in Palestine, and Palestine alone.

Dr. Mohn told me about the trip as soon as he returned. In spite of his experience and extensive travels, during which he had seen much suffering, blood, and oceans of tears—in Spain during the civil war, in Poland

under Hitler, in the far hinterland of Asia—the Swedish “man of mystery” now appeared to be seized by a rare emotion. He narrated some characteristic episodes which, had they not been so starkly tragic, might have been entertaining.

In one camp, he related, the party after a long search found a Jew with a straggly beard who seemed strong-willed enough not to be influenced by propaganda. Naturally several of the visitors leapt at the opportunity and bombarded him with questions. To their enormous surprise, they found that the man was the Mizrahi leader in the camp and one of the leading Zionist spokesmen.

Elsewhere they saw a young man walking along a side-alley who showed no particular inclination to meet them. One of the members jocularly remarked that the youth probably wished to settle overseas and wanted to avoid getting their “evil eye” if the Zionist propagandists found out what he had said. But when they waylaid him, they discovered he was one of the young emissary instructors from Palestine in charge of the camp kiddies.

Mohn himself interrogated some seventy persons, each one of whom without exception opted for Palestine. One showed him an American visa stamped on his passport, despite which he said he only wanted to go to Eretz Israel. It seemed to me that the experienced Swede was psychologically incapable of understanding why these harried Jews were entirely unwilling to go to the United States.

After great hesitation, he asked me a direct personal question: “Will you be prepared to accept some invalids and cripples who are the victims of Nazism and war?” He told me with great feeling of meeting many of these unfortunate persons who longed with all their heart and soul to go to Palestine, and of their personal tragedies, and added: “I understand that you are bound to consider the needs of the country first, to absorb young and vigorous pioneers who can build it, but can’t you make exceptions in a number of the hard cases?”

I assured him that his apprehensions were unfounded. “Our duty is to save as many of them as we can, and we’re doing that today. You’ll find many hundreds of

them in the leaky old refugee vessels trying to reach Palestine." I told him of the large number of elderly people, invalids, children, and pregnant women who came in the various craft, but sensed his skepticism.

Two years later, after the creation of the State of Israel, when Dr. Mohn was U.N. representative in the country and was having tea at my home in Tel Aviv, I recalled his doubting mood in Geneva.

"Well, you've certainly been better than your word, as the English saying goes, I must confess," he returned, and said nothing more.



Thus we continued our efforts to win over the representatives of eleven different countries, alien to us and our world, who had been chosen to reach an inexorable historic decision which might transcend the power of man to determine. Upon us, a small group of Jewish Agency nominees, rested the grim responsibility of indicating the one and only path along which we believed a settlement lay.

It was in this tense and oppressive eve-of-decision atmosphere that I met Mr. Justice Rand for the first time since coming to Geneva. I told him of my short sojourn in Egypt. He did not foresee the danger of an organized Arab invasion, but believed the Jewish population would have to face the increased infiltration of armed bands. He repeated the need of a complete final solution and dwelt on the considerable impression made on him by the country and its people. He had faith in us and in our administrative ability, yet wanted the transfer of authority to be gradual.

Our conversation frequently passed from the political to the personal, and he kept reiterating his admiration of our people's ardor and vigor and of the fact that he had found among the Jews a complete dedication of body and spirit to a single-minded cause. He again inquired about various details of my own youthful years in land pioneering, and I could see how the human and political aspects were blended into a rounded whole in

his mind as he sought a way out of the ~~enmeshed~~ issues.

He asked probing questions in a low, controlled voice. He questioned, listened, meditated, and weighed what he heard in what appeared to be a spiritual turmoil within his being. His was the most thorny path of grappling with personal conscience.

The proposal that cropped up in the Committee to invite representatives of the Mandatory Government developed into a grave controversy. The committeemen were overcome with surprise when the Canadian member, Justice Rand, threw his full weight against the proposal. "The Mandatory Government," he declared, "is a party in this dispute, and any invitation issued to it for official consultation at this stage of the proceedings will impair the Committee's independence and neutrality."

His statement exercised a major influence over the other members of UNSCOP when the time came, and as a result Justice Ivan Rand became the Committee's conscience, enabling it by his indomitable rectitude, wisdom, and courage to throw off the shackles that were preventing its stepping out on the royal road to a solution.

POLEMIC AND BLOODSHED (29)

Those summer days were beautiful. One morning we left by car for a trip up to the mountain peaks brooding over Lake Geneva. Around us spread the refreshing dark green of the crowding woodlands, filling the eye with their splendor. Mont Blanc and the snow-capped Alps towered above; below lay the blue expanse of Lake Geneva, speckled by a thin white mist. The panorama was limned by the touches of a rare serenity, which lifted the soul to unimagined heights and bore one off to illimitable distance in its mystic force.

Somewhere, down there, eleven tired men were grappling with the problems of a world strange to them in an effort to pronounce judgment on its future. And

many hundreds of miles away, despite the close spiritual proximity, lay a bleak, desolate land, made of wilderness and mountain, whose bare rock symbolized the stern gravity of its historic problem.

The events evolving there seemed insignificant at this distance, but none the less they cast their pall on the tranquillity of our surroundings.

Peace had apparently departed for good from the homeland. The first Arab attack on Jews in ten years had been staged at the Hawaii Garden roadhouse near the Yarkon Bridge outside Tel Aviv. Three Irgunists had been hanged at the British prison in Acre; two British sergeants were kidnapped and hanged in reprisal. The act, which was the most abhorrent in the chronicles of Irgun Zevai terrorism, had aroused a wave of hostility against us throughout the world.

The strands of fate reached farther, to a small French port where three ships lay at anchor, carrying their sad and wretched human cargoes of thousands of souls penned in shocking congestion. The refugees of *Exodus 1947* continued to resist. Their refusal to land had been matched by the British refusal to convey them any farther. It was a clash of wills. And all these together—cool, peaceful Geneva, turbulent and inflamed Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the ships standing offshore from France—were distilled in our minds and hearts as an essence of life and bitter struggle and festering, gnawing uncertainty.

There was one major factor which remained an impenetrable enigma. It defied comprehension and we were never able to tear away the cloak spangled with interrogation points. That factor was the British attitude.

It was a baffling situation. The British were ready to evacuate Egypt, India, and Greece; the upkeep of their armed forces was a colossal economic burden, as well as the cause of a grave manpower shortage at home; they were reducing their military commitments in all other sectors, even at the risk of insecurity. Yet they hung on by their nails to this tiny land and maintained a hundred thousand armed men to protect some mysterious interest that no one could fathom.

From an economic standpoint Palestine was an intolerable burden; the days when the British Government could derive some economic benefits from it had long passed. Like India and Egypt, Palestine had become a nuisance to Britain, yet the War Office in London was spending on it millions of pounds sterling contributed by the hard-pressed British taxpayer. The growing economic crisis in Britain was vastly different from that of the thirties, when the causes had been a deficiency of purchasing power, markets, and labor. Britain today lacked manpower, goods, and staple commodities. The remedies, too, were now strikingly different. They comprised a curtailment rather than an expansion of purchasing power, its constriction instead of an increase.

The crux of the problem was the adverse balance of payments. Britain had forfeited most of its overseas investments and part of its maritime trade revenues without finding a substitute, but the Labour Government was still reluctant to depend entirely on American assistance. Under these circumstances the experts underlined the sole panacea as a reduction of military commitments which would save Britain scores of millions of pounds and tens of thousands of essential labor units. The decrease of army establishments had been carried out in India, Egypt, Greece, and Germany; but not in Palestine.

The Foreign Secretary, who had rejected a traditional pro-Zionist policy on the ground that it would require another division in Palestine for enforcement, was now compelled to send more than another division to impose an anti-Zionist policy, and was ready to dispatch still more. He regarded the Zionist struggle as a plot against himself and Great Britain and went so far as to threaten to resign if his Palestine policy were altered.

What was the motivating force behind this enigmatic policy? A leading British statesman said at the time: "We have reached a satisfactory settlement with India and can get one in Palestine, too, if it weren't for Mr. Bevin." Most people, in fact, were inclined to identify Britain's obdurate attitude with Bevin personally.

The need to clarify the motivations of British policy

and intentions inspired Aubrey Eban to go to London to get at the truth of the matter. He returned with fresh and important information. Friends on *The Times* had told him of a talk with the Prime Minister, who had emphasized that no majority resolution by the United Nations would be flouted. "England will carry out any reasonable decision by the United Nations to the best of its ability," Attlee had asserted.

Aubrey had also met Harold Beeley, who always conveyed the harshest possible view of British policy, though it usually turned out to be the correct one. "There's no likelihood of mobilizing a two-thirds majority for an anti-British solution, owing to the split between the big powers, and any such motion is doomed to failure," Beeley remarked.

One of the important underlying motives in British policy was the military consideration, which was based on a fundamental misconception. The British experts estimated that the requisite reinforcements to cope with Palestinian Arab resistance alone, assuming that the British-influenced "League" would not interfere, would be far greater than those needed to counter Jewish opposition; whereas the truth of the matter was that the Jews were able, in due course, to stand up against the whole of the organized and equipped armies of the Arab East.

The exaggerated estimate of Arab strength had been of great harm to us within UNSCOP and was an important consideration when the members had weighed the relative advantages and shortcomings of the various proposals for a solution. On the other hand, Partition had won support because of the failure of the members, notwithstanding all their efforts, to find another satisfactory solution.

The Committee also informally discussed the relations between King Abdullah and Haj Amin el Husseini, as well as the question of incorporating the Arab part of Palestine in Transjordan. Several grave doubts were expressed whether such a proposal was appropriate in view of the known opposition towards King Abdullah among some of the higher levels of the Palestinian Arabs.

The members were in unison on one point: that the proposed solution must be definite and final. Several went farther and argued that it must provide for the exclusion of the third party, Great Britain, from any special position in the country or any part of it.

A draft survey of the problem, dealing with the issues involved but without offering any practical recommendations, was prepared by the chairman and submitted to his colleagues. But the majority of them rejected it, since they did not wish to be fettered in advance by a report prepared by an individual. Dr. Bunche, on the other hand, urged the formulation of a brief report that would comprise conclusions alone and would leave out any long analysis of the kind abundantly available in reports by numerous inquiry commissions, more especially the Royal Commission of 1937.

The first business sessions at which the solution itself came under discussion were opened by the chairman, who presented all facets of the problem.

He then asked: "Does anyone favor an Arab state in the whole of Palestine?" There was no reply. Even Sir Abdur Rahman lacked the courage to support a categorical Arab solution.

The same negative response was given when the second extreme solution was put to the vote—a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine.

But rejection of the two proposals did not advance the deliberations of UNSCOP by one iota. Plans for federation, a binational state, separate Jewish and Arab states, and cantonization sprang up in their various guises like mushrooms. The controversy was long and wearisomely debated.

Dr. Weizmann, whom I visited at the summer resort where he was resting in another part of Switzerland, drew a parallel between the Committee's deadlock and the rabbi's reply to a Jewish housewife's query concerning the *kashruth* (ritual purity) of a slaughtered chicken. "If you're referring to a *milchike* (reserved for milk) ladle and pot, then everything's all right," the rabbi responded. "If you're talking about a *fleishike*

(meat) ladle and pot, then there's no objection either. The *she'aila* (question) only arises if you want to use a *milchike* ladle with a *fleishike* pot, or vice versa."

The committeemen faced a conundrum that they apparently felt was about as simple as squaring the circle or finding the philosopher's stone.

One of the extreme solutions propounded was of an Arab state disguised as "a democratic binational state," of which the Indian member was the author. As it was based on the existing numerical strengths of the population, it was no different from an Arab state with guarantees for minority rights. Several members caviled at the imposture, but the proposal was not shelved. On the contrary, it assumed one guise after another. When modified, it even enlisted a number of disciples, until there was the risk of its becoming accepted by a substantial number of members, as the Committee was in process of breaking apart out of sheer exhaustion.

Our function was now no longer restricted to preventing the adoption of a negative decision, which would be calamitous to our interest. We had to guide UNSCOP away from the dead end it was approaching and forestall the disintegration of the Committee into several groups without a common ground, sponsoring several reports, which would stand no chance of commanding the attention of the General Assembly.

It was like being caught between the devil of a joint solution prejudicial to our cause and the deep sea of UNSCOP's dismemberment, which would be no less disastrous. On the other hand, we realized it would be much better for the Committee to be divided rather than for it to put forward a generally agreed-upon formula militating against us.

We had to reckon with all these factors without for a moment forgetting that our influence over UNSCOP was limited both by contact with it and in actual scope, and that any false step would be liable to bring about the reverse of what we sought.

As we were scouting for opportunities of contact with the various delegations on UNSCOP, one of our party discovered a young Australian girl who was employed at the U.N. offices in Geneva and knew the Australian delegates.

We had thus far not been in direct touch with the Australians and felt it would be a good plan to sound them out through her. She was a young woman of good education, an authority on economics and sociology, a graduate of Oxford or Cambridge, and married to a writer. She knew several languages and, in addition to being fluent in English, French, and German, had an amazing proficiency in Polish.

In the course of conversation it transpired that she was not Australian by origin at all, but a Polish Jewess who had arrived in the commonwealth after having completed her studies in Geneva and England. The story of her life conjured up a forgotten memory and I wondered whether I had guessed aright. Finally I began to tell her, in great detail, the narrative of what I believed to be her own life and family background. I told her where she had been born and how she had been brought up and educated in the house of her father, a manufacturer in Lvov; how her father had sent her to study in Switzerland, and of her academic career and life in England, what she had chosen as her university subjects, and who her friends had been.

I went on to tell her how she had earned her living by using a unique shorthand system that was still not in general currency; had gone to Australia and given radio talks about her system, and was invited to lecture at a university there. I said that her father had started a factory in Australia on the basis of import statistics he had seen which showed there was an increased demand for a certain commodity in that country, and had obtained Australian Government permission and assistance

to set up the plant. I even gave her a number of details concerning her father's early life.

She had been paling and flushing by turns during my circumstantial account. She could not understand how I knew so much about her. True, our intelligence service had gained a world-wide reputation for efficiency; she knew that. But how had I unearthed minor particulars of her father's youth? That surpassed all understanding. It was superhuman. Especially as at the outset of our conversation I had not seemed to know her.

Even Moshe Shertok and another colleague who were lunching with us were taken aback. Only I, who knew the secret, reflected semi-philosophically how very small and strange the world was, to be sure. This was not the first of my odd encounters in different parts of the world. I felt that these incidents showed how the vast stretches of our planet could shrink to a tiny replica of itself.

Of course, the source of my knowledge was not rooted in any mystic or telepathic powers. The only remarkable feature in the affair was the operation of blind chance or the hand of fate, or what have you, which enters the orbit of human experience in such haphazard fashion.

Two years earlier I had spent a holiday at a rest-home in the vicinity of Haifa. One of my fellow guests was a distinguished Zionist worker, formerly a member of the Zionist Executive and now the director of an important economic institution. We had been talking about the Jewish genius for adaptation to various changes of circumstance, and as an example my friend, a wise and humorous man, had told me of the adventures of the Polish-Australian manufacturer and his family. Owing to my companion's marvelous facility for storytelling, I had tucked the tale away at the back of my mind. Although I had not known the identity of its heroes, the story had come back to me in all its detail after a few minutes' conversation with the young Australian economist.

I had put two and two together and made four. But I might as easily have been mistaken and made five!

out to the telephone. His grave face on returning indicated that something amiss had occurred. It was, in fact, the report from Palestine that the Jewish mayors of various towns and cities had been arrested and interned. Once again we felt the oppressive sense of being cut off from our home realities, those same realities which were the root and purpose of our struggle here in Switzerland.

We went on seeking ways and means of making contact with the various delegations and influencing them. Shertok meanwhile went off to Belgrade, and I remained behind feeling somewhat forlorn, with only the overwhelming responsibility of our mission for company. During his absence I acted in his stead, though without any formal power of decision, and co-ordinated our activities in Geneva.

Shertok's absence in Belgrade and later at the Zionist conference held in Karlsbad coincided with a difficult and most decisive phase in UNSCOP's annals. We lived under unbearable tension, having to be constantly vigilant and going without much sleep. I had telephone conversations with Shertok in Belgrade at two o'clock after midnight for many nights in succession, and was often called up from London and Paris.

These nocturnal intervals between telephone calls, and the fluctuations between fear and anxiety and worry, were followed by days of intensive activity at a feverish pitch of which I had never before known the like.

One evening, dining with some colleagues on the hotel terrace overlooking Lake Geneva, I was summoned to the telephone. "London calling!" One of my friends informed me on the best authority that the refugees of *Exodus 1947* were to be deported to Germany. I was aghast.

A short while later a cable arrived confirming the report. It was in melancholy mood that I spoke later that night over the telephone to Moshe Shertok in Belgrade and Moshe Sneh in Paris.

The ominous turn in the conflict with the British and the threat of imminent outbreaks marked UNSCOP's efforts with momentous political significance.

At the chairman's request, each of the members prepared a report defining his own version of a solution. These eleven secret reports not only shed light on their standpoints but also illuminated their individual characters, tendencies, and intellectual levels.

Most of the essays gave veiled support to Partition. The most original was written by the Peruvian, Dr. Arthur García Salazar, who, after a thorough analysis of the matters at issue, proposed the partitioning of Palestine. In his view, it was the best resort in the absence of any prospect of harmony between the two peoples. He admitted it was not an ideal way out, but everything was such a complete mess that an ideal solution was impossible.

Nevertheless, Dr. Salazar arrived at an ill-omened conclusion. He asserted that there was no relationship whatever between a solution of the Palestine problem and the Jewish question. The latter was a separate matter, the settlement of which must be undertaken separately.

Consequently, Dr. Salazar adduced that a Partition formula must leave the smallest possible number of Arabs under Jewish rule, and that could only be done by restricting the Jews to the small area in which they were in the majority. This meant a major sacrifice of area in return for authority; and as regards authority, Dr. Salazar affirmed that he was prepared to waive any limitation and envisage the most tenuous link between the two states. At all events, such a token Jewish state in the most severely restricted area of Palestine would on no account be acceptable to the Jews.

For his part, Dr. Nicolaas Blom, of the Netherlands, dealt principally with implementation. Who would implement a solution? How would it be implemented? He found these questions to be no less baffling than the problem of what was to be the best solution. This experienced, practical colonial administrator took strong exception to the academic tendencies shown by the intellectuals, and, tying up the problem of implementation with ruthless realism, he declared that no solution could be given effect without the co-operation of the Mandatory Government.

An interesting Partition plan was developed by Justice Ivan Rand, of Canada. He tried to create a synthesis of political autonomy and economic co-operation between the two states, which would be geographically divided.

By contrast with the apostles of Partition, who had not formally made coalition nor yet shaped a definite and unified attitude, a Yugoslav-Indian-Persian minority inclined toward various forms of a single state, ranging from Sir Abdur Rahman's camouflaged Arab state to the Yugoslavs' projected binational federation.

There were, at the same time, growing doubts about the likelihood of the economic viability of any independent Arab state that might be set up. Consequently, I prepared a memorandum to show that the likelihood existed. Analysis of the Arab economic structure demonstrably showed that it had no organic centers that served as its focal points. It was a primitive economy, which could be split up into much smaller cells. The fellah's farm tended toward autarchy and had few ties with the market. The question of the size of the territorial area within which it functioned was of no overriding importance. Furthermore, economic union would open to the fellah the markets of the Jewish state, and the subsidies granted would make possible enhanced development of state services, which would be far superior to those in other Arab countries. Moreover, those areas of the country which were projected as part of an Arab state had never maintained strong links with the well-

developed coastal area in which Jewish settlement was centered.

We were greatly worried by the hesitant attitude of Karel Lisicky, which had become an insoluble mystery during the Geneva period. Whenever he chatted with me, he always made out as if he supported Partition, but he showed a chronic disinclination to vote when in committee meeting. Consequently, Moshe Shertok made it a point of seeking out the Czech Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, whom he had known for many years, when the latter happened to pass through Geneva. Masaryk had earned a reputation as a friend of Zionism, and he received Shertok cordially.

The Foreign Minister told Shertok of a conversation on Zionism he had had with Josef Stalin, to whom he emphasized Czechoslovakia's special attitude on the matter. Stalin had replied that he knew of Czechoslovakia's views in this connection and that it was not fettered, nor was there any intention of imposing upon it a policy that would be contrary to its desires and opinions on the issue.

Masaryk confided in Shertok that he was utterly fatigued and needed a holiday. When Shertok smiled skeptically, he remarked: "Yes, I'm very unfortunate. I look as robust as a German brewer and no one believes I'm a sick man. I'm tired, very tired, but if you want me to help at the United Nations, I'll come to the Assembly for you."

As a matter of fact, Masaryk appeared outwardly to be the picture of health, brimful of good humor and the joy of life. He loved witty anecdotes and the cosmopolitan cultural atmosphere of the Continent.

"I shall never be a Communist," he said to Shertok. "I'm too fond of freedom of thought, of reading, and of expressing my free opinion. I've been used to that freedom all my life and I cannot live without it."

He promised to discuss our case with Lisicky, and we again hoped for the Czechoslovak member's support of the Partition plan.

The dire responsibility of our task aroused in Aubrey Eban and me the strong desire to confer at this grave juncture with Dr. Weizmann, who was sojourning in a Swiss village on the Austro-Italian frontier.

We traversed the calm, beautiful countryside, steeped in its restful atmosphere. The unreal world around us was sunk in an almost celestial torpor, as of the days that preceded the two World Wars. Life flowed on as if it had no concern with the eternal snow-capped peaks thrusting into the sky, and was far removed from the turmoil of our urgent problems, vexations, and perplexities, the ferment of our own existence.

It was a long and far-ranging conversation that we had with "the Chief." We gave him a full account of the developments and current issues. "Although we must secure a stable majority within UNSCOP, there's the risk that a majority of this sort may jeopardize the possibility of setting up a Jewish state in a suitable and adequate area of the country," we told him. "The propositions of area and sovereign authority conflict with each other, and choice of one endangers the other."

We were interrupted by a telephone call from Geneva. It was Moshe Shertok calling. He had just been talking with M. Vigier, a Frenchman, political adviser to UNSCOP, who had posed for him the full gravity of the dilemma we had just touched upon. "You must choose between complete independence in a limited area or limited autonomy in a larger area," the Frenchman said. "That's the crux of it, and you can no longer avoid it."

Shertok was much disturbed at the blunt way in which so influential a person attached to UNSCOP as M. Vigier had presented the matter, and read a bad omen into it.

I returned to Dr. Weizmann, told him what Shertok had said, and continued my survey. Our host made some suggestions about the line to be taken, feeling they might overcome the formidable obstacle in our way, and we returned to Geneva armed with his wise counsel and comments.

A journalist friend who reached Geneva astonished us

with his consummate skill in getting in touch with various members of the committee and winning their confidence. On meeting Mr. Justice Rand, the Canadian jurist voiced sharp criticism of the British Administration in Palestine and regarded its discharge of the Mandate as well-nigh an abandonment of the fundamental obligations.

"England always delays doing the right thing, and when it finally gets around to it, far too late, finds that the opportunity has been lost," the judge affirmed. "It was late in South Africa and was saddled with the Boer War; it was late in Ireland, and now it's losing the chance in Palestine.

"I flew over the country," he concluded, "and I saw the tortuous windings of the Jordan; and I thought: these are the wanderings of the Jews, but I fervently hope they won't end up, like the river, in the Dead Sea."

My friend was somewhat surprised by his talk with Sir Abdur Rahman, the Indian. The latter readily admitted that he had little hope that his plan would be acceptable to his colleagues. He himself only regarded it as a point that would enable him to rally the Committee around the federal proposal, which was ostensibly a compromise solution, but in reality would meet most of the Arab demands. Abdur Rahman thought that the gravamen of the Palestine problem was the alleged Jewish expansionist ambitions, and he refused stubbornly to believe that they had no other objective than Palestine.

He cited a naïve analogy to illustrate his point. "If you want to buy a house that's worth \$40,000, and you like it well enough, you'll even pay as high as \$50,000 and \$60,000 to get hold of it. But you'll never agree to pay fifty million. Yet that's what the Jews are doing in Palestine. How can it be explained otherwise than that they're aiming to set up a springboard to conquer the entire East? The frontier settlements are really bases of attack against Syria and Egypt, and the tremendous influence the Jews have in Great Britain and the United States is a political weapon of first-class importance."

The Indian was considerably surprised when the newspaperman, by way of answer, adduced figures and facts

to prove that Jewish influence in London and Washington was weak and limited, and to show what a small number of Jewish members there were in the House of Commons and the United States Congress. It was Abdur Rahman's first trip outside India in his life, and he was none too conversant with world affairs. He said that the witness who had impressed him most was Dr. Weizmann, but his keen admiration of the Zionist leader by no means detracted from his strong opposition to the cause the latter represented.

In my talks with UNSCOP personnel I derived an intimate glimpse into their mental processes. Karel Lisicky remained undecided. He told me that the Yugoslav delegation was progressing satisfactorily with its deliberations, and as it did not stick to a rigid line, some agreement might be reached on their proposal of Federation. The Czechoslovak delegate's attitude astounded me; I regarded it as a retreat from his former position and an indication of his fear of going outside the frame of the Slav bloc. He also told me that Ernest Bevin had been deeply hurt by our attacks on him, and Lisicky felt it was a grave mistake on our part. As a solution, Lisicky favored the idea of an interim stage and dwelt at length on economic union and Partition, which he hoped to twist into arguments for Federation.

I explained that from the dual standpoint of area versus authority there was an irreducible minimum from which we would never budge no matter how long we had to fight for it.

But Lisicky was not inclined to accept my viewpoint and returned: "There are three forms of reaction toward any solution: agreement by the parties concerned, physical opposition, and acquiescence. I don't believe in agreement, I don't want physical opposition, and I can only hope for acquiescence."

He concluded by warning us against repeating the error of rejecting the Royal Commission's report in its time, adding: "Don't go on aspiring for a full solution at all costs. It's far better to accept a solution that is halfway satisfactory than to pass up another opportunity."

Thinking it over later, I decided it was imperative to find immediately a concrete solution that would forestall the failure of our cause by default. The postponements and endless delays meant that time was becoming our most dangerous adversary.

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INTERLUDE with CROSSMAN AND BUNCHE

Richard Crossman had promised to visit me at Geneva during his stay in Switzerland, where he was giving a series of lectures at Zurich. I awaited his arrival impatiently for three reasons: first, I wanted to relax from the constant tension of my work, and Dick Crossman's company offered the best opportunity; secondly, I was anxious to get some first-hand information about the state of our affairs in England; and lastly, I wished him to meet a number of UNSCOP members, primarily Dr. Ralph Bunche, who seemed to me to have several points of resemblance with Crossman.

Both men were typical intellectuals; both were permeated to their marrows with the universalism of world culture; both had agile minds and the faculty of quickly grasping an idea; and both were as charming and scintillating in their writings as in conversation, in the individuality of thought, and in social communion.

Crossman arrived as lively and refreshing and sparkling as ever. He had now become a celebrated personality, and his star in the Labour sky was in the ascendant. He was outstanding in the current crisis as a leader of the left-wing "rebels" within the party and one of their leading spokesmen.

In his opinion, Ernest Bevin was the strongest figure in the Government. The Foreign Secretary's power lay in his magical primitive qualities, the tremendous personal force emanating from him, which bordered on ruthlessness, the marvelous intuition that enabled him to

win the heart of the masses. Crossman believed that the explanation of Bevin's remarkable perception of what the public wanted was to be found in his having, in his spiritual make-up, a mixture of the same positive and negative characteristics of which popular feeling consisted. The aggressive trade-unionist had none of the wavering irresolution of the intellectual, who was always apt to see both sides of a question. Bevin defeated his opponents at the Labour Party conference by appealing directly to the masses, while reviling those who had "stabbed him in the back" during his negotiations with the Americans. It might not have been true, but it sounded convincing, and that was all that mattered to "Ernie."

"As regards the Palestine question," Crossman said, "a feeling that it's open warfare now is spreading in England. The old British tendency toward being self-righteous, which was expressed during the South African War as 'Liberate the Boers from Krüger,' is now apparent in connection with Bevin's Palestine policy.

"Jewish terrorism has had a prejudicial effect on British public opinion and destroyed any of its sympathetic elements. Even the shocking and tragic episode of the *Exodus 1947* failed to stir the public conscience, which still hasn't recovered from the anger over the murder of the two sergeants at Nathanya."

Nevertheless, he went on, there was a mounting predisposition in favor of quitting Palestine and leaving its peoples to their own devices. The tendency hadn't yet won a foothold at the Foreign Office, which still hoped for U.N.O.'s backing of the British position in the Holy Land on Britain's own terms, after it firmly refused to carry out any "insane plan" based on Jewish demands.

But Crossman pinned his faith on public opinion. He believed that a clear and resolute report by the majority in UNSCOP would win popular support, of which the Palestine problem was now deprived, and even the Foreign Office would then not be able to hold out.

We began our talk during a stroll along the lakeside, sat for a while on a marble bench in the fine park there, and finally chartered a small motor-boat and cruised on

the lake, plowing long furrows of creamy foam in our wake. We merged into the picture-postcard scene: the green-swarded mountainsides, the thickly clustering woodlands, the small white houses jeweled by lovely gardens, and the hoar-headed Alpine summits resembling ice-cream cones held up for heaven's delight.

Landscape and speech, nature's glistening beauty and the lightning flashes of spoken thought, commingled into a rare distillation of the essence of life. The sensation of being borne over the water, the soothing effect of glamorous vistas, and the good conversation combined to send us into mellow mood; and so, Crossman's eyes glinting vivaciously behind his glasses, we sped wingless over the lake in the swift, sure little vessel.

Several miles outside Geneva there is a lakeside restaurant named Bellevue, set in a handsome garden; and it was there that Crossman, Bunche, and I met together the first time, that evening of the Englishman's arrival. The moment I introduced the two men I felt the spark of mutual recognition which shot between them; that spark, the like of which I had often experienced, which ignites two men of similar mental and spiritual calibers, so that the intellection of the one fires the thought of the other and many common problems are clarified by the fusion of brilliant light.

Crossman, who regarded psychological complexes, prejudice, and hatred of Hebrews as one of the chief barriers to an equitable Palestine solution, expressed this opinion to Bunche and asked the latter jestingly if he had already managed to turn anti-Semitic as a result of being immersed in the Jewish question.

Bunche returned curtly: "That would be impossible."

"Why?"

"Because I've been a Negro for forty-two years." He paused and added: "I know the flavor of racial prejudice and racial persecution. A wise Negro can never be an anti-Semite."

The proud, incisive rejoinder pleased Crossman, who resumed the discussion on Palestine. "If there's no possibility of finding an immediate solution, there ought to be an interim solution," he affirmed. "The one hundred

thousand immigrants the Jews want ought to be admitted, and then the whole problem should be threshed out once and for all."

This approach accorded with our own desires, the whole emphatic force of which was focused on one basic aim: to break out of the strait-jacket of the *status quo* in Palestine. I explained to Crossman and Bunche that an interim palliative of this kind would remove the sting from the tactics of delay, and once delaying action was no longer rewarding to the British Government, the palliative would mark a step forward to the final solution.

The kernel of the problem, according to Crossman, was implementation. He voiced the fear that the Foreign Office would refuse to give effect to a solution that failed to coincide with its own intents and purposes, and felt that the creation of an international force was an imperative necessity in carrying out any positive formula.

As regards the Jewish claims, he proceeded, the advantage in the figure of one hundred thousand immigrants was that President Truman had urged their admission; while Partition must fulfill the minimum Jewish territorial demands for two reasons: (1) the needs of Jewish immigration; and (2) the fact that the Arabs opposed any form of Partition, and it was necessary to have the support of at least one party.

In contrast to Dick Crossman, Bunche was still in the stage of confusion and uncertainty. He raised the questions of economic union and the ties between the two states, and doubted the possibility of enforcing the maintenance of such ties as well as the economic viability of the Arab state. He also apprehended opposition to any proposal for uniting the latter state with Transjordan, which was not a member of the U.N.O. and was far more backward in its development than the Palestinian Arab community.

Moreover, he differed from Crossman's view and stressed the importance of a final solution without fail. The question of carrying out a solution was likely to encounter formidable difficulties. In the first place, it would be hard to get the support of a majority at the General Assembly to any solution, whatever it might be.

Even if the majority were obtained, a difficult transition period would set in, and there was no foretelling what form it would take, for no one yet knew who would supervise Partition. There would be a minority of about half a million Arabs in the Jewish state, and the immigration issue during the transition stage would involve unimaginable difficulties.

Furthermore, he added, the legal position was very obscure. In effect, the validity of the Mandate had ended the moment the League of Nations expired.

I divined Bunche's qualms and misgivings, from the dual standpoint of intellectual discernment and conscience, as I listened to him. Sharp-cut analysis, keen perception, had failed to bring him any closer to a definite judgment. They enabled him only to define more clearly the lack of clarity in his thinking.

We were a bizarre trio seated there at the lakeside, under a star-radiant vault, engrossed in conversation, and sensitive to the unique rustic tranquillity of this unique country. The three of us hailed from three different corners of the world: a Briton, scion of a proud cultural tradition in a group of western islands, who had succeeded in merging it, by personal synthesis, with a European, almost cosmopolitan intellectualism and a humanistic-cum-socialistic world-outlook—a keen man, of quick perspicacity, having a mind as sensitive as quicksilver, yet withal a realist in his political assessments; an American Negro, citizen of the world's youngest civilization, intelligent, sharp, possessed of a deep humanitarian feeling and extraordinary intellectual awareness, which goaded him into complete identification with a problem destined to occupy an important place in his life; and myself, a Jew, descendant of the oldest among nations, born in eastern Europe and brought up in a life and scheme of things so utterly different from the experience of the other two.



On the following day Crossman met Judge Sandstrom, who invited him to appear before a plenary ses-

sion of UNSCOP. His appearance there was of unusual significance. A member of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee, which had failed at the problem, addressed the inheritors of the task and tried to the best of his ability to guide them along the winding paths of a maze that seemed to them to have no outlet.

Crossman repeated the statements he had made to Bunche and me the day before. "Seek an interim solution of one hundred thousand immigrants and then Partition. It is necessary to get the support of at least one party, and the Jews should therefore be given an area which will suffice them. Britain is likely to refuse to implement any scheme incompatible with its terms, so you must demand an international force.

"The importance of a provisional solution is no smaller than of a long-range solution. British evacuation without any solution being provided will lead to the Jews capturing the larger part of the country, and thereby obtaining very much more territory than under organized partition."

Crossman had at that time arrived at the inexorable conclusion that no solution of the Palestine tangle was possible without enforcement. He preferred the coercion of one party to the imposition of a solution on two parties at once. He wanted the coercive measures to be undertaken by an international force and not by the British Army, and he believed that a pro-Jewish solution was the more just, and that in any event Arab extremism ruled out any decision in their favor without subduing the Jews to such an extent that no neutral third party would undertake it.

His statement produced an unforgettable impression on the UNSCOP members. It was of superlative importance to the issues involved, but none of them could know at the time, Crossman least of all, how time would endorse the validity of his judgment. He prophesied; yet it was doubtful whether he knew clearly what he was prophesying. Events confirmed the prophecy not only on the score of implementation and British reaction, but also of the startling and—at the time—fantastic assertion that the Jews would take over control of

the larger part of Palestine in the train of a chaotic British withdrawal.

The Arabs were not entirely obtuse and submitted a detailed memorandum to UNSCOP, a copy of which came into our hands. One of the committee members who praised the memorandum to me found a defect in it. In order to emphasize the danger of illegal Jewish infiltration into the country, the Arabs blew up the estimate of Jewish population into a figure of 700,000 to 800,000 persons. The exaggeration was not only unhelpful to their interest, but had a detrimental effect.

The conflict and differences of opinion within the Committee continued to center on three fundamental points: the question of the form of future government, the question of area—as important in the case of Partition as in Federation, and the question of implementing a solution.

The principal danger to our interest lay in the possibility that the Committee would try to fulfill our demands within the orbit of the future constitutional structure of the country, but at the same time condemn us to a territorial Procrustean bed.

The *rapporteur* on territorial questions to the Committee was Dr. Paul Mohn, who had more responsibility than any other person concerned in demarcating the frontiers of the future Jewish state. We sat together hour after hour over the maps as I tried to convince him that there was a close identity between the frontiers prescribed in the Morrison-Grady plan and those stipulated by the 1939 White Paper's land laws. I also emphasized the British political designs to freeze and constrict the Yishuv, and our firm determination not to yield one jot or tittle of our demands for an irreducible territorial minimum.

It was at this time that something occurred which had a dramatic and adverse effect on the deliberations. A secret British memorandum, submitted to UNSCOP, admitted that though they did not regard Partition as an appropriate solution, the Committee must remember, if it were in any event considering a Partition proposal, that there was a large number of these draft schemes

extant. The memorandum cited a Jewish plan as being among these as well as the Peel Commission scheme. The document finally declared that there was only one Partition proposal which would be feasible and capable of effectuation, and that was one limiting the Jewish state to an area bounded by Beer Tuvia in the south, along the coastal plain, including the Plain of Esdraelon, the Vale of Beisan, and part of the Jordan Valley, and up to the River Jordan outlet into Lake Kinnereth in the north.

Under this delineation, the northern and southern Negev, a part of southern Judea, the eastern section of the coastal plain (*Shephelah*) and Lydda, Ramleh, and the whole of western and eastern Galilee would fall to the Arabs, and the Jewish territory would consist of a narrow strip of lowlands densely settled and wholly indefensible.

The memorandum was accompanied by maps as well as detailed geographical and demographical commentaries and explanations, the possible effect of which on the committeemen worried us a great deal. The information that filtered out to us from the Committee's sessions confirmed the fact that our alarm was by no means unjustified.

AS MOURNERS (33) at a GENTILE FEAST

JIt was the period of the great annual festivals in Geneva. A fairyland of multicolored lights illuminated the nocturnal scene, and thousands of rockets and fireworks sprayed the night sky with their sparkling fountains. In the daytime the city was bedecked with gay carpets of flowers, and the streets were merry with carnival processions, people masquerading in ornate garments and wearing masks, living tableaux enacted on open-air stages, and showers of many-hued confetti descending on the

strollers along the fine lakeside promenade. It was a simple, naïve, and all-embracing *joie de vivre*, which spilled out of every corner on the sidewalks and gushed along the roadways in a torrent of unrestrained gaiety.

We moved through the happy crowds downcast and mournful, torn by anxiety and frustration and bitterness, grim skeletons at an alien feast. The many voices of the frolicking city reached us but found no echo; the sight of the revelry lay before our eye but evoked no smiling response. Our ears and eyes were trained to another pitch and spectacle—the pitch and spectacle of a historic destiny that was being fashioned in this Swiss city unperceived by its heedless citizens, the destiny of a people that was being balanced again in the timeless scales of history. The sinister British memorandum cast a dark shadow over the discussions and threatened to destroy the structure we had built with such painstaking effort for so many weary weeks.

The menacing situation impelled me to seek out my old friend Donald MacGillivray, who represented the British Government at Geneva. He was apparently somewhat bored in the Swiss cantonal capital. He had not intervened a great deal in UNSCOP's deliberations and allowed them to take their own course. He surveyed developments from his ivory tower with a calm, Olympian detachment in which I detected a trace of fine irony. His facial expression seemed etched with a sardonic aloofness, though by nature and inner consciousness he had a keen sense of fair play and true humanitarian feeling. Even his identification with his Government's policy seemed to me only an official attitude, which, to my mind, explained the remarkable indifference with which he appeared to view the various forms and stages of UNSCOP's march of affairs.

I gave him my frank opinion of his Government's policy and warned that it was goading the country toward disaster. Finally we touched upon the matter that was exercising my mind so much—the territorial frontiers of the Jewish state. I was surprised to learn that MacGillivray was urging only one solitary concession to the Arabs: the incorporation of western Galilee within

the confines of the Arab state. He made no effort to differ from me on the other points, and stated that he was maintaining the principle of complete nonintervention in UNSCOP's work. When, indeed, he was invited by the Committee several days later to provide some explanations on territorial matters, he did so in a thoroughly dispassionate and objective manner, without disclosing his own opinion.

We were aided by some interesting demographic facts during this consideration of the Jewish state's frontiers. In presenting the data, which I had brought with me, I showed the committee that it was impossible to avoid leaving a substantial Arab minority within a Jewish state. Even the exclusion of the Negev and Galilee could not alter this fact. The Arabs, much like the Jews, were mostly concentrated in the central region and coastal area of the country, and not in the south or north. The elimination of the Negev and Galilee would have very little effect on the size of the Arab minority in a Jewish state, which in any case could not but comprise the coastal plain. The upshot of such a move would only be to block the development of the large, desolate areas of the Negev and the semicultivated parts of Galilee.

I went on to explain that the concentration of Jews and Arabs in the coastal plain was not fortuitous. Jewish settlement acted like a magnet, drawing Arabs into the potential development areas where there were new opportunities of employment. Arab mortality rates declined in these zones, so that population increase was at a quicker tempo and evolved the situation we witnessed today.

In my talks with Dr. Mohn, who was primarily occupied with the territorial aspects of Partition, I recalled the fact that the country had already been partitioned at one time in the past, and its eastern segment had been detached and made into an Arab principality under the Emir (later King) Abdullah.

"Our present demands are the minimum, from which we are not prepared to retreat," I insisted over and over again. "Area has no significance where the Arabs are concerned. They have more than enough as it is, and

their objection to Partition is on the ground of principle alone. They will never develop these lands, because they have no reason or purpose for doing so, but development is the only course open to us.

"The problem of the Arab minority is not a numerical one, by the same token, but is intrinsically related to the essence of the Partition plan. The idea of a territorial ghetto is a delusion. We rejected the Morrison plan in the past and we shall go on rejecting it in future, even if it is served up in a new edition by U.N."

"But the future of the Jewish state is based principally on industrial and not agricultural development," Dr. Mohn observed.

I took issue with him and outlined a co-ordinated plan of agricultural and industrial development. I reminded him of the impressions of his tour of the D.P. camps and the unanimous wish of their inmates to settle in Palestine. I also stated that the new British plan was even worse than the Morrison plan.

"How about the place you've been promised in the United Nations? Don't you attach any importance to it?" he asked.

"We need more than a place in the United Nations; we must have tens of thousands of places in Palestine for our refugees," I retorted.

Another question pending in UNSCOP's discussions was the fate of Jerusalem. The Committee had reached the conclusion that the city must be international, but was divided in its views on the details, and plans cropped up as fast as toadstools after the first rains.

The Jerusalem issue came up in a talk I had with John Hood, the Australian member. His deputy, who was not one of our friends, put the palm of his hand over the Jerusalem area and the "corridor" as far as Lydda on the map in front of him, and asked me: "What is your opinion about allocating all this territory to Jerusalem?"

This attitude, which envisaged the conversion of Jerusalem into a third state, was supported by the Peruvian delegate, Dr. Salazar, an ardent Catholic (and, in fact, Peruvian Ambassador to the Vatican at that time).

212 Those who were opposed to it included the pro-Jewish

elements and the protagonists of the city's partition, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav delegates, who feared the establishment of a clerical reactionary enclave, under Catholic influence, on the other.

The gravity of the differences was strikingly revealed at a meeting of the deputy members who had been appointed as a subcommittee to discuss the position of Jerusalem. Leon Mayrand, the Canadian deputy, and Jose Brilej, the Yugoslav, supported our position from two opposing vantage-points. Mayrand wanted the city to be partitioned as recognition of the religious and spiritual ties with Judaism; Brilej was of the same mind, but out of fear of a reactionary theocratic-clerical state being forged out of Jerusalem and its environs under an "international" guise.

Our representatives won the support of other alternate members, including two or three of the Latin Americans. A compromise formula was ultimately adopted favoring the internationalization of the city in a most restricted area.



The Zionist General Council met in session at Zurich that week and was preceded by an Agency Executive meeting, to which I was invited. The Executive listened to our report with great interest, and it was the pivot of discussion.

To our surprise, we encountered a keen readiness among most of the Executive members to support our line of activity. Rabbi Fishman emphasized that the prospects of obtaining independence should be seized and fostered, without going too deeply into the moot subject of the "totality of the country," and Dr. A. H. Silver and Emanuel Neumann astonished us by displaying a positive attitude, wishing us every success in achieving the creation of a Jewish state in a suitable area of Palestine.

The skeptic of them all, this time, was Moshe Sneh. When we broached the likelihood of UNSCOP proposing a Jewish state with an aggregate area of between

eight and ten million dunams (2 to 2½ million acres), Sneh asked ironically: "How many 'just and upright men' are there on the Committee who'll support that?" Moshe Shertok and I, he said, were toying with pleasant but idle fancies.

Meanwhile our prospects within UNSCOP were dismal. Our struggle sometimes appeared almost futile, the weapons at our disposal ineffective. All we could muster for our aid were the claims of right and justice, the suffering and agony of a harassed people, without any real physical power behind us. The backdrop to our efforts was a ravaged and bewildered Europe, bereft of peace and stability; the steady deterioration in relations between East and West; the supremacy of power politics in political life, and armed strength outweighing all else as the single decisive factor in a disillusioned and cynical world.

Little wonder that we felt success in the teeth of such circumstances could only be the result of a miracle.

We were told more than once in meeting UNSCOP personnel that there wasn't a scrap of hope of achieving our full demands. We were advised to sacrifice either the idea of complete independence or the claim to larger areas. Some recommended that we accept the first course and support federalization; others urged upon us a token state that would guarantee us equality of status in the family of nations.

Reluctant as we were to entertain this grave alternative, there was no desire among us to precipitate a third course—a rupture within UNSCOP. We knew that in such a division we could only hope to get the support of a small minority, whose recommendations would elicit no attention whatever at the General Assembly. Yet the feeling was paramount among us that the time for compromise and retreat had not yet come, and the fight for an acceptable solution must go on so long as a glimmering of hope remained.

SUCCESS FROM SCHISM (34)

Two blocs shaped up within UNSCOP, one advocating the Partition idea and the second plumping for Federation. The Yugoslavs finally sided with the Asian representatives who consented to "compromise" with them. The former had insisted on a formula framed as moderately as possible, while the Indian wanted Federation, which was no different from the pro-Arab plan; and Nasrullah Entezam, of Iran, bent every effort to mediate between them and bring them to common ground.

The other eight members of UNSCOP constituted the majority, which endorsed Partition. But even the majority was split and as full of doubts as a pomegranate is of pips. The question of the viability of an Arab state caused the members great concern.

Most of the members wanted to assure the financial support of the Arab state by the Jewish state, but the principal stumbling-block remained the issue of area and authority. While Justice Rand demanded the maximum area for the Jews and the maximum economic ties between the states, Dr. Salazar held out for an independent and entirely separate Jewish state of small token size. On the other hand, Dr. Blom placed his emphasis on implementation. The question worrying him was plain yet momentous: "Whatever the solution, who will supervise its execution? Who will govern the country during the transition period? Britain? It can refuse to carry out a plan which does not conform to its wishes and terms. The United Nations? It's possible that there won't be the requisite two-thirds majority to approve the recommendation."

The differences in the pro-Partition camp were seven-fold complicated by the cunning tactics of the federalists, who insisted on the contraction of the area of the proposed Jewish state in order to compel the Jews to reject the entire plan. They knew full well that such a plan

running counter to the will of both parties must inevitably fail and disappear.

The position of Dr. Mohn, regarded by the members as an authority on the territorial issues, was obscure and indefinite. We were worried and alarmed by his mysterious manner and the odd expression on his face. I was the only one to retain faith in Mohn and remained in close touch with him over the question of frontiers. Events proved my judgment correct, and the opinion of most of my colleagues that he was our sworn enemy was completely invalidated by his attitude and actions.

Mohn was interested in the contribution that the Jewish people had made to world culture. In general, he was fond of exploring the Jewish intellect. When he came to Tel Aviv two years later with Count Folke Bernadotte, and we had our first meeting, he remarked that the Jews were already showing their superior talents at every international conference and gathering, by virtue of that unique and unparalleled Jewish intellect, which nothing could withstand. "I'm only surprised," he quipped, "that those unfortunate statesmen, even those belonging to the great enlightened powers, were able to hold out against you in the debates."

There was no tinge of hostility or hatred in the discussions then proceeding, but in the tense atmosphere any kind of covert behavior was suspect and aroused apprehension as to its possible effect on our interest.

A typical illustration of the mood and crosscurrents plaguing UNSCOP was the breeze that sprang up over the proposal made by Professor Enrique Fabregat, of Uruguay, concerning the future frontiers of the Jewish state:

Member 1: It's an immoral proposal!

Member 2: Nations don't recognize morals, but only interests.

Member 3: It's a European conception of politics.

Member 4: I didn't know that X was in Europe.

The Committee's deliberations entered an impasse. It seemed to us that all our efforts were being frittered away uselessly. The majority of UNSCOP faced utter disintegration. The moot point of frontiers would lead

to a series of valueless and ineffectual separate reports, or an inconclusive report that would be no better than an academic thesis.

Then the dreaded moment came. At eleven o'clock one morning the information sped to us that after a brief early session several of the members of the pro-Partition majority were seceding from its support.

We sat around disconsolately in Moshe Shertok's room faced by a grim and unpalatable alternative: the dissolution of UNSCOP, or recommendation of a token state that we would be bound to refuse. We were in despair and bewilderment.

Then I rebelled vigorously against the despondency that had seized us all. "We have two and a half hours left," I exclaimed. "Let's use the time to make a last effort to save the situation and swing the scales in our favor."

My suggestion aroused rueful skepticism rather than opposition, as if to say: do as you wish, and may you prosper, but we know it will be futile.

There were six of us in the room at the time: Moshe Shertok, Aubrey Eban, Leo Kohn, Moshe Tov, Gideon Rufer, and myself.

Aubrey and I left dejectedly and went to a restaurant called La Globe to lunch with Donald MacGillivray—an appointment made several days before. I liked MacGillivray and respected his judgments, but the idea of meeting him at the moment stuck in my throat like a bone.

The minutes ticked by as slowly as drops of blood oozing from a deep open wound. The shadow of three o'clock, the time set for UNSCOP's next conclusive session, overcast my thoughts and conversation.

Several committee members were also lunching at La Globe. No sooner had Aubrey and I begun our talk with MacGillivray than Dr. Salazar came in. I asked my companions to excuse me and hurried over to him. I explained in a few succinct sentences the consequences of the decision which he and his fellow members were about to take.

"We shall not accept or reconcile ourselves to any

state having such confining frontiers," I said flatly and without quibbling. Salazar listened, but made no reply.

I went back to our table and resumed the conversation with MacGillivray. It dealt, of course, with the same topic.

"We're not after a flag or the other trappings of statehood," I declared. "We want hard and solid ground beneath our feet."

I tackled him on his obduracy over the question of western Galilee and tried to convince him that he was taking on the responsibility for precarious historical developments even if UNSCOP failed in its mission. "It's Britain's last chance to resume orderly relations with the Jews," I averred. "The failure of this attempt means only one thing: continued warfare."

It was another attempt to dislodge MacGillivray from his passive attitude. But I knew that even if I succeeded in doing so, it could have no effect on the decision, which was to be taken at three o'clock.

I exchanged a few words also with Professor Fabregat and Dr. Granados, who entered the restaurant. My conversation with them confirmed the surmise that the only man who could help in alleviating the gravity of our position was Ivan Rand. I had to make an immediate decision whether or not to appeal to him at this last moment. I knew him well and was aware that an appeal of the sort at this moment was not proper and could be regarded as tactless; and I felt that in the delicate circumstances which had arisen my visit might annoy him.

It was twenty minutes before three. The meeting was scheduled to begin at three o'clock. I had very little time left to hesitate. It was the last hope. I decided to take the risk and let blind chance decide for me.

I went to the telephone and rang the Palace of the Nations. Justice Rand said he would receive me if I came at once, before the meeting began. I jumped into a car, raced through the streets of Geneva, and was in the Canadian delegate's room at ten minutes before the hour.

"I know it isn't proper to intrude on you at this time and in this way," I started, "but I remembered our first

talk at Haifa. You then said: 'You're fighting with your backs to the wall.' If one is fighting with one's back to the wall, one does not observe the proprieties of the situation."

Rand's smile encouraged me to continue.

"If it's decided to put this yoke around our neck, and the Jewish state is reduced to a mere sham, then we shall be doomed, but the solution of the problem will also be doomed. We know from Arab sources that they're pinning all their hopes on the consequences of this proposal. It won't get even a two-thirds majority in the United Nations, and the Palestine problem will be just as insoluble as ever."

I held my breath while awaiting his reply. It was brief but forceful. All he said was: "I won't allow you to be placed in a territorial ghetto." Just that and nothing more.

We exchanged a strong handshake and I left. I knew the purport of his words. I knew, too, the personal, moral, and political authority behind them, and that was enough for me.

The car seemed to crawl on the way back to our hotel. I literally burst into Shertok's room and awoke him from a nap.

"There's a change, there's new hope!" I cried excitedly.

He turned a doubting, questioning gaze on me and asked for particulars. I told him of my talks with MacGillivray, Salazar, Granados, and Fabregat, and finally what Rand had said. Shertok listened intently and skeptically. He was still not persuaded that the crucial turning-point had come.

The first reports of the afternoon session reached us that evening. Most of the supporters of Partition had rallied again. Ivan Rand had taken a staunch position and raised new points.

"The pledge concerning a Jewish national home has never been fulfilled," he said. "For the past ten years, immigration and land-purchases have been artificially restricted, and the Jewish community has had to remain

static. It's clear that were it not for the White Paper and the land legislation, the Jews would have had far larger areas than they hold today."

Justice Rand's firmness and percipience won the day. The plan of a truncated state fell through. The crisis had been overcome.

We were once more out on the straight, but still had many barriers and obstacles to surmount. In a talk I had with Karel Lisicky, that cautious Czech warned that we had made too much of political considerations in the discussions on Jerusalem and had not given the members sufficient factual material. An uncompromising attitude on our part, he maintained, would be harmful; the world was tired of the Palestine issue and was liable to seek refuge in a mechanical and formal "democracy" as the key to all problems, including the immigration question, which was so vital to us.

Ralph Bunche, too, was critical and skeptical of the attitude of the UNSCOP majority. He had no faith in a combination of Partition and economic union, and held that Partition would cancel out the economic ties. He felt that an economic alliance could not be imposed and was only possible with the free consent of the parties. He was more inclined toward a scheme of Federation which would more closely approximate our aspirations than that put up by the minority group, especially regarding immigration.

I attached high importance to his opinion because I knew his tremendous influence on UNSCOP, and I therefore tried to make him see the rightness of our attitude. He seemed very preoccupied and distract. Several days later I learned he was engaged, almost entirely alone except for a certain amount of help from Paul Mohn, in composing two reports, one for the majority and the other for the minority on the Committee. He completed this amazing job, which was so exceptional from both psychological and technical standpoints, in a matter of days.

Thus the two widely differing and contradictory Reports of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, the famous majority and minority documents, are

the handiwork of one man alone. It is probably a unique occurrence in the annals of international relations.

For the first time Dr. Bunche plumbèd the real deeps of the Palestine issue, and, as he confessed to me three years after the Geneva interlude, it was the greatest and most elevating experience of his whole life. Indeed, it brought him to the forefront of world politics and wrote his name in glowing letters on the pages of history.

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The atmosphere of Geneva had a pronounced influence on the minds and feelings of the UNSCOP party. In Jerusalem they had been the pivot of social and political life, but here in the city of international assemblies they passed unnoticed. They were swallowed up in the maw of the city's oblivious tranquillity, and few knew of their presence. It was as though their historical importance had been suddenly expunged and they were eleven ordinary men engaged on a certain job, in which the indifferent passing parade around them took no apparent interest.

Geneva was a grim testing-place for us no less. No longer standing on the terra firma of our familiar world and far removed from the realities of our environment, we were cut off and isolated and unable to draw strength from our natural surroundings, left to our own mental resources. We felt our position keenly, and at times it seemed almost unbearable.

The critical stage in UNSCOP's work had passed, but the struggle over frontiers still went on. Our efforts to secure the inclusion of western Galilee in the Jewish state had not produced any direct result, but had had a favorable effect on the fate of the Negev. The consideration that had been most effective in procuring the incorporation of the whole, undivided Negev in the state was the reiterated argument that only the Jews were capable of developing and fostering the efflorescence of its barren, neglected stretches.

"The Arabs," we pointed out, "have a large surplus of cheap territory available throughout the Middle East,

and the redemption of the Negev is of no economic or commercial significance to them. We have no other area besides it on the whole globe. Consequently it's the only solid hope we possess for development and settlement."

When we were reminded that the costs of settlement would run into fantastic amounts, we begged our interlocutors to let us do the financial worrying. "The world stood aside indifferently without lifting a finger when six million Jews were massacred in Europe," we said. "Why should there suddenly be this concern lest we spend too much money on saving the remnants who have survived?"

We were most surprised when Jaffa was included in the Jewish state. It was the work of Paul Mohn, who did not believe in various forms of enclaves and corridors. The only case in which he was compelled to acquiesce in a composite arrangement of this kind was in connection with the junctions of corridors, a new and original device attributed to Donald MacGillivray. These "kissing points," as everyone called them, soon came in for some caustic criticism in the U.N. General Assembly.

The time for signing the reports arrived. We knew there would be two reports, we knew who would be the signatories of each; we knew that seven members would sign the report propounding Partition, that three members—the Yugoslav, Indian, and Iranian—would express support of a federal solution without immigration, and that the other one, John Hood, of Australia, would abstain. In the opinion of us all, it was a brilliant success which surpassed all expectations.

Once more our small group sat together—Moshe Sherstok, Leo Kohn, Aubrey Eban, Moshe Tov, whose contacts with the South Americans had played an important part in the proceedings, Mordecai Kahane, Gideon Rufer, Eliahu Sasson, and I. We were tired, keyed up in anticipation of the publication of the reports, which had still not been officially signed, yet inspired by the elated feeling of a mission fulfilled. Once more we looked into each other's eyes and scanned our watches, on which the hands were moving slowly but surely to nine o'clock of the evening when the signatures were to be affixed.

Aubrey Eban and I, the two official liaison officers of the Jewish Agency, had been assigned to appear at the appointed hour to receive copies of the report. On the way I turned for a moment into Justice Rand's room to say good-by. I shook hands with him in mute emotion and felt this would be an unforgettable moment.

Three men stood in the splendid antechamber of the Palace of the Nations: Aubrey Eban, Donald MacGillivray, as liaison officer of the Mandatory Government, and I. We were impatient, and the ceremony lasted longer than we expected. At ten o'clock no one had emerged from the hall in which the documents were being signed.

Eleven o'clock! One of the committee members darted out for a moment, threw us a swift glance, and said wryly: "Oh, here are the expectant fathers."

Midnight. The door swung open and the members filed out. Enrique Fabregat approached and embraced me. "It's the greatest moment in my life," he said with tears in his eyes.

At five minutes past midnight the report was officially handed over to us. The curtain fell on the UNSCOP act of the Palestine drama, the act without which the Jewish people would never have won the U.N. Resolution of November 29, 1947, the British might perhaps never have left the Holy Land at all, and the historic developments, including the Yishuv's immortal resistance against the invasion by the Arab states, would have been deferred to a later period or perhaps have assumed an entirely different form.

This fact highlights the preponderant importance that the efforts of eleven different nationals in Jerusalem and Geneva exercised on the course of history, and is the measure of our reward for many months of striving and suffering in this stern, fluctuating political struggle.

The next day we went to Zurich to attend the Zionist General Council session. During the train journey, we had the opportunity of reading the report fully for the first time, and the feeling of victory was accentuated. The enthusiasm with which we were greeted at Zurich was moving. The birthday-party feeling, reminiscent of my boyhood days, lasted in me for a long time.

Our Political Committee also met and we reviewed the prospects at the U.N. General Assembly country by country. The tension of the UNSCOP period had barely subsided and we were plunged again into the thick of a new struggle and a new tension.

The chapter of time lying ahead of us was prescient with difficulty and hard work, perhaps more so than the chapter just closed. We were again summoned to a rigid discipline of vigilance and greater physical and spiritual exertions. It was an experience I had already endured several times and was fated to undergo more than once in the future. I felt like a man climbing higher and higher up a series of ridges until the top was neared and then being flung back to start over again, an endless role of Sisyphus.

Aubrey Eban and I were given the errand of going to London to sound out the political pulse and then joining our colleagues who were going straight to Lake Success, where the General Assembly was about to open.

I felt that I was being divorced entirely from my economic work and getting into the groove of external political activity. My work had long ceased to be economic advice in the shaping of Zionist "foreign policy"; after many months of unadulterated diplomatic activity, it had become purely political.

I arrived in London with mixed feelings and found it unchanged—gray, cold, sunk in apathy. The critical po-

sition had laid its mark on economic and political conditions alike.

There was also in London an inimical attitude toward the Zionist cause. The positive UNSCOP report had not thawed out any fraction of the political frost. The tone of newspaper editorials remained the same—aggressive, unyielding, hostile. I felt there was no end to the endless London cycle, which went on going round and round between one commission and another, one visit and another. Sisyphus was back at the bottom of the hill again!

Dr. Weizmann was extremely pleased with the U.N. report and complimented us with great heartiness. He was about to meet Winston Churchill, Oliver Stanley, and some Colonial Office people. Bevin, whom he had approached, refused to see him, but there was no wonder; the Foreign Secretary had also put off the High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, who had asked for an interview.

Jon Kimche told me that the view was crystallizing that Palestine must be evacuated. Experts believed that the whole of the Middle East was about to flare up, owing to the UNSCOP report.

Everyone surmised correctly that Ivan Rand had turned the scales. Canada was known as Britain's most loyal Dominion and could not be charged with having anti-British prejudice. Its seal on the report was regarded by all as being a powerful factor in the UNSCOP chapter.

I had a meal with Harold Beeley at the Carlton Grill, the place where we usually met. The tone of our conversation was the invariable one of polite, cultured detachment, as of people completely unembroiled in the matter of the discussion.

I criticized the attitude of the British press. "There's no vacuum in politics. Britain is carrying out the White Paper policy. If it refuses to accept UNSCOP's recommendations, its policy must continue to be that of the White Paper. There's no third alternative.

"Great Britain can either accept the recommendations or cry off and continue on a course which all authoritative bodies have condemned. The British Government

submitted the issue for arbitration three times—to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the defunct League of Nations, to the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee, and to the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine. All three decided against the White Paper. There's no logic in going on submitting the problem to an endless number of committees until one is found to do Britain's bidding.

"As for the Arabs, Britain's attitude toward them exceeds all the normal bounds of friendship. It has fought their battle three times without winning. It flooded us with brilliant pro-Arab plans—the Morrison plan and the Bevin plan—to no avail. The problem now remaining is not one of principle—that has been decided—but of political expediency.

"What faces England, therefore, if it perseveres in its present course? The Jewish population deems itself considerably fortified as the carrier of a United Nations mission. The whole world is rebelling against British obstinacy in rejecting the results of arbitration which it asked for and recognized."

Beeley conceived three possible courses against the two I had envisaged. They were: (1) implementation of the UNSCOP report; (2) evacuation; and (3) fixing an agreed date between the Jews, Arabs, and United Nations, and if by then a solution satisfactory to all parties had not been achieved, British surrender of the Mandate and withdrawal from Palestine.

He agreed that the *Exodus 1947* affair was a British blunder and agreed with me that the White Paper in its letter and spirit was no longer valid. He believed that a subcommittee would be appointed by the General Assembly to examine UNSCOP's report and the possibilities of executing its recommendations.

He told me that the British delegation to Lake Success would consist of Arthur Creech-Jones, John Miller Martin, a Principal Assistant Secretary at the Colonial Office, Douglas MacGillivray, and himself.

He wasn't inclined to attach importance to military expenditure; the army had to be kept somewhere, after all.

As for the minority report, it was not practicable; it was based on the co-operation of all parties concerned, and that was no longer feasible.

Unlike Beeley, John Martin, of the Colonial Office, foresaw three other possible courses:

1. giving effect to UNSCOP's plan with outside help—not necessarily technical aid, but moral aid, which would relieve Britain as the sole target for the slings and arrows of the Arab world;
2. immediate evacuation as a counsel of desperation, which of course would not be fair to the Jews who came to Palestine with the assurance of British protection;
3. a *status quo*, which he did not regard as feasible.

He asked my opinion of UNSCOP's minority report. I replied in Beeley's coin concerning the impracticability of carrying it out, and retailed the famous anecdote about Napoleon when he asked the Mayor of Smolensk why he had not fired salvos of cannon in the conqueror's honor.

"I have seventeen reasons for it," the mayor replied. "First of all, we haven't any cannon. Secondly . . ."

John Martin, like Napoleon, contented himself with the first reason and wasn't interested in the other sixteen so far as the minority report was concerned.

My stay in London was taken up with a press of work and the endless series of meetings which Aubrey Eban and I had with newspaper correspondents, officials, diplomats, army and intelligence officers, with whom we conferred and exchanged information, and whom we entertained. It all had to be compressed into the space of a few weeks.

The powers that be in Britain were in somewhat of a confusion. Another committee had indicted them. It was not easy to admit mistakes, but there was none the less the desire to be rid of the sorry mess and emerge without loss of face.

Was there a way out? The Cabinet had clearly reached no decision yet.

I found particular interest in a talk with a high official of the American Embassy. He had some interesting ideas about the structural changes in civilization which would develop as a result of Western birth control, as contrasted with the natural increase among Eastern and colonial peoples. He envisaged the rise of the colored peoples as a looming factor on the international scene.

I agreed with his view that the reduction of mortality among colonial peoples owing to improved standards of hygiene now exceeded the reduction in the birth-rate, but this phenomenon was destined to pass. The intellectual development of these peoples was still backward and lagged behind that of the Western nations, which had advanced owing to various historical conditions.

As regards Zionist matters, he felt that we tended to minimize Bevin's great political genius, and he cited the way Bevin had handled the miners. He had said quite simply: "They'll give us the coal we need," and won them by that direct approach and expression of faith. Bevin, according to my informant, was grappling with the Palestine problem in the same way. He would choose the most appropriate method to carry out the most popular solution—namely, military evacuation. The *status quo* would continue for the time being.

Events were to show that of all the prognostications and predictions uttered, his was closest to the truth.

He stressed the importance of amending and alleviating the United States immigration laws. "Such a reform will place the United States Government in a better light with the Arabs," he said.

But I differed with his view that spreading the Dispersion still farther was an effective means of solving the Jewish problem, and we turned to a detailed discussion of the issue with all its corollary aspects.

He believed in a theory held in many quarters, which we refuted, that Jews were at their best when they served as a leaven in civilized groups of people. They were the cultural yeast of civilization, which operated best in small scattered quantities, not as a concentrated mass.

They were excellent, for example, in Boston, where he was born and brought up. The sharp intellect of his Jewish schoolmates had spurred him to emulation. But in New York, where Jews were congested in a dense mass, they began to be less pleasant. He believed that the Jews would impair their essential values in a monoracial Eretz Israel.

Taking issue with him, I ascribed the remarkable development of the Jewish intellect to the one-sided emphasis on intellectual functions at the expense of the other physical and spiritual fundamentals in man, which they neglected for want of opportunity. It was like a blind man developing another sense as a substitute for lost sight. The Jews had needed to keep their wits about them and so, for hundreds of years, they had exercised them as a pugilist flexes and develops his biceps. This had retarded the development of other faculties and values. It was possible that some of the people would lose part of their mental proficiency once they had a state of their own, though in my opinion the general level would not be substantially lowered. I myself believed there would probably be an osmosis between manual labor and culture, not as a deviation from normalcy, but as a new and higher phase of human evolution.

I called at the Colonial Office, where the question of Palestine's sterling balances was first raised. My fears that they would be frozen were confirmed in due course. I explained to the officials whom I met that our balances were of a unique kind and different from other categories. The man handling the question at the Colonial Office, who had spent some time in the Palestine civil service, rejoined sarcastically: "Yes, like everything else of yours there."

I had heard a great deal about Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Martin Charteris, formerly G.S.I. (head of military intelligence) at Force Headquarters in Jerusalem. He was considered one of our most confirmed and unrelenting adversaries. We believed it was he and none other who had initiated the British campaign of suppression of June 29, 1946 and was entrusted with its discharge.

His opinion had been that Haganah and not the dis-

sidents must be the objective. He rightly regarded Haganah as the only solid force which, once removed, would make it simple to deal with the dissident groups. His political plan comprised smashing the Jewish Agency and preparing the way for the emergence of a new moderate leadership, which he hoped to discover among the mayors and elements close to them. He was later transferred to London and was given the Palestine desk at the War Office.

Charteris did not know the source of our information, and we were not entirely certain that he was aware to what extent his leanings were known to us. Consequently, when I met him through Aubrey Eban and the three of us lunched at Prunier's in St. James's Street, off Piccadilly, our conversation assumed the form of cautious gropings in the dark.

Charteris had an easy, half-bantering tone, with a dash of polished satire. He was sophisticated, clever, and civilized. His personality made an excellent impression.

He spoke mainly of the military and strategic significance of the Palestine question. His fundamental premise was that Arab disturbances were inevitable and he sincerely believed that a Jewish-Arab military struggle in Palestine would end in a Jewish victory.

A year after our meeting, at the height of the Yishuv's fight against the Arab gangs toward the end of April 1948, eve of the Arab invasion, he addressed a small British group on the position in Palestine. They were the most critical days in the Yishuv's developing war, and the fact of the imminent Arab incursion was known to all. Yet Colonel Charteris surprised his listeners by confidently predicting a Jewish victory. The only other man in England who held the same view at the time was the great British soldier, the late Field Marshal Lord Wavell.

Notwithstanding his high opinion of Jewish prowess, Charteris did not conceal his negative attitude to Zionism. The struggle in Palestine, he declared, was between Arab right and Jewish need. He did not believe that British administration in the country would last much longer.

He described his feelings by recounting the well-known story of the man who threw himself off the Empire State Building in New York. When he was hurtling past the fortieth floor someone shouted: "How do you feel?" He yelled back: "Everything's all right so far."

He carried on the conversation in an affable and friendly tone, touched with a mordant wit. Once he interrupted and remarked with a smile: "That's an important point I'll use in the report I'll give of our talk." He said it half-jestingly, half-seriously, but it expressed our mutual recognition that the lunch-table chat would serve each party as a source of information for report. His disarming candor, therefore, did not have the effect of halting our colloquy. It went on as an interesting exchange in which the broadswords of thought were sharpened on each other, without a shadow of hope that protagonist would convince antagonist, or vice versa.

A TALK WITH AZZAM PASHA (36)

There is a peculiar enchantment in the moist-green English countryside which refreshes the spirit with its virility. The trip from London to Oxford in a fast car is a pleasant and relaxing experience, even though practical matters await one at the destination.

Oxford itself is lovely and its outward appearance fascinating, a medieval island browsing in the twentieth century. The colleges resemble old monasteries. The antique style of architecture, the gracious lawns and gardens and gray walls, the undergraduates in their traditional garb—all these are relics of the Middle Ages and, to our contemporary eye, weird and wonderful, yet for all that mute with their own innate glory.

I asked the name of one of the buildings we were passing. "New College," I was told. "Built at the beginning of the fourteenth century."

The man we were on our way to see in Oxford was, more than anyone else, deserving of the title Father of

the Partition Plan. He was Professor Sir Reginald Coupland, member of the 1937 Royal Commission and the principal author of its celebrated report, which remains the most objective, profound, and thoroughgoing document ever produced on the Palestine question.

He received us cordially and, when Aubrey Eban had introduced me, expressed delight with the UNSCOP report, which revived the proposals made by his colleagues and himself, though it adjusted them to the altered conditions of the times.

He inveighed bitterly at the spreading anti-Semitic manifestations and deplored the short memory of people who had so quickly forgotten what they had done to the Jews over the generations. He expressed the hope that the new report would be the final solution, once guarantees against aggression and expansion had been added.

The series of meetings proceeded, but one vital link was missing—a meeting with the Arabs. I deemed it necessary to make a final effort to reach agreement with the Arabs in the light of the report. But all my gropings in that direction were fruitless until one day the coveted opportunity was presented by my friend Jon Kimche, the newspaperman.

He phoned one morning, out of a clear sky, and said it was possible to arrange an interview with Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, leader and secretary-general of the Arab League. I at once agreed, and an appointment was made for five o'clock the following afternoon.

Aubrey, Jon Kimche, and I went to the Savoy Hotel, where Azzam Pasha was staying, and a short while later were sitting with a swarthy, lean-faced Arab with dark, piercing eyes, who received us with great courtesy.

I opened the conversation. After setting out my view of UNSCOP's report, I turned to analyze the situation: "The Jews are a *fait accompli* in the Middle East. Sooner or later the Arabs will have to reconcile themselves to the fact and accept it. You Arabs cannot wipe out or exterminate over half a million people. We, for our part, are genuinely desirous of an agreement with the Arabs and are prepared to make sacrifices for one.

"Such an agreement will be reached in time, so why precede it by squabbling, fighting, and bloodshed? There are no conflicting fundamental interests and insuperable obstacles involved in any agreement. We're not hankering after expansion, conquest, or domination of other peoples. We want to become integrated in the fabric of the Middle East so that we can be mutually beneficial.

"We know that it's a vital interest for us. I understand that you don't wish to rely on assurances and lofty sentiments. Consequently, we're ready to propose a concrete plan for co-ordination of interests and a real peace between the two peoples.

"The plan is in three parts:

"First, *political*: that is, an arrangement with the Arab League based on a system of well-defined rights and obligations.

"Secondly, *security*, which will have the effect of dissipating your groundless suspicions of our alleged expansionist ambitions, though we keep on declaring and repeating that our sole object is to in-gather the hundreds of thousands of our brethren within the bounds prescribed for us and to revive the wilderness, and despite the fact that any attempt on our part to break out of this frame will be met by the opposition of the entire world. We're ready to give you concrete guarantees, both from ourselves and from the United Nations.

"Finally, the plan will have an *economic* section to be drawn up in consultation between the parties and will deal with the conjoint development of the Middle East, to the advantage and prosperity of the Arab masses."

Azzam Pasha: "The Arab world is not in a compromising mood. It's likely, Mr. Horowitz, that your plan is rational and logical, but the fate of nations is not decided by rational logic. Nations never concede; they fight. You won't get anything by peaceful means or compromise. You can, perhaps, get something, but only by the force of arms. We shall try to defeat you. I'm not sure we'll succeed, but we'll try. We were able to drive out the Crusaders, but on the other hand we lost Spain and Persia. It may be that we shall lose Palestine. But it's too late to talk of peaceful solutions."

Aubrey Eban: "The UNSCOP report establishes the possibility of a satisfactory compromise. Why shouldn't we at least make an effort to reach an agreement on those lines? At all events, our proposal is a first draft only and we shall welcome any counterproposal from your side."

Azzam Pasha: "An agreement will only be acceptable at our terms. The Arab world regards you as invaders and is ready to fight you. The conflict of interests among nations is, for the most part, not amenable to any settlement except armed clash."

Horowitz: "Then you believe in the force of arms alone? You don't think there has been any progress whatsoever in the settlement of controversial issues among different peoples?"

Azzam Pasha: "It's in the nature of peoples to aspire to expansion and fight for what they think is vital. It's possible I don't represent, in the full sense of the word, the new spirit which animates my people. My young son, who yearns to fight, undoubtedly represents it better than I do. He no longer believes in us of the older generation.

"When he came back from one of the more violent student demonstrations against the British, I told him that in my opinion the British would evacuate Egypt without the need for his demonstrations. He asked me in surprise: 'But, Father, are you really so pro-British?'

"The forces which motivate peoples are not subject to our control. They're objective forces. It may have been possible in the past to have reached agreement if there'd been amalgamation from below. But it's no longer feasible. You speak of the Middle East. We don't recognize that conception. We only think in terms of the Arab world. Nationalism, that's a greater force than any which drives us. We don't need economic development with your assistance. We have only one test, the test of strength. If I were a Zionist leader, I might have behaved the way you're doing. You have no alternative. At all events, the problem now is only soluble by the force of arms."

Azzam Pasha's forcefulness and fanaticism impressed us deeply. His world-outlook had something of the bio-

logical determinism of racial theory. The realistic picture he painted was a fatalistic one of objective, almost blind forces erupting and spilling over unchecked on the stage of history.

Azzam proclaimed his attachment to democratic principles in our ensuing conversation, it was true, but his extreme beliefs bordered on a fascist world-conception. The admiration of force and violence which was evident in his statements seemed to us to be both strange and repugnant, and his description of any attempt at compromise or peace as a naïve illusion left no door of hope open.

In spite of the amiable, even cordial atmosphere, we felt the full historic impact of this dramatic encounter. With it vanished the last effort to bridge the gulf. The final illusion of reaching an agreed and peaceful solution had been exploded.

We left the hotel and crossed over into the Strand both stirred and depressed. Azzam had managed to impart something of his spirit and outlook to us. We saw looming up before us latent, powerful forces pushing us irresistibly and inescapably toward the brink of a sanguinary war, the outcome of which none could prophesy.



My work in London was completed and I left for a visit home, with the intention of settling some outstanding matters. The British Airways Dakota covered the journey from England to the Mediterranean without incident, but suddenly there was an extraordinary occurrence.

A young man with an alarmed and panic-stricken face burst out of the pilot's cockpit into the passenger cabin and called to us to fasten our safetybelts. He then turned to me and whispered: "Get your lifebelt on. We may have to make a forced landing in the sea."

I imagined that something was wrong with the motors. I looked out of the window and saw the thin, dark line of the North African coast. The situation appeared

serious, but as we continued skimming toward the mainland, I surmised that the motors had picked up again.

Then an officer came into the cabin and apologized for alarming us, though it transpired that the situation was far from reassuring. An effort would be made to reach El Adem, but we might be compelled to land on one of the airstrips dotting the desert.

The tense and precarious flight went on another two hours until finally we put down at El Adem without mishap. It then came out that we should have to spend several hours at this lonely and boring R.A.F. station in the heart of the Western Desert. We spent seven long, weary hours there until the crew and airfield mechanics repaired the faulty engine. After a trial spin, we took off again, reaching Lydda at midnight. My worried family were awaiting me there impatiently.

A few days of feverish activity in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and I was off again for London via Amsterdam.

The British Government's decision was already known in London. The British rejected UNSCOP's report and would refuse to implement it. Arthur Creech-Jones, who now completely identified himself with Ernest Bevin's attitude, would be the British representative at the Lake Success discussions on Palestine. Beeley's assessment and predictions had once more proved correct.

The British, like the Arabs, rejected our overtures for an agreement on the basis of the UNSCOP majority report. But it was this one that prevailed. The minority report could not be carried out without our co-operation, and it was consequently doomed to be shelved. As a matter of fact, the minority proposal settled nothing. It did not open the gates of the country to the European survivors, and, on the other hand, it left the existing Yishuv at the mercy of the ex-Mufti and his fanatical followers. The proposal, in effect, was for an Arab state masquerading as Federation, which would arouse the whole Jewish people against it.

On the other hand, the majority report, which was really the Committee's report, contained two solid achievements: first, it put the international seal of approval on the demand to wind up the Mandate and

thereby created a political vacuum which had to be filled with new substance; secondly, it prepared a positive platform for discussion by the General Assembly, without which there was not a wisp of hope of mobilizing the necessary two-thirds majority in favor of a satisfactory formula.

Nevertheless, we still faced an onerous task, beside which our efforts in regard to UNSCOP paled into insignificance. Unlike the latter, which was a semi-independent legal body tending to divorce itself from all considerations save judgment of merits, the free interplay of political forces and interests governed the General Assembly's work.

We now stood in the political arena, where naught else mattered save the diplomatic projection of power politics, a small, feeble people, without sovereignty or influence. Could we, in such overwhelming circumstances, carry out our mission?

Once again, Sisyphus-like, we stood at the foot of the hill, and the slope seemed to be steeper, the summit farther away, and the ascent more difficult and strewn with more pitfalls.



New York, cosmopolitan and multiform, but unified by its very diversity. . . .

Wherever I went in the great metropolis, I had the sensation of Jewish New York watching the unfolding of the historic drama with bated breath, following each phase of the struggle with sympathy, warmth, and enthusiasm.

One of my colleagues told the story of how he wanted to elude the bombardment of questions by New York Jews in his hotel, the shops, restaurants, and streets. When questioned by a cab-driver, he said he was a South African. But even this artful dodge was useless. The cabby's second question was: "What do they think about the Palestine question in South Africa?"

The morning after my arrival, I went for the first time out to Lake Success along the broad parkway lined

by suburbs, meadows, and woodlands. Long lines of cars sped along with incredible rapidity. Lake Success itself is about fifty minutes' drive from the city. The United Nations building then housing the committees, with the exception of the General Assembly, which was located at Flushing Meadow, about half an hour from this spot, was a wartime gyroscope factory converted into office space. Its interior arrangements were splendid and excellently designed, providing all the up-to-date achievements of modern American techniques, from office equipment to earphones transmitting the translations of speeches into five languages.

But the most profound impression on the spectator was the multiplicity of languages, peoples, and races of this contemporaneous Babylon, trying to erect the political towers of our world and age. White and brown, Negro and yellow-skinned people crowded the corridors and the huge cafeteria. There a long line of people queued up for food, passing with trays and cutlery along the heavily laden counters, choosing what they fancied, and paying the trifling amounts at the other end. A spirit of equality and democracy prevailed, at least in this canteen, with absolute authority. Herschel Johnson, chief American delegate, stood behind an unknown Negro chauffeur; alongside Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani delegate, was a Chinese typist; behind them Berl Locker, of the Jewish Agency, and the Belgian delegate: a singular medley of illusory freedom and equality which had sought refuge here from a world that spurned it everywhere else.

An aura of queerness hung over the hall, a sensation of unreality, a kind of artificiality and makebelieve, isolating it spiritually as well as physically from the solid outer world. Everything inside was manufactured to uniform design: the conditioned air you breathed, the lighting system simulating daylight; giving one the eerie feeling of living in a world of pretense, far removed from the familiar realities outside.

The same feeling of isolation from reality overcame you in listening to the debates between West and East, filled with the sound and fury of crackling thought, yet

signifying nothing. Then you knew what it was: the distorted reflection of that other, tragic outer world, so very distant.

LAKE SUCCESS

(37)

The delegates' lounge was a humming hive of activity. The Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, now become the cynosure of interest, was about to hold its first session on the most important item before the General Assembly.

Delegates, messengers, girl secretaries, and newspapermen hustled to and fro, their images crowding the huge mirrors on the walls behind the upholstered lounges.

One of the Yugoslav delegates approached me with a hearty greeting. He bore tidings: "The minority report which was the stumbling-block in UNSCOP no longer separates us. A caucus of the Slav bloc decided to reject it. It has been buried and is a complete corpse."

This was surprising, encouraging, and even sensational news. We knew that it was for us to turn the impossible into the possible, to achieve something that had never been done at any time before—to find a common denominator, at least in one part of the entire globe, between East and West. The single hope or prospect of attaining our objective was to form a partnership—nothing less!—on this issue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

One of the obstacles had now been removed, according to my Yugoslav informant. And though we had no inkling of the attitude to be taken by the Soviet Union and its allies, at least one formidable barrier on our path—the minority report—had been removed.

The initial sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee were devoted to spying out the land and skirmishing. The smaller countries were reluctant to enter into any moral obligations before the United States and the Soviet Union made their viewpoints known. Only Guatemala

and Uruguay at one end and the Arab states at the other had no hesitation in speaking their minds.

The Arabs let themselves go in a barrage of denunciations against us. We were unable to do much to counter the strong psychological impression made by the speeches of the seven Arab representatives, including the gentleman of the obsolete state of Yemen, who blew hot and cold from fiery ardor to deep pathos. Our participation was limited to that of tolerated guests, without any of the rights accruing to member states.

The Arabs declaimed virulently, aggressively, and threateningly. The Egyptian was not even deterred from bluntly proclaiming the danger of disturbances against Jewish communities in Arab lands should a pro-Jewish decision be taken. "These acts will, of course, be deplored by the Arab governments," he said ingenuously, "but they won't be able to restrain the fury of the aroused masses."

Fares el Khoury, of Syria, took another line. In his learned opinion, the Jews were not the descendants of the ancient Hebrews at all, but came from the Khazar tribes of southern Russia who had embraced Judaism. Unlike them, the Arabs were the legitimate heirs and assigns of the original indigenes of Palestine. But his historicoracial sophistry had little effect on the delegates. They were not interested in Fares el Khoury's pseudo-historiography, but in concrete political realities based on their own hard recognition.

One of the Indian delegates commented on this somewhat sharply in private conversation later: "If a man calls himself a Jew, it's obvious he knows what he's talking about, as otherwise he wouldn't make the claim." In other words, a man who voluntarily assumes a heritage of suffering and obloquy is too well aware of his origin to need repudiation.

There were innumerable instances of factual and statistical distortions in the Arab addresses. The constant iteration of lies and falsehoods, with none to controvert them, finally sounded like the truth to their listeners, so that when we ultimately had the opportunity of replying, individual denials had no effect.

Moreover, we knew there was nothing worse than to flounder in a morass of denials and useless defense against slanders. Some shreds of the unending fabric of libelous statement and innuendo would remain impaled on the barbs of belief, and it was futile to try to remove them.

The most outstanding of the Arab envoys was Camille Chamoun, young and intelligent, cultured, with an interesting and expressive cast of countenance. This exceptional Arab diplomat, of civilized deportment, delivered orations in the best French tradition, fusing an ebullient emotion and flaming rhetoric with well-chosen dialectical arguments. His dissertations had their effect on the delegates.

But the most eloquent of them all was Sir Zafrullah Khan, of Pakistan. He was of dusky hue, with a short beard and glittering eyes, and had a cold, unflurried manner of speech. His statements were made with great deliberation and apparent objectivity, probing and revealing the weak spots in his opponents' defenses, and hauling them out for closer inspection like the skilled lawyer he was. He was aided by an impeccable Oxford English accent, brilliant and polished style, and keen power of logic.

Zafrullah Khan pinned down his listeners for four hours with a series of excellently reasoned premises, seemingly irrefutable, delivered with fine diplomatic aplomb. He based the Arab case on seven postulates as follows:

1. *The Legal Basis:* There was no legal validity to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Great Britain had no right to give away what it did not possess. The Mandate was contrary in spirit and letter to the Charter of the United Nations, which established the right of self-determination among peoples. On the other hand, the Mandate did not promise the Jews any more than they had received—that is, a haven for some of their brethren in Palestine. The United Nations had no authority to take juridical decisions and define territorial rearrangements. Such

a decision would be contrary to international law, the natural rights of any people, and the Charter of U.N., which recognized those rights. The matter should be referred to the International Tribunal.

2. *The Historical Basis:* The Jews were nothing but the descendants of the Khazars. At all events, they had only been in the country a short space of time, whereas the Arabs had occupied it the last 1,300 years. What would happen if we started turning the wheel of history back everywhere?

3. *The Formal Democratic Basis:* By the principles of democracy, every people was entitled to decide the fate of the territory on which it dwelt. There was a clear and substantial Arab majority in Palestine. The inhabitants should be permitted to determine the country's future by democratic means, without outside interference.

4. *The Practical Political Basis:* The procedure suggested by the inquiry committee could not be carried out. The frontiers were absurd and the structure of the regime was artificial. It was an experiment foredoomed to failure. The opposition of the Arab world would lead to an inevitable clash. A Partition resolution would precipitate a military conflict endangering world peace and the peace of Jewish communities in Arab countries.

5. *The Nationalist Basis:* A rejuvenated Arab nationalism was emerging after many years of dormancy. It was growing solidly and massively with the purpose of achieving national emancipation and unity. It was now encountering the Jewish intruder into a land that did not belong to him. It was natural that Arab nationalism should rise in fury and fight for its right to liberty, unity, and integrality.

6. *The Economic Basis:* Economic union could not be achieved against the will and wish of the Arabs, and the proposed Arab state in itself was incapable of durable economic existence.

7. *The Ideological Basis:* Zionism and the Jewish enterprise in Palestine were an artificial creature, devoid of roots or future, because they were not rooted

in historical, national, cultural, or political realities of any kind.

The Jewish case was presented to the Ad Hoc Committee by three speakers: Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, and Moshe Shertok.

Dr. Weizmann's testimony carried its greatest weight primarily because of his eminent personality, which was an indissoluble part of decades of Zionist history. The day he appeared, the hall was overflowing, and an air of high expectancy prevailed. He read out his statement from the manuscript, slowly and with evident exertion of his defective eyesight.

His dignified, subdued mien, unsullied by any theatrical effects, was that of a noble, suffering personage, in sharp contrast to the clamor and narrow nationalism of the Arab spokesmen. The distinguished scientist and statesman addressed the emissaries of the world gathered to weigh the destiny of his people in measured, considered, and responsible language.

Shertok and Silver presented a broad canvas of historical, practical, economic, and cultural considerations. Their statements were a fervent call to world conscience and wisdom, and were balanced against the more numerous addresses by the Arabs. Shertok's second speech, brief though eloquent, asserting that the Jews were ready to fight to the finish for their existence, had a great impact.

The points made in our statements threw another light on the arguments raised by the Arabs:

"The Mandate was primarily designed to foster the creation of the Jewish national home. The solemn pledge of 52 nations cannot be flouted. Such a precedent will destroy faith in the United Nations, on which the entire world pins its hopes.

"The absolute sovereignty of peoples over the territories which they occupy no longer obtains in the modern world. The sole priority is world interest, and that interest demands the rehabilitation of the ravaged Jewish people.

"A breach of faith by the United Nations would

be the beginning of the end. It would mean yielding to threats such as were the cases in Abyssinia, Spain, and Manchuria during the life of the League of Nations.

"The Palestine question has been discussed three times by international bodies—the Permanent Mandates Commission of the old League of Nations, the Anglo-American committee, and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. On each of the three occasions these committees condemned the British 'White Paper' and urged the fulfillment of the solemn promises made to Israel by the nations.

"Six million Jews, one third of the entire people, were slaughtered in the World War. Supreme human justice requires that a refuge be given to the survivors. The world must once and for all solve the Jewish problem.

"The position of the Jews must be weighed against that of the Arabs. The Arabs gained seven independent states, whereas the Jews are asking for only one per cent of the vast territories in Arab possession in order to set up their own sovereign independence.

"The arguments and considerations adduced in vindication of the Balfour Declaration are still valid. Far from having detracted from their validity, events have served only to strengthen them.

"If the United Nations take the Arab threats of force into account, the Jews will have no alternative other than to fight for their existence.

"There is no other solution to the Jewish and Palestine questions concurrently than the creation of a Jewish State. The historic right of the Jewish people to Palestine has never lapsed. The Jewish people have never broken their ties with this country over the centuries nor has ever bound its destiny to any other area.

"Partition is a satisfactory compromise, and not a Jewish solution.

"Democracy is not a formal concept of a majority and minority alone. Moreover, if there is to be a plebiscite, it should not be held on a countrywide basis,

but only among the inhabitants of that area which the Jews are claiming and in which there is already a Jewish majority.

"Enforcement of Partition is possible if the world desires it.

"Arab contentions that the Jewish undertaking is an artificial creature because it is a product of immigration sound the more grotesque when uttered on this continent, whose entire civilization is nothing but the product and growth of immigration.

"The Jewish undertaking has created massive facts in Palestine. The positive effects of these facts are visible in the Arab population. Tremendous potentialities lie dormant in the Jewish undertaking and Zionist settlement project. They can bring prosperity and plenty to the Middle East, and possibly even exercise a beneficial influence on the whole world.

"Consequently, the world is bound to take the decisive step and give its hand to a solution of the Palestine problem in order to do justice to the Jewish people and maintain the peace. The only way of achieving this is by establishing a Jewish State in Palestine and giving effective and rapid fulfillment to the report of the United Nations inquiry committee."

The voice of justice and logic spoke through the throats of our representatives. But in this arena of power politics and mighty vested interests, considerations of justice and logic were relegated to secondary place.

The attitude of three countries that ostensibly had no direct interest in the Palestine problem was characteristic in this respect.

France's desire to appease its large Arab populations in North Africa was from our viewpoint, of course, a negative factor. But, on the other hand, the French knew full well that an Arab victory over Palestine, coming so soon after the liberation of Syria and the Lebanon, would knock away the underpinnings of the French position in North Africa. The buttressing of Arab nationalism and the success of its designs in the Middle East would turn the Arab League, its hands now free, to new

pastures and purposes, and it would be French North Africa's turn.

Moreover, France had never forgotten the part played by the British in squeezing French influence out of the Middle East, and the opportunity of giving the British tit for tat was not unperceived by the molders of French policies. A Jewish political victory in the Middle East would also strengthen the position of the Maronites in the Lebanon, the principal pro-French factor remaining in the Middle East.

On the other scale, there was the strong Catholic influence and the apprehensions concerning the fate of Jerusalem juxtaposed with the general tendency to co-ordinate western European policy and conjoin French foreign policy with that of Britain. The result was uncertainty, hesitancy, and lack of clarity.

Vast and populous India, standing just at the beginning of its newly gained sovereign independence, faced its crossroads. Its representative, that brilliant woman Mrs. Lakshmi Pandit, sister of Prime Minister Nehru, with her finely chiseled and expressive face, had listened intensely to the Jewish statements. The Indian leader, who had a warm and compassionate feeling for the ancient, persecuted Jewish people, believed strongly in the visionary impulses of Jewish national creativeness. But other factors operated in her colossal homeland, submerged as it was by a flood of controversial problems.

India had a large and powerful Moslem minority, and the New Delhi policy-makers were afraid of giving Pakistan any fresh pretext for grievance. The latter would denounce any concessionary attitude to the Jews as another Indian onslaught against the Moslem interest. Above all, support of the Jews was tantamount to support of Partition, than which there was no more detested idea among the people of India. They had fought bitterly to prevent the partitioning of their country, and the painful operation that had severed Pakistan from India had been contrary to their wishes. How could they now approve that hateful act in another part of the world?

Moreover, India aspired to create an Asiatic bloc under its leadership. It could not achieve this purpose if it

aroused the anger of the Arab states, which controlled wide areas and large populations in the same region.

On the other hand, India regarded the coalescence of the Arab world with little favor. The creation of a continuous belt of Moslem lands from Tangiers in North Africa to Pakistan on the frontier of India did not bode well for the latter. An independent ally, which would sever that chain at a most vital link, would undoubtedly be a positive element in the array of far-reaching considerations.

How best unravel the skein? There was a great deal of activity within the Indian delegation. Long cables sped to and fro between Lake Success and New Delhi. Finally the latter decided in favor of pro-Arab calculations. The Government of India gave priority to temporary expedience over far-reaching policy. The delegation at Lake Success accepted the verdict with bitter heart. The members differed sharply from the official line, and voted against their own opinions and conscience in great personal disgust.

The Yugoslavs, too, had their own calculations. There was a large Moslem community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from the standpoint of principle they were unable facilely to support Partition. Yugoslavia was a federation of peoples based on the principle of amalgamation, not separation. How, then, could it vote for a Partition scheme? The Eastern bloc was voting for Partition, but, on the other hand, it could not ignore the importance of the Arab world. Would it not be better if the Yugoslav leaders and the Slav allies left a door open also to the Arabs?

These considerations strongly influenced Yugoslavia. When, therefore, we approached Semyon Zarapkin, of the Soviet Union, and asked for his help in persuading the Yugoslavs, he promised to do so, but, to our surprise, he suggested we should apply to them directly as well. We attached no importance to his remark at the time. We believed, as indeed the whole world believed, that a Soviet hint was sufficient to determine Yugoslavia's attitude. But in due course, when the Soviet-Yugoslav split occurred, we understood that Yugoslavia's jealousy

flaunted independence was even then a symptom of the profound break in store, which was to have such a momentous influence over the march of international politics.

(38) THE KEY IN BRITISH HANDS

Jin this imbroglio of vying interests and principles of big-power politics, the key to the entire solution was in British hands. Britain was in effect the ruler of Palestine. Its armed forces gave effect to the Mandate. It could evacuate the country in a manner compatible with the proper fulfillment of a solution by a successor, or it could leave a state of chaos behind.

Implementation of the plan with British aid would be easy and simple. But if, on the other hand, Britain wished to obstruct such implementation of a plan it regarded as unsatisfactory, no other power was prepared to offer military units for the purpose. The United States was disinclined to support an international force for it would give Soviet troops a footing in Palestine. It would also be difficult to persuade American public opinion that American blood must be spilled in Palestine. The Americans aspired to a common policy with Britain in the Middle East which would fit into the common world pattern.

Britain's influence over the Arab world was also of primary importance. It could prevent the interference of the Arab states, or at least a part of them, in the event of an armed dispute in Palestine. There was no limit to its influence over Transjordan. The Arab Legion, best-trained and superior force in the Middle East, was under British command. Its refusal to co-operate might impel the other Arab states to withdraw from the military-political adventure.

One of the first of our objectives was, therefore, to ascertain the British attitude, and I arranged to meet Harold Beeley in a corner of the handsome lounge at

Lake Success. Many people passing to and fro must have wondered at the sight of a prominent anti-Zionist among the Britons conferring at length with a representative of the Jewish Agency, and the press photographers snapped their shutters on the piquant spectacle.

I explained to Beeley that Britain's treatment of the Arabs had been above reproach. It had offered them the Bevin and Morrison plans, which met their demands to a far greater extent than any propounded by the international commissions. The British Government was now able to point to the fact that it had defended the Arab position to the best of its ability, but the Arabs had thrust aside the outstretched hand.

From now on, the British could say, they could only carry out the decisions of the United Nations. If, in fact, it was the British intention only to preserve their relations with the Arabs, as they asserted, and not to engage in acts of hostility against the Jews, then this was the proper time to prove it.

Beeley said that the Arabs saw realities in a different light, and added, in a burst of good humor, that the Foreign Office ought to hire me to explain their line to the Arabs.

I rejoined, in the same vein, that he had better watch out or I might find it easier to do that than explain our case to him.

My talk with Arthur Creech-Jones, who had then just arrived at Lake Success, began on a similar jocular note. He remarked that I seemed to have abandoned Palestine altogether in favor of continent-hopping.

But our conversation soon took a serious turn. The British Colonial Secretary urged us not to be unduly suspicious. He detected a regrettable tendency on our part to read between the lines, instead of accepting things at their face value.

His warning failed to convince me, and I counted off our suspicions and fears one by one, telling him candidly what we thought his Government's intentions to be.

Creech-Jones complained bitterly of these suspicions and repeated the grievance to a number of other people, as I learned later. But even this fact was insufficient to

dispel my fears. And, indeed, subsequent events not only confirmed them, but were far more grave than had been anticipated.

I concluded on a note that, as later transpired, was not unprophetic. "You overestimate the military and political strength of the Arabs, and underestimate the Jewish strength. That's your biggest mistake."

The Ad Hoc Committee continued at its deliberations. Dr. Jorge García-Granados delivered an impassioned *J'Accuse* against the ex-Mufti, Haj Amin, while his colleague Professor Fabregat, of Uruguay, accompanied his moving description of the fate of Jewish children in Europe with a sorrowful appeal to the conscience and sentiment of the world.

Two other friends of the Jews made effective speeches. Jan Masaryk, in a succinct but vigorous contribution, dwelt on the tragic side of Jewish destiny. "I don't know very much about oil pipelines," he declared, "but I know of another pipe through which Jewish blood has been flowing for many long generations."

The Norwegian delegate, speaking eloquently and with deep humane feeling, recounted in simple terms how the leaders of his country had pondered long over the grave Palestine issue, with its many cogent considerations on either side and its tragic conflict between one right and another right, one act of justice and another. Finally he explained why they had chosen to vote for Partition and why he regarded it as the best possible solution in existing circumstances.

These were the first still, small voices of the courageous little nations. The others preferred to remain silent, awaiting a sign from the United States and the Soviet Union of their respective viewpoints. Both the pessimists and the optimists among us were united on one opinion: it would be impossible for us to carry the matter through without big-power help. It was not so much the considerable weight these big powers commanded in the Assembly as that other factors were concerned in a solution that accentuated the influence wielded by them.

The Middle East was one of the sensitive areas as regards strategy, and rich in oil resources. It sprawled

around a vital world crossroads in the frontier region between two great blocs, and, like all frontier zones, was itself a point of conflict between opposing interests. This created a huge void, from the political and strategic vantage-points, in which a medley of varying and contradictory political interests milled around against a background of general instability and confusion.

In this region there were a number of backward semi-feudal states, reactionary in their cultural development; and each of the two big powers was afraid that any step by one of them in the direction of supporting a comprehensive, logical, and just solution of a problem that plagued the entire world might push the Arab states into the arms of its opponent. The U.S.S.R. attitude had a foremost place in American calculations, and vice versa. The question was which of the two would take the first plunge into the boiling waters. We were afraid lest mutual fear might prevent both from giving their blessing to the Partition plan.

The supercharged atmosphere, and the clangor and clash of the stormy political struggle between the two giants on the world scene, tended to confirm the gloomy forecasts of the pessimists and the jeremiads of their many castes.

I dropped in for a moment to listen to the discussions in the Political Committee. The delegates were arguing over the admission of new members to the U.N. Andrei Vishinsky was sharp, clever, aggressive, and pugnacious by turns, his style of oratory reflecting the characteristic mood of the clash of world power. Many members of both blocs took part in the subsequent debate. The silken gloves of polite diplomatic exchanges were off and the niceties of etiquette fashioned by centuries of tradition were forgotten in the high temper of these wordy affrays. It seemed at times that the irascibility went beyond all normal bounds. Epithets and insults flew fast and thick in a manner surely without precedent in peace-time relations.

The spokesmen of both blocs engaged in these all-out verbal duels, in which no oratorical quarter was given to either side, in most committees of the Assembly.

The objective factors operating in American policies at this time were similarly arrayed against us. One of the primary theses of the new American policy was co-ordination with British policy. This criterion had more solid justification in the circumstances reigning in the Middle East than elsewhere. While political hegemony in the Far East, Turkey, Greece, and Iran had passed out of British into American hands, the Middle East remained principally a British sphere of influence; Britain held the position of an experienced suzerain backed by traditional ties and a coherent political interest together with military strength in the region. It was a distinctive British sector of the general Western political front.

Moreover, America's concern for the black gold hidden beneath the rich soil of Arabia's present and potential oilfields did not make the United States particularly anxious to offend the Arab oligarchs. The great oil corporations, jealous of the security of their concessions, pipelines, and bargaining powers over royalty payments, turned on the heat of their powerful lobbying at the State Department to prevent any hasty step that would annoy the Arabs. America's chief overseas investment stake was in oil, and this fact strengthened the oilmen's arguments.

Withal, the psychological hinterlands and forelands of American public opinion had not been prepared for any sort of political action which might be interpreted as co-operation with the Soviet Union.

These impediments to our interest, of principle and psychological unpreparedness, were supplemented by technical and specific difficulties that arose during the review of the Palestine issue and operated against bridging the chasm between America and Russia in our favor.

The Soviet Union, too, faced a number of secondary problems of its own. It wanted to shift the question of implementation, and the center of political gravity generally, to the Security Council, where its relative power —both in the number of supporting votes and in the right of veto—was much greater. The United States, on the other hand, desired the opposite: it bent its whole

effort toward broadening the powers of the General Assembly and its committees.

The difference over this issue would come to the fore when the problem of implementation was raised before the Assembly. This question had become manifoldly difficult owing to British refusal to undertake the enforcement of any plan not based on mutual Jewish-Arab consent. The only alternative to British enforcement was United Nations enforcement, but this would predicate close Soviet-American co-operation, at least on this score; and it was evident that any attempt to base political plans on American-Russian co-operation was a mere illusion. In this our case was no exception. But it was the only course left to us; and, in contrast to these negative elements, there was a more positive set of factors operating in the United States to which we had recourse.

IN THE SCALES

(39)

American public opinion has a long pro-Zionist tradition, and the American press served as a loyal medium of expression of these feelings. The pioneering character and originality of the Jewish enterprise in Palestine, and its dynamic force, resembled the early periods of American history. The numerous close parallels between Jewish and American colonization, and the Jewish struggle for independence and the American colonial war against the British which led to the establishment of the Union, were too vivid to pass unnoticed.

The Jewish case was especially supported by liberal and progressive opinion, which was grieved by Jewish suffering and rebelled against the anti-Semitic and reactionary tendencies of the anti-Zionist groups.

The liberal daily and weekly press in the United States launched a wide campaign in favor of the Partition scheme. Bartley Crum and other liberals, who had done a great deal for the Zionist cause, were joined by such persons as Sumner Welles, a former Under Secretary of

State, a highly respected personage of great influence, and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the late President and a member of the U.S. delegation at Lake Success, who openly advocated the creation of a Jewish state.

Practical and humanitarian considerations also exercised their weight, especially on President Truman. The outcry of the Jewish camp inmates demanding transfer to Eretz Israel, coupled with the fact that the large majority of an objective inquiry committee had recommended Partition as a constructive solution to a problem that seemed irremediable, were grounds which could not be easily ignored.

But one potent factor, which excelled all others operating on our behalf, was the strong action and pressure exerted by American Jewry. This great community, from the Zionists to the American Jewish Committee led by Judge Joseph Proskauer of New York, rallied massively to help in the political struggle waged by the Jewish Agency representatives at Lake Success.

American Jewish influence, despite the shallow estimation of it that is current, is not derived from the strength of "the Jewish vote" in the key zones of America's political system. The intellectual, cultural, economic, and social power of the great community in the United States reaches through many sectors of life, and once it throws full weight behind any movement, its force and effect are inestimable.

On this occasion American Jewry flung itself into the thick of the fray with an enthusiasm and dedication which had no parallel or standard of comparison in all past experience. The whole of the community, from coast to coast, was aflame with the zeal and ardor of the battle; its heart beat in unison with ours through each rise and fall in the political temperature at Lake Success. Solicitous inquiries, suggestions and advice, sage or naïve if well-meant counsel were showered upon us. The tension and concern in all classes and walks of life reached an unimaginable pitch. Everyone was eager to help.

My wife and I on one occasion, while dining in a Seventh Avenue restaurant, were conversing in Hebrew. We saw to our surprise that the waiter at our table was

edging away and throwing us clearly hostile glances. We did not know the cause and went on chatting.

Finally the waiter approached and asked in an unfriendly voice: "What sort of a language are you talking here?"

"Hebrew," I replied, astonished at the odd question.

A look of remorse and shame settled on his face. He clutched his head and cried in Yiddish: "Oh, what a fool and ignoramus I am! I thought it was Arabic."

I understood the reason for his strange behavior. It typified, in fact, the feelings of a third of the populace in this vast, unique metropolis. Waiters, cabbies, store-keepers, businessmen, members of the liberal professions —the whole of the largest Jewish cosmopolis on earth was lit by the blaze of Jewish solidarity and nationalist fervor.

There were a few solitary voices of dissonance in the great and wonderful choir of unity, including the negligible group led by Lessing Rosenwald, that persistent assimilationist. But these were isolated, among the few exceptions that proved the general rule.

Two men stood out in the American delegation at the Assembly. They were Herschel Johnson, the chief delegate, and General John Hilldring, its adviser. Johnson was an experienced diplomat, sharp-witted and hard-hitting, though he concealed his pugnacity behind a façade of smooth diplomatic courtesy. He led the delegation with ability and tact, and his shrewdness steered it around the many snares and pitfalls bestrewing the path.

At first he was disinclined generally to take on the job of handling the Palestine question, with which, and the Jewish problem, he was wholly unfamiliar. He regarded the Partition plan as surrender to internal political pressure. But the deeper he went into it, as part of his duties, and the more he absorbed the details and ramifications in his keen mind, the more zealous he became in the prosecution. An intellectual and spiritual change evolved in him, and little by little he turned into a stout friend of the people and the cause for which they were fighting. He deemed our case to be a just one; and he no longer lagged behind the sympathies of the State Department,

but rode ahead, doing his best to help us and even favorably influencing the State Department's attitude.

General Hildring, who had formerly served in the American administrative service in Germany and had seen the results of the Nazi atrocities in the sufferings and plight of the Jewish survivors, was a tower of strength from the outset. He was the moving spirit in the American delegation for a firmer and more active line. He expressed his views with the vigor and integrity of a professional soldier, and his boldness in reaching clear-cut, firm decisions and formulas helped more than once to find a way out of complicated and ambiguous situations. As information link with the Jewish representatives, he met us frequently, and invariably displayed candor, courage, clear and honest judgment, a faculty for quick decision, and a loathing for customary diplomatic double-talk.

Facing the American giant was another giant of sphinx-like inscrutability. All were expectantly waiting to hear from the Soviet colossus and its satellites.

Our information of what was taking place within the Eastern bloc was scant and nebulous. My conversation with Vladimir Simic, who revealed the Slav bloc's negative attitude to the minority report, had been a bombshell, as I said earlier, when I retailed its gist to an Agency Executive meeting.

But it raised only one corner of the veil shrouding the Soviets' intentions, the full revelation of which we nervously anticipated. At the previous session of the General Assembly, Andrei Gromyko had caused a sensation with his famous speech advocating the partitioning of Palestine if no agreed federal solution was reached. But in the meantime Yugoslavia, an ally of the Soviets, had favored the minority report, and we wondered whether this might not be a portent of the Soviet attitude.

We essayed a forecast of the Soviet plans in the light of its probable calculations. First, the sole prospect of getting the British forces out of Palestine was the execution of Partition. Secondly, a reactionary and feudal regime was common to the Arab states. Thirdly, there was also the likelihood of the Soviet Union's desire to be co-

operative with other powers on at least one question of second-class importance.

But these were surmises and conjectures alone, and we had no way of knowing how closely or otherwise they equated with the true Soviet position.

Rumors had reached us of the Soviets' interpretation of their attitude to the merits of the Jewish problem in so far as it was linked with Palestine. According to these rumors, the Yugoslavs had tried at the Slav caucus to enlist support of their federative proposal. Andrei Vishinsky rose and said they were ignoring one vitally important fact in their reckonings—the Jewish problem.

"The Jews," he is reported to have said, "were the victims of Hitler's campaign of extermination in the Second World War, and they lost six million souls. An ocean of Jewish blood was spilled. Their sufferings, terrible enough for many generations, have now reached their height and the Jews are entitled to a home and independent political existence." The statement, made at a secret meeting of the Eastern bloc, reached us by a roundabout route, and we could only wonder how true it was.

But it was confirmed one evening from an unexpected quarter. With some colleagues, I had been invited to a function at one of the Slav embassies, and sat next to a leading statesman of that country. We started talking about Zionism, and he told me frankly of his opposition to Zionism as a matter of principle. He had been a disciple of Jewish Communists who warned him it was a bourgeois and reactionary movement.

In replying, I used the same arguments almost in the very same words that rumor had credited to Vishinsky.

My astounded companion interrupted me in an outburst of spontaneous surprise: "Why, I heard that very statement from Monsieur Vishinsky himself at one of our private meetings recently!"

Needless to say, I hastened to convey the encouraging confirmation to my associates.

We also read a symptom of Soviet Russia's intentions, before they were made known, in the clear support given by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Events were to show

that our surmise was not based upon sheer optimism.

Poland was one of the countries that loyally upheld our cause, as an earnest of the desire to atone for the wicked treatment of the Jews on Polish soil. This had been publicly announced by the Polish Foreign Minister, and was reflected in the sympathetic conduct of Ksawery Pruszynski, who was elected chairman of the committee set up by the General Assembly to work out details of the Partition plan.

Czechoslovakia's support had been promised in the eloquent address by its Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk.

The Asiatic bloc was solidly and unitedly negative. The fact of our complete isolation on this continent, into whose life we aspired to become integrated, pained me especially, and I anxiously followed the attempts to overcome the perverse situation. China changed its mind three times and ultimately abstained. It was strongly influenced by its tussle with India to gain leadership of the Asiatic bloc, and in spite of abstention remained among our adversaries. The Philippine delegation changed twice. India voted against us at the directions of the New Delhi Government, contrary to the wishes of its delegates.

Would we be able to interweave our existence in the weft of the life of Asia? This question, which I had encountered more than once in my political work, arose again at Lake Success and continued to disturb the minds of those shaping Zionist external policy until (and after) the State of Israel was established.

The Latin bloc's attitude was particularly important. The Central and South American republics comprised one third of U.N.O.'s membership and thus had considerable weight. Our energetic efforts among them were appreciably successful. The member of our delegation directing these efforts was Moshe Tov, of Argentina, who was in charge of political work in the Latin-American countries.

There were several contributory factors assisting us in this field. First and foremost was the sympathy of these young states for our pioneering efforts, and the influence of their Jewish communities. But against these were ranged equally weighty elements. The preponderant in-

fluence of the Vatican in the Latin-American republics was thrown against us, and the British developed wide anti-Zionist propaganda. One of the British delegation who spoke Spanish and knew Latin America well devoted the whole of his time and energy to this work alone, and the large Arab communities there spared no effort to sway their governments.

Moshe Tov, who was unflagging in his activity, employed all the means at his disposal to persuade and convince. Explanations, cajolings, pressure, and use of pull—all these he operated with skill and success. He was glued to the telephone day and night, speaking with the capitals of the Latin-American republics, and his emissaries sped to every part of the continent.

The political lobbying went on behind the scenes as the forces gathered for the decisive struggle. Day after day the cars sped us out along the broad white highway beyond the Triborough Bridge, from which a marvelous vista of the skyscraper city was to be had; past the pleasant suburbs, parks and copses and woodlands. Day after day we walked along the bewildering maze of corridors and halls, meeting-rooms and lounge, breathing in the filtered air of the efficient conditioning plant; hopeful, worried, expectant, anxious, alternating between dread and anticipation.

Those corridors and halls were for many weeks the focal point of our lives, thoughts, and feelings. We strolled, talked, yearned, hoped, and wondered in them. Each tried to draw sustenance and strength from his fellow so as to stand firm in the days of testing.

the BIG POWERS (40) PRONOUNCE JUDGMENT

At long last, after days of expectancy and suspense, the United States of America and the Soviet Union made their intentions public.

The contents of the American declaration had been known to us on October 11, 1947, about two days before publication. But the details of the Soviet statement were told to Moshe Shertok by Andrei Gromyko only a few hours before it was read out on October 13. Both documents supported the Partition idea in principle, both were reserved and cautious, and both sounded somewhat ambiguous to us on a number of vital points.

Although Dr. Herbert F. Evatt, the gifted Australian Minister for External Affairs, handled the sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee (of which he was chairman) with great talent and energy, it had soon come home to us that little was to be gained from rhetorical debate.

The Swedish-American motion, designed to prepare the way for a practical discussion of the Partition solution, was not accepted. The battle between the supporters and opponents of Partition raged around this proposal.

Its supporters and Zionist sympathizers favored the selection of a single committee with definite terms of reference to draw up the details of the Partition plan. They were also ready to make some concessions in return for the new committee being thoroughly representative of the whole United Nations. In the opposition, the Arabs and their friends sought two committees, one to discuss the Partition plan and the second to consider another solution of their own devising.

We put up a strong fight against this proposal, which would place the Arab plan on equal footing with the UNSCOP plan, and insisted on a single committee representing the Assembly, excluding the sworn unyielding enemies of Partition.

The first important vote in the Ad Hoc Committee resulted in our defeat, and the Arab motion was adopted. But it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good; we were now able to sway the composition of the committee. As it was now to be a body confined to disciples of Partition, only unconditional supporters were named. Even the various undecided countries and neutrals were omitted, including France, whose abstention we regretted.

The committee was made up of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, Soviet Russia, South Africa, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The salient advantage, in our view, was the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The second committee consisted of representatives of Moslem countries—that is, Arab League states—Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, and in addition Gonzalez Fernandez, Colombian representative, as chairman. He showed open hostility toward us during the discussions.

Although at the time we felt the two-committee resolution to be a defeat, it was in fact a move that turned in our favor.

Many nations regarded the Partition plan as a “Jewish” plan and tried to forge a compromise with the Arab plan. The San Salvador delegate was a vigorous proponent of this line, arguing that the United Nations Organization was based on the ideal of compromise and conciliation, and not on a system of coercion and dictation from above. Many of the hesitating countries joined him, and total defeat for the Assembly and ourselves was averted solely by Dr. Evatt’s wise and energetic handling.

A deadlock meant *status quo*; and that meant perpetuation of the White Paper policy. Time was against us. Our solitary hope lay in a quick, firm decision.

It was difficult in these circumstances to gain improvements in the UNSCOP plan, without which the question of frontiers would remain unsatisfactory. If, as we dreaded, neutral elements were brought into the committee, an attempt would undoubtedly be made to water down the plan by offering substantial sops to Arab demands, producing a vague and equivocal formula regarding constitutional structure, frontiers, and enforcement. A hybrid of this sort would make no difference to the Arab position and would be rejected by ourselves. The end result: deadlock again.

The establishment of a committee with clearly defined powers and purposes, therefore, was the best guarantee of a vigorous effort to reach a solution acceptable to at least one of the parties. The assumed defeat was thus actually a sheet-anchor of salvation. It widened the gulf

between protagonists and antagonists of Partition and reduced the danger of compromise.

On the other hand, the very fact that the proposal we supported had suffered defeat, even if only on procedural grounds, revealed our vulnerable position as well as the difficulty of our mission and the seeming hopelessness of achieving it.

But the composition of the subcommittee to formulate the Partition details was an encouraging omen. The chairman, Ksawery Pruszynski, of Poland, conducted the proceedings with the aim of bringing about the creation of a Jewish state. He was a Polish prince, an aristocrat who went Left and supported the new regime, but was not a Communist. As a Polish patriot, he believed this to be the only course for his country and pursued it consistently and undeviatingly. Pruszynski was also a versatile writer and publicist, had visited Palestine several times, and had written a friendly and sympathetic book on Jewish upbuilding there. He was keenly aware of all that other nations had done to us, including the Poles, and he maintained ties of strong friendship with us.

The other outstanding members of the committee were the representatives of the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, and the Latin Americans, particularly Dr. Granados and Professor Fabregat.

There were no differences of opinion visible in the other committee. The Colombian chairman, who felt himself to be in a somewhat invidious position, resigned a few days later, and it remained an entirely Moslem committee, devoid of any semblance of objectivity. It completed its work quickly and conjured up a detailed scheme for an Arab state with a Jewish minority.

The only question over which differences arose in the Arab-Moslem subcommittee was the degree of minority rights to be given to the existing Jewish population, and what degree of recognition to confer on the Jews who had settled in Palestine since the Balfour Declaration. The extremist wing of the Arab states, which preponderated on the committee, prevailed on this issue over Zafrullah Khan, of Pakistan, and the formulas prescribed

were in uncompromising terms or, in the most charitable interpretation, couched equivocally. These facts deprived their report of its remaining value, and its political importance was nil.

Meanwhile, the proceedings in the first or, as it was named, the Partition Subcommittee went rapidly. The public meetings were at first suspended, contrary to the desires of the Russians, who regarded public discussion a fundamental prerequisite in the U.N., and the committee met in camera, but after a few closed sessions the open ones were resumed.

The topics reviewed came under three heads: Frontiers, Implementation, and Economic Union. Serious difficulties and differences cropped up in each. We had been allowed to attend the meetings and proffer comment and opinions on each point. The opportunity was utilized to the full, and Moshe Shertok displayed his gifts for able argument, thorough knowledge of the material, political sagacity, and polemical skill on the many occasions he spoke at each session.

After one of his addresses, General Hilldring remarked: "Shertok could sell ice to the Eskimos."

Occupied though we were in an arduous and intricate discussion, we nevertheless felt a thrill of peculiar pride in being able to prosecute the highly responsible task. It was the first time Jews were able to reappear on the stage of history as delegates of a recognized independent Jewish interest, after having had for countless years to rely on others in the absence of sovereign attributes—a much longer period than was known in the history of any other people. It was the first time, too, since the loss of national autonomy, that the Jews entered the arena of international policies on their own recognizances, not as dependents of others, to take part in determining their future as a nation.

The question of frontiers started off the discussions. UNSCOP's proposed map aroused many dissentient views, and Zafrullah Khan's statement in the Ad Hoc Committee that this was "the craziest and most absurd carpet ever suggested" was vivid in many minds. It did, indeed, look like a patchwork quilt, and the "kissing

points," the junctions of the "corridors," came in for critical comment as a highly doubtful device.

To be fair, this had been a map that Dr. Paul Mohn drew up as an adjustment between Dr. Salazar's and Justice Rand's ideas and between my suggestions and those of Donald MacGillivray, whose indifference to the question of the Negev brought about its proposed incorporation in the Jewish state just as his negative attitude caused western Galilee to be excluded from its boundaries. To sum up, the whole thing was a real mess, and the more the new committee went into it, the thornier the differences.

Several of the countries supporting Partition in principle wanted to compensate the Arabs and were inclined to amend the map in their favor. We, for our part, stood out for amendments we regarded as indispensable to us. We reiterated the fact that from the Arab standpoint the problem of area was unimportant; it was the principle they opposed. We cited their own statements in the Ad Hoc Committee to bear this out.

The countries favoring amendment argued that they wished to reduce the Arab minority in a Jewish state. To this we again retorted that curtailing the outer edges would not substantially affect the numerical strengths, because, owing to Jewish immigration, the Arabs, like the Jews, had concentrated in the coastal plain.

The first bone of contention was Safad. The U.S. State Department wanted it excluded from a Jewish state. Shertok dwelt on Safad's vital importance to the Jews and based his suit on Jewish tradition and history.

"Two of the four cities sacred to Jews, Jerusalem and Hebron, have been denied to us, and now we're being asked to forgo the two others, Safad and Tiberias," he exclaimed.

He adduced proofs from the history of Israel also during the discussion on Galilee itself. Considerations of security, development, and settlement reinforced those claims. "The Peel Commission," Shertok declared, "proposed that Galilee be allocated to the Jews. Its severance from the territory of the state, or even the severance of western Galilee alone, is like thrusting a dangerous wedge

into the body of the state and throwing our frontier open to a Syrian-Lebanese attack."

But these arguments were of no avail. The American delegation had received clear and specific instructions from the State Department at Washington, and though our contentions sometimes convinced the American delegates, they had no effect on the attitude in Washington, from which the express directives continued to flow. The State Department agreed to concede on one point, and General Hildring, whom I met by chance in one of the corridors, informed me of its assent to the inclusion of Safad in the Jewish state. It was an encouraging piece of news, which we regarded as a good augury.

As a matter of fact, we had our way many times from then onward. We obtained the Beit Natufa plain (in Galilee) and important corrections of the lines in lower Galilee and the Vale of Beisan. When Beisan was being discussed, someone mentioned that the Peel Commission had awarded it to the Arabs. But the settlement map we exhibited, which clearly testified to our achievements in the area, turned the scales with practically no discussion.

The improvements in the Gilboa region of the Plain of Esdraelon were of particular strategic significance, since they gave us a series of strong-points along the upper ridges of the mountain range.

the FRONTIERS OF (41) THE STATE

Consideration of the frontiers had been assigned in part to a special subcommittee, on which M. Pruszynski, Professor Fabregat, and Dr. Mohn represented the full subcommittee, and Moshe Shertok, Zalman Lifschitz (Liff), and I appeared for the Jewish Agency. The late Zalman Liff was a grand soul and a gifted authority on land questions and maps. He discharged a function of tremendous importance in the struggle at Lake Success.

Professor Fabregat had acquired considerable knowledge of frontier questions, and Dr. Mohn knew every settlement and obscure village, the area of its lands, its boundaries, and the number of its inhabitants—an amazing performance.

Prolonged discussions occurred between Mohn and MacGillivray on the one side, and Zalman Liff and me on the other. They resulted in the amendment and shaping of the frontiers of the Jewish state. We had the upper hand on most occasions, mainly owing to the advantage of knowing the merits and the historical, demographical, economic, and geographical background in each instance. Zalman Liff had a remarkable knowledge of the country as a whole—it was almost uncanny—and played a major role in this connection. Our advantage of knowledge and skill in argument were also to the forefront in the Partition subcommittee.

In spite of all the obstacles, we secured improvements in the frontiers of Samaria and the Dead Sea region. M. A. Novomeysky was helpful in pressing for the enlargement of the latter area for the needs of the potash works. Masada, the ancient fortress near En-Gedi, was included in the Jewish state because of its historical and national value.

Simha Blass, the Jewish Agency irrigation engineer, turned up unexpectedly in New York, bringing instructions from David Ben-Gurion to alter the position of the corridor junctions in order to fit in with our irrigation schemes. It was a formidable task, but Blass, with his remarkable energy and almost brutal vigor, succeeded in convincing Mohn, who at first refused to enter into the question at all, to change his attitude and the location of the "kissing corners" at one and the same time.

A sharp tussle broke out over Lydda Airport. We explained its considerable importance to us, and showed clearly, with the help of statistics, that most of its passengers and virtually all its cargo were Jewish. "Lydda stands in the same relationship to Tel Aviv as La Guardia Airport does to New York," ran our argument, which was supported, like so many others, by Semyon Zarapkin, of Russia.

During the discussion, someone remarked sarcastically that the Arabs might need Lydda Airport as a suitable landing-place for the "magic carpet" out of the *Thousand and One Nights*. I was reminded of the witticism over two years later when the first of the aircraft began to reach Lydda with Yemenite Jewish immigrants in Operation "Magic Carpet." It was an unexpected fulfillment of the ironic jest.

One morning, as we were deep in argument at Lake Success over the frontiers, I was called to the telephone. "Mr. Hamseh of Jerusalem is calling you," the secretary said.

I was puzzled, not only at getting a direct call from Jerusalem to the U.N. headquarters on Long Island, but also by the peculiar name of the person at the other end. I racked my brains to think of a Mr. Hamseh without success.

Picking up the receiver, I expected to hear the New York operator putting me through and said, in English: "This is Horowitz speaking."

To my surprise, a faint voice came through in Hebrew: "Dolek, is that you?" Then: "We are speaking from Maaleh Ha'Hamisha. The representatives of Kiryat Anavim, Maaleh Ha'Hamisha, and Neveh Ilan are meeting here, and we want you to do the best you can to include us at least in the international zone of Jerusalem. It's a matter of life and death to us, and you must do this."

I was almost overcome in listening to the distant voice of friends. It was a most moving experience in that atmosphere of isolation from home. But I knew that I had no encouraging reassurance for them in my briefcase and I answered in a broken voice: "We're doing the best we can, but there's very little hope."

I could feel and shared the pain of their bitter disappointment.

The most difficult debate was over the fate of the Negev. Instructions to the U.S. delegation were to fight for exclusion of the Negev, or at least most of it, including Elath (Aqaba), from the area of the Jewish state.

But we, too, adopted a staunch position. We based our argument on the fact that UNSCOP had allotted the region to us after a thorough examination and discussion. It was a most logical decision, as the Arab minority here was negligible. The largely uninhabited, derelict territory could be developed only by means of bold and comprehensive irrigation schemes, which we alone were ready and able to undertake. Handing over the Negev to the Arabs, we declared, meant abandoning it to eternal neglect and desolation. Only the Jews, who were prepared to invest their full energies and resources in the Negev with no commercial intent, could redeem the vast arid expanse and uncover the buried mineral deposits.

The Gulf of Elath was similarly a vital necessity. It freed us from dependence on Egypt, and when developed and made a port, it would serve us as a gateway to India and the whole of Asia.

The Americans countered that every change made on the Partition map hitherto had been to Jewish advantage. The elimination of the Negev from the Jewish state was a reasonable compensation to the Arabs. They pointed out that the Negev was a bridge between Egypt and the other Arab states.

During talks with Ernest Bevin and Arthur Creech-Jones in February 1947, the former said: "The Negev is outside the sphere of Jewish or Arab interests and we had better not deal with it."

Now that the Negev issue had come up again, J. M. Martin, the British observer, asked for permission to speak. "It is true that Great Britain is taking no part in this discussion," he said, "but I deem it my duty to bring all the objective information at our disposal to the committee's knowledge. I desire, therefore, to read out excerpts from a report by a British scientific expedition which explored the Negev."

The report, which he read out with slowly measured emphasis, began with these words: "The landscape of the Negev resembles the landscape of the Moon." It went on to give a most gloomy picture of the desolation, neglect, and barren wilderness, strewn with naked rock and

waterless, having no vegetation, settlement, or living inhabitant. The description was a melancholy and alarming one, yet its truth was difficult to controvert. Any-one knowing the southern Negev region could not easily deny the depressing recital presented so graphically in the British report.

When it was evident that we could not hope to get the whole Negev, we decided to conform somewhat to the American attitude and waive that part which was not vital to us. We proposed an Arab enclave running from the southern coastal strip around Gaza, allotted to the Arabs by UNSCOP, and across the Negev along the Egyptian frontier. The American delegation decided to ask Washington for instructions.

Meantime the Truman-Weizmann interview we had long awaited now took place. Dr. Weizmann raised the Negev issue in the conversation, and recounted one by one the considerations in favor of its inclusion in the Jewish state. He was helped by a map over which the President and he pored. His plea convinced the President, who promised Dr. Weizmann to take action in the spirit of their talk.

But the deadline for the American reply on the basis of State Department directives had been fixed for the morrow of Dr. Weizmann's interview at the White House. The session was called for three o'clock. I arrived at Lake Success a quarter of an hour before. One of the American delegates accosted me and asked where he could find Moshe Shertok. I said he had not yet arrived.

A moment or so later, another member of the delegation asked me the same question. The urgency aroused my suspicions and I sought out General Hilldring to ascertain what had happened. The general told me, in some confusion, that the reply on the Negev was a negative one. I at once realized that the President's instructions had not come through the channels and that it was necessary to gain time at all costs lest the official reply, once given, could not be retracted.

Shertok arrived at ten minutes of three, after I had waited for him a few moments at the outer gate. We

went into an adjoining room to confer. At three o'clock, when we came out, one of the American delegates accosted him and asked him to come to the delegates' lounge, where Herschel Johnson was waiting.

Shertok left me and I sat down a short distance away, watching the expression on his pallid face in an effort to follow the course of the conversation.

He told me later that he felt like a mouse between a cat's paws in those few moments. Johnson began the conversation with the customary polite phrases, while Shertok was on tenterhooks to know the worst. But the diplomatic preliminaries did not take long and Johnson went on to speak about the Negev.

Suddenly he was called to the telephone, but refused to break off. One of the younger aides on the delegation leaned close and whispered three words in his ear: "The President, sir."

Johnson rose quickly and went into a telephone booth. He remained inside twenty minutes.

When he emerged, he was surrounded by a group of fellow delegates and aides and had a brisk conversation with them. But then he realized that Shertok, who was excited and upset, was waiting for him to resume.

He went over to him and said: "What I really wanted to say to you, Mr. Shertok, was that there is nothing new in this matter."

We sighed with relief.

Dr. Weizmann's talk had been successful. The Negev was saved. The struggle for the frontiers ended in victory.



Our political work was not restricted to the precincts of U.N. headquarters. Most of it was done at meetings with other delegations outside the assembly rooms at Lake Success. Those of primary importance, of course, were our talks with the American and Soviet representatives.

Our first encounter with the Soviet delegation took place at the Consulate-General of the U.S.S.R. in New

York. When Shertok, Eliahu Epstein (Elath), and I appeared on the doorstep of the building at the appointed time, a trifle wrought up and on our mettle, we were being expected and were conducted down a corridor—on one wall of which hung a huge portrait of Stalin—to the second floor. There were two likenesses of Lenin and Stalin on the walls of the large chamber into which we were ushered.

The Soviet representatives, Semyon Zarapkin, and his assistant, Professor Boris Stein, awaited us near a small table.

Semyon Zarapkin was a young Russian, with dark hair and eyes, with a quick understanding, a concentrated manner of thought and speech, and an ironclad logic. He spoke Russian with us, though he knew English.

Boris Stein, an elderly Jew, scientist and veteran Bolshevik, was completely divorced from Jewish life, but still remembered his boyhood days in the Jewish faith. He was a wise and shrewd man of broad mental horizons. The fact that he belonged to the older generation was somewhat apparent, in contrast to Zarapkin, who was of the revolutionary epoch.

They undertook the examination of our case with characteristic thoroughness, inquiring into every detail, every fragment of the broad tapestry of the problem. They were interested in the questions of Jerusalem, frontiers, enforcement of a solution, economic union, our administrative capacities and military strength. Their questions were courteous and put in friendly tones, but none the less incisive and penetrating.

"Are you able to take administrative control of the country's life when the State is established?

"Have you sufficient military strength to ward off a possible attack?

"How do you envisage the enforcement of a Partition decision?"

These and similar questions were put to us at every meeting. They always did the questioning and we replied. They preferred to demonstrate their replies by action, and this was made manifest in their obstinate es-

pousal of our cause at every stage and in every sector of the U.N. deliberations.

We devoted one of our meetings to a comprehensive review of the Jerusalem issue. Moshe Shertok described the layout of the city, explained the difference between the walled old city and the new town, and presented our demand for complete Jewish authority over the latter.

Zarapkin of a sudden interrupted him and asked for an explanation of the Russian term for the Western Wall —rendered as "Wailing Wall." But it was his colleague, Boris Stein, who answered, telling him of the Jewish worshippers who there lamented the loss of their independence and the destruction of their Temple.

The general atmosphere of these talks was friendly, and the Soviet envoys showed keen sympathy and understanding of our efforts and interests.

On one occasion Zarapkin got up and went out of the room for a few moments and returned with a bottle of wine and some glasses. It was at the outset of the U.N. discussions and the future was still beclouded. Consequently we were inwardly elated and delighted when Zarapkin filled the five glasses and, raising his own, gave the toast: "The future Jewish State!"

We responded by raising our glasses to the Soviet Union, and felt the episode to be a part of the unique evolution of the historic hour.

Shertok retailed the incident at an Agency Executive meeting the same evening and added: "What's happened to us in connection with the Soviet Union is a real miracle." These words succinctly expressed the universal astonishment at the remarkable change in the Soviet attitude after many years of unflagging opposition to Zionism.

The unremitting aid that Zarapkin and Stein gave our cause, and their sharp, direct logic, played an important part in the long series of gains we made and in the sum total of our triumph.



At the same time we maintained close and cordial relations with the Americans. We often went straight

from the U.S. delegation's offices in Park Avenue to the Soviet Consulate, or vice versa. We conferred with the Americans on various matters and tried to reach common ground with them on the question of frontiers.

Our general aim was to avoid forcing our attitudes on them by means of a majority vote among the countries supporting us. We wanted to achieve an agreed line, a prior condition to the full support of the General Assembly, without which there was no prospect of winning a two-thirds majority.

The slow evolution of the wise, intelligent, and experienced delegation chief, Herschel Johnson, toward identification with our position eventually turned the scales. Once his innate tact, diplomatic skill, and faculty of deft formulation were fused with his growing personal recognition of the higher purposes of his mission, many of the obstacles bedeviling us were quickly removed.

We explained our position forcefully, yet in the friendliest terms, during our calls at the U.S. delegation offices on Park Avenue. The form of organization required to implement Partition caused us no little worry. We knew the Russians would insist on transferring ultimate authority over enforcement to the Security Council, whereas the Americans preferred to leave it with the Assembly or one of its committees.

We drew the attention of the Americans to the snag. But they brought up an important point against vesting authority in the Security Council by indicating its current membership. Indeed, most members were opponents of Partition or "neutrals." Britain, China, Colombia, and Syria were opposed, Belgium and France were irresolute. Under these circumstances, it would be enough for the Council to remain passive to nullify any resolution the General Assembly adopted.

General Hildring, however, went beyond the official attitude of his delegation and said reassuringly, "But don't worry! We won't allow the difference between ourselves and the Russians to upset matters and prejudice the solution." He dropped a delicate hint of a possible compromise on the basis of a division of powers. And, in fact, that was the way it eventually worked out.

Our general rule in conferring with the delegates of the two great powers was to be entirely honest. We told the Americans that we were meeting the Russians, and the Russians of our conferences with the Americans, without holding back anything. As we had no physical force to help us in the event of a deadlock, the least we could do was to maintain moral balance. Even had we wished, we could not have woven a mesh of conspiracy or played the game of secret diplomacy as though we were a great power.

We told both the Americans and the Russians that our sole criterion was the Jewish interest. We did not put on borrowed plumage, but told the representatives of both governments that we sought whatever aid we could muster for our undertaking and the solution of our problem, and we should welcome any such aid from whatever quarter it came.

This frank attitude won the appreciation of both sides, and they regarded us as convenient channels on this question, the only one in the international sphere on which at least partial agreement was ever reached. The Americans would often say: "Perhaps you'll talk the matter over with your friends the Russians"; on the other side, the Soviet envoys would encourage us by remarking: "It's worth while your getting the support of your friends the Americans for this action."

So we became a kind of bridge or point of contact, virtually the only one, between the two world giants. The fact aided us throughout the deliberations. As an outcome of it, we were not suspected of indulging in dubious tactics. Both sides fully appreciated the fact that we were not trying to deceive them, and that we were not serving as the mouthpiece of any interest save the redemption of our people and the establishment of the Jewish state. That was why they had confidence in us.

Sometimes, in that atmosphere of cold war which had so lately begun, we felt like tightrope walkers teetering over a deep chasm; and it is likely that of all the crucial tests we successfully endured, that one was the most critical.

YUGOSLAVIA'S ATTITUDE (42)

Jn addition to our contacts with the big powers, we kept in touch with the smaller states through the rubric of our relations and meetings outside the committee chambers at Lake Success.

Relations with Yugoslavia had an odd character. Its attitude was compounded of friendly and keen sympathy for the Jewish people, its enterprise in Palestine, and our delegation, and a series of checks and restraints the origin of which lay in the Belgrade Government's regard for its Moslem minority, relations with the Middle East countries including the Arabs, and opposition in principle to partition on the basis of nationalities. A morsel of doctrinalism, minimizing the value of the new Jewish nationalism, was not missing from the mixture.

But it was because of these checks that the Yugoslavs tried the more to display their friendship and sympathy for us as a nation and groups of persons representing a pioneering project.

At a banquet given in the Yugoslav Consulate in New York, attended by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister and his deputy, I sat next the latter, Alec Bebler, a brilliant diplomat. Bebler, an old-style Communist, of good education, was a linguist who commanded English, French, and German in addition to his own native tongue, Serbo-Croat. He was versed in social sciences and Marxist literature.

His questions were characteristic: "International capital is the principal financing agency for your enterprise. Does that not mean you are dependent on Wall Street? Aren't you sacrificing your economy to international concessions?" He seemed concerned lest we should become a beachhead for foreign imperialisms in that part of the world.

I told him something of the nature of our efforts and movement, the economic and social structure of the Yishuv, and its problems and achievements. I used

the terminology of dialectical analysis, and felt it was the first time Bebler was being told about Zionism in language he understood.

Our conversation lasted several hours and we struck up a cordial friendship. Nevertheless, he admitted that while this was the first time the Zionist problem had been presented to him in the light of dialectical thought, his position and that of his associates continued to remain unchanged—that is, undefined.

My talks with Vladimir Simic brought us closer. I gave him an account of my interview with Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League, in London. This effort on our part to secure incorporation of our state in the Middle East framework, which the Arabs rejected, made a deep impression on Simic. (And not on Simic alone. The account of that episode served as a convincing ground in our meetings and talks with various delegations. We were free to relate it, since we had undertaken only to withhold it from printed publication, and Azzam Pasha himself reported on the conversation in detail at an Arab League conference held in Bloudan, Lebanon.)

Contact with the Yugoslavs and efforts to influence their attitude went on until the day the U.N. vote was taken. In one of my talks with Bebler, in a corridor of the U.N. building, I remarked on the fact that among the Latin-American countries all those having relations with General Franco opposed us, whereas the anti-Fascists supported us.

"Then we're in bad company," Bebler rejoined meditatively. I felt that mention of the unfortunate circumstance had given him something to ponder.

The Dutch, with whom we also had consultations at the time to enlighten them on our attitude, differed radically from the Yugoslavs. They were realistic, practical, and absorbed with economic problems. They regarded the question of absorptive capacity as a test of our capacity to solve, at least partially, the more urgent aspects of the Jewish problem. We explained the elasticity of the term "economic absorption" by illustrating the experience of their own country, with a population

of eight million compressed into a relatively restricted area. We touched on their sea reclamation schemes and systems of dikes, and said: "We propose to conquer the wilderness in the same way you conquered the ocean."

From the political perspective, the Dutch had doubts and difficulties of their own. They, too, ruled a large Moslem population in the East Indies, and their external policy was to a large extent parallel with Britain's. In addition, they were exercised over the problems of implementation and Jerusalem. The delegation head, a young man named Stassen, who had a Dutch father and an Italian mother, showed great sympathy toward us, but he had to grapple with many obstacles in which the vital interests of his country were involved.

After their conversation with Aubrey Eban and me, the Netherlands delegates were invited to meet Dr. Weizmann, who reviewed our standpoint for their benefit.

These talks showed us that while we could rely on them to vote for Partition, which they too regarded as the only possible solution, we could not expect any particular activity on their part in the political campaigning preceding the vote.

Dr. Weizmann played a leading part in our contact with the delegations. His political eminence and personal charm often worked wonders. His appearances at Lake Success, where he met the foremost figures at the United Nations, and the visits of the various delegations at his hotel in New York, had a considerable effect on developments. His radiant personality, wisdom, innate moral pathos, and profound humanism, and the absence of any pretense and dissembling, stamped him as the truest symbol of a harassed, tormented people and as the champion of a great humanitarian project.

We often called on him to draw inspiration from his profound wisdom and counsel from his rich experience.

The Netherlands was alone among the western European countries in its decision to support the Partition plan. France vacillated between the fear of its Moslem colonial population and Vatican and British influences on the one hand, and considerations in our favor on the other. At a superficial glance, it did seem that British,

Moslem, and Catholic influence combined (the last exercised primarily in the Jerusalem issue) might get the upper hand.

Belgium, too, caused us much anxiety, and its attitude gave us no rest. The Belgian Socialists were committed to the co-ordination of their policies with those of the British Labour Government, regarding that consummation as the alpha and omega of their mission in the sphere of international relations, while the Catholics kept their eyes on the Vatican.

The British Dominions had still for the most part not clarified their final attitude, but on the whole betrayed a tendency to depart from the British position. We were especially encouraged by the line taken by South Africa and Australia, which supported Partition to our full satisfaction. South Africa preserved allegiance to its long pro-Zionist tradition, and the Prime Minister, that great friend of Zionism, Field Marshal Smuts, was among the first doughty apostles of the Partition idea.

Dr. Herbert Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs and architect of its Federal Labour Government's foreign policy, deemed Partition to be the only remedy for Palestine which the U.N. could adopt. He regarded the Palestine problem as a test of the U.N. capacity to solve difficult and complex issues, and the solution as a challenge to U.N.'s maturity.

His was no bed of roses as chairman of the General Assembly, and he had to assume a mantle of maximum neutrality in that capacity. He was at great pains not to impugn the impartial character of his office.

The group of champions of United Nations ideals, including the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, whose credo and tenets were similar to those of Dr. Evatt, had a distinguished place in the developments at Lake Success. These world servants felt that the failure to find a solution for the Palestine problem was an admission of U.N.O.'s helplessness which might spell the ultimate bankruptcy of the international body. As no other realistic solution than Partition appeared on the political horizon, the apostles of world unity had no other alternative than to give it wholehearted support.

That, too, was the attitude taken by Sir Carl Berenson, New Zealand envoy, an honest and able statesman whose outlook was based on moral and realistic considerations. But he was hampered by instructions from his Government which approximated the British line and he was careful not to diverge from it. Berenson himself hesitated a long while owing to the fear that the unwillingness of the great powers to undertake the military and administrative burden of enforcing a solution would make it valueless and pointless.

He kept on reiterating that the United Nations risked saddling itself with responsibility for bloodshed if it handed down a judgment without providing sufficient concrete force to execute it. His integrity, clear vision, and fervor were esteemed by other delegates. Nor were his doubts and hesitations devoid of all foundation.

Canada was a problem unto itself. Its talented delegation chief, Lester Pearson, was among the most eminent personages at U.N. There were other gifted men of high intellectual stature among the delegation. Canada, in short, had one of the finest missions at Lake Success, excelling many others in caliber and influence, always commanding attention for its pronouncements and standpoints.

I had a special affinity with the Canadians, which went back to UNSCOP's stay in Palestine and my friendship with Justice Rand. I turned a deaf ear to the warnings that my efforts to meet with and win over the Canadians would be useless against the influence of Miss MacCallum, the Canadian authority on Middle Eastern affairs, who was described as inimical toward us. I continued to seek ways and means of getting to them.

One day Leon Mayrand, who had been Ivan Rand's alternate on UNSCOP, arrived at Lake Success. I met him in one of the half-empty meeting-rooms after a session, and he asked if I would like to be introduced to Miss MacCallum. I jumped at the opportunity. I liked meeting opponents no less than friends.

He presented me to a woman with a broad brow, wreathed in an aureole of white hair, and a face of aris-

tocratic lineaments and spiritual refinement. She said she had heard a lot about me, had read my books and articles, and when she first saw me in the meeting-chamber she decided I must be the man whose name she knew but had never met.

I soon ascertained that she was conversant with every small detail of political and economic life in Palestine. She had read all the literature in European languages which had been published on Palestine and the Middle East. She knew the names of officials and the functions they performed and was personally acquainted with many Arab leaders.

I found no hostility in her attitude toward us. She differed from our standpoint and views, but had no rooted prejudices. In spite of the differences, our conversation was friendly and Miss MacCallum showed every desire to study the problem impartially.

After our chat I met other members of the Canadian delegation. In due course the delegates began playing a part in our affairs which reminded me of their fellow countryman Ivan Rand's role at UNSCOP. The dynamic force and pathfinder was Lester Pearson, who later became Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs at Ottawa. His views, as I have said, approximated those of Dr. Evatt and Trygve Lie, and, like them, he regarded the Palestine problem as a challenge to the ability of the United Nations to provide a sound and just solution of a complex tragic issue.

His adherence to the pro-Partition fold was an important turning-point. His influence, as one of the foremost figures at U.N., was tremendous. It may be said that Canada, more than any other country, played a decisive part in all stages of the U.N.O. discussions on Palestine. The activities at Lake Success of Lester Pearson and his fellow delegates were a fitting climax to Justice Rand's beneficent work on UNSCOP.

The deviation of the four British overseas realms from the official policy of Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom carried immense moral and political weight, without which it is doubtful whether we should have witnessed the spectacle of U.N.'s final af-

firmative vote for Partition on the 29th of November 1947.

The Scandinavian countries also made a positive contribution. Norway, whose lofty moral position was an example and model to the many; Sweden, which supported the report of a committee that one of its citizens, Dr. Sandstrom, had headed; and Denmark and Iceland, which joined with their comrades, voted for Partition.

The Swedish attitude was of importance. Dr. Sandstrom, who was loyal to the report he helped to produce, added a weighty point in favor of Partition during one of his conversations with us.

"The Partition plan," he said, "can be regarded as compatible with even formalistic democratic principles. The fact that the Arabs are a majority in the *whole* of the country does not vitiate the right of self-determination and the secession of the Jewish community, which is a majority in part of the country.

"The fact of the existence of a geographical unit named 'Palestine' still does not establish the right of the inhabitants of areas in which Arabs are the majority to determine the fate of areas in which there is a Jewish majority."

The Swedish delegation was helpful and constructive on the Ad Hoc Committee, even though, like other U.N. missions, it believed Partition to be only a lesser evil and was not oblivious of its many shortcomings.

Our efforts among the Asiatic bloc, on the other hand, could hardly be classified as auspicious.

China chopped and changed three times. The first time it was against Partition, then for it, and finally it abstained. While the Chinese Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Wellington Koo, was a supporter, its U.N. representative, Dr. T. V. Tsiang, was a consistent opponent and enlisted the Chiang Kai-shek Government's approval of his position.

India decided to vote against, despite the sympathy of its delegates and their leader, Mrs. Pandit.

The Filipinos, too, altered their mind during the session. General Carlos P. Romulo, who was to become President of the General Assembly three years later, told

me at a function where we met: "Now that the United States has defined its attitude, it's natural that its ally, the Philippine Republic, should follow suit and vote for Partition."

Nevertheless, the Philippines twice changed their attitude.

(43)

BETWEEN HOPE and DESPAIR

The feeling of uncertainty about what the hour might bring, good or ill, remained with us during the entire General Assembly session. The mercury of our mood changed as often as the political barometer rose and fell, elevating us to heights of confidence and hope, then plunging us into deep despondency and pessimism. Every grain of rumor or seed of suspicion that rolled our way worked its effect in keeping with the portent. It was a confused and trying period.

One day a British newspaperman told me that the Arabs had succeeded in mustering seventeen votes against Partition, and that, as we could not mobilize the requisite two-thirds majority, this decided our fate.

Another day the rumor reached us of an Arab offer to the Russians to support the Eastern bloc on a number of important issues in exchange for a Soviet switch-over on the Palestine question. A day later we were informed that the Russians had turned down the offer.

On the other hand, a persistent rumor went the rounds to the effect that the British were about to leave the fold of abstainees and join the Arabs in actively voting against Partition.

These and many other rumors drifted through the halls and corridors, and we could never trace their origin or determine the degree of veracity in them. The fluctuations among the smaller powers, far removed from the problem, such as Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, the Philip-

pines and several Latin-American countries, by no means facilitated our task.

About that time I was invited to attend a conference of the Welfare Federations, which encompass most of the Jewish congregations in the United States and are the backbone of the various funds. It was to be held at Pittsburgh, steel and mining center in Pennsylvania.

The organization had a powerful influence over the progress of affairs within American Jewry. The conference discussed fund-raising in the coming year, and many delegates stood out against the predominance of aid to communities overseas—namely, for the Jews of Europe and Palestine—and insisted on supplying more help to local charities.

I addressed the conference on the matter, and outlined what I had envisaged as likely to happen: withdrawal of the British forces, a general attack by the Arabs of Palestine and neighboring territories, a war of independence, a battle for survival and rescue from physical extinction; and, concurrently, a torrent of immigration, with the necessity of financing massive defense measures, creating the apparatus of statehood, and providing for the newcomers during the actual combat period.

Dread and incredulity struggled in the minds of my listeners on hearing the ruthless forecast. They asked themselves: Is it likely? Will that be the lot of the Yishuv, and its fate in just a few months?

Imagination boggled at the full scope of the nightmare and calamity, the gallantry and the glory.

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The subcommittee assigned to draw up the details of Partition had ended its discussion on frontiers and began on the Economic Union item.

The whole idea seemed to be to put a sugar coating on the bitter pill of Partition which the Arabs would have to swallow, and to treat them to some of the benefits of Jewish settlement by ensuring the economic existence of the Arab state.

For our part, we aspired at the maximum of political and economic autonomy. Independence in development,

absorption of immigrants, and securing foreign credits was the most vital need for our future and the discharge of our bounden functions.

Moreover, we had no wish to be saddled with the excessive burden of giving subsidies to the projected Arab state. We knew that a customs pact was unavoidable, but we deemed it essential to ensure the division of revenues in such a way as would enable us to finance economic development. We also wanted to preserve the independence of our fiscal policies in other fields outside customs.

Our attitude was not entirely compatible with UNSCOP's own conception of a customs pact as a form of Jewish subsidy to the Arabs and its formulation of a system of proportional division for the purpose. We had no objection to paying a tax of this kind in return for our independence, but wished to fix the rational limits for such a contribution.

A fixed and frozen predetermination of percentage distribution was, to our mind, a doubtful expedient which overlooked the enormous increase in imports owing to development and immigrant settlement once the newcomers began streaming into the state in their tens of thousands. The system would augment the concealed subsidy payments unrestrictedly, without any relationship to the needs of the Arab state, which would get richer as the mounting revenues were distributed among its almost static population.

On the other hand, the subsidies would constitute an intolerable burden on the Jewish state, confronted by immense difficulties and tasks arising from building, settlement, development and mass immigration. Consequently, we requested that a definite ceiling be put over this structure of Jewish state payments to its Arab neighbor, and that the inequity of the scale of percentages be eased.

In addition, we wished to ensure ourselves the possibility of fighting an Arab boycott by means of economic reprisal measures. This was especially difficult to carry out in the teeth of a customs pact. For that reason, we urged that this defense of our interests be vested in the

joint economic council that was to be set up. I was assigned to determine, formulate, and present the demands.

I was compelled to reiterate the Jewish claims and arguments in innumerable speeches and talks within the committee until I finally clarified our position.

The American delegation at the outset displayed understanding and sympathy in the economic-union issue. Johnson especially gave us his support.

I had frankly revealed our position and the wish to avoid having our economic policy dictated by an Arab state with different, and occasionally contradictory, requirements, structure, political and economic interests from our own. I dwelt on the task of immigrant absorption and the anticipated growth of importation owing to increased population, and explained that the whole edifice of economic union might be wrecked and grave political consequences be engendered if a too heavy burden were imposed upon us.

"It's quite unnatural," I declared. "It's enough that we agree to support an Arab state, without being treated as a unified state carrying mutual responsibility. The Arabs cannot be permitted on the one hand to oppose any Jewish immigration, and to enjoy its fruits on the other. Partition is the outcome of Arab opposition to Jewish immigration, and they must take the consequences and give up one of the two—their objections to immigration or the benefits it confers.

"Moreover, the artificial structure of the economic union is liable to retard rather than develop true co-operation and sharing of mutual interests, and its imposition will be tantamount to defeating the whole idea of economic union.

"As for a blockade," I continued, "protection against it at present, at least officially, is the duty of the Mandatory Government. The preamble to the Mandate places on the Government the responsibility to protect the interests of inhabitants against any discrimination whatsoever, and a special clause to that effect is included in the economic agreement with Syria.

"But even that official obligation will lapse after the establishment of the Jewish state, and we shall be de-

prived of any economic protection unless that function is imposed on the proposed joint economic council."

A prolonged discussion ensued after my statement, and the battle raged over each separate article. A special subcommittee was set up under Dr. Granados, of Guatemala, with whom I met for a lengthy conversation at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel to clarify our position.

Eventually we were able to obtain reasonable amendments in the charter of the economic union. The autonomy of our currency policy was assured, a ceiling was placed on the subsidy which the Arab state was entitled to receive under the customs treaty, and the economic council was empowered to protect the country's trade interests.

The question of the form of economic union, like the frontiers issue preceding it, was satisfactorily settled.



Yet our troubles were far from over. The rumors about the attitudes of various countries and our prospects in a vote continued to perturb us.

The first of our worries was fear of a retreat by the United States. Well-informed circles hinted that our case had been pushed aside owing to more important issues.

Disturbing reports were also arriving from western Europe. The British Government had brought heavy pressure to bear on the governments of France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. At a meeting of the Political Commission of the Belgian Parliament, Liberal and Catholic deputies opposed the Partition plan for Palestine, while the Socialist leader, Paul Spaak, indicated that he was ready to support it if the United States and the Soviet Union continued to do so.

Information from Paris was that France intended to abstain, but, if its vote were needed to complete a two-thirds majority, might change its mind. The French Government, however, was not prepared to enter into any commitment in this respect. The French delegation at Lake Success believed it was wrong for France to saddle itself with direct moral responsibility for the failure

of the General Assembly to reach any solution, but this line had still to win the Quai d'Orsay's approval.

The fate of the problem was not being determined at Lake Success alone; we knew that well. Our envoys launched intensive diplomatic action in world capitals, making strenuous efforts to mobilize world opinion in various countries. The Jewish Agency missions in New York, London, Paris, and other capitals held long international telephone conversations with one another and with our representatives everywhere. Long cablegrams brought reports that shot the temperamental mercury upward to hope or downward to despondency.

Our delegation at Lake Success became a nerve-center of Zionist diplomacy, its tentacles reaching to all parts of the world. The fact accentuated our recognition of the responsibility and privilege of taking part in fashioning this chunk of historic national regeneration.

The inner unity of our delegation was exemplary. Moshe Shertok, Aubrey Eban, Eliahu Epstein, Walter Eytan, Arthur Lourie, Michael Comay, Moshe Tov, Zalman Liff, Mordecai Kahane, Gideon Rufer, and I worked in close and constant harmony. This was particularly so with Aubrey Eban and me; we maintained our teamwork and warm friendship from UNSCOP days.

The galvanizing spark among us was Moshe Shertok, leader and co-ordinator of the delegation. In addition to his unflagging efforts at Lake Success itself, he was the liaison channel between the Zionist mission to the United Nations and the Executive in Jerusalem. The Executive members in New York joined our consultations, and Dr. Silver, Emanuel Neumann, Rose Halperin, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, and Chaim Greenberg were active in the practical work and appearances before the Assembly and its committees.

Our organization had the support of a Political Committee elected at the Zionist General Council session at Zurich, the membership of which represented various parties under the chairmanship of Joseph Sprinzak (now Speaker of the Knesseth). To this advisory body were submitted regular reports on developments among the different political agencies with which we negotiated

and conferred, as well as on our tactics and line of action, and we had the advantage of sound advice and constructive criticism. The job of appearing before the Political Committee devolved principally on Shertok, Goldmann, and me.

The main problem that continued to exercise the U.N. delegates cracking the hard Palestine nut was that of implementation. It was generally realized that the most successful solution would be subverted if no effective method of implementing it by action was found.

The Americans at first hoped for restricted British co-operation in this matter, and at one stage even informed us that they believed such a minimum partnership to be assured. The idea was to hand over authority gradually to provisional governments while orderly withdrawal from the country was proceeding.

But Ernest Bevin finally had his way, and it was evident we would have to face anarchical evacuation, leaving chaos behind, without our being able to set up administrative institutions or a militia force. This sort of evacuation would suit the Arabs, for it permitted them to develop their instruments of authority in neighboring countries and marshal their military forces to overwhelm Palestine.

Although many still doubted Arab readiness to undertake an armed invasion, others feared the infiltration of armed gangs across every frontier. But few, very few, conceived in their wildest imagination the organized incursion of Arab sovereign armies. No one envisaged the possibility of self-enforcement.

The disparity between the puny Jewish underground force and the Arab hordes and resources, seemingly limitless, was so pronounced that any efficacious action on a solution appeared highly doubtful. True, there were suggestions of an international force, but these did not materialize into any concrete plan.

At all events, the possibility of a sanguinary war between the small, outnumbered Jewish community and the mighty Arab armies, equipped with artillery, armor, and aircraft—while the world stood aside—never occurred to even the most confirmed gloom-mongers. No

one in the General Assembly for a moment credited the Arab states' blustering threats of a general holy war to capture Palestine. If, in fact, the United Nations delegates had taken these menaces seriously, the decision of November 29, 1947 would probably never have come about.

But Arab threats of bloodshed multiplied and became their principal weapon in the political strife, so that it was difficult to ignore them.

Any decision enabling the British to continue their administration during the transition period required Russian consent. The question of what part the Security Council should play in enforcement action became a grave controversial issue, and no sooner had the discussion on this point begun than it bogged right down. Differences over ways and means cropped up at every step between the two principal partners sponsoring Partition, the United States and the Soviet Union. A series of frantic approaches to the British to abandon their ambiguous position was fruitless, and their replies left no doubt of their attitude.

Our firm friends addressed many fervent appeals to the United States and the Soviet Union to lay aside their differences for this once and find common ground. Señor Pedro Zuloaga, of Venezuela, wise and sensitive statesman, reminded both powers that while the cold war was raging in other Assembly halls, this was the spot where the first sprouts of co-operation to solve a thorny international problem were burgeoning, and the experiment should be promoted at all costs. Pruszynski, of Poland, proclaimed that the fact that this hall was the only one in the Assembly where a different language was spoken from those of the altercation and bickering elsewhere constituted a sufficient warranty for international co-operation to find a just and agreed formula.

But the distance between ardent pleas and solution was still a long one, and the fear that our efforts and hopes might be smashed against the rock of world-power fractiousness mounted rapidly.

In my constant ruminations on the problem of finding a way out of the quandary, it seemed to me that the scope and public nature of the discussions were among the most prominent hindrances to achieving big-power agreement.

I had a brain-wave concerning a possible way of moving at least one step forward to an agreed proposal. Seeking out Moshe Shertok, I told him of my idea of having a small subcommittee set up, consisting of the United States, Soviet Russia, and Guatemala, to confer privately on a new formula of enforcement.

Shertok reacted enthusiastically, and I undertook my approaches at once.

I conferred with several of my American and Russian friends, and besought Señor Zuloaga to put the idea up officially, which he did. The Russians held back at first, but finally agreed on condition it would not be an official body but an informal "working team." The Americans readily consented to the device.

Dr. Granados, of Guatemala, was delighted. He regarded his co-option as an honor and mark of esteem for his country and himself, and accepted willingly.

That was how the committee saw the light, and the jocular nickname of "the Big Three" was given it.

During one of the intervals I met the Canadians and ascertained that their participation on the small committee might be possible. I knew Lester Pearson's great abilities and influence and felt his membership would be a substantial contribution to success. I suggested his co-option through one of our friends, and it was agreed upon, so that "the Big Three" became "the Big Four." Pearson's tranquillizing effect over all differences was immeasurable. He always found the proper device in all circumstances to help the two big contestants find common ground.

The "Big Four" sat behind the locked doors of No. 11 Committee Room deep in discussion. Press correspondents and delegates, including our representatives, milled outside the closed door agog for an announcement.

The talks went on for several days. The Soviet delegates awaited further instructions from Moscow, while

the Canadian and the Guatemalan labored unremittingly to find a unified solution—no easy task.

Skepticism was the rule among the knot of people outside No. 11. Was it possible, they all asked, to disentangle one solitary problem from the skein of differences between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.?

the BOMB SHELL of the (44) AMERICAN-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT

All kinds of rumors percolated into the corridor outside No. 11 Committee Room, and no one knew the truth of them until the day of decision.

On this occasion the crowd had become larger and more excited than usual. Delegates, correspondents, Jewish Agency men, officials, lobbyists, and plain rubberneckers stood around in an atmosphere of growing suspense.

A day earlier Semyon Zarapkin disclosed to us that the Soviet Union had agreed, in order to reach a solution, to postponement of the expiry of the British Mandate over Palestine for several months and also agreed to a compromise on the subject of implementation. Those were the instructions received from Moscow. But the results of this favorable turn were still kept dark.

Suddenly the locked door of No. 11 opened and General Hilldring appeared. He came over to us and whispered there was hope of agreement.

A short while later someone else came out and conveyed the same tidings to the pressmen.

Excitement grew. The correspondents scampered between telephone booths and No. 11. The phones were never free and the teletype machines clacked busily.

When the door finally opened and the "Big Four"—Herschel Johnson, Semyon Zarapkin, Lester Pearson, and Jorge García Granados—came out, smiling, with their aides and told the crowd besieging them that agree-

ment had been secured, the news exploded over Lake Success with the roar of a bombshell.

It was the first agreement ever reached between the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics at the United Nations Organization.

The Americans had made a heavy sacrifice in joining with the Soviet Union against the attitude of their ally Great Britain, while the Soviet Union had made the most far-reaching concessions, which went way outside the scope of their policies at Lake Success. Indeed, the Soviet delegates told us: "You don't know how big a thing we did for you in these negotiations."

The British delegates were downcast and disconcerted. I met Harold Beeley in the lounge and asked: "What now?"

But he had not lost his wits. His keen mind had already worked out a new device to defeat the agreement. His quick reply was significant: "We'll issue a statement, and the Assembly will vote in the light of both facts—the agreement and our statement."

I knew he was not speaking idly, and that the results might be fatal. The barometer of our position as personified in this tall, astute Englishman had never misled me. He was put out at the moment, but remained in fighting fettle. I imagined that he must regard this as a personal defeat. The United States and the Soviet Union had found common ground on Zionism.

The ebullient Beeley and his associate in charge of relations with Latin-American countries increased their propaganda efforts, which now became more overt and venomous. This experienced man threw the full weight of his personality on the scales of fate, which tipped ominously against him.

Nevertheless, the British delegation itself was not united. John Martin, of the Colonial Office and Donald MacGillivray, competent Mandatory Government official, were considerably vexed with Beeley's tactics. Churchill's statement about the unnecessary war with the Jews in Palestine also had its effect on the Britons.

The United States had moved into the forefront of pro-Partitionists in conformity with public opinion and

the attitude of the President and Congress. The Soviet Union's position was no longer in doubt. The considerations that shaped and guided its policy were lack of faith in the Arab League, the desire to see the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine, and the aspiration to win world Jewish sympathy.

Britain's prestige was not enhanced among the Arab states. The appeasement policy merely hardened the resolve of Iraq and Egypt, which saw it as an irretrievable opportunity to extort more concessions. "If the British are so anxious for Arab friendship, why shouldn't they pay handsomely for it?" the cunning pashas and beys of Cairo and Baghdad reasoned.

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Harold Beeley and his minions had not cried despair, and their reply to the Soviet-American agreement was not tardy in coming.

Sir Alexander Cadogan made his statement at a special plenary session of the Ad Hoc Committee, convened at British request on the 13th of November. The statement announced Britain's decision not to take any form of action which might involve it in the enforcement of Partition, the creation of a militia, and the organization of a new regime. Implementation of Partition, they contended, meant forcing it upon the Arabs, who opposed the scheme, and consequently the British would refrain from taking any part in applying decisions framed in this spirit.

Great Britain, he went on, would withdraw its armed forces from Palestine on August 1, 1948, and would until then continue to govern any area in which those forces were located.

The statement came as a bolt out of the blue to all U.N. delegations. The effective meaning was that the British had no intention of conducting their evacuation in such a manner as would permit the international agencies and nuclei of local government to take over from the Mandatory Administration. Evacuation would be carried out in conditions favoring the Arabs and breeding political, military, and administrative chaos.

Once more the great question mark had been written against implementation. Would the pro-Partitionists retreat? The "Big Four" met again, weighed the situation, and decided to hold to their decision in spite of the British declaration and to adapt the details of their plan to the new conditions.

We, too, met for our own caucus talks, attended by all members of the delegation and the Zionist Executive. In a short address I expressed the opinion that the purpose of Britain's policy was to defeat Partition at any cost. The most pessimistic construction possible must be placed on its plan.

The reassuring British statements made to us by this or that statesman from time to time were regarded by some people as the result of naïveté and ignorance or misunderstanding of the real policy; by others as a deliberate diversionary attempt to enable the conspiracy to be pursued more effectively. We must not be misled by delusions and must be prepared for the worst in order to counter the looming dangers.

My statement, while it made a strong impression, was regarded by many as a biased view of the position, resulting from groundless pessimism. It surprised my associates to find me uttering such sentiments. I was known to have cherished strong sympathy for the British people and had many friendships with British civil servants in Palestine, our political adversaries among them.

But my attitude was based upon the growing recognition that British policy was showing an extraordinary deviation in relation to Palestine, and that events were shaping up which I would never believe Britain was capable of contemplating in any other place. I had the strong feeling that, owing to this contradiction, the Palestine question must be excluded from any broad assessment of Britain's higher aims and the British character. In this way my consciousness was compounded of the diametrically opposed feelings of profound liking and admiration for Britain, the British people, and the Britons whom I knew, and utter loathing of the British Government's Palestine policy.

I believed, as I still do today, that the majority of the British people, Parliament, and even a number of Cabinet ministers were unaware of this policy or had not fully studied it. I believe that they did not know the whole story, with its unsavory aspects.

When, in fact, Palestine was eventually evacuated by the British forces, these two contradictory trends became strikingly manifest: the one, a desire to thwart Partition and harm the Yishuv; the other, the abhorrence and resentment among wide sections of the British people who were disgusted at the situation in which Great Britain had been placed in Palestine. They not only believed it necessary to avoid making sacrifices, but that Britain ought to relinquish its thankless task in the Holy Land and return its custody to the United Nations, instead of continuing to carry out a policy liable to be interpreted as suppressing another people by the use of military coercion.

While I believed that most of the British people were inspired by positive considerations, the belief did not blind me to the actual line of policy then being followed, or to the dangerous consequences.

About that time I was introduced, at a meeting at Dr. Weizmann's, to an eminent British diplomat at the United Nations who in due course of years was to occupy a most distinguished position. He was a man of broad outlook, high intelligence, and culture, a worthy epitome of twentieth-century civilization. His *Weltanschauung* had produced in him a blend of irony and philosophic doubt, sophistication, and intellectual perspicaciousness. He surveyed the world from the peaks of modern culture with sharp, cold, disillusioned eyes, the eyes of a man who had long progressed beyond the stage of toying with naïve beliefs and childish romantic dreams of bygone epochs.

Our conversation began on the general plane. We touched on Spengler, and our talk soon veered to the subject of the philosophy of civilization, modern theories of historiosophy, and other phenomena of culture and modern society, including contemporary literature. I felt that my companion found our discussion a relaxa-

tion from the hurly-burly of daily political life. Nevertheless, we could not help coming round to Palestine, and he hinted that our behavior seemed to him to be very injudicious. If we continued along that path, we should face the entire Arab world, thirsting to exterminate us. His military analysis was most interesting.

"The Negev will be cut off at once because it is indefensible," he said. "Galilee will only be able to hold out a few days. You will be pushed into a narrow coastal strip in a few weeks. And then what will happen to you?"

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The last question to be discussed by the Partition Subcommittee was Jerusalem, on which differences existed among ourselves no less.

Those who favored at least a temporary compromise over internationalization advanced tactical considerations. Partition of the city would jeopardize the two-thirds majority vote. Several Latin-American countries would withdraw under Vatican pressure, and France and the Benelux countries would no longer be with us.

The Americans openly supported internationalization, and Herschel Johnson delivered a fine address on the need for one venue of brotherhood and international co-operation in this zone of differences, which would serve as a bridge between Arabia and Israel as well as a portal to peace, reconciliation, and a new human cultural vision. He deemed Jerusalem to be such a meeting-ground, and deeply impressed most of the committee with his viewpoint.

The Canadians, at first inclined to support our position on Jerusalem, later recanted and joined the Americans.

The Dutch delegates expressed a wish to confer with us on the matter, and Shertok, Eban, and I met their representatives in a corner of the delegates' lounge. They recounted the obstacles they met at home and abroad before deciding to support Partition. But we were adding another difficulty by being stubborn over Jerusalem, which might compel them to withdraw on Partition.

Even Shertok was impressed, despite his staunch opposition to internationalization. If such was the state of affairs with Holland, how much more so in relation to the other western European countries—sensitive and hesitant France and Belgium, inclining toward the risky idea of turning the matter over to the Hague Court for an opinion.

Our opposition to internationalization naturally declined; though we continued to press for partitioning the city, we knew that a resolution for an international regime was inevitable at that juncture.

The one remaining impediment was the question of who would be its guardian authority. Logically, it should be administered by the Trusteeship Council. But the U.S.S.R. was not represented on that Council, and the others feared Soviet opposition to the plan.

After some days of consultations, the Soviets again sprang a surprise by consenting to the Trusteeship Council's becoming the guardian authority over Jerusalem, with the additional hint that they might join its membership shortly.

THE TIME FOR DECISION (45)

With the completion of the Partition Subcommittee's work on details of the scheme, the time for a vote in the Ad Hoc Committee came round.

The first vote was taken on the Arab proposal, which was rejected by a large majority.

Colombia presented a motion to solve the question of Jewish refugees outside Palestine, the idea being to take the sting out of the issue and separate it from the Palestine issue. It was denounced as gambling with the bitter lot of the refugees and failed in its purpose, though it was not formally rejected.

At the last moment we were spared by a majority of only one vote the danger of indefinite postponement of a solution arising from a motion to submit the problem

first to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for an opinion. The motion was supported by most of the reluctant states, which hoped in this way to evade a decision.

Finally, the Partition Subcommittee's proposal was approved by the substantial majority of 25 to 13 votes, though this was not the two-thirds majority that would be needed in the General Assembly. The prospects of success in the Assembly were favorable, for several of the states that had refrained from voting in the Ad Hoc Committee promised to give their support in the Assembly, and we hoped to persuade a number of others during the few days remaining before the final roll-call.



The discussion by the General Assembly was resumed in a solemn atmosphere at Flushing Meadow, halfway between New York and Lake Success, with the full attendance of delegations and under the chairmanship of that accomplished Brazilian statesman Dr. Oswaldo Aranha. The business before the Assembly was to vote on the Partition plan submitted as an approved declaration by the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine.

There was great excitement in the large hall, and it gripped us no less as we sat in the section reserved for the Jewish Agency delegation.

The session opened with a series of speeches, which peppered us like enormous hailstones out of a clear sky. First the representative of Greece stood up and announced he would vote against Partition. He was followed by General Romulo, for the Philippines, with a virulent speech that similarly opposed the plan.

We were shaken to the core. Here we had been imagining that salvation was nigh, when suddenly, overnight, it had turned out to be a will-o'-the-wisp again, another in the long series of snares and delusions. Were all our toil and efforts to be in vain? Was there really no end in sight of the long day of suffering and hopelessness? Would we again be hurled, like Sisyphus, to the

bottom of the slope, as though nothing had ever happened?

The delegate of Sweden was on his feet. He, too, began reeling off a long schedule of considerations against Partition. We held our breath.

Shertok, alongside me, leaned over and whispered in a quavering voice to Nahum Goldmann: "Let him say it and not keep us on tenterhooks."

The Swedish envoy concluded with the statement that he would none the less vote for Partition.

But it was no time for rejoicing yet. Rumor had it that several other states had changed their minds; some would abstain and others vote against, it was reported.

The Haitian delegate rose and spoke against Partition. The day before he had been for it.

We left the hall and had a short consultation in the corridor. The cause seemed lost. Only a postponement of the voting could save us. The morrow was an American national holiday—Thanksgiving Day—and there would be no sessions. We could use the time to improve our position.

Our friends were delivering long addresses to save time, but hope was very slender. The atmosphere was supercharged, and no one was listening to the speeches.

The Arabs were smiling broadly and crowing, their heads held proudly. Beeley was radiant with joy.

A majority was convinced that the creation of a Jewish state in part of Palestine was the best solution, but that majority did not amount to two thirds of the membership. It seemed for the moment that our fate was in the hands of Haiti, Liberia, Abyssinia, and the Philippines, remote countries barely known to us.

Shertok, Silver, Neumann, Eban, and I, among others, sat in a corner of the corridor, grim-faced and dejected. One of our South American friends came up and said: "Go home! The sight of your faces is demoralizing your friends."

Miss MacCallum, of Canada, came over and asked me to have a meal with her. She tried to console me with a story about the Crusaders at Acre who were apparently

lost but were saved by the strength of their faith and a miracle.

The sun was setting outside. Inside the hall the endless spate of orations went on. The meeting ended without a vote. The curtain had fallen on the first act of the drama.

"Black Wednesday," as we were to call it later, had passed. The fighting spirit rose in us again. We met at the Agency offices and consulted on ways and means to turn the wheel of events once more. The struggle began again.

The telephones rang madly. Cablegrams sped to all parts of the world. People were dragged from their beds at midnight and sent on peculiar errands. And, wonder of it all, not an influential Jew, Zionist or non-Zionist, refused to give us his assistance at any time. Everyone pulled his weight, little or great, in the despairing effort to balance the scales to our favor.

In the one day we met with tens of delegations, and most stood firmly behind the conviction that Partition was the only feasible solution in the extremity of the Palestine question.

Shertok and I met the Ethiopians, whom we feared would vote against us. Shertok recalled the traditional tie with Israel from days of old until the Ethiopian war, and the hospitality shown their Emperor and his entourage during their exile in Jerusalem.

I reminded Shertok of a small incident in which he had been involved, and he retailed it to the Ethiopian representatives. It was during the Italo-Ethiopian war in the middle thirties. The Italian consul in Jerusalem had called on Shertok at the Jewish Agency and complained of the treatment by the Jewish press, pointing out the importance of the Italian attitude to world Jewry generally, and to Italian Jewry in particular.

Shertok then wisely replied that it was a free press and would not sell the conscience of our people for a mess of pottage. Nor was he afraid of threats, and he refused to influence the newspapers as the consul wished.

The Ethiopians listened interestedly. Shertok concluded by saying: "If you vote for us, we shall be most

grateful and you will have done the proper thing. If you refrain, we shall be sorry, but we shall understand. But if you vote against us, we shall be deeply offended, and our friendship will suffer."

The chief Ethiopian delegate answered in faultless English, choosing his words with deliberation. "True," he said, "the interests of Ethiopia, which needs the Arab vote at U.N.O. for its own causes and must maintain good-neighborly relations with the Arab states, especially Egypt, require us to vote with the Arabs. But as a token of appreciation of our friendship, and in the light of the justice of the Jewish cause and our obligations as members of the United Nations, we have decided, after cogitating the matter and weighing it all last night, to refrain from voting."

The reply satisfied us and we parted from them cordially.

We went on meeting delegations individually or together, and felt there was a slight change for the better.

America's line of action had swung in a new direction. As a result of instructions from the President, the State Department now embarked on a helpful course of great importance to our interest.

The improved atmosphere swayed a number of wavering countries. The United States exerted the weight of its influence almost at the last hour, and the way the final vote turned out must be ascribed to this fact. Its intervention sidetracked the manipulation of the "fringe votes" against us.

Still the excitement mounted. The cynosure of the world was Lake Success, where a small number of votes would decide the issue of the final ballot.

Jewish New York was seething and reached the boiling-point. Tens of thousands of Jewish inhabitants remained glued to their radio sets. The Yishuv's eyes were upon us.

A change was occurring along the whole front. General Romulo had left and there was a renewed tendency in the Philippine delegation to vote for us. A revolution had occurred in Siam and the authority of the Siamese Prince, who had voted against us in the Ad Hoc Com-

mittee, had been suspended until the situation was determined. We were able to enlist the support of Liberia and Haiti. A more complaisant attitude was taken by other missions.

When we returned to Flushing Meadow on Friday, November 28, victory was seemingly assured. But at the last moment Alexandre Parodi, of France, moved that both sides be given a period of twenty-four hours in which to reconcile their differences, and to let the delegates have an opportunity for further consideration.

Once again the danger loomed of the delicate balance being upset. But his arguments were manifestly convincing, and it was difficult to object to a delay of twenty-four hours before taking an all-important vote. Parodi's motion was adopted.

It appeared as if Palestine had become the heart of the world in those days. We had always marveled at the amount of interest the world took in that small land. Now that the spotlight had been focused on it full strength, the feeling was manifoldly accentuated.

Our own position was like that of the man who has swum the ocean for miles and begins to sink when he is within grasp of shore. Our pulses beat faster, our throats were constricted.

One of us said half-seriously, half-jokingly: "I suppose the time will come when we shall no longer be like defendants in court before all kinds of committees and conferences discussing our fate."

And someone else rejoined: "I'd like us to be on the bench at the next inquiry, judging the fate of others."

The casual remark raised a rueful smile.



The 29th of November 1947.

Jewish New York had really reached the blow-off point. Many families ordained themselves a day of fast. The elevator boy at Dr. Goldmann's apartment house said to him: "If you come back, sir, without the decision for a Jewish state, you'll have to walk upstairs. I won't take you."

Thousands of people lined up outside the U.N.O. building to get admission tickets. The telephones were clogged with inquiries for tickets.

The enormous General Assembly hall was crowded to overflowing. Dr. Aranha stood on the President's rostrum, flanked by Trygve Lie. Behind them a huge painted representation of the globe; before them a wide semicircle of delegations with table-signs, and the packed galleries.

Would this be the day of decision? The Arabs were making a final despairing effort to postpone the vote. Camille Chamoun, of the Lebanon, proposed a "compromise" adjusting the Arab plan to a formula of "cantonization" bristling with reservations and concealed pitfalls.

The device was fairly transparent. Herschel Johnson and Andrei Gromyko, titans of the Assembly, rose and tore the Arab proposal to shreds. They showed that as it had no authority or substantial form, it was a mere trick. Johnson's voice was sharp and forceful; Gromyko's analysis was cold, precise, undissembling. Chamoun's motion was set aside.

Other procedural attempts to delay the decision were defeated by Dr. Aranha's capable and energetic handling.

Our patience and expectancy were being tried beyond endurance. We guessed at the likely results of the ballot that would bring us the longed-for victory, but we dreaded another postponement.

The dramatic moment none of us would ever forget finally came. The voting began. The names of the states were called out clearly, one after another, and after each: "Yes," "No," or "Abstention."

The ballot was interrupted only once as a storm of cheering greeted the French "Yes," following the postponement of the day before. The President rapped sharply for order and warned the public against demonstrations. The voting continued in silence—"Yes," "No," or "Abstention."

Excitement became a physical pain.

The President rapped his gavel. "Thirty-three in 303

favor, thirteen against, eleven abstentions," he announced.


As he spoke, a feeling that grips a man but once in his lifetime came over us. High above us we seemed to hear the beating of the wings of history.

The Arab delegates came up to the speakers' rostrum to utter their menaces of blood and battle, filling the hall with the smell of gunpowder. Were these idle threats or the thunder heralding the storm?

But none at that moment wished to give heed to the morrow. The well-springs of joy had burst within us. Jewish Agency delegates, friends, press correspondents, and a great throng of reveling Jews milled in the hall and corridors. Jewish New York celebrated in gala mood the great festival of political renascence. There was dancing and merrymaking in the streets. It was an amazing spectacle.

We relaxed in the sense of the high privilege afforded us to have worked for this moment, to quaff deeply of its intoxicating draught of exultation.

We spent the evening with Chaim Weizmann, who had been anointed as the living symbol of our dreams and visions fulfilled. We did not sleep that night, stirred to the depths by achievement and eyes turned to the morrow on whose threshold we stood.



Part Four

ON THE THRESHOLD

the DECISION and (46)
ITS PLACE IN HISTORY

In the historical perspective of the establishment of the State of Israel a relevant and highly significant question inevitably arises: what part did the United Nations decision of November 29, 1947 play in the great historic eventuality of the revival of Jewish independence?

One imagines that the radiance of that proud moment, at which our national revival and the resurgence of our independence were stamped with the authority of the world's political and moral judgment, is overcast by the glory, the suffering, and the gallant struggle

which succeeded it. There is a clear tendency today to minimize the value of the difficult and prolonged political struggle of 1947 by contrast with the military operations and triumph and the wonderful human epic of 1948.

But perhaps there are values in any historical perspective which cannot be effectively weighed on materialist scales. The memory of the 1948 struggle will remain fine-etched as the decisive contribution that our generation made to the sum total of the spiritual and historical experiences of a nation, the political resurrection of which was the lodestar of our lives.

But if we take material considerations and cold political analysis alone as the determinants, then two clear and irrefutable conclusions emerge:

1. The Yishuv and the nation did, indeed, encounter tremendous obstacles despite the U.N. resolution. The people stood alone in the battle and alone enforced the decision of the world forum, which showed no readiness to extend any aid whatever.

But, on the other hand, even the intervention in the struggle waged against us was limited and restricted, not least because of the November 29 decision. Moreover, had the U.N. Assembly reached a decision denying our claim, or one that we might have been compelled to reject because of unsuitable frontiers or the like, then our enemies would have mustered considerable and even il-limitable support to crush our opposition.

In a struggle such as this, with the balance swaying between victory and defeat, support of that kind would undoubtedly have tended completely to transform the picture and to bring about our political and physical subdual alike.

2. The British military evacuation, and the liquidation of British administration in Palestine, would never have come about had it not been for the November 29 decision. British policy in 1947 was directed wholly at getting a decision, or lack of decision, making for stagnancy and maintaining the *status quo* of the 1939 White Paper.

hands of Great Britain under the compulsion of realistic political and military facts, and it was only a fundamental change of this position that could have opened the door to Jewish independence under those conditions, and only the U.N. decision that was capable of precipitating that change.

These two hard and incontrovertible facts, however, were not the only factor in the metamorphosis initiated at Lake Success.

Each delegation at U.N.O. has a small signboard before it on the table, denoting the country represented. For two thousand years the name of the people of Israel was absent from the roster of world nations; it was missing, too, from the council rooms of the United Nations.

Then for the first time a small sign appeared, and on it the words: "Jewish Agency." It was, of course, still only a substitute, a state in the making and not actual independence; nevertheless, it bore the hallmark of international recognition of Jewry as a unique and autonomous, firmly established national entity. It was a revolutionary historic change after hundreds of years of discussion of the nature and national-territorial characteristics of Judaism, a discussion that had seemingly been finalized by this modest shingle.

The Jews no longer appeared as the carriers of a religion or tradition alone, but as a unified ethnic political entity, bound by a common destiny and recognized by judgment of the nations.

Admittedly, Jewish political nationalism first entered the arena of international relations in 1917 with the issue of the Balfour Declaration and later at the San Remo Conference. But for thirty years Jewish policy faced Britain alone, without relation to other peoples of the world and with no sovereign status. The Jewish people returned to the depths of political oblivion, removed from the stage on which it had briefly appeared as a static figure alone. It was relegated to its former isolation or, rather, to its ostracism from a sovereign standpoint, a stepchild in the family of the nations. Palestine became a backwater, one of the many colonial problems of a great and populous empire of many diverse races.

Now, as the result of a revolutionary historic process, the problem arose out of its political oblivion and was once more under international scrutiny. The Jewish problem grew again from the dimensions of "an internal issue" for each nation separately into world scope. The U.N. Assembly was the first to permit the representatives of the Jewish people to present their case from its public rostrum, and not behind the scenes: to appear as Jews representing the Jewish interest, and not by the charity of others. This status was granted us at the height of the political struggle, before it was crowned with victory and success, and the fact exercised decisive influence over the final victory itself.

This recognition was not confined to external factors. The frame of Jewish unity assumed flesh and sinews during this historically significant period, and the enthusiastic support and aid freely given by every Jew approached anywhere had a major share in this process.

We stood on the threshold. It was a time of decision which occurs only once, as a solitary phenomenon, in the history of a nation. The people did not fritter away the opportunity. It gave us its willing hand as one man, from cosmopolitan New York to some out-of-the-way corner of the world: to the Yishuv fighting in its own land. It was as though for one moment a whole people felt the long arm of history shaking it and commanding it: Act!

Behind us stood Jewish realities and the Jewish undertaking in Israel—immigration, settlement, accomplishments, that living and sentient reality which was building and tackling the difficulties. It was not through the sanction of rights and pressing needs alone that we now appeared before the world: facts were now speaking for themselves and for us, and facts, as we all know, have a supreme weight beyond anything else.

Behind us, too, was the Jewish tragedy, without match in world history. Behind us the cemetery of millions, in which lay buried no less the hopes and longings of many generations. Behind us an epic of the heroic bravery of the ghetto battles for the spirit of freedom and the sacrifices implicit in their sufferings.

With us, a fighting creative Yishuv and survivors yearning for rehabilitation and reconstruction in the ancestral homeland. With us, the latent forces of a glowing and hopeful future.

Before us, a morrow awaiting our redeeming hand and constructive energy, in whose spirit we spoke now, too, to the nations.

But the international political arena in 1947 was radically different from that of 1917.

A great era of universal good will had descended on mankind at the close of the First World War; an intoxication of hope and faith in a new world, a new redemption, inspired in the minds of all peoples the dream of justice and a springtide of nations renewing their youth in resurgence: a dream that fired the whole world.

But this had become another world again. In 1947 it was reeling under the impact of power politics, a cynical, ruthless world bereft of illusions and hope; a world in which the prospects of any issue succeeding without the backing of guns and armored divisions were practically hopeless, if they existed at all. The Jewish people had no voice of its own at the General Assembly to speak up on its behalf; the Arabs had seven votes and seven voices, tens of thousands of troops, oil, tanks, and artillery.

The Assembly was not a juridical body, but an arena of interests and forces; and the world in which we live today is a world of interests and forces. Could the inner logical force of a great and just vision overcome the bastioned walls of an epoch, of which the courses were built out of the stubborn masonry of hatred, vested interests, cynicism, and indifference?

The Middle East, orbit of our life and effort, was a purely British region. British policy was based entirely on a close alliance with the Arab world. We were a disturbing and irritating element, especially in view of the growing weight of the Arab League. The Arabs lost no appropriate opportunity to emphasize their views. They flung innumerable dire threats into the Assembly. They brought their full parliamentary influence to bear as representatives of seven nations. A tremendous trawl of propaganda and pull was spread against us.

The international situation, the titanic dispute between West and East, between the United States and the Soviet Union, were similarly to our disadvantage. We realized that only a common American-Russian front in support of our cause would bring about victory. But was such an alliance even remotely conceivable in the widening gulf between the two blocs?

The only way for our mission to succeed was to isolate the Palestine issue and remove it from the atmosphere of cynical realism and the complex pattern of oil and bloc strategic policies in the Middle East. We were compelled to shuffle all our cards again. America must take an independent political line of its own in the Middle East, clashing with British policy; we must substitute for its considerations of interests consideration of the merits of the case, and human and moral values and principles. We had to achieve a fundamental revolution in the tradition of the political struggle between East and West at the United Nations, and in their methods and considerations alike.

Our cause had no support from any physical force. Our struggle was unique of its kind, just as were our problem and our undertaking, without parallel in space or in time. Our chief instruments in the struggle were right and justice, the great achievements of a creative and constructive enterprise, and, above all, the lack of any alternative.

But of what avail were such frail weapons against artillery and armor, the votes and geopolitical position of our foes and adversaries? Could the character of international policy be changed at this time?

For all these reasons our ultimate victory, too, was unique of its kind, the first victory ever scored in such conditions and with such weapons. Its character was utterly consonant, to the *nth* degree, with the ice-age spirit of power politics. It was uncanny, a supermiracle, a marvel and a mystery.

The great miracle, of course, was the Soviet-American unity forged in the process of the decision to create the Jewish state, the solitary instance of such unity in the history of United Nations. The miracle seemingly

brought a new light and a fresh wind the like of which the political world had not known for many a day.

After it had happened, someone told me that several anti-Semites had commented: "Those damn Jews! They even bring America and Russia together when they want something."

Harold Beeley's apparently logical surmise that we were embarked on a fool's errand remained unfulfilled. The United States and the U.S.S.R. stood together, for a short while, over the cradle of Jewish independence.

Nor was it the only miracle in this chapter. The four British Dominions in concert deserted the mother country for the nonce and voted for the decision, despite the tradition of the British Commonwealth, which almost always votes solidly on international issues with its metropolis, despite the British interest in the problem, and despite the fact that Palestine was under British rule and in a strategic sector vital to Britain. It was a bold step. Canada, most important and loyal of the Dominions, led the rebels. Nor did the Canadians merely take a line opposing British policy; they displayed considerable and effective activity in promoting that line.

Had any dreamed before the General Assembly met that such a revolution would take place? Could we stake our hopes and political destiny upon its likelihood?

Nevertheless, the die was cast. France and the Benelux countries joined the pro-Partitionists despite the numerous difficulties and restraints, and the risks involved to their own vital interests. Only the ten Moslem states and three others voted against Partition. The November 29 decision was approved by the great two-thirds majority required.

The miracle became a fact and, inconceivably, a reality. The tremendous and almost unexpected turn of the situation came about, and once more the cards in the complex problem were reshuffled and a new game began, with a much better deal in our hand.

We were not drunk with victory. We knew that days, months, perhaps even years of a desperate struggle loomed ahead. General Hilldring defined the situation immediately after the vote as follows: "Planning is ten

per cent of any military operation; execution is ninety per cent. You've only just won ten per cent."

His remark summed up the feeling of us all. And, indeed, the first victims fell on the highways of Eretz Israel the next day. The second stage of the struggle began, the open fight against the pledged independence. The threats of the Arab leaders were no idle threats. They fanned the flames of war, and Jewish and Arab blood was spilled in profusion, on the roads, in the city outskirts, and in the fields.

We had only one single night of rejoicing. That evening we were virtually smothered in a torrent of congratulations and cablegrams from all sides, and were glad to hear one of the most brilliant advocates of the Arab cause remark that if he, as a lawyer and statesman, had had to present the Jewish case, he would have pursued exactly the same course as our own.

The day after the great victory we were already caught up in the atmosphere of the new struggle, closing our ranks to carry the burden of the new tasks that had sprung up before us.

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THE BATTLE BEGINS

The battle was joined at home. It now became clear that Britain had no intention of leaving the country in a manner which would facilitate the enforcement of U.N.'s decisions. It would do its best to thwart the Partition plan.

"Operation Chaos" was launched with the destruction of the country's administrative machinery and with the undermining of the security of life and property, while seventy-five thousand British troops were still garrisoning Palestine.

Gangs of Arab irregulars filtered across the open frontiers. The country's highways and byways became an inflammable powder-keg, and our ill-armed and ill-equipped convoys were left to defend themselves, while

the British searches jeopardized the scanty arms available. Constant gun-duels went on in Jerusalem, along the boundaries of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, and in Haifa. Jewish settlements were attacked here and there, and as reprisal Haganah blew up houses in the Arab villages implicated. The boundary quarters in the mixed cities became front lines, and victims fell on both sides daily. The military struggle began.

The British Army declared it could not maintain order. For five months several thousands of Jewish youths, carrying only light arms, held off the power of the Arab irregulars, who collapsed completely under their defeats at Mishmar Ha'Emek, on Mount Kastel, in Jaffa, Haifa, Tiberias, and Safad.

The British withdrawal was carried out in such a way as to enable the Arabs to seize extensive areas of the country and assemble their forces there. A similar Jewish area in Tel Aviv was established as a factitious "balance." But while the Arabs were able to import equipment and firearms uninterruptedly, the only Jewish means of entry by sea was sealed off by the British Navy, which maintained a strict blockade of all ports.

Our position was well-nigh intolerable, and some outlet had to be found. At our internal discussions we reviewed the possibilities of seeking the creation of an international force, demanding equipment from the United Nations and preparing for defense by all possible means. Political activity concentrated on feverish efforts to find weapons and the means of arming secretly.

Matters were at their most strained on the political front. The Palestine Commission—namely, the Implementation Commission—was weak and powerless. The Assembly faced the alternative of electing an independent, authoritative commission that would include several of the big powers and one of the dominions, to consider the submissions of both sides and exercise the full weight of its powers, or appointing a commission not necessarily representative of the stronger countries but none the less loyal and devoted to the decision under all circumstances. This commission would include coun-

tries like Guatemala, Uruguay, Poland, and Norway, and would at least have the power of decision and bold action.

But the Assembly chose neither. The commission representing Bolivia, Panama, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and the Philippines had no authority or power of decision, no great political weight, and no virtue of loyalty to the idea of the creation of the Jewish state. Karel Lisicky, the hesitant Czechoslovak, lacked decisiveness and daring. Federspiel, the Dane, and the delegate of the Philippines, the country that had changed its mind three times and only in the end agreed to vote for Partition, were among its members.

It seemed as though this composition had been deliberately chosen to deprive the body of all power, authority, and capacity for effective action. Many then believed it was the retort of the anti-Zionist forces intent upon whittling down the resolution and defeating it on the enforcement level.

It was not the only disquieting symptom on the political horizon. A Colonial Office representative who met Shertok and me said quite openly that he saw no possibility of negotiations between the British and ourselves in London. Negotiation was feasible only in Jerusalem with the Mandatory Administration—that is, on the administrative rather than the political level.

He also believed that war was inevitable, and there was no ground to suppose that Britain would allow us freely to use any one of the ports, as we had requested, nor, prior to termination of the Mandate, would it release the Jewish refugees interned on Cyprus.

As for the Implementation Commission, Great Britain could not permit its arrival before completing evacuation and liquidating the Mandatory Administration, for this step would mean duplication of government.

These tactics grieved many of us who had always cherished a profound sympathy for the British people and country. Although I knew, even in this difficult hour, that this was not a policy conceived by the British people, nor a true expression of the values of British Labour, it was not until our victory was consoli-

dated and orderly relations had been renewed between Israel and the British Government that my faith was restored. Then once again I had admiration for this fine, cultured, and gracious people.

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Palestine was on the agenda when the Security Council met for the first time after the November 29 resolution. Aubrey Eban and I were observers at the open meeting, with no right to intervene or express an opinion, and we sat alongside Camille Chamoun, Fadil Jamali, of Iraq, and other Arab representatives.

A certain tension was evident and we listened intently to the proceedings. The discussion confirmed our most gloomy surmises. Palestine was dripping blood, and the Security Council engaged in debating points of scholastic casuistry. Every word was weighed cautiously, lest it commit the speaker to some action.

The Arabs closely followed the Security Council's reactions and developments, and the question obviously gleamed in their eyes: how far can we go without arousing the wrath of the United Nations and bringing about their concrete intervention? When they heard the eventual formula, weak and void of all significance, you could see on their faces and in their glittering eyes what they were thinking—the principal hindrance had been removed, they could go as far as they liked without any deterrent. The threat of international force was gone. They had the green light.

We communicated our impressions to a meeting of the Executive. Our report was perturbing and alarming. The State Department was in process of retreat. England was doing its best to frustrate the enforcement of Partition. The Arabs, encouraged by the vacillation of the United Nations, were preparing for a decisive battle. The Arab League regarded the Palestine problem as mucilage to patch its fragments together. The Implementation Commission was weak and hesitant. We had no equipment, arms, or adequate financial means to purchase them. The crucial struggle for our

existence was approaching. The first flames were already licking at the corners of our home, and the Arabs apparently were on a winning pitch.

I resolved to go home. I had no wish to be away from the country at its most difficult time. On my way, I was asked to look into a number of matters in London concerning the fate of our currency, food supply, and political issues. Aubrey Eban and I were due to sail in the *Queen Mary* for Southampton.

Twenty-four hours before my departure, Shertok phoned me at my hotel and said he had to see me at once at a restaurant he named. I hurried over and found Lourie and Rufer with him. Shertok, who was about to return home, began with an account of the deteriorating position at Lake Success and said it would be unwise to have no political representative there at such a critical juncture.

Turning to me, he said: "You're the one who can direct our work at the United Nations. You must change your plans and stay on. You will have to keep in contact with the delegates here and represent us, especially as concerns the Security Council."

I was surprised and upset. Psychologically, I was not prepared to remain abroad. My plans, my feelings, urged me to return. I began giving him various arguments to justify my journey, but to no avail. Shertok, Lourie, and Rufer hammered away at me, and Shertok finally asked: "You aren't suggesting that we neglect Lake Success entirely at this time? Then what do you suggest?"

I suggested Aubrey Eban, who had been instructed to carry on the work in England and who was preparing to go there. My suggestion was finally accepted on condition I undertook to arrange it with him. He agreed; and I left the next day, arriving in London on December 17.

In London, I took part in the meeting of Agency representatives with the Colonial Secretary and his senior aides. We demanded arms for drivers, withdrawal of the Arab Legion, and security for road traffic. The British replies were evasive:

"Arming the drivers would be provocative and would increase the attacks on the road convoys. There's more security in unarmed convoys.

"The Arab Legion cannot be withdrawn, because the security position is so bad and British forces are inadequate.

"The British Government is concerned about the position and is in close communication with the High Commissioner."

Public opinion, occupied with domestic problems, was completely indifferent to what was going on in Palestine. Statesmen, newspapermen, and military officers with whom I spoke were remarkably vague and non-committal. They said a lot about impartiality and neutrality, which, in the prevailing conditions of the breached land frontiers, meant only one thing: an Arab campaign directed against us.

On the other hand, the British representatives asked us numerous times if we would remain loyal to the U.N. decision and not try to capture larger areas than had been assigned to us.

My reply to that was clear and unequivocal. I said that we would, of course, be loyal to the U.N. decisions if they were enforced by the United Nations and accepted by the Arabs. But if the Arabs used armed force against us and tried to thwart the U.N. decisions, we should regard ourselves as exempt from all obligations.

It was clear, I said, that implementation by warlike means was far different from peaceful implementation, and the U.N. decisions were based on the assumption of their being enforced by agreement and pacific measures. Moreover, the Arabs could not conduct a war with "limited liability." They had been offered a compromise and rejected it; they had chosen battle and war.

If they won, the compromise—the partition of the country—would be canceled out. If they were vanquished, they would have to accept that compromise as it stood, without change. There was no such thing as a war of this sort without risk. If it were possible to fight "wars of limited liability," without risking anything, the world would soon be turned into a continual battle-

field. The Arabs must take the risk of losing the advantages that the U.N. decisions also gave them.

I met an official of the U.S. Embassy. He suggested that we refrain from provocative action, not arm or ask for arms, but just hoist the United Nations flag and pin our faith to it. Our constant requests for arms simply spelled an expression of no confidence in U.N.O. and alienated it from us, while the import of heavy armaments was liable to drag the Arab states into the fighting. The few Arab gangs in the hills were no danger. They would disperse quickly enough on their own, and even if a few armed clashes occurred, that, too, was no disaster.

The main thing was to maintain confidence in the United Nations and the Security Council and avoid any provocation. The name of the United Nations should be used daily, we should keep our faith in it, and all would be well.

I did not doubt the good intentions of the man, but I knew that his attitude was the result of vacillation and fear of anything likely to annoy the Arabs. He believed it really possible to prevent a crucial conflict at this time.

I answered that his proposal appeared to me impractical. Our head was in the lion's mouth. We were surrounded by bloodthirsty enemies, and we were responsible for the fate and security of our people. We certainly would not allow ourselves to be wiped out for the sake of some fine slogan, be it even the spoken name of the United Nations Organization.

Harold Beeley was another whom I met. He was frank as always and maintained that our frontiers were not practical. "The Negev and Galilee are indefensible," he said. "You have a fairly large Arab minority. Partition is now unavoidable, but so is a conflict. You may find a way open later for peace, and you'll perhaps be left with a narrow coastal strip after the Arabs take Galilee and the Negev."

I hardly saw much comfort in the latter statement, and felt he was trying vainly to soften the blow of defeat which he was predicting. The interesting feature of

Beeley's military analysis was its resemblance to the forecast I had heard from that eminent British personage whom I had met at Dr. Weizmann's hotel in New York.



From London I flew to Geneva, with visions of the grim situation pursuing me. I knew we had no alternative but to defend ourselves. Arms, ammunition, equipment—those were the first and last of our demands. We must get arms by all means and at all costs. Our only hope lay in them; without them we were lost, with none to save us.

At Geneva I met our representatives who were engaged in acquiring, assembling, and transferring arms. It was difficult and tiring work. Armaments were only sold to states, and we were still not a state. Grave difficulties were encountered in shipping the consignments through various countries. There was little money, and the blockade of the ports in Palestine was rigidly enforced.

A— told me of several encouraging prospects that had cropped up in this field in the past few weeks. I was given the details of possible purchases and asked to report fully to David Ben-Gurion.

I left Geneva airport on December 29, one month after the historic decision at Lake Success. Tranquil Geneva, with its snow-capped Alps, the blue Adriatic, and the Mediterranean rolled swiftly away, and at nightfall we had landed at Lydda.

The airport seemed fairly quiet against the strife-torn background of the country. Armed groups of Jews and Arabs were at work under the vigilant guard of men on both sides disguised as clerks, porters, and the like. Each watched the other suspiciously. An air of mystery hung over the building.

British constables maintained the alleged peace somewhat indifferently, secure in the knowledge that they would be leaving in a few weeks, and, after them, the deluge.

I explored ways and means of reaching Tel Aviv. I was told that small aircraft took off each morning, and a place was reserved for me on the morrow's plane; but, I was told, if I wanted to take a chance that night, a Haganah man with a car was waiting for me.

It was a tempting offer. I was on edge and had urgent information for Ben-Gurion. The atmosphere of the country, the lurking dangers and stealth of it all, made me tingle all over in those first few moments after my arrival. I decided to go to Tel Aviv by car.

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THE SHOOTING WAR

JIt was pitch-dark when we left Lydda Airport, and armed British policemen opened the outer gates for us. We were on the lookout for land mines and attacks, especially around Yehudia, that notorious Arab village center of murderers and brigands. Our car sped through the darkness like an arrow.

It was only when we reached the outskirts of Petah Tikvah that our driver drew a deep breath and said: "Well, we're safe now." We covered the distance to Tel Aviv in record time and I was in my house within a few minutes.

I picked up the telephone and dialed Ben-Gurion's number. "David Horowitz speaking."

"You here? When did you arrive?" he exclaimed in surprise.

"Less than five minutes ago."

"What! How?"

"By plane from Geneva."

"I don't mean that. How did you come from Lydda to Tel Aviv?"

"By car."

"What, by car? It's dangerous, it's not safe at all. How could you do it?"

"At all events, I'm here, in Tel Aviv."

"Can you come at once?"

I was at his home in Keren Kayemeth Boulevard in Tel Aviv some minutes later. I gave him the information from A—at Geneva, and he then gave me an account of the position in Palestine. He told me of the defense organization in the Negev, the problem of arms, and our preparations for the future.

"We must organize our economic front parallel with our military front, and that's your job," he said.

I saw that he was entirely preoccupied with the military aspects of the situation, and that he was convinced the decision would be made on the battlefield. In view of the onerous military tasks looming, B.-G. pushed aside any other consideration or subject outside that orbit.

There was only one political problem exercising his mind: would the British really quit the country? I ventured my opinion that they had no alternative to evacuation after having gone so far. But B.-G. was skeptical of my conclusions and differed from me.

On returning home, my wife and I strolled out to Café Kassit, in Ben-Yehuda Street. Friends and acquaintances greeted me cordially and besieged me with questions. The radio was switched on some time later to get Haganah's underground broadcast. The announcer retailed the usual daily list of clashes and battles, his voice heard clearly in the hushed restaurant.

Distant shooting sounded from the direction of the Jaffa boundary. I was deeply impressed by the serious mood. The grim, set faces of the people around me reflected the dire emergency in the country as a whole.

But then, suddenly, I was filled with a glow of encouragement that suffused my whole being. The situation had seemed desperate and hopeless from afar. I had seen only the figures and what was written on paper. But here were the living people, the flesh and blood of the enterprise; I sensed the spirit, the wonderful indomitable spirit of the country and the Yishuv, and it inspired me to a strange elation compounded of hope and the forcefulness emanating from a collective experience. It transcended all rational considerations.

No less than the people around me, I knew how grave

the position loomed, how great the shortage of arms and ammunition, how superior the military strength of the enemy. Yet I sensed another spirit exuding from the realities around me, the spirit of determination and faith, in which is implicit its own triumphant invincibility.



Travel along the highways was difficult and precarious. Transport was under constant attack, and moved in convoys guarded by Palmach boys and girls armed with only light weapons of comparatively short range.

My son was in a most dangerous area, in the besieged Etzion bloc, on the Bethlehem-Hebron highway. One day I was informed from Jerusalem that he had arrived there in a convoy and was continuing to Tel Aviv to see me. When he finally turned up safely, it was as though we had not met for many years.

Meanwhile I was head over heels in work. One morning Moshe Shertok, who had arrived back in the country shortly after me, came into my office and asked, smilingly: "Can you tell me what possible harm will result to the Jewish people if you leave your work here and go to Lake Success at once?"

Sighing, I explained the importance of what I was doing and the difficulty of leaving. Shertok remained unconvinced.

"You're needed at Lake Success," he said. "We shall feel safer if you're there. I insist on your going back there at once. But if you feel you ought not to go, I'll discuss it with Eliezer Kaplan when we meet at Geneva, and will cable you our final decision."

No sooner had Shertok left the country again than cables came urging me to follow him. Kaplan, who arrived home, told me Shertok insisted on my being released at once to go abroad.

I saw there was no alternative but to bow to the inevitable, but it was with a heavy heart. I felt my place was here at home. My son was about to return to the

Etzion bloc, that tiny Jewish island, surrounded by a vast Arab community of eighty thousand persons, which had just fought a desperate battle with thousands of attackers. The Jewish defenders were pitifully few and pitifully armed. The entire Yishuv was in trepidation for their fate.

My wife was remaining in Tel Aviv. All my friends were taking their share of the common effort. Bullets whizzed through the chill winter air. The country was embattled. How could I leave it at this time, in these conditions?

But leave I must and did.

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The Air France plane landed me in New York in twenty-six hours. The restless, unconcerned hubbub and tumult of the skyscraper metropolis increased my spiritual depression.

Shertok, whom I met shortly after arrival, had arranged a conference for me the next day with other members of the Agency delegation and said he had held up a number of important matters with a view to consulting with me.

When I awoke early the next morning and opened the paper, I was thrown into a turmoil. The first reports had arrived of the ambush and murder of the thirty-five Haganah youths who had been marching through the hills toward the Etzion settlements. The vague, incomplete information filled me with dread, which was accentuated by fears for the safety of my son, who had left with the intention of trying to reach Etzion by whatever means or routes.

I was unable to get further news from local agencies. I decided to telephone Tel Aviv. The operator said the connection would be closed down after three o'clock that afternoon, but she would do her best to get the call through before then.

It was a long and painful wait. I remained in my room. At half past two I was told that connections had been broken off for technical reasons. I urged her to go

on trying, though the operator felt there was little prospect of success.

At seven minutes to three o'clock I called the exchange again and asked what was the earliest I could be connected with Tel Aviv the next day. To my astonishment, the girl replied that she had had Tel Aviv on the wire but could not connect me, because my line was busy. It is not the custom in New York, as elsewhere, to interrupt a local conversation for an overseas call.

My excited anger jolted her composure and she promised to make another effort to put me through. The call was connected at three minutes to the hour. My son came on; he had not yet left Tel Aviv. The conversation with my wife and son calmed me somewhat. I left for the conference with the delegation.

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The Implementation Commission headed by Karel Lisicky had only just begun its work. It was immediately swamped by a sea of files and documents, and became snarled up in long procedural discussions. It was completely divorced from the facts and developments of the situation in Palestine, where the strife was mounting, and its uselessness was evident.

Karel Lisicky had dubbed his associates and himself "five lonely pilgrims," a true expression of the defeatist and despairing spirit seizing them long before they took their first steps. The commissioners were conscious of their helplessness and had no confidence in their ability to cope with the massive forces and situations pitchforked around them. They groped and blundered along in bewilderment.

The political skies continued to grow more sinister. The opponents of the November 29 decision were emboldened once more. American policy in the matter had gone into reverse.

The British attitude was much worse than America's. A responsible British Minister predicted that it would be impossible to prevent a position similar to that in Spain in the thirties from occurring in Palestine.

The probability grew that King Abdullah would join the campaign. The Arab Legion, a well-trained and well-equipped force, was under direct British influence. It seemed as if the British intended using it to defeat both the Yishuv and the ex-Mufti at one and the same time, and present Abdullah as the liberator of the country. This would re-establish British prestige in the Middle East and enable them to come back into Palestine by the back door after having left through the front.

Arising out of this policy was the British authorities' refusal of permission for the Implementation Commission to go to Palestine, on the pretext that it would provoke the Arabs—as though it were still possible to placate them at a time when the fighting was in full swing.

The secretary of the Commission was my friend Ralph Bunche, the only one of its personnel distinguished by clarity, energy, and practical ability. I met him in his office at Lake Success and poured forth all the bitterness of my heart. He listened and forbore to express any opinion, and it was only at our second conversation that he opened up and ventured to say something. He indicated that he was familiar with the situation, and we must be prepared for the worst. I was able to infer his own bitter feeling over the fact that the situation had been allowed to develop as it did. Although he spoke cautiously and with great restraint, it appeared to me that he was deeply grieved and perturbed by the British behavior.

When I described the conspiracy hatched against us, he could not help bursting out: "You yourself don't know how much truth there is in what you're saying."

His manner and the way he said it were an additional testimony to the man's fine personality, his great wisdom, quick perception, and broad outlook, and, above all, his tremendous energy. But his hands were tied, and not even his own brilliant personality was able to fire the enthusiasm of the members on the feeble, impotent commission of which he was secretary.

(49) THE MESHES FROM LONDON

Won the 21st of January 1948 Sir Alexander Cadogan appeared before the Commission and stated: "The story which the Jews are telling that the Arabs are the attackers cannot stand up under examination. The Arabs have decided to show that they will not submit tamely to the U.N. plan to carve up the country while the Jews are trying to consolidate the advantage they won at Lake Success by a series of intimidating operations designed to rid the Arabs of any will to further resistance."

One of the commission members hit the nail on the head when he remarked to me: "The British want to create a vacuum in Palestine, but they're refusing to hand over even that vacuum."

Infiltrations across every border continued. Fawzi el Kaukji massed his forces in the hills of Samaria, which British troops had evacuated; the ex-Mufti's gangs assembled in the hills of Judea under the command of Abdul Kader el Husseini, one of his kinsmen, and carried out attacks on Jewish traffic and settlements. The British Administration was being swiftly wound up, and "Operation Chaos" progressed by leaps and bounds, destroying any trace of law and order still reigning in the small, tempestuous land. The Implementation Commission was a broken reed, but we held on to it as best we could.

Per T. Federspiel, the Dane, a sensitive man who was a typical specimen of the advantages and shortcomings of European culture, did not conceal his doubts or defeatism. Striking an inept note, though in an entirely friendly spirit, he suggested that we should settle with Abdullah and the British on the basis of concessions in immigration policy within a binational state. His personality was a mixture of elegance and sophistication, like a handsome scarlet gladiolus of which some of the petals have begun to wither.

Karel Lisicky wanted an international force at all costs, and toyed with the idea of presenting an ultimatum to the Security Council that there was no possibility of implementation without such a force. I warned him against the move, that might be the thin end of the wedge which would lead to the U.N. decision being abrogated, but he differed from me and argued that enforcement by use of the Haganah was inadmissible for political reasons.

He was convinced that the countries that supported Partition were unaware of the serious position at the time, and he saw no practical way out of the tangle. He was also skeptical of our estimate, of which I tried to persuade him, that a small international constabulary of about ten thousand men was sufficient to enforce the U.N. decision, if it were a well-equipped, mechanized, and armored force, supported by a fair-sized air unit. He estimated that a minimum establishment of one hundred thousand men would be required.

Our arguments concerning the need to maintain the good reputation of the United Nations and citing the failure of the League of Nations in its weak and faltering efforts in Abyssinia, Spain, and Manchuria, which led directly to the Second World War, aroused little attention in the cynical and hard-boiled political world around us. Morality, justice, and international obligations were stripped of all tangible significance by the adamant objective considerations arrayed against us. The spirit of the age defeated us. Recovering from the slight "divergence" of the 29th of November, the political world was back in its old grooves.

The Pakistan delegate, who had fought so sternly against Partition in the Assembly, now appeared in a debate with his Hindu neighbor before the Security Council and repeated word for word the same arguments we had put forward to justify Partition a few weeks earlier at Lake Success! What was no good for Palestine was apparently fine in India—a case of one man's poison being another man's meat. That was the real political likeness of the contemporary world, the background against which a small, despairing, friend-

less people had to fight in a society without vision or feeling.

The proposal came up in some political circles to reconvene the Assembly in order to revoke the November 29 decision.

The Arabs rejoiced. The campaign was reinvigorating the disintegrating Arab League and providing a diversionary target for the social grievances of their resentful masses. Their representatives and propagandists at Lake Success produced a whole fabric of complex legal sophistry with the purpose of showing that the Assembly's decision was illegal because it was "only a recommendation." The proposition found ready ears among all those who aspired to cancel the decision and wash their hands clean of the whole affair.

The British stuck to their guns. But there were dissentients among them as well. A British statesman whom I met differed strongly from the line his Government had taken. He regarded it as the result of error and blind obstinacy and obsolete credo with no forward-looking elements. The Foreign Office had always tried to maintain equitable relations with Moslem India and the Moslem world generally in order to protect the route to India; but now that India had gained its independence, the consideration had lost its pungency and validity. The Foreign Office pursued an archaic habit of mind. It was even more extreme than the Mandatory Administration itself. Whereas the latter deemed its natural duty to be maintenance of law and order until expiry of the Mandate, the Foreign Office was inexorably bent on prosecuting the policy of chaos. The High Commissioner, for example, had urged that a stockpile of food commodities be stored in Palestine, but the Foreign Office demurred, and it was only after a long exchange of cabled dispatches that London yielded to Jerusalem's request.

Meanwhile, without consultation or prior warning, the announcement was made excluding Palestine from the sterling bloc, and adding another to our load of political and military worries.

Naughton, the Canadian whose turn it was to be Chairman of the Security Council, and some of his aides. The meeting took place in the Canadian delegation's offices. During the Second World War the general had been in the running for supreme command of all Allied land forces in Europe. He had a number of remarkable gifts and qualities, which, on the surface, hardly seemed to fit in with each other. He was a brilliant soldier, a renowned physicist and mathematician, and a diplomat of eminent stature.

Shertok gave a long review of the circumstances and enforcement of the November 29 decision, and I added further particulars. We dwelt on the significant relationship of our problem to the future of U.N.O. Then we pointed out that the Jews, who were carrying out U.N.O.'s decision, were being discriminated against by being refused arms and the means for defense preparations, in contrast to the Arabs, who were transgressing it. Although every source from which we could get arms was closed to us, the Arabs, who admitted their aggressiveness, were able to arm uninterrupted.

General MacNaughton refrained from commenting and contented himself with asking a number of shrewd questions, but I felt he keenly appreciated and was sympathetic with our position and feelings in the matter.

The Security Council met two days later. Karel Lisicky, tired, downcast, and hesitant as usual, submitted a report. It was marked by indecision, disappointment, and despair. The highlight of the proceedings was a most ambiguous United States statement, which heightened our suspicions.

When the session ended, General MacNaughton tried to console me. "The matter is still in the development stage and I'm glad at the way it's going," he said. "I believe we'll reach a satisfactory arrangement in the end."

I was surprised at his optimism and parted from him cordially, but my feeling of oppression did not lift. One of the American delegation asked me how an international force of ten thousand men would be sufficient if the British could not govern the situation with an army

ten times as strong. I explained that the U.N. body would be backed by a Jewish population of seven hundred thousand, and described the role of Haganah in defense against aggression as it appeared to us. "It's a fight for our existence," I said, "and we're prepared to take the brunt."

We continued to condemn the grotesque situation in which those abiding loyally by the U.N. decision were being prevented from getting arms, while the aggressors were getting a constant stream. This attitude, we said, was condonation and encouragement of aggression. That aggression it was and who was the aggressor could not even be considered a controversial issue, in view of Arab pronouncements, and threats.

Dr. Weizmann, who was in ill health at the time, rose from his sickbed to meet American personages, and in talks with President Truman was able to prepare the ground for the change in the American attitude that came about with the proclamation of the State of Israel.

We had close and cordial relations with the U.N. Secretariat, and Shertok had many meetings with Trygve Lie, who did much to promote the execution of the resolution.

At home the sanguinary conflicts went on. The realization that the physical contest would determine our fate was growing daily. The world press reported the battles and attacks with great "impartiality," as though this were just another dispute between Arabs and Jews, with no reference whatever to the United Nations and its decision, collective security, or differentiation between aggression and defense. The dispatches dealt principally with Arab victories, and the general view was that our prospects of surviving were faint. Our chances on the military front, without the aid of an international police unit, seemed as grim and hopeless as the political chances; and no such unit had been set up, or, according to the portents, was in the offing at all. Could we survive on our own in such conditions?

Concurrently with our efforts to secure the establishment of a world force, we actively urged a Jewish militia and the provision of arms and equipment. These

representations met with the objections of the Implementation Commission, which refused to recognize Haganah or accept responsibility for its operations.

A vigorous discussion broke out in America over Haganah's reprisals and offensives and we had to explain to the Commission and the representatives of other powers that it was impossible to define, from a military viewpoint, artificial limits such as abstention from offensive actions. The political question was to determine the attacker, but once the battle was joined, tactical actions had to be governed by purely military factors and considerations. If we refrained from attacking the enemy, he would be relieved of the necessity of defending his positions and thereby be able to deploy his forces to hit us at the spot most convenient to himself, whereas we, with our scattered units, would be unable to hold out. We added that we were ready to halt the fighting on the basis of the November 29 decision, but so long as we came under fire, we had to operate in accordance with military dictates and compel the enemy to disperse his strength, for the danger of attack confronted us in every part of the country.

The military situation in Palestine was deteriorating rapidly. Ben-Gurion cabled an alarming SOS reporting the substantial increase of the Arab forces, that the Iraqis controlled Jaffa and its environs, Fawzi Kaukji's forces were concentrated in the notorious "Triangle" (the area between Nablus, Tulkarem, and Jenin, in hinterland Samaria), and that Jerusalem was threatened with being cut off. Arab equipment and arms were far superior in number to ours, their command and military abilities were rapidly improving, and the stream of aid in men and matériel from the neighboring territories was mounting.

These reports were grave and alarming. We knew that we could only mount a small, hastily organized force, limited in training and equipment. Our sacrifices were increasing, though we still had the upper hand in the "battle of the highways" to keep the communication routs open. The grim military position also had harmful political repercussions, and a foremost

American military leader expressed his bitter disappointment with our military strength.

Several problems obsessed us:

Would the power of will and sacrifice alone sustain us against the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in heavy armaments and numbers?

Could the Yishuv's "Dunkirk spirit" alone aid it in this dark hour?

What was the strength of the forces we should eventually have to meet? Palestinian Arabs alone, armed gangs filtering in from adjoining countries, or perhaps an organized invasion of Arab regular armies?

The last question was not military alone, but one of first-class political import, the key to which was held by Washington, London, and Lake Success no less than Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Baghdad. The prevention of an organized Arab invasion by regular troops was the function of the Security Council. But would that body display the requisite firmness to deter the Arab states from their intents?

The reply to that was subject to considerable doubt. Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Britain and China, were opposed to us, and the other members were hesitant and vacillating.

The Chinese delegations had its offices on one of the upper floors of a large skyscraper building situated on one of New York's busiest avenues. One morning three Jewish Agency representatives—Chaim Greenberg, member of the Zionist Executive, Aubrey Eban, and I—were received there by Dr. T. V. Tsiang, leader of the Chinese U.N. delegation and its representative on the Security Council. Tsiang was among our sworn adversaries, and his country's abstention from the November 29 vote had been carried out against his desires. If the Chinese Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Wellington Koo, had not intervened, there was no doubt that Chiang Kai-shek's Government would have said "No" in the crucial Assembly balloting.

Yet the smile did not leave Dr. Tsiang's face throughout our conversation, nor did he indicate by the flicker of an eyelash what he thought of our representations.

He said that he did not believe the position of our national home would be at all comfortable, because it would suffer from the jealousy and quarrelsomeness of its neighbors. Later he said he would have to give careful consideration whether to deal with the problem from the aspect of the need to implement the U.N. decision or on the merit of the issue itself.

We, for our part, dwelt on the necessity of opposing all aggression and reminded him of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, with its effect on the League of Nations. The fate of the United Nations hung in the balance over this affair. On the other hand, war involved the danger of our physical decimation, which the Security Council was able to circumvent.

Dr. Tsiang defined our case as "a problem of peoples," without solution, and in his capacity as a professor of history he remarked that he could not understand why we did not assimilate. Of course, he knew as a historian how difficult assimilation was; nations were as obstinate and unyielding as steel or granite, and even people without a historic past, like the Filipinos, refused to assimilate. Yet, he observed, if we did so, we should make it much easier for ourselves and for others. A prior condition, of course, was to root out anti-Semitism.

"The examples you gave are the best argument against your thesis," I told the Chinese envoy. "Our people are the most heavily burdened by history. It is not, therefore, a problem of anti-Semitism alone, but primarily one of the dormant creative forces and aspirations of our nation."

Dr. Tsiang admitted that the disappearance of anti-Semitism was a most doubtful eventuality. Our conversation developed along historiosophical lines, in the course of which he displayed broad knowledge and typical Chinese courtesy, but it had no practical result. He concluded his remarks with the statement that he awaited instructions from his Government, and the smiling mask continued to conceal his true thoughts and feelings.



The Implementation Commission went on wrestling with the complexities. While some of its members urged it to go to Palestine at once, in spite of the British ban, it was said of one man that he expressed readiness to accept any course except being compelled to risk the journey to Palestine, where security was so precarious. It was finally resolved, as a compromise, to send a party of U.N. officials to Palestine as an advance guard for the Commission, and to this, without any display of excessive enthusiasm, the British consented.

There was an extraordinary willingness among U.N. Secretariat personnel to volunteer for the job. A spirit of international suprapatriotism based on allegiance to the U.N.O. and its purposes was growing among world civil servants and inspired them to a general readiness to accept the hazards in a turbulent area in order to perform a historic function.

The leader of the first group was a Spanish Republican diplomat, Dr. Pablo Azcarate, and it included a distinguished Norwegian military specialist, Colonel Rosher Lund, a confidant of the U.N. Secretary-General.

During that period Shertok and I assisted Yishuv emissaries in raising funds to purchase arms and equipment. I reminded a gathering of several American Jewish leaders that not long since we had lost the majority of European Jewry, whom money could not save. There was no necessity to lose the Yishuv; but to protect it, defense measures had to be provided, and that needed money. The wealth of American Jewry could help the Yishuv, now shedding its blood; and the more weapons, the more armor, and the more defense instruments it was given, the less blood would be shed. I told of a number of incidents of valor and gave other information I had obtained during my short stay at home a few weeks earlier.

The news was depressing: mounting casualties, vital routes cut off, shortage of arms, equipment, and men, the tightening ring of Arab fire. I had little news from home, but was assured that my son was safe, though his whereabouts were unknown. I gathered he had been able

to get back to Etzion in a convoy that broke through the Arab cordon.

Our political situation grew worse. The feeling gnawed us that we were being cynically betrayed by all around us and had been left without compunction to wage the struggle alone and unaided. The world press pursued its course of covering the battles with so-called impartiality, and it seemed that none but ourselves remembered that this was a war against the world's conscience and the U.N. decision.

BACK HOME AGAIN

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Suspense, anxiety, grief, and despair lacerated our nerves to the breaking-point and, unable to endure it any longer, I became ill. I wrestled with my illness in a room on the seventeenth story of a skyscraper hotel in midtown New York.

The days were piercingly cold, and snow lay thick everywhere. I looked out over the wonderful panorama of white-blanketed Central Park from my window, and the eerie sight of stark leafless trees and open ground muffled by the crystal pall added to my sense of isolation and exile in the delirium of illness.

As a feeling that the end was approaching swept over me, the scenes of my life passed through my mind. The rosy days of childhood at home in Galicia; the sweet, noble, loving face of my mother; the faces of my father and mentor, my brothers and sisters and friends. . . . The First World War, and flight on the last train out of Lvov. . . . The refugee life in Vienna, where I went to school in the mornings and sold newspapers on the street in the evenings. . . . The youth-movement club, in which I was one of the leaders and instructors, flaming emotions of adolescence, with its fervent idealism and ardent love of a far-off land I had never seen. . . . Secret preparation for pioneer settlement, and then the

journey. . . . Finally, the translation from secondary school in Europe to *kibbutz* life in Eretz Israel; days of back-breaking labor in road-building, living in tents; later, swamp drainage at Nuris in the Plain of Esdraelon, and settlement at Beth Alpha, at the foot of Mount Gilboa. . . .

The years pass. . . . Membership in *Gdud Avodah*, wrestling with spiritual difficulties and inner dissensions. . . . Long days of unemployment and idleness, cooling my heels at the labor exchange in vain expectation of work; ah, the days of desolation and defeat! . . .

I remembered the basement in the *Davar* newspaper building on Allenby Street in Tel Aviv, where I worked in company with Moshe Shertok on editing its English weekly supplement; and then the appointment on the Jewish Agency's staff. . . . The past three years of political activity; London and the Colonial Office, Geneva and the Palace of the Nations, New York and the corridors of U.N. Headquarters at Lake Success, meetings with the eminent, and the thrilling moment at Flushing Meadow on that Saturday evening in late November. . . . My home in Tel Aviv beckoning to me, a distant vision. . . .

These and other facets of my life passed before my eyes as the sum total of forty-nine years of living until that bleak winter's day early in 1948. What next? Achievement or oblivion from which there was no refuge? Were the Jewish people marching toward their Musa Dagh, as the Armenians had? Was there no escape from the fate of the Warsaw ghetto, this new Masada?

I knew but one thing: we should defend ourselves, be it the last act of our existence. Yet a heavy oppression lay over me, more grinding than any I had ever experienced; and it was made worse by the unbearable nostalgia for home and the struggling, fighting country, Tel Aviv and family and friends.

It was clear to me I could do no more in my present condition, nor overcome my malady and physical weakness. I refused a suggestion to enter one of the best hospitals in New York, irrational though the refusal was,

and one morning left for La Guardia Airport to fly home, to Palestine, by Air France. I knew of no other place where I could recover, gain new health and strength, and continue with my work.

Two reporters with open notebooks met me at the airport.

"What errand are you going to Tel Aviv on, Mr. Horowitz?"

"To get medical treatment."

They smiled unbelievably, I was fooling them. I could think of no more credible pretext. Was it conceivable, they probably reflected, that any man in his senses would leave New York, where the finest medical knowledge was available, to be treated in out-of-the-way Tel Aviv? And Palestine in flames and running with blood at that, with its explosions and shootings and street battles? Come now, Mr. Horowitz, do you think for a moment we believe that Palestine is the best health resort in the world at the moment? Are you poking fun at us? Do you think we're complete fools?

That, no doubt, was what the cynical newspapermen must have thought about the silly excuses and evasions of these Jewish Agency people whom they met. But how could I assure them it was the genuine truth, strange and incredible though it sounded?

The aircraft flew off into the gray overcast above New York. Homeward bound! It was a consoling reflection. Home—to that strange, fascinating land, with its gray rocks and amber sands and blue skies, rocked by explosions and covered by the smoke of burning pyres and drenched with blood, but my own land. . . .



I went straight to bed on getting home in Tel Aviv, and there, for three days, a stream of friends, colleagues, and Agency people came to visit me, giving me a picture of the situation. I reported fully to Ben-Gurion, who was among the visitors, on the political struggle and conveyed the belief of our associates in New York, especially

Shertok, that a provisional state council ought to be set up at once so as to endow the Agency representatives with plenipotentiary powers.

Yet we were not oblivious of the fact that the November 29 decision was in the balance and faced the danger of revision.

Another of my visitors, Israel Galili, gave a disturbing account of our military position and the dearth of arms and ammunition. Small quantities were coming in as clandestine shipments, but they were so scanty as to have no possible effect on the situation.

By doctor's orders I went into hospital for examination. After the first day under observation, a group of doctors filed into the ward and surrounded my bed. It worried me no end. I thought I was suffering from a rare disease and that this was a top-flight medical consultation.

They surveyed me silently for a few moments, and one asked: "Are you David Horowitz?"

I returned a faint affirmative.

"Is it true you arrived from New York two days ago?"

I could not deny it.

"Is it true you came back to get medical attention here in Tel Aviv?"

Correct, I answered.

The doctor smiled, introduced himself and his colleagues, and said they wanted to see the man who had come all the way from the United States to get treatment at the Beilinson Hospital of Kupat Holim. It was an unusual compliment they had never had before. I burst out laughing, greatly relieved.

Eliezer Kaplan came to see me in the hospital the next day.

"When can you discharge him? There's a lot of urgent work waiting," he told my doctor.

"When do you need him?" Dr. Harry Heller countered.

"As of yesterday."

Kaplan spoke of the critical economic position, the chaos and difficulties of supply, and the unprecedented

job of financing the creation of a state and getting the funds to equip an army.

I was under observation for a week and finally asked my doctor: "What's the diagnosis, after all?"

"Lake Succitis," he cracked.

It was overwork and worry, which had slightly impaired my digestive processes and caused some disturbance.

I was able to return to work—to help in preparing for the crucial period in which we would have to stand alone face to face with the Arabs—and with ourselves.

the DECLARATION (51) of INDEPENDENCE

The whole of the country was in the grip of battle. Rifle and mortar fire rent the sky, explosions robbed the nights of peace. Every able-bodied man, young or middle-aged, was on guard, in the trenches or on the highways, on full-time or part-time service.

The front line in Tel Aviv ran along the boundary with Jaffa, a few hundred yards from the city center. The stranglehold of the Arab noose was being drawn tighter around the neck of the Yishuv.

Kaukji's armies continued to assemble and train in the Samaria Triangle, and recruits with arms flocked in from the adjoining countries. The British maintained their stringent coastal blockade and prevented any reinforcements and, more important, arms and equipment from reaching us.

Moshe Shertok cabled asking me to be the liaison between our associates in Palestine and our representatives at Lake Success. His first request was for cabled authorizations from all parties and groups in the Yishuv empowering our Lake Success delegation to represent Palestine Jewry before the Implementation Commission. It was no easy task procuring these warrants, and I had

some interesting surprises. While the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Sternists), for example, gave their consent without reservation or haggling, the Revisionists and Union of Sephardic Jews made endless difficulties and bargained closely over every clause and condition, without reference to the dire emergency in which we stood above a yawning chasm.

But my principal activity lay in the economic and financial sphere. Haganah demanded increasingly larger amounts of money, and we set up a taxation and customs authority of our own. We even began, illegally, levying a number of taxes. We advised the Jewish population to suspend all tax payments to the Mandatory Government and await the establishment of the state, or make payment directly to ourselves.

Yet these amounts were only a drop in the ocean of needs. The funds coming in through the Yishuv's Mobilization and Redemption Campaign were inadequate. We began to organize the first national loan and banking credits, and embarked on other financial devices to raise the money required.

Day after day, representatives of the Haganah command and its treasury echelon turned up at my office to remind us of our onerous responsibility. That responsibility exercised us unremittingly. The feeding, clothing, equipping, and commissioning of an army in the field demanded money, money, and yet more money, and Kaplan and I had to find it by any means, as we did.

Then there were the economic worries. Long lines of people stood outside the provision stores, and the first symptoms of shortage set in. The Yishuv had to be supplied with food.

Work at the refineries in Haifa Bay was about to be halted. We had to get a fuel stockpile for Haganah and industry.

These were state needs, which had to be met without the help of state instruments. We knew that the military campaign could not succeed without effective organization of the economic front. In modern war, especially in a country as small as ours, there are no longer a separate front and rear. Factories and plants worked at full blast

on army ordnance. There was, it is true, no heavy-armament industry. Field pieces, rifles, machine guns, and ammunition had to be brought from abroad. But the underground Haganah factories had long engaged in producing mortars, light automatic weapons of the Sten-gun type, hand-grenades, landmines, antitank arms, and explosives. This had now to be taken over by private plants as well.

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One evening, as I was going home after having reviewed the position at Lake Success to a crowded audience at the "Vocal Newspaper," one of Tel Aviv's adult-education institutions, I met a friend who said that a short while earlier the report had come in of America's secession from its support of Partition.

The next day people were more grim-faced and pale than even in the most critical days. Consternation was rife. I met Golda Meyerson at her room in the Kaete Dan Hotel. Her comment, compounded of emotional determination and defiance, was the authentic expression of the Yishuv's attitude generally.

A few hours later a new fighting slogan came from Ben-Gurion: "You won't have a state given you on a silver platter—a state must be won."

It was a tight-lipped decision where no alternative existed, the hope that was bred of desperation, and the spirit that surged through the fighting Yishuv as its ship of state plowed manfully through the stormy waters.

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A National Administration of thirteen members was set up from the membership of the executives of the Jewish Agency and Vaad Leumi (National Council), plus representatives of Agudath Israel and the Union of Sephardic Jews. David Ben-Gurion was elected the head, and the foreign-affairs portfolio went to Moshe Shertok. Eliezer Kaplan had charge of economic and financial affairs.

The other portfolios for the organization of the various tasks of converting the Yishuv into statehood were

distributed, and the National Administration began energetically to create the instruments of sovereign government which were to succeed the Mandatory agencies.

The foremost problem remained that of military and defense measures to counter the daily materializing danger of invasion by the Arab states. The three possibilities had been a struggle with the Palestine Arabs alone, with the Palestine Arabs supported by large bands of infiltrators from neighboring lands, and a general incursion by Arab armies. The first had been dissipated, the second was a fact, and the third—gravest of the three—was now unfolding.

Moreover, it was evident beyond all shadow of doubt that no international aid whatever could be expected, not even by way of equipment of a Jewish militia if this were set up. The state was about to be born in the most inconceivably difficult conditions. The adjurations by the delegates of Holland and New Zealand and by General Hilldring in the Assembly, and Dr. Bunche's later warning, that any decision for Partition was useless without the power of enforcement, were now being substantiated with tragic emphasis.

The only possible course open to us was to implement the U.N. resolution ourselves, and to achieve independence with our own hands and by our own blood, sweat, toil, and tears.

David Ben-Gurion performed a function of historic magnitude in the crystallization of this indomitable purpose, and it was he who became the dominant impulse and co-ordinating force, the guide and leader of his people.



The battle of the settlements was added to the battle of the highways. Tirat Zvi, the Etzion bloc, Yehiam, Ataroth, the Negev outposts, and finally Mishmar Ha'Emek shared in the saga of gallantry as the Arab tides were flung back. As these outlying settlements were of no great strategic value in relation to the effort, and large casualties were required to storm them, the at-

tacks were the first of the Arabs' tactical blunders.

We at first attached crucial importance to these out-post battles and were compelled to spread our forces thinly, but we soon learned that the principal thing was to smash enemy strength and not to hold out at each isolated spot. The war thus assumed a new character.

On the other hand, the Yishuv was encouraged and solaced by the fact that all Arab attacks ended in defeat. They did not capture their objectives.

The highway fighting went badly, however, and drew off the cream of our fighters, costing many and precious lives.

The High Commissioner, General Cunningham, remarked in a conversation with B.-G. that as an old soldier he could not understand our military tactics or logic at all. The same view was held by an army colonel, a friend from one of the smaller western European countries, who inspected our defense system at our request.

The danger of complete severance of communications between various parts of the country lay in these convoy battles. A large convoy of scores of vehicles was way-laid between Etzion and Jerusalem, and its men had to scramble under fire to take up positions in a deserted Arab house alongside the highway. Jerusalem heard the appeals for assistance radioed by the besieged convoy fighters for two days on end while they faced butchery, with no possibility of help until the British Army stepped in. They were saved at the cost of handing their transport and rifles over to the Arab attackers.

A far worse incident was the destruction of a convoy to Yehiam, in western Galilee, when over forty Haganah men lost their lives in the desperate combat.

The iron ring around Jerusalem was tightened, and the city came under merciless blockade. Large, well-equipped forces were needed to smash the Arab besiegers, but they were not at our disposal. Our task was difficult: to create a long, narrow corridor through the hills which would link the coastal plain with the mountaintop city, surrounded on three sides and faced by superior enemy odds, and to convey supplies of food, arms, equipment, and ordnance along the bottleneck.

From a military viewpoint it was an insane venture, yet there was no alternative. That was the initiation of the immortal "Operation Nahshon."

An incident that occurred in the early days of April 1948 was the origin of the operation. A small vessel had slipped through the British naval blockade and secretly unloaded a cargo of arms, mortars, and a large quantity of ammunition. The whole affair came close to being a miracle, and all who knew of it had tears of joy in their eyes. I still recollect the beaming face of the Haganah commander whom I met a day later as he told me of the first large vital shipment, which had been brought safely ashore the previous night.

The use of these arms brought "Operation Nahshon" into being, and the blockade of Jerusalem was lifted. It was an act of desperation and courage, to achieve which all the forces at our disposal were thrown in, as if our whole destiny were staked on that solitary card. Many people believe, indeed, that the turning-point in highway warfare and the first great victory were scored by the capture of Mount Kastel, dominating the western highway out of Jerusalem.

Victories became more frequent later and continued until the Arab invasion on the 15th of May 1948. "Operation Nahshon" and the capture of Tiberias, the swift and astounding liberation of Haifa, the occupation of Jaffa, Safad, Beisan, and a long list of other Arab towns and villages cheered the Yishuv, freed it of the menace on the highways, and initiated a new phase of the struggle.

The imminent invasion by the Arab armies, of which the Arab press crowed boastfully and which Haganah's intelligence service confirmed, would no longer find a strange seesaw of Jewish and Arab zones, each commanding the other's centers and lines of communication, but a compact and organized Jewish area arrayed against them along the whole long front from Metullah in the north to Asluj in the south.

That was the setting for the crucial test.

We entered upon the testing-period under the most cumbersome conditions and almost destitute of means for defense.

The 700,000 Jewish inhabitants of Israel had to face the trained armies of states which had a combined population of 40,000,000 people.

These armies, built up and provided with the best equipment during thirty years of Arab independence, were being faced by a force that was the result of hasty improvisation. The Jewish defenders lacked heavy armaments, artillery, armor, and aircraft and had no organized outside aid. No wonder, then, that many had balked at the decision whether to hazard our fate on this one throw.

Was this the proper time to proclaim statehood? Didn't such a decision border on lunacy and a reckless disregard of the actual balance of forces, the superior odds against us? These and like questions were raised by the dubious, and while none proposed an alternative to constituting the State of Israel immediately, everyone realized the historic responsibility of this bold step.

Colonel X, the friend who had inspected Haganah dispositions and front-line points, undertook a thorough-going review and was given all available information by Haganah of its accouterments, arms, numbers of men, and standard of training. His report was gloomy and made no attempt to limn a hopeful picture. He stated that our position was worse than that of Norway in 1940. We were being pushed into a narrow strip along the seashore in the worst possible strategic conditions. Galilee and the Negev were a sagging burden on our resources of manpower and equipment, and moreover we lacked tanks, artillery, and aircraft.

The enemy, he pointed out, had every advantage in the types of armaments and ordnance of which we were short, and our dispersal benefited him by facilitating the defeat of our forces, which were vainly striving to defend each individual point.

As a friend, the colonel pleaded with our leaders to refrain from any rash move and to seek a compromise to gain time. That, too, was the counsel and well-considered

opinion of many of our friends, genuinely alarmed over our predicament.

The Chief Operations Officer of Haganah, Yigal Yadin (later Rav-Aloof and Chief of Staff, Defense Army of Israel), reported on the position at a meeting of the National Administration—Minhalat Ha'Am. It was similarly no encouraging picture he gave—an uncertain future in which the ascent from our plight to victory appeared long and arduous, and even impossible by all rational calculations.

Nevertheless, there was no other course. The alternative was puerile surrender, physical extinction, and the complete effacement of the Yishuv.

The fight, then, was for life or death; and the innate strength of the Yishuv was in that *Ein B'reira*—No Alternative—which was the imponderable factor overlooked by the military experts.

The spirit of valor and indomitable determination pulsated through the whole of the population, from the gallant and daring pioneer force, the Palmach, the spear-head of Jewish military achievement, to the masses behind. All knew that grim struggle lay ahead, and there was no retreating. The Arab armies had no inspiring cause for which to fight; they had tanks and guns, nothing else.

But the spirit of abnegation and sacrifice was there in the battle, too, as well as steel and fire, and it was our own sole advantage.



Minhalat Ha'Am knew the actual relationship of forces, and were aware of the Arab superiority in strength and numbers. B.-G. gave unvarnished accounts of the evolving situation to its meetings time after time, and never concealed the gravity of the hour.

But, in the spirit of *Ein B'reira*, which dictated onward and not backward, it was evident that the Jewish people would not be vanquished if they created new facts to readjust the balance; and that could not be attained except in total battle.

The responsibility was one of unique proportions in the long Jewish history, but the historic opportunity was equally unique and irrevocable, and that realization dictated the inevitability of the move that must be made.

Dr. Weizmann, then abroad, was asked by a special emissary for his advice, and he unhesitatingly advocated the declaration of independence and of the Jewish state even if it meant a struggle for our existence.

The differences of opinion centered not so much on the essence of the decision itself as on the practical methods of prosecuting it. It was as if the narrow path up which we were moving, and from which there was no going back, had not been of our own choosing, but was forced upon us by hidden forces over which we had no control.

Yet many still refused to believe until the last moment that the British would really leave the country. Those of us who were convinced of it, as a result of close observation in London and at Lake Success, were vindicated by the actual events.

There were also doubts whether Egypt would join in the fray, but they vanished as the date for termination of the British Mandate drew nearer and the dread realization became hard certainty.

Minhalat Ha'Am met on the 13th of November, a Thursday. The general reports resembled a Job's record of distress. Golda Meyerson and Ezra Danin, who had returned from a visit to King Abdullah in Transjordan which they intrepidly undertook, had heard him declare: "I am no longer alone. I am one of five. I must come into the war."

His peace proposals, which included a guarantee of minority rights for the Jews under Arab government, were immediately rejected by Golda during the audience, and the battle with the Arab Legion which had begun at Kfar Etzion, in the Hebron hills, threatened to spread throughout the country in a few hours.

The Egyptian Army, with armor and artillery, was advancing into Palestine in several columns, and the Syrians had already launched their general offensive. The

ring of steel was closing, the great battle was about to begin.

Besieged Etzion had fought its last despairing stand against the thousands of Transjordan legionaries with artillery and armor, and Ben-Gurion opened the meeting with the moving statement that there was no longer any hope for the last-ditch defenders, who had been ordered to surrender and be taken captive.

We listened in deep distress. "Be taken captive" was a new term in our lexicon. It had so far been a mutual merciless slaughter. I was personally concerned, for my son was among the Revadim settlers in the Etzion bloc, now burning and collapsing in flames, and I had no idea of his fate. I had spent two days in scanning the reports, and went to Haganah Command Headquarters in Ha-yarkon Street in Tel Aviv at every leisure moment to get information.

The dreaded announcement had now been made by the head of the National Administration himself, and it hit me with sledge-hammer force. My wife and I had a sleepless night, and it was only on the morrow that we had the slightly more encouraging news that the settlers of Revadim, Ein Zurim, and Massuoth Itzhak had been taken captive by the Arab Legion and were spared the butchery that overtook their unfortunate comrades at Kfar Etzion.

The personal anxiety, mingled with the distress over the general situation and the feeling of imminent catastrophe, hardened in a resolve to carry on without flinching or wavering



Crowds waited outside the Tel Aviv Museum in Rothschild Boulevard the next afternoon. It was Friday, the 14th of May.

Many had come, undeterred by the possibility of hostile air raids, as if unable to believe the marvel that was about to occur. No publicity had been given to the event, for reasons of security, but the throngs were there

all the same, and we had to push our way through them into the hall.

A queer atmosphere reigned inside the hall, elation mingling with dread. Only some twenty persons—members of Minhalat Ha'Am, high staff officers, and three or four others, who bore the great responsibility—knew what the morrow would bring, and the feeling was as if we stood on the verge of disaster or salvation, without being able to divine which was the closer.

It was only when David Ben-Gurion read out the Proclamation of Independence that we felt, once more, the rush of history's flapping wings over our heads.

The crowds reveled and applauded in the streets, and we who knew the authentic situation went home silently, withdrawn into our innermost beings.

That night was one of cogitation and dreams of the future; yet my mind went, too, to the hills of Etzion and my son, whose fate I did not know.

The air-raid sirens wailed their alarm after midnight and we descended to the basement shelter.

It was there that I heard of the first echoes of our Proclamation of Independence as the world reacted, and the astounding and unexpected announcement of America's recognition of the infant State of Israel.

At that moment Egyptian aircraft were dropping their first bombs on the outskirts of Tel Aviv.

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A NOTE ON THE TYPE

This book is set in Garamond, a modern rendering of the type first cut in the sixteenth century by Claude Garamond (1510-1561). He was a pupil of Geoffroy Tory and is believed to have based his letters on the Venetian models, although he introduced a number of important differences, and it is to him that we owe the letter which we know as Old Style. He gave to his letters a certain elegance and a feeling of movement which won for their creator an immediate reputation and the patronage of the French King, Francis I.



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